## Bava Batra Daf 44a

###### Bava Batra 44a:1
[Bava Batra 44a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Batra/r/44a:1)

וְלוֹקְמַהּ בְּגַזְלָן!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And** according to the understanding of Rav Sheshet, that the *baraita* is disqualifying one whose field was stolen from testifying on behalf of one who purchased the field from the robber, why is it necessary to discuss a case involving a buyer, when it would be simpler to **establish it with regard to** testifying for the **robber** himself?


###### Bava Batra 44a:2
[Bava Batra 44a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Batra/r/44a:2)

מִשּׁוּם דְּקָא בָּעֵי לְמִיתְנָא סֵיפָא: מָכַר לוֹ פָּרָה, מָכַר לוֹ טַלִּית – דְּדַוְקָא מָכַר, דְּהָוֵה לֵיהּ יֵאוּשׁ וְשִׁינּוּי רְשׁוּת; אֲבָל לֹא מָכַר, דְּהָדְרָא לֵיהּ – לָא; תְּנָא רֵישָׁא נָמֵי מָכַר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: The *tanna* of the *baraita* discusses a case involving a buyer **because** he **wants to teach the latter clause:** If he **sold a cow to him,** or if he **sold a cloak to him,** he can testify about it for the buyer. **As** in this clause, the *tanna* **specifically** needs to discuss a case where the robber **sold** it, **because** then **it is** a case of **despair** by the owners due to the robbery, **and** there is also **a change in possession** due to the sale, and the one who was robbed can no longer reclaim the stolen item. He is therefore no longer biased in his testimony and can testify for the one who purchased the item. **But** in the latter clause, if the robber did **not sell** it, in which case the stolen item **is returned to** the robbery victim, he **cannot** testify, as he prefers that the item be in the possession of the robber, so that he can recover it from him. Therefore, the *tanna* **taught** in **the first clause as well** about a case where he **sold** it.


###### Bava Batra 44a:3
[Bava Batra 44a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Batra/r/44a:3)

וְסֵיפָא נָמֵי – נְהִי דְּמִיָּיאַשׁ מִגּוּפַיהּ, מִדְּמֶיהָ מִי מִיָּיאַשׁ? לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּמִית גַּזְלָן – דִּתְנַן: הַגּוֹזֵל וּמַאֲכִיל אֶת בָּנָיו, וְהִנִּיחַ לִפְנֵיהֶם – פְּטוּרִים מִלְּשַׁלֵּם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And** in **the latter clause as well,** where there is despair and change in possession, **granted that** he **despairs of** recovering the item **itself,** but **did** he **despair of** being reimbursed for **its value?** While it is true that he lost his ownership of the item, he is still entitled to payment. Therefore, he is still biased in his testimony. The Gemara answers: **No,** it is **necessary** in a case **where the robber died,** in which case the robbery victim cannot collect even the value of the stolen item, and is no longer biased in his testimony. **As we learned** in a mishna (*Bava Kamma* 111b): In the case of **one who robs** another of food **and feeds** it to **his** own **children, or** who **left** a stolen item **to them** as an inheritance, the children **are exempt from paying** the victim of the robbery after their father’s death. Since he is no longer able to collect the value of the stolen item, he is not biased in his testimony and can testify on behalf of the buyer.


###### Bava Batra 44a:4
[Bava Batra 44a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Batra/r/44a:4)

וְלוֹקְמַהּ בְּיוֹרֵשׁ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And** why not **establish** the entire *baraita* **with regard to** testifying for the robber’s **heir?** This would demonstrate the contrast that the *tanna* wanted to teach. In the case of a stolen field, which always must be returned to its owner, the robbery victim is biased in his testimony because the field can be recovered. Therefore, it is in his interest to establish that it is in the possession of the robber’s heirs. In the case of movable property, which cannot be recovered after the death of the robber, he is not biased in his testimony.


###### Bava Batra 44a:5
[Bava Batra 44a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Batra/r/44a:5)

הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: רְשׁוּת יוֹרֵשׁ לָאו כִּרְשׁוּת לוֹקֵחַ דָּמֵי – שַׁפִּיר; אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: רְשׁוּת יוֹרֵשׁ כִּרְשׁוּת לוֹקֵחַ דָּמֵי – מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara notes: **This works out well according to the one who says** that the transfer of an item to the **possession** of **an heir** is **not like** the transfer of an item to the **possession** of **a buyer,** but is viewed as an extension of the possession of the legator. According to this opinion, it is **well** that the *baraita* did not establish its case with regard to the robber’s heir, as the robbery victim would be able to recover the item, and would be considered biased in his testimony. **But according to the one who says** that the transfer of an item to the **possession** of **an heir** is **like** the transfer of an item to the **possession** of **a buyer,** and the item is not recoverable in either case, **what can be said** to explain why the *baraita* does not state its case with regard to an heir?


###### Bava Batra 44a:6
[Bava Batra 44a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Batra/r/44a:6)

וְעוֹד קַשְׁיָא לֵיהּ לְאַבָּיֵי: מִפְּנֵי שֶׁ״אַחְרָיוּתוֹ עָלָיו״ וְ״אֵין אַחְרָיוּתוֹ עָלָיו״?! מִפְּנֵי שֶׁ״הִיא חוֹזֶרֶת לוֹ״ וְ״אֵינָהּ חוֹזֶרֶת לוֹ״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And furthermore,** this explanation was **difficult for Abaye** to understand, as according to Rav Sheshet’s explanation, is it accurate to state, as the *baraita* does, that the distinction exists between the cases of land and movable property **because** in the first clause the financial **responsibility** to compensate the buyer **for** the land is **upon him, and** in the latter clause the financial **responsibility** to compensate the buyer **for** the movable property is **not upon him?** That is not the crucial distinction. The *tanna* **should have** taught instead that the difference is: Here he cannot testify **because** the stolen field **returns to him, and** here he can testify because the stolen item **does not return to him.**


###### Bava Batra 44a:7
[Bava Batra 44a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Batra/r/44a:7)

אֶלָּא כִּדְרָבִין בַּר שְׁמוּאֵל – דְּאָמַר רָבִין בַּר שְׁמוּאֵל מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל: הַמּוֹכֵר שָׂדֶה לַחֲבֵירוֹ שֶׁלֹּא בְּאַחְרָיוּת – אֵין מֵעִיד לוֹ עָלֶיהָ, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁמַּעֲמִידָהּ בִּפְנֵי בַּעַל חוֹבוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara offers a new explanation of the *baraita*: **Rather,** explain instead **in accordance with** the statement **of Ravin bar Shmuel, as Ravin bar Shmuel says in the name of Shmuel: One who sells a field to another** even **without a guarantee** that if the field will be repossessed the seller will compensate the buyer for his loss **cannot testify with regard to** ownership of that field **on behalf of** the buyer, **because** he is **establishing** the field **before his creditor.**


###### Bava Batra 44a:8
[Bava Batra 44a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Batra/r/44a:8)

וְדַוְקָא בַּיִת אוֹ שָׂדֶה, אֲבָל פָּרָה וְטַלִּית – לָא מִיבַּעְיָא

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara clarifies this by noting: **And** this is the case **specifically** in the case of **a house or a field. But** in the case of **a cow or a cloak,** he is not biased in his testimony, and can testify on behalf of the buyer. The Gemara explains: **It is not necessary** to say that this is the *halakha*