## Avodah Zarah Daf 46a

###### Avodah Zarah 46a:1
[Avodah Zarah 46a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Avodah%20Zarah/r/46a:1)

אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, וַהֲלֹא כְּבָר נֶאֱמַר: ״אַבֵּד תְּאַבְּדוּן״, אִם כֵּן מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְאִבַּדְתֶּם אֶת שְׁמָם מִן הַמָּקוֹם הַהוּא״? לְכַנּוֹת לָהּ שֵׁם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Akiva said to him: But isn’t it already stated: “You shall destroy”** (Deuteronomy 12:2)? This obviously includes rooting out all traces of idols. **If so, what** is the meaning when **the verse states: “And you shall destroy their name out of that place”?** This means that it is a mitzva **to give it a nickname.**


###### Avodah Zarah 46a:2
[Avodah Zarah 46a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Avodah%20Zarah/r/46a:2)

יָכוֹל לְשֶׁבַח? לְשֶׁבַח סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ?! אֶלָּא יָכוֹל לֹא לְשֶׁבַח וְלֹא לִגְנַאי? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״שַׁקֵּץ תְּשַׁקְּצֶנּוּ וְתַעֵב תְּתַעֲבֶנּוּ כִּי חֵרֶם הוּא״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
One **might** have thought that one may give it **a positive** nickname. The Gemara interjects: Would it **enter your mind** that one may give **a positive** nickname to an idol? **Rather,** the *baraita* means that one **might** have thought that the reference is to a nickname that is **neither positive nor negative.** Therefore, **the verse states:** “And you shall not bring an abomination into your house, and be accursed like it; **you shall detest it, and you shall abhor it; for it is a proscribed item”** (Deuteronomy 7:26). This verse clearly indicates that the nickname should be a negative one.


###### Avodah Zarah 46a:3
[Avodah Zarah 46a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Avodah%20Zarah/r/46a:3)

הָא כֵּיצַד? הָיוּ קוֹרִין אוֹתָהּ בֵּית גַּלְיָא — קוֹרִין אוֹתָהּ ״בֵּית כַּרְיָא״, פְּנֵי מֶלֶךְ — ״פְּנֵי כֶּלֶב״, עֵין כֹּל — ״עֵין קוֹץ״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**How so?** To what type of nickname is this referring? If the idol worshippers **would call** their house of worship **the house of elevation [*beit galya*], one should call it the house of digging [*beit karya*].** If they call it **the all-seeing eye [*ein kol*],** one should call it **the eye of a thorn [*ein kotz*].**


###### Avodah Zarah 46a:4
[Avodah Zarah 46a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Avodah%20Zarah/r/46a:4)

תָּנֵי תַּנָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב שֵׁשֶׁת: הַגּוֹיִם הָעוֹבְדִים אֶת הֶהָרִים וְאֶת הַגְּבָעוֹת — הֵן מוּתָּרִין, וְעוֹבְדֵיהֶן בְּסַיִיף, וְאֶת הַזְּרָעִים וְאֶת הַיְּרָקוֹת — הֵן אֲסוּרִין, וְעוֹבְדֵיהֶן בְּסַיִיף.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The ***tanna*** who recited *mishnayot* and *baraitot* in the study hall **taught** a *baraita* **before Rav Sheshet:** With regard to the *halakha* in the case of **the gentiles who worship the mountains and the hills,** the mountains and hills **are permitted, but their worshippers** are punished with decapitation **by** the **sword. But** with regard to gentiles who worship **plants and vegetables,** the plants and vegetables **are forbidden and their worshippers** are punished with decapitation **by** the **sword.**


###### Avodah Zarah 46a:5
[Avodah Zarah 46a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Avodah%20Zarah/r/46a:5)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: דְּאָמַר לָךְ, מַנִּי? רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר יְהוּדָה הִיא, דְּאָמַר: אִילָן שֶׁנְּטָעוֹ וּלְבַסּוֹף עֲבָדוֹ — אָסוּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rav Sheshet **said to him: Who is** the *tanna* **who said** this **to you? It** must be **Rabbi Yosei, son of** Rabbi **Yehuda, who says** that **a tree that one planted and subsequently worshipped is forbidden.**


###### Avodah Zarah 46a:6
[Avodah Zarah 46a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Avodah%20Zarah/r/46a:6)

וְלוֹקְמַהּ בְּאִילָן שֶׁנְּטָעוֹ מִתְּחִלָּה לְכָךְ, וְרַבָּנַן! לָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ, דְּקָתָנֵי דּוּמְיָא דְּהַר, מָה הַר שֶׁלֹּא נְטָעוֹ מִתְּחִלָּה לְכָךְ, אַף הַאי נָמֵי שֶׁלֹּא נְטָעוֹ מִתְּחִלָּה לְכָךְ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **But** why not **interpret** the *baraita* as referring **to a tree that one initially planted for** idol worship, **and** then the ruling would be consistent with the opinion of **the Rabbis** as well? The Gemara answers: This should **not enter your mind, as** the *baraita* **teaches** the case of plants and vegetables as being **similar to** the case of **a mountain.** Therefore, one can extrapolate that **just as** with regard to **a mountain,** it is a case **where one did not initially plant it for this** purpose, as mountains are not planted by people, **so too, this** case of plants and vegetables is a case **where one did not initially plant it for this** purpose.


###### Avodah Zarah 46a:7
[Avodah Zarah 46a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Avodah%20Zarah/r/46a:7)

אִיתְּמַר: אַבְנֵי הַר שֶׁנִּדַּלְדְּלוּ — בְּנֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, חַד אָמַר: אֲסוּרוֹת, וְחַד אָמַר: מוּתָּרוֹת. מַאי טַעְמָא דְּמַאן דְּאָמַר מוּתָּרוֹת? כְּהַר — מָה הַר שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ תְּפִיסַת יְדֵי אָדָם וּמוּתָּר, אַף הָנֵי שֶׁאֵין בָּהֶן תְּפִיסַת יְדֵי אָדָם וּמוּתָּרִין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ It **was stated:** The *halakha* in a case where a gentile worships **boulders that** naturally **became dislodged from a mountain** is subject to dispute between **the sons of Rabbi Ḥiyya** on the one hand **and Rabbi Yoḥanan** on the other. **One** side **says: They are forbidden, and one** side **says: They are permitted.** The Gemara asks: **What is the reason of the one who says** that **they are permitted?** The Gemara answers: The status of the dislodged stones is still **like** the status of the **mountain** itself. **Just as** in the case of **a mountain, it** is **not** the product of **human involvement, and** therefore it is **permitted** to derive benefit from it even after it is worshipped, **so too, these** boulders, **which** are **not** the product of **human involvement, are permitted.**


###### Avodah Zarah 46a:8
[Avodah Zarah 46a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Avodah%20Zarah/r/46a:8)

מָה לְהַר, שֶׁכֵּן מְחוּבָּר! בְּהֵמָה תּוֹכִיחַ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara raises an objection: **What** is notable **about a mountain?** It is notable **in that** it is **attached** to the ground. This may be the reason for the leniency concerning it, and this does not apply to boulders. The Gemara responds: The case of a worshipped **animal can prove** that this is not relevant, as it is permitted to derive benefit from a worshipped animal even though it is not attached to the ground.


###### Avodah Zarah 46a:9
[Avodah Zarah 46a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Avodah%20Zarah/r/46a:9)

מָה לִבְהֵמָה, שֶׁכֵּן בַּעֲלַת חַיִּים! הַר יוֹכִיחַ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara defends its objection: **What** is notable **about an animal?** It is notable **in that** it is **a living,** animate **being.** This may be the reason for the leniency concerning it, and this does not apply to boulders. The Gemara responds: The case of **a mountain can prove** that this is not relevant, as it is permitted to derive benefit from a mountain that was worshipped, even though it is not a living being.


###### Avodah Zarah 46a:10
[Avodah Zarah 46a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Avodah%20Zarah/r/46a:10)

וְחָזַר הַדִּין, לֹא רְאִי זֶה כִרְאִי זֶה, וְלֹא רְאִי זֶה כִּרְאִי זֶה, הַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן שֶׁאֵין בָּהֶן תְּפִיסַת יְדֵי אָדָם וּמוּתָּר, אַף כׇּל שֶׁאֵין בָּהֶן תְּפִיסַת יְדֵי אָדָם וּמוּתָּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And the inference has reverted** to its starting point, and the *halakha* can be inferred from a combination of the two sources: **The aspect of this** case, that of a mountain, **is not like the aspect of that** case, that of an animal, **and the aspect of that** case **is not like the aspect of this** case; **their common element is that they are not** products of **human involvement, and** it is **permitted** to derive benefit from them. **So too,** in **any** case of worshipped objects **that are not** the product of **human involvement,** including boulders, they are **permitted.**


###### Avodah Zarah 46a:11
[Avodah Zarah 46a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Avodah%20Zarah/r/46a:11)

מָה לְהַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן, שֶׁכֵּן לֹא נִשְׁתַּנּוּ מִבְּרִיָּיתָן!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara objects: **What** is notable **about the common element between** the case of a mountain and that of an animal that prevents utilizing it as a paradigm for other cases? These worshipped objects are notable **in that they were not altered from their natural form.** Perhaps that is why their status remains unchanged. By contrast, a dislodged boulder has been moved from its original position.


###### Avodah Zarah 46a:12
[Avodah Zarah 46a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Avodah%20Zarah/r/46a:12)

אֶלָּא אָתְיָא מִבְּהֵמָה בַּעֲלַת מוּם, וּמֵהַר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** the *halakha* that a boulder that is dislodged from a mountain is still permitted after it is worshipped **is derived from** the case of **a blemished animal and from** the case of **a mountain,** both of which are permitted after having been worshipped. The notable aspect of a mountain, in that it is an unaltered object and is attached to the ground, is countered by the case of a blemished animal, and the notable aspect of a blemished animal in that it is a living being is countered by the case of a mountain. Therefore, it can be derived from the common element of the two cases that just as these two are not products of human involvement and are not rendered forbidden by worship, so too, a dislodged boulder is not rendered forbidden by worship.


###### Avodah Zarah 46a:13
[Avodah Zarah 46a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Avodah%20Zarah/r/46a:13)

וְאִי נָמֵי, מִבְּהֵמָה תַּמָּה וּמֵאִילָן יָבֵשׁ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Alternatively,** the *halakha* can be derived **from** the case of **an unblemished animal and from** the case of **a withered tree,** both of which are permitted after having been worshipped. The notable aspect of an unblemished animal, in that it is unaltered and a living being, is countered by the case of a withered tree, and the notable aspect of a withered tree, in that it is attached to the ground, is countered by the case of an unblemished animal.


###### Avodah Zarah 46a:14
[Avodah Zarah 46a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Avodah%20Zarah/r/46a:14)

וּמַאן דְּאָסַר, לְהָכִי כְּתִיב ״שַׁקֵּץ תְּשַׁקְּצֶנּוּ וְתַעֵב תְּתַעֲבֶנּוּ״, דְּאַף עַל גַּב דְּאָתְיָא מִדִּינָא לְהֶיתֵּרָא, לָא תֵּתְיַאּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And** what is the reasoning of **the one who deems** worshipped boulders **forbidden?** The Gemara answers: According to that opinion, it is in order **to** teach **this** *halakha*: **It is written:** “And you shall not bring an abomination into your house, and be accursed like it; **you shall detest it, and you shall abhor it;** for it is a proscribed item” (Deuteronomy 7:26). This verse teaches **that although** one may theoretically **derive, by logical inference, to permit** the boulders, **do not derive** that *halakha*.


###### Avodah Zarah 46a:15
[Avodah Zarah 46a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Avodah%20Zarah/r/46a:15)

תִּסְתַּיֵּים, דִּבְנֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא דְּשָׁרוּ, דְּבָעֵי חִזְקִיָּה: זָקַף בֵּיצָה לְהִשְׁתַּחֲווֹת לָהּ, מַהוּ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara introduced the case of a boulder that naturally dislodged from a mountain as the subject of a dispute between the sons of Rabbi Ḥiyya and Rabbi Yoḥanan, but it did not specify who subscribes to which opinion. The Gemara suggests: **It may be concluded that it is the sons of Rabbi Ḥiyya who deem** it **permitted, as Ḥizkiyya,** Rabbi Ḥiyya’s son, **raises a dilemma:** If one **erected an egg** in order **to bow to it** as an idol, **what is** the *halakha*? Is it then prohibited to derive benefit from the egg?


###### Avodah Zarah 46a:16
[Avodah Zarah 46a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Avodah%20Zarah/r/46a:16)

קָא סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ לְהִשְׁתַּחֲווֹת לָהּ, וְהִשְׁתַּחֲוָה לָהּ, וְקָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ הַאי זְקִיפָתָהּ אִי הָוֵי מַעֲשֶׂה אִי לָא הָוֵי מַעֲשֶׂה, אֲבָל לֹא זָקַף — לָא מִיתַּסְרָא, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ בְּנֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא דְּשָׁרוּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains the proof: **It enters your mind** that this dilemma is referring to a case where one erected an egg in order **to bow to it, and he** then **bowed to it. And he raises a dilemma** as to **whether this erecting** of the egg **is** considered a significant **act** of human involvement that renders the egg forbidden as an object of idol worship, or **whether** it **is not** considered a significant **act** of human involvement. **But** if he had **not erected** the egg, there would be no dilemma, as clearly it would **not become forbidden.** Accordingly, one can **conclude from** this dilemma that **the sons of Rabbi Ḥiyya** are the ones **who deem** the boulder **permitted,** since it is not a product of human involvement.


###### Avodah Zarah 46a:17
[Avodah Zarah 46a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Avodah%20Zarah/r/46a:17)

לָא, לְעוֹלָם אֵימָא לָךְ: בְּנֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא דְּאָסְרִי, דְּהִשְׁתַּחֲוָה לָהּ, אַף עַל גַּב דְּלֹא זְקָפָהּ אֲסוּרָה, וְהָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן? כְּגוֹן שֶׁזָּקַף בֵּיצָה לְהִשְׁתַּחֲווֹת לָהּ, וְלֹא הִשְׁתַּחֲוָה לָהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects this proof: **No, actually I will say to you** that perhaps it is **the sons of Rabbi Ḥiyya who deem** the dislodged boulder **forbidden** after it was worshipped, and they similarly hold **that** in this case of the egg, if **he bowed to it, even if did not erect it,** the egg is certainly **forbidden. And** the dilemma is as follows: **Here we are dealing with** a case **where he erected** the **egg** in order **to bow to it, but he** ultimately **did not bow to it.** Ḥizkiyya’s dilemma was whether designation of an object as an idol renders it forbidden even without actual worship.


###### Avodah Zarah 46a:18
[Avodah Zarah 46a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Avodah%20Zarah/r/46a:18)

וּלְמַאן? אִי לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה שֶׁל יִשְׂרָאֵל אֲסוּרָה מִיָּד — אֲסוּרָה, אִי לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: עַד שֶׁתֵּיעָבֵד — הָא לָא פַּלְחַהּ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **But according to whom** does he raise the dilemma? **If it is according to the one who says** that any object **of a Jew** who dedicated it to **idol worship is immediately** rendered **forbidden,** there is no place for the dilemma; the egg is clearly **forbidden. If it is according to the one who says** that an object of idol worship is not forbidden **until it is** actually **worshipped,** there is also no place for the dilemma, as the egg was **not worshipped,** and is therefore permitted.


###### Avodah Zarah 46a:19
[Avodah Zarah 46a:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Avodah%20Zarah/r/46a:19)

לָא צְרִיכָא, כְּגוֹן שֶׁזָּקַף בֵּיצָה לְהִשְׁתַּחֲווֹת לָהּ, וְלֹא הִשְׁתַּחֲוָה לָהּ, וּבָא גּוֹי וְהִשְׁתַּחֲוָה לָהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers by reformulating the case: **No,** those are not the cases with regard to which the dilemma is raised. It is **necessary** to raise it with regard to a case **where** one **erected an egg** in order **to bow to it, but** ultimately **he did not bow to it, and** then **a gentile came** along **and bowed to it.** It is with regard to this case that Ḥizkiyya raises the dilemma.


###### Avodah Zarah 46a:20
[Avodah Zarah 46a:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Avodah%20Zarah/r/46a:20)

כִּי הָא דְּאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁזָּקַף לְבֵינָה לְהִשְׁתַּחֲווֹת לָהּ, וּבָא גּוֹי וְהִשְׁתַּחֲוָה לָהּ — אֲסוּרָה. וְקָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ: לְבֵינָה הוּא דְּמִינַּכְרָא זְקִיפָתָהּ, אֲבָל בֵּיצָה — לָא? אוֹ דִּלְמָא לָא שְׁנָא? תֵּיקוּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
There is an established principle that one cannot render forbidden an item that is not his. In this case, the egg can be rendered forbidden only by a combination of the Jewish owner’s indicated intention and the gentile’s act of worship. This dilemma assumes **that which Rav Yehuda says** that **Shmuel says:** In the case of **a Jew who erected a brick** in order **to bow to it, and a gentile came and bowed to it,** it is **forbidden. And** Ḥizkiyya **raises the** following **dilemma** with regard to the case of an egg: **Is it** specifically **a brick** that is forbidden, **as its being erect is** clearly **recognizable** and is therefore a clear indication of intent on behalf of the Jewish owner, **but** as for **an egg,** erecting it is **not** enough of an indication, and it is therefore permitted? **Or perhaps** there **is no difference,** and the egg would similarly be forbidden. The Gemara concludes: The question **shall stand** unresolved.


###### Avodah Zarah 46a:21
[Avodah Zarah 46a:21](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Avodah%20Zarah/r/46a:21)

בָּעֵי רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא: הַמִּשְׁתַּחֲוֶה לְהַר, אֲבָנָיו מַהוּ לַמִּזְבֵּחַ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **Rami bar Ḥama raises a dilemma:** In the case of **one who bows down to a mountain, what is** the *halakha* with regard to the permissibility of using **its stones for** building **the altar** in the Temple?