## Arakhin Daf 18a

###### Arakhin 18a:1
[Arakhin 18a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/18a:1)

וְאַחַר כָּךְ מֵתָה בִּתּוֹ, פִּקֵּחַ וְנִתְחָרֵשׁ וְחָזַר וְנִתְפַּקֵּחַ, פָּתוּחַ וְנִסְתַּמֵּא וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִתְפַּתֵּחַ, שָׁפוּי וְנִשְׁתַּטָּה וְחָזַר וְנִשְׁתַּפָּה — כָּשֵׁר. זֶה הַכְּלָל: כֹּל שֶׁתְּחִילָּתוֹ וְסוֹפוֹ בְּכַשְׁרוּת — כָּשֵׁר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**and afterward his** wife, who was the **daughter** of the father-in-law, **died,** which means that the witness is no longer related to the party involved; or when he was **able to hear, and** then **became a deaf-mute, and again became able to hear;** or when he **could see, and** subsequently **became blind, and afterward could see** again; or when he was halakhically **competent, and** then **became an imbecile, and again became** halakhically **competent;** in all these cases he is **fit** to testify.**This is the principle: Any** individual **whose beginning and end** is **in** a state of **qualification** to serve as a witness is **qualified** to testify, even if he was unfit in the interim. Evidently, it is not derived from the verse: “And he is a witness,” that the witness must be fit from the beginning to the end.


###### Arakhin 18a:2
[Arakhin 18a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/18a:2)

שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״אוֹ רָאָה... אִם לֹא יַגִּיד״, בִּרְאִיָּיה וְהַגָּדָה תְּלָא רַחְמָנָא מִילְּתָא, וְהָא אִיכָּא. וְאֶלָּא ״וְהוּא״ לְמָה לִי?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains: The *halakha* **is different there,** with regard to testimony, **as the verse states:** “He is a witness, **whether he has seen**…**if he does not utter”** (Leviticus 5:1). This formulation indicates that **the Merciful One renders the matter** of testimony **dependent on seeing and recounting** the content of his testimony. **And** in this instance **there is** both valid seeing and valid recounting, despite the fact that the witness was disqualified in the interim. The Gemara asks: **But** if so, **why do I** need the exclusion of the verse: **“And he** is a witness”?


###### Arakhin 18a:3
[Arakhin 18a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/18a:3)

לְכִדְתַנְיָא: רָאָה סִיאָה שֶׁל בְּנֵי אָדָם עוֹמְדִין, וְעֵידָיו בֵּינֵיהֶן, וְאָמַר ״מַשְׁבִּיעַנִי עֲלֵיכֶם אִם יוֹדְעִים אַתֶּם לִי עֵדוּת שֶׁתָּבוֹאוּ וּתְעִידוּנִי״, יָכוֹל יְהוּ חַיָּיבִין? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״וְהוּא עֵד״, וַהֲרֵי לֹא יִיחֵד עֵידָיו.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: The limiting clause is necessary **for that which is taught** in a *baraita*: If someone **saw a crowd of people standing, and his witnesses** were **among them, and he said: I** hereby **administer an oath to you, if you know any testimony** relating **to me, that you will come and testify for me,** one **might** have thought that this form of address suffices to single out the witnesses. This would mean that if the witnesses take a false oath that they do not know testimony with regard to the person who addressed them, they **would be obligated** to bring an offering of an oath of testimony. Therefore, **the verse states: “And he is a witness,”** to emphasize that the offering applies only to one who is singled out as a witness, **and** in this case the individual **did not single out his witnesses,** as he addressed a whole crowd of people. Consequently, the witnesses are exempt.


###### Arakhin 18a:4
[Arakhin 18a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/18a:4)

יָכוֹל אֲפִילּוּ אָמַר ״כׇּל מִי״? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״וְהוּא עֵד״, וַהֲרֵי יִיחֵד עֵידָיו.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The *baraita* continues: One **might** have thought that **even** if this individual **said** to the crowd: I adjure **whoever** knows testimony relating to me that he will come and testify for me, that even in the case of this more specific address the witnesses are likewise exempt from the offering of an oath of testimony. Therefore, **the verse states: “And he is a witness,” and** by clarifying his appeal the individual **did single out his witnesses.** Consequently, in this situation the witnesses would be obligated to bring the offering.


###### Arakhin 18a:5
[Arakhin 18a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/18a:5)

אֲבָל בַּקׇּרְבָּנוֹת אֵינוֹ כֵּן וְכוּ׳. אָבִיו מֵת וְהִנִּיחַ לוֹ רִיבּוֹא — עָשִׁיר הוּא! אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ, אֵימָא: מַנִּיחַ לוֹ רִיבּוֹא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna teaches: **But with regard to** the **offerings** of a leper **that is not so.** If the leper is destitute, even if his father died and left him ten thousand dinars, the Temple treasury has no share in it. The Gemara raises a difficulty: **If his father** already **died and left him ten thousand** dinars, **he is wealthy.** How could he be considered destitute at all? **Rabbi Abbahu said** that one should **say** instead: His father is dying and **leaving him ten thousand** dinars, but he has not yet died.


###### Arakhin 18a:6
[Arakhin 18a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/18a:6)

פְּשִׁיטָא! כְּשֶׁהָיָה אָבִיו גּוֹסֵס. מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: רוֹב גּוֹסְסִין לְמִיתָה? קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara raises a further difficulty: If so, it is **obvious** that with regard to the Temple treasury he remains destitute, as at the time he is in fact destitute. The Gemara answers: The *halakha* was stated with regard to a case **where his father is moribund. Lest you say** that as **the majority of moribund** people proceed **to die** the son should be considered wealthy even before the father dies, the mishna therefore **teaches us** that the son retains his status as destitute until the father actually dies.


###### Arakhin 18a:7
[Arakhin 18a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/18a:7)

סְפִינָתוֹ בַּיָּם וּבָאָה לוֹ בְּרִיבּוֹאוֹת, עָשִׁיר הוּא! אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: כְּשֶׁהָיְתָה מוּחְכֶּרֶת וּמוּשְׂכֶּרֶת בְּיַד אֲחֵרִים. וְהָאִיכָּא שְׂכִירוּת? שְׂכִירוּת אֵינָהּ מִשְׁתַּלֶּמֶת אֶלָּא לְבַסּוֹף.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The mishna likewise teaches: If **his ship is at sea and** merchandise valued at **ten thousand** dinars **is coming into his** possession, this money is not taken into consideration by the Temple treasury. The Gemara asks: But isn’t **he wealthy? Rav Ḥisda said:** The mishna is referring to a case where his ship **was leased or rented to others,** and therefore the merchandise it contains belongs to someone else. The Gemara asks: **But isn’t there** the **rent** money that will be paid to the leper? The Gemara answers: **Rent is paid only at the end** of the rental period, which means that the owner is destitute in the meantime.


###### Arakhin 18a:8
[Arakhin 18a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/18a:8)

וְתִיפּוֹק לֵיהּ מִשּׁוּם סְפִינָה! הָא מַנִּי? רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הִיא, דִּתְנַן: רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר, אִם הָיָה אִיכָּר — נוֹתֵן לוֹ צִמְדּוֹ, וְחַמָּר — נוֹתֵן לוֹ חֲמוֹרוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara raises another difficulty: **But let** the mishna **derive** and determine that the leper is wealthy **due to** the fact that he owns **a ship.** The Gemara answers: In accordance with **whose** opinion **is this** statement in the mishna? **It is** in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Eliezer,** who maintains that with regard to determining one’s obligation to bring an offering as a wealthy or destitute individual, the property that he uses for business is not taken into account. **As we learned** in a mishna (23b): When someone’s property is repossessed in order to pay his debt to the Temple treasury, **Rabbi Eliezer says: If he was a farmer,** the treasurer **gives him** permission to keep **his pair** of oxen with which he plows the field. If he was **a donkey driver,** the treasurer **gives him** permission to keep **his donkey.**


###### Arakhin 18a:9
[Arakhin 18a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/18a:9)

**מַתְנִי׳** הַשָּׁנִים בַּנִּידָּר, כֵּיצַד? יֶלֶד שֶׁהֶעֱרִיךְ זָקֵן — נוֹתֵן עֵרֶךְ זָקֵן, וְזָקֵן שֶׁהֶעֱרִיךְ אֶת הַיֶּלֶד — נוֹתֵן עֵרֶךְ יֶלֶד. הָעֲרָכִין בַּנֶּעֱרָךְ, כֵּיצַד? אִישׁ שֶׁהֶעֱרִיךְ הָאִשָּׁה — נוֹתֵן עֵרֶךְ אִשָּׁה, וְאִשָּׁה שֶׁהֶעֱרִיכָה אִישׁ — נוֹתֶנֶת עֵרֶךְ אִישׁ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**MISHNA:** The sum fixed by the Torah based on **the years** of age is **in accordance with** the age of **the subject of the vow; how** so? **A youth who valuated an elder gives the valuation of an elder, and an elder who valuated a youth gives the valuation of a youth. And the** distinction based on sex that is written in the *halakhot* of **valuations** is stated **with regard to the one valuated; how** so? **A man who valuated a woman gives the valuation of a woman, and a woman who valuated a man gives the valuation of a man.**


###### Arakhin 18a:10
[Arakhin 18a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/18a:10)

וְהָעֵרֶךְ בִּזְמַן הָעֵרֶךְ, כֵּיצַד? הֶעֱרִיכוֹ פָּחוּת מִבֶּן חָמֵשׁ, וְנַעֲשֶׂה יָתֵר עַל בֶּן חָמֵשׁ, פָּחוּת מִבֶּן עֶשְׂרִים, וְנַעֲשָׂה יָתֵר עַל בֶּן עֶשְׂרִים — נוֹתֵן בִּזְמַן הָעֵרֶךְ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And the** different **valuation** based on the age of the one valuated is determined **at the time** one takes **the** vow of **valuation; how** so? If **one valuated** another when he was **less than five years old,** when his valuation is five shekels, **and** before payment to the Temple treasury the subject of the vow **became more than five years old,** when his valuation is ten shekels; or if **one valuated** another when he was **less than twenty years old,** when his valuation is ten shekels, **and** before payment to the Temple treasury the subject of the vow **became more than twenty years old,** when his valuation is fifty shekels, in all these cases **he gives** payment according to the age of the subject of the valuation **at the time of the valuation.**


###### Arakhin 18a:11
[Arakhin 18a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/18a:11)

**גְּמָ׳** תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: אַתָּה הִקַּשְׁיתָּ דָּמִים לַעֲרָכִין, מַרְגָּלִית לְקַלִּים, וְלִידּוֹן בִּכְבוֹדוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**GEMARA:** With regard to the statement of the mishna: And the valuation is determined at the time one takes the vow of valuation, **the Sages taught** in a *baraita*: **You** have **compared** pledges of **assessments** for the Temple treasury, i.e., one who takes a vow to donate a certain person’s assessment, **to** vows of **valuations.** This comparison applies with regard to **a pearl** belonging **to light** people, i.e., the poor. In other words, just as the assessment of a pearl is determined by the pearl’s location in a village of the poor rather than by the potential price of the pearl in the city market, so too, the valuation of a person is determined at the time of the valuation. **And** similarly, the comparison teaches that the court is required **to assess** the value of the limb **by its significance,** i.e., in the case of a limb that is vital to one’s survival, the valuation of the limb is equivalent to the valuation of the whole person.


###### Arakhin 18a:12
[Arakhin 18a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/18a:12)

יָכוֹל נַקִּישׁ עֲרָכִין לְדָמִים, שֶׁיִּתֵּן כִּשְׁעַת נְתִינָה? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״כְּעֶרְכְּךָ כֵּן יָקוּם״, אֵינוֹ נוֹתֵן אֶלָּא בִּזְמַן הָעֵרֶךְ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
One **might** have thought that **we should compare valuations to assessments** in **that** the one pledging must **give** a person’s valuation not corresponding to his value at the time of the pledge but **in accordance with** his value at **the time of giving,** as is the case with regard to vows of assessments. To counter this suggestion **the verse states: “According to your valuation it shall stand”** (Leviticus 27:17), which teaches that the one making the valuation **gives** his donation **only** according to the valuation of the person **at the time of the valuation,** as stated in the mishna.


###### Arakhin 18a:13
[Arakhin 18a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/18a:13)

**מַתְנִי׳** יוֹם שְׁלֹשִׁים כִּלְמַטָּה הֵימֶנּוּ, שְׁנַת חָמֵשׁ וּשְׁנַת עֶשְׂרִים כִּלְמַטָּה מֵהֶם, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְאִם מִבֶּן שִׁשִּׁים שָׁנָה וָמַעְלָה״, הֲרֵי אָנוּ לְמֵדִים בְּכוּלָּן מִשְׁנַת שִׁשִּׁים, מָה שְׁנַת שִׁשִּׁים כִּלְמַטָּה הֵימֶנָּה, אַף שְׁנַת חָמֵשׁ וּשְׁנַת עֶשְׂרִים כִּלְמַטָּה הֵימֶנָּה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**MISHNA:** The Torah provides three age categories that determine the amount of the valuation: From the age of one month until age five, from age five until age twenty, and from age twenty until age sixty. For anyone less than one month old there is no valuation. The halakhic status of the **thirtieth day** is **like** that of the period **preceding** thirty days, and therefore the one who took the vow is exempt. Likewise, the halakhic status of the **fifth year and** the **twentieth year** is **like** that of the period **preceding them. As it is stated: “And if it is from sixty years old and upward”** (Leviticus 27:7), and **we derive all** the other age categories **from** the **sixtieth year: Just as** the halakhic status of the **sixtieth year,** where upward is written, is **like** that of the period **preceding it, so too,** the halakhic status of the **fifth year and** the **twentieth year** is **like** that of the period **preceding them.**


###### Arakhin 18a:14
[Arakhin 18a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/18a:14)

הֵן? אִם עָשָׂה שְׁנַת שִׁשִּׁים כִּלְמַטָּה מִמֶּנָּה לְהַחְמִיר, נַעֲשֶׂה שְׁנַת חָמֵשׁ וּשְׁנַת עֶשְׂרִים כִּלְמַטָּה מִמֶּנָּה לְהָקֵל?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The mishna asks: Is that **so?** Can one derive a *halakha* in this manner? **If** the Torah **rendered** the halakhic status of the **sixtieth year like** that of the period **preceding it** in order **to be stringent** and require one who valuated a sixty-year-old person to pay his valuation to the Temple treasury, **shall we render** the halakhic status of the **fifth year and** the **twentieth year like** that of the period **preceding** them in order **to be lenient** and pay a lower sum?


###### Arakhin 18a:15
[Arakhin 18a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/18a:15)

תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״שָׁנָה״ ״שָׁנָה״ לִגְזֵירָה שָׁוָה, מָה שָׁנָה הָאֲמוּרָה בִּשְׁנַת שִׁשִּׁים כִּלְמַטָּה, אַף שָׁנָה הָאֲמוּרָה מִשְׁנַת חָמֵשׁ וּשְׁנַת עֶשְׂרִים כִּלְמַטָּה מִמֶּנּוּ, בֵּין לְהָקֵל וּבֵין לְהַחְמִיר. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: עֵד שֶׁיְּהוּ יְתֵירוֹת עַל הַשָּׁנִים חֹדֶשׁ וְיוֹם אֶחָד.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Therefore, **the verse states “year”** with regard to the fifth and twentieth years (see Leviticus 27:3–6), and **“year”** with regard to the sixtieth year (Leviticus 27:7), **for a verbal analogy. Just as** the halakhic status of the **year stated with regard to** the **sixtieth year** is **like** that of the period **preceding** it, **so too,** the halakhic status of the **year stated with regard to** the **fifth year and** the **twentieth year** is **like** that of the period **preceding** them, **both** in order **to be lenient and** in order **to be stringent. Rabbi Eliezer says:** Their halakhic status remains like that of the period preceding it, **until they will be** aged one **month and one day beyond the** fifth, twentieth, and sixtieth **years.**


###### Arakhin 18a:16
[Arakhin 18a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/18a:16)

**גְּמָ׳** מוּפְנֶה, דְּאִי לָא מוּפְנֶה — אִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ כִּדְפָרְכִינַן. ״שָׁנָה״ ״שָׁנָה״ יַתִּירָא כְּתִיבִי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**GEMARA:** The Gemara notes: Evidently, the verbal analogy in the mishna is **free,** i.e., in each verse the word “year” is superfluous, and therefore can be used in the verbal analogy. This means that the *halakha* derived from the verbal analogy is considered as though it is written explicitly in the Torah. The significance of this fact is **that if** a verbal analogy **is not free,** it **can be refuted** by logical reasoning. In this case the refutation would be **as we refuted it** in the mishna, that if the fifth year and the twentieth year are considered the same as the respective periods preceding them, this generates a leniency. The Gemara confirms: The verbal analogy is free, as both the first **written** mention of **“year”** and the second written mention of **“year” are superfluous.**


###### Arakhin 18a:17
[Arakhin 18a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/18a:17)

לֵימָא מַתְנִיתִין דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי, דְּאִי רַבִּי — הָאָמַר: ״עַד״ ״וְעַד״ בַּכְּלָל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests: **Let us say that the mishna is not in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi, **as, if** it is in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi, **doesn’t he say** that the word **“until”** means **until and including?** With regard to valuations, the Torah states: “From twenty years old until sixty years old…And if it is from five years old until twenty years old…And if it is from one month old until five years old” (Leviticus 27:3–6). Accordingly, in the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi there should be no need for a verbal analogy to include the fifth year and the twentieth year in the periods preceding them.


###### Arakhin 18a:18
[Arakhin 18a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/18a:18)

דְּתַנְיָא: ״מִיּוֹם הָרִאשׁוֹן וְעַד יוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי״, יָכוֹל רִאשׁוֹן וְלֹא רִאשׁוֹן בַּכְּלָל, שְׁבִיעִי וְלֹא שְׁבִיעִי בַּכְּלָל,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara provides the source of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s opinion. **As it is taught** in a *baraita* concerning the festival of Passover: The verse states: “For whoever eats leavened bread **from the first day until the seventh day”** (Exodus 12:15). One **might** have thought that the prohibition against eating leaven applies from the **first** day and onward **but** the **first** day **is not included,** and likewise that the prohibition continues until the **seventh** day **but** the **seventh** day **is not included.**