## Arakhin Daf 7b

###### Arakhin 7b:1
[Arakhin 7b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/7b:1)

מְחַתֵּךְ בְּבָשָׂר הוּא! אָמַר רַבָּה: לֹא נִצְרְכָה לְהָבִיא סַכִּין דֶּרֶךְ רְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**It is** merely **cutting flesh,** and there is no reason why it should be prohibited. **Rabba said: No,** the *halakha* concerning cutting open her abdomen is **necessary** only to teach that it is permitted **to bring a knife by way of the public thoroughfare** for that purpose, despite the fact that this constitutes a prohibited labor by Torah law.


###### Arakhin 7b:2
[Arakhin 7b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/7b:2)

וּמַאי קָמַשְׁמַע לַן, דְּמִסְּפֵיקָא מְחַלְּלִינַן שַׁבְּתָא? תְּנֵינָא: מִי שֶׁנָּפְלָה עָלָיו מַפּוֹלֶת, סָפֵק הוּא שָׁם, סָפֵק אֵינוֹ שָׁם, סָפֵק חַי, סָפֵק מֵת, סָפֵק נׇכְרִי, סָפֵק יִשְׂרָאֵל — מְפַקְּחִין עָלָיו אֶת הַגַּל!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And what** does **this teach us?** Does it teach **that** even in a case **of uncertainty we desecrate Shabbat** for the chance of saving a life? But **we** already **learned** this in a mishna (*Yoma* 83a): With regard to **one upon whom a rockslide fell,** and there is **uncertainty** as to whether **he is there** under the debris or whether **he is not there,** and there is also **uncertainty** as to whether he is still **alive** or whether he is **dead,** and finally there is **uncertainty** as to whether the person under the debris is **a gentile** or **a Jew, one clears the pile** from **atop him** on Shabbat.


###### Arakhin 7b:3
[Arakhin 7b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/7b:3)

מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: הָתָם הוּא דַּהֲוָה לֵיהּ חֲזָקָה דְּחַיּוּתָא, אֲבָל הָכָא דְּלָא הֲוָה לֵיהּ חֲזָקָה דְּחַיּוּתָא מֵעִיקָּרָא — אֵימָא לָא, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: It is necessary to teach that one may bring a knife in the case of a woman, **lest you say** that it is **specifically there** that one may desecrate Shabbat, **as** the person who was buried under the rockslide **had a presumptive status of being alive** and therefore he is assumed to still be alive. **But here, where** the child **had no prior presumptive status of being alive,** as he was not yet born, you might **say** that one may **not** desecrate Shabbat in order to save his life. Therefore, it is necessary for Shmuel to **teach us** that even here one may desecrate Shabbat for the possibility of saving the fetus’s life.


###### Arakhin 7b:4
[Arakhin 7b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/7b:4)

הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁנֶּהֶרְגָה וְכוּ׳. וְאַמַּאי? אִיסּוּרֵי הֲנָאָה נִינְהוּ! אָמַר רַב: בְּאוֹמֶרֶת ״תְּנוּ שְׂעָרִי לְבִתִּי״. אִילּוּ אָמְרָה ״תְּנוּ יָדִי לְבִתִּי״, מִי יָהֲבִינַן לַהּ?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna taught: In the case of **a woman who was killed** through court-imposed capital punishment, one may derive benefit from her hair. The Gemara asks: **But why** is it permitted? After all, a corpse and its hair **are items from which deriving benefit is prohibited. Rav said** that this is referring to a case **where she says** before she dies: **Give my hair to my daughter.** The Gemara asks: Is the prohibition contingent on the deceased’s wishes? **Were she to say: Give my hand to my daughter, would we give** the hand **to her?**


###### Arakhin 7b:5
[Arakhin 7b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/7b:5)

אָמַר רַב: בְּפֵאָה נׇכְרִית, טַעְמָא דְּאָמְרָה ״תְּנוּ״, הָא לֹא אָמְרָה ״תְּנוּ״ — גּוּפַהּ הוּא וּמִיתְּסַר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rather, **Rav said:** This is not referring to the actual hair of the deceased, but **to a wig [*pe’a nokhrit*],** which is not part of the deceased’s body. The Gemara infers from Rav’s statement that the **reason** it is permitted is **that** she **said** to **give** her wig to her daughter, thereby indicating that she did not consider it part of her body. **But** if she **did not say** to **give** her wig to her daughter, **it is** considered part of **her body, and** it **is forbidden** to derive benefit from it.


###### Arakhin 7b:6
[Arakhin 7b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/7b:6)

וְהָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא, דְּבָעֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא: שְׂעַר נָשִׁים צִדְקָנִיּוֹת מַהוּ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains why this implication is problematic: **But didn’t Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, raise this** as **a dilemma? As Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina raised a dilemma:** With regard to the **hair of righteous women** in a city whose residents were incited to idolatry and, therefore, all of their property must be burned, **what is** the *halakha*? Is it considered their property and burned, or part of their body and not burned?


###### Arakhin 7b:7
[Arakhin 7b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/7b:7)

וְאָמַר רָבָא: בְּפֵאָה נׇכְרִית לָא קָמִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ, כִּי קָמִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא דִּתְלֵי בְּסִיכְּתָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And Rava said:** Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, was not referring to actual hair, but rather **he raised** his **dilemma with regard to a wig.** This is difficult according to the opinion of Rav, as his ruling indicates that a wig should be considered part of a woman’s body unless she stipulated otherwise. The Gemara answers: **When Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, raised** his **dilemma** as to whether a wig is considered part of the body, he was referring specifically to a case **where** the wig was **hanging on a peg.** The dilemma is whether it is considered part of her clothing, which, like her body, is not burned, or whether it is considered like any other property of hers, since she was not wearing it at the time.


###### Arakhin 7b:8
[Arakhin 7b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/7b:8)

הָכָא דִּמְחַבַּר בַּהּ, טַעְמָא דְּאָמְרָה ״תְּנוּ״, הָא לֹא אָמְרָה ״תְּנוּ״ — גּוּפַהּ הוּא וּמִיתְּסַר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
On the other hand, **here** Rav is referring to a wig **that is** actually **attached to her.** In such a case, one may correctly infer that the **reason** that it is permitted is **that** the deceased **said** to **give** her wig to her daughter, thereby indicating that she did not consider it part of her body. **But** if she **did not say** to **give** her wig to her daughter, **it is** considered to be part of **her body and is prohibited.**


###### Arakhin 7b:9
[Arakhin 7b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/7b:9)

קַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ לְרַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק, וְהָא דּוּמְיָא דִּבְהֵמָה קָתָנֵי, מָה הָתָם גּוּפַיהּ — אַף הָכָא נָמֵי גּוּפַיהּ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
This claim, that the mishna is dealing with a wig rather than natural hair, is **difficult for Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak.** He explains the difficulty: The mishna **teaches** the issue of the prohibition of the woman’s hair as being **similar** to the other prohibition it mentions, that **of** the **animal. Just as there,** in the case of the animal, it is referring to deriving benefit from **its body, so too here,** it must be referring to benefit from **her body** itself, not from a wig.


###### Arakhin 7b:10
[Arakhin 7b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/7b:10)

אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: זוֹ מִיתָתָהּ אוֹסַרְתָּהּ, וְזוֹ גְּמַר דִּינָה אוֹסַרְתָּהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, Rav Naḥman** bar Yitzḥak **says:** The mishna is referring to natural hair, and there is a distinction between the hair of an animal and that of a woman. In the case of **this** woman, it is **her death** that **causes her to be forbidden.** Therefore, the hair, which does not undergo any change when she dies, remains permitted. **But** in the case of **that** animal, the **verdict causes it to be forbidden,** even before it is killed. It is prohibited to derive benefit from the animal as soon as the verdict is issued. Therefore, the hair that is attached to the animal is forbidden as well.


###### Arakhin 7b:11
[Arakhin 7b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/7b:11)

תָּנֵי לֵוִי כְּוָותֵיהּ דְּרַב, תָּנֵי לֵוִי כְּוָותֵיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק. תָּנֵי לֵוִי כְּוָותֵיהּ דְּרַב: הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁיּוֹצְאָה לֵיהָרֵג וְאָמְרָה: ״תְּנוּ שְׂעָרִי לְבִתִּי״ — נוֹתְנִין, מֵתָה — אֵין נוֹתְנִין, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהַמֵּת אָסוּר בַּהֲנָאָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Levi teaches** a *baraita* **in accordance with** the opinion **of Rav,** and **Levi** also **teaches** a *baraita* **in accordance with** the opinion **of Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak.** The Gemara elaborates: **Levi teaches** a *baraita* **in accordance with** the opinion **of Rav:** In the case of **a woman who was being taken to be killed and** who **said: Give my hair to my daughter, one gives** it to the daughter. If she **died** without instructing that it be given to her daughter, **one does not give** it to the daughter, **because** it **is forbidden to** derive **benefit** from **a corpse.**


###### Arakhin 7b:12
[Arakhin 7b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/7b:12)

פְּשִׁיטָא! אֶלָּא שֶׁנּוֹיֵי הַמֵּת אָסוּר בַּהֲנָאָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: Isn’t it **obvious** that this is the reason her hair is prohibited? The Gemara explains that this is referring not to the hair itself, but **rather** to a wig, and the *baraita* is teaching that it is **forbidden to** derive **benefit** even from the **adornments** of **the deceased,** such as a wig.


###### Arakhin 7b:13
[Arakhin 7b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/7b:13)

תַּנְיָא כְּוָותֵיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁמֵּתָה — נֶהֱנִין בִּשְׂעָרָהּ, בְּהֵמָה שֶׁנֶּהֶרְגָה — אֲסוּרָה בַּהֲנָאָה; וּמָה הֶפְרֵשׁ בֵּין זֶה לָזֶה? זוֹ — מִיתָתָהּ אוֹסַרְתָּהּ, וְזוֹ — גָּמַר דִּינָה אוֹסַרְתָּהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara further explains: **It is taught** in a *baraita* **in accordance with** the opinion of **Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak,** as follows: Whereas in the case of **a woman who died, one may derive benefit from her hair,** with regard to **an animal that was put to death, it is forbidden to** derive **benefit** from it. **And what is the difference between this** case **and that** one? In **this** case it is **her death** that **causes her to be forbidden, but** in **that** case the **verdict causes** the animal **to be forbidden.**


###### Arakhin 7b:14
[Arakhin 7b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/7b:14)

**הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ הַכֹּל מַעֲרִיכִין.**


###### Arakhin 7b:15
[Arakhin 7b:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/7b:15)

מַתְנִי׳ **אֵין נֶעֱרָכִין** פָּחוֹת מִסֶּלַע, וְלֹא יָתֵר עַל חֲמִשִּׁים סֶלַע. כֵּיצַד? נָתַן סֶלַע וְהֶעֱשִׁיר — אֵינוֹ נוֹתֵן כְּלוּם, פָּחוֹת מִסֶּלַע וְהֶעֱשִׁיר — נוֹתֵן חֲמִשִּׁים סֶלַע.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**MISHNA:** **One cannot be charged for a valuation less than a *sela*, nor** can one be charged **more than fifty *sela*. How so?** If **one gave one *sela* and became wealthy,** he is **not** required to **give anything** more, as he has fulfilled his obligation. If he gave **less than a *sela* and became wealthy,** he is required to **give fifty *sela*,** as he has not fulfilled his obligation.


###### Arakhin 7b:16
[Arakhin 7b:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/7b:16)

הָיוּ בְּיָדָיו חָמֵשׁ סְלָעִים, רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: אֵינוֹ נוֹתֵן אֶלָּא אַחַת, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: נוֹתֵן אֶת כּוּלָּן. אֵין נֶעֱרָכִין פָּחוֹת מִסֶּלַע, וְלֹא יָתֵר עַל חֲמִשִּׁים סֶלַע.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
If **there were five *sela* in** the **possession** of the destitute person, and the valuation he undertook is more than five *sela*, how much should he pay? **Rabbi Meir says: He gives only one** *sela* and thereby fulfills his obligation. **And the Rabbis say: He gives all** five. **One cannot be charged for a valuation less than a *sela*; nor** can one be charged **more than fifty *sela*.**


###### Arakhin 7b:17
[Arakhin 7b:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/7b:17)

גּמ׳ אֵין נֶעֱרָכִין פָּחוֹת מִסֶּלַע. מְנָלַן? דִּכְתִיב: ״וְכׇל עֶרְכְּךָ יִהְיֶה בְּשֶׁקֶל הַקֹּדֶשׁ״, כׇּל עֲרָכִין שֶׁאַתָּה מַעֲרִיךְ לֹא יְהוּ פְּחוּתִין מִשְׁקָל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**GEMARA:** The mishna teaches: **One cannot be charged for a valuation less than a *sela*.** The Gemara asks: **From where do we** derive this principle? The Gemara answers: **As it is written: “And all your valuations shall be according to the shekel of the Sanctuary”** (Leviticus 27:25). This verse indicates that **all valuations that you valuate shall not be less than a shekel,** which is the equivalent of a *sela*. One does not fulfill his obligation by giving less than this amount.


###### Arakhin 7b:18
[Arakhin 7b:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/7b:18)

וְלֹא יָתֵר עַל חֲמִשִּׁים סְלָעִים. דִּכְתִיב: ״חֲמִשִּׁים״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The mishna further teaches: **Nor** can one be charged **more than fifty *sela*.** This is the highest valuation specified in the Torah, **as it is written:** “Then your valuation shall be for the male from twenty years old unto sixty years old, your valuation shall be **fifty** shekels of silver” (Leviticus 27:3).


###### Arakhin 7b:19
[Arakhin 7b:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/7b:19)

הָיוּ בְּיָדָיו חֲמִשָּׁה כּוּ׳. מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר? כְּתִיב ״חֲמִשִּׁים״ וּכְתִיב ״שֶׁקֶל״, אוֹ חֲמִשִּׁים אוֹ שֶׁקֶל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna teaches that if **there were five *sela* in** the **possession** of the destitute person, Rabbi Meir says: He gives only one *sela* and thereby fulfills his obligation, and the Rabbis say: He gives all five. The Gemara asks: **What is the reason** for the opinion **of Rabbi Meir?** The Gemara answers: **It is written** with regard to a male between the ages of twenty and sixty: “Your valuation shall be **fifty** shekels of silver” (Leviticus 27:3), and the verses likewise specify the valuations for other individuals. **And it is** also **written:** “Your valuations shall be according to the **shekel** of the Sanctuary” (Leviticus 27:25). This teaches that the valuation is **either fifty** shekels for one who vows to donate the valuation of a man between twenty and sixty, **or** one **shekel,** if he cannot afford to pay fifty.


###### Arakhin 7b:20
[Arakhin 7b:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/7b:20)

וְרַבָּנַן? הַהוּא, לְכׇל עֲרָכִין שֶׁאַתָּה מַעֲרִיךְ לֹא יְהוּ פְּחוּתִים מִשְׁקָל הוּא דַּאֲתָא, הֵיכָא דְּאִית לֵיהּ — אָמַר קְרָא: ״אֲשֶׁר תַּשִּׂיג יַד הַנּוֹדֵר״, וַהֲרֵי יָדוֹ מַשֶּׂגֶת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** how do **the Rabbis** respond to this reasoning? According to the Rabbis, **that** second verse **comes** to teach **that all valuations that you valuate shall not be less than a shekel,** but in a case **where** the individual **has** more than a shekel, **the verse states: “According to the means of him that vowed** shall the priest value him” (Leviticus 27:8), **and** as **he has the means** to pay more than a shekel, he is required to pay the maximum that he can afford.


###### Arakhin 7b:21
[Arakhin 7b:21](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/7b:21)

וְרַבִּי מֵאִיר? הָהוּא ״יַד הַנּוֹדֵר וְלֹא יַד הַנִּידָּר״ הוּא דַּאֲתָא, וְרַבָּנַן, לָאו מִמֵּילָא שָׁמְעַתְּ מִינַּהּ דְּהֵיכָא דְּיָדוֹ מַשֶּׂגֶת שְׁקוֹל מִינֵּיהּ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** how does **Rabbi Meir** respond to this reasoning? According to Rabbi Meir, **that** verse **comes** to teach that the charge is calculated according to **the means of one who took the vow and not** according to **the means of the one about whom the vow was made.** Consequently, if a poor man vowed to donate the valuation of a rich man, the amount to be paid is calculated according to what the poor man, not the rich man, can afford. **And** how do **the Rabbis** respond to this reasoning? They would say: **Doesn’t** it emerge **by itself** that **you** also **learn from** this verse **that** in a case **where he has the means** to pay more than a shekel, you should **take from him** the maximum that he can afford?


###### Arakhin 7b:22
[Arakhin 7b:22](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/7b:22)

אָמַר רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה: הָיוּ בְּיָדָיו חָמֵשׁ סְלָעִים, וְאָמַר ״עֶרְכִּי עָלַי״, וְחָזַר וְאָמַר ״עֶרְכִּי עָלַי״, וְנָתַן אַרְבַּע לַשְּׁנִיָּה וְאֶחָד לָרִאשׁוֹנָה — יָצָא יְדֵי שְׁתֵּיהֶן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The Gemara cites a ruling based upon the opinion of the Rabbis. **Rav Adda bar Ahava says:** If **one had five *sela* in his possession and said:** It is incumbent **upon me** to donate **my valuation, and he** then **said again:** It is incumbent **upon me** to donate **my valuation, and he gave four** *sela* **for the second** vow **and one** *sela* **for the first** vow, **he has fulfilled** his obligation to pay for **both of the** vows. Consequently, even if he becomes wealthy, he is not required to make any further payments.


###### Arakhin 7b:23
[Arakhin 7b:23](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/7b:23)

מַאי טַעְמָא? בַּעַל חוֹב מְאוּחָר שֶׁקָּדַם וְגָבָה — מַה שֶּׁגָּבָה גָּבָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**What is the reason** for this? There is a principle that with regard to **a creditor** holding a promissory note dated **later** than the notes of other creditors, **who collected** his debt **before** the other creditors collected theirs, **whatever he has collected he has collected,** and it is not expropriated from him even if the debtor does not have the means to pay back all his creditors.


###### Arakhin 7b:24
[Arakhin 7b:24](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Arakhin/r/7b:24)

בְּעִידָּנָא דְּיָהֵיב לַשְּׁנִיָּה, מְשַׁעְבַּד לְרִאשׁוֹנָה. בְּעִידָּנָא דְּיָהֵיב לָרִאשׁוֹנָה, תּוּ לֵית לֵיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
In this case, since **at the time that he gave** the four *sela* **for the second** vow, his possessions were **liened for** the payment of his **first** vow, it is as though he had no possessions at all with which to pay the second vow, and he therefore fulfilled the second vow even though he paid less than the full amount of money in his possession. Then, **at the time he gave** one *sela* **for** payment of **the first** vow, **he** in fact **had no more** than one *sela*, as he had given the other four *sela* in payment of the second vow, and therefore he fulfills his obligation by paying one *sela*.