## Bava Kamma Daf 102b

###### Bava Kamma 102b:1
[Bava Kamma 102b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/102b:1)

לִיקַּח לוֹ חִטִּין – וְלָקַח מֵהֶם שְׂעוֹרִין, שְׂעוֹרִין – וְלָקַח מֵהֶם חִטִּין; תַּנְיָא חֲדָא: אִם פָּחֲתוּ – פָּחֲתוּ לוֹ, וְאִם הוֹתִירוּ – הוֹתִירוּ לוֹ; וְתָנֵי חֲדָא: אִם פָּחֲתוּ – פָּחֲתוּ לוֹ, וְאִם הוֹתִירוּ – הוֹתִירוּ לָאֶמְצַע!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**to purchase wheat for him,** which he plans to sell at a profit, **and** instead the agent **purchased barley with** the money, or if he gave his agent money to purchase **barley and** instead **he purchased wheat with** the money, two *baraitot* issue discordant rulings with regard to the *halakha*. **It is taught** in **one** *baraita* that **if there was a loss, the loss is for** the agent, **and if there was a profit,** the **profit is for** the agent as well, as he is considered to have abrogated his status as an agent by deviating from the instructions. **And it is taught** in **one** *baraita* (*Tosefta*, *Bava Metzia* 4:20) that if there was an agreement that both parties would split the profits from the transaction, **if there was a loss, the loss is for** the agent, **and if there was a profit,** the **profit** goes **to the middle,** i.e., the agent and the investor split the profit.


###### Bava Kamma 102b:2
[Bava Kamma 102b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/102b:2)

אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: לָא קַשְׁיָא; הָא רַבִּי מֵאִיר, וְהָא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
To reconcile the *baraitot*, **Rabbi Yoḥanan said:** This is **not difficult. This** first *baraita* is in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Meir, and this** second *baraita* is in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Yehuda.**


###### Bava Kamma 102b:3
[Bava Kamma 102b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/102b:3)

הָא רַבִּי מֵאִיר, דְּאָמַר שִׁינּוּי קוֹנֶה; וְהָא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, דְּאָמַר שִׁינּוּי אֵינוֹ קוֹנֶה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rabbi Yoḥanan explains his rationale: **This** first *baraita* is in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Meir, who says** that **a change** by an agent that deviates from the terms of his assignment means that the agent **acquires** the item in question for himself, as in the case of one who was paid to dye wool red but dyed it black. In this case as well, when the agent purchases wheat instead of barley, or vice versa, he acquires the grain for himself. **And this** second *baraita* is in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Yehuda, who says** that **a change** by an agent which deviates from the terms of his assignment does **not** mean that the agent **acquires** the item in question for himself. It is acquired by the one who appointed the agent, and they split the profits as agreed. But the agent is held responsible for any loss incurred, due to his deviation from the instructions.


###### Bava Kamma 102b:4
[Bava Kamma 102b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/102b:4)

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: מִמַּאי? דִּלְמָא עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר – אֶלָּא בְּמִידֵּי דַּחֲזֵי לֵיהּ לְגוּפֵיהּ, אֲבָל לִסְחוֹרָה – לָא אָמַר!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Elazar objects to this** explanation: **From where** do you say that the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda extends to the case of these *baraitot*? **Perhaps Rabbi Meir says** that a change by an agent from the terms of his assignment results in the acquisition of the item by the agent **only with regard to an item that is fit for** use by the one who appointed the agent **himself,** such as wool dyed the wrong color, which is now not usable for its intended purpose. **But** Rabbi Meir **does not say** his ruling with regard to an item purchased **for** subsequent sale as **merchandise,** since it is intended to be sold for a profit in any event, and the transaction would take effect as agreed upon initially, with the agent held responsible for any loss incurred.


###### Bava Kamma 102b:5
[Bava Kamma 102b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/102b:5)

אֶלָּא אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: הָא וְהָא רַבִּי מֵאִיר, וְלָא קַשְׁיָא – כָּאן לַאֲכִילָה, כָּאן לִסְחוֹרָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, Rabbi Elazar said:** Both **this** *baraita* **and that** *baraita* are written in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Meir, and** it is **not difficult. Here,** in the first *baraita*, it is discussing grain purchased **for eating,** and since the one who appointed the agent desired wheat, he does not acquire the barley. **There,** in the second *baraita*, it is discussing grain purchased **for** subsequent sale as **merchandise,** and the transaction takes effect as agreed upon initially, with the agent held responsible for any loss incurred.


###### Bava Kamma 102b:6
[Bava Kamma 102b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/102b:6)

מַחֲכוּ עֲלַהּ בְּמַעְרְבָא: לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, וְכִי מִי הוֹדִיעוֹ לְבַעַל חִטִּין – שֶׁיַּקְנֶה חִטִּין לְבַעַל מָעוֹת? מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר סַסְרָטִי: אִי הָכִי, אֲפִילּוּ חִטִּין וְחִטִּין נָמֵי לָא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara notes that **they laughed at it in the West,** Eretz Yisrael, at the explanation **of Rabbi Yoḥanan,** who said that **according to** the opinion **of Rabbi Yehuda,** a deviation by an agent from the terms of his assignment does not result in the acquisition of the item for the agent himself: **And who informed the owner of the wheat,** i.e., the seller, **that he should transfer the wheat to the owner of the money?** If the seller was unaware that the agent was acting on someone else’s behalf, how would the one who appointed the agent acquire the wheat? **Rav Shmuel bar Sasrati objects to this** rationale: **If so,** then **even** in a case where the agent was sent to purchase **wheat and** he purchased **wheat,** the one who appointed the agent should **not** acquire the wheat, since the seller was unaware that the agent was acting on someone else’s behalf.


###### Bava Kamma 102b:7
[Bava Kamma 102b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/102b:7)

אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ: שָׁאנֵי חִטִּין וְחִטִּין, דִּשְׁלִיחוּתֵיהּ קָא עָבֵיד – וְכִי בַּעַל הַבַּיִת דָּמֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Abbahu said:** The case of an agent who was assigned to purchase **wheat and** purchased **wheat is different, as** the agent **is performing his assignment and,** as such, **he is like the customer,** i.e., the one who appointed him, and it is as though the latter has purchased the grain himself.


###### Bava Kamma 102b:8
[Bava Kamma 102b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/102b:8)

תִּדַּע – דִּתְנַן: אֶחָד הַמַּקְדִּישׁ נְכָסָיו, וְאֶחָד הַמַּעֲרִיךְ אֶת עַצְמוֹ – אֵין לוֹ בִּכְסוּת אִשְׁתּוֹ, וְלֹא בִּכְסוּת בָּנָיו, וְלֹא בְּצֶבַע שֶׁצָּבַע לִשְׁמָן, וְלֹא בְּסַנְדָּלִים חֲדָשִׁים שֶׁלְּקָחָן לִשְׁמָן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rabbi Abbahu further explains: **Know** that the agent is viewed as an extension of the one who appointed him, **as we learned** in a mishna (*Arakhin* 24a): Concerning both **one who consecrates his property and one who valuates himself** by donating his fixed value to the Temple, the Temple treasury **does not have** any rights **with regard to** the donor’s **wife’s clothing; and not with regard to his children’s clothing; and not with regard to** new clothes colored with **dye that the** donor **dyed for** his wife or children; **and not with regard to new sandals that** the donor **purchased for** his wife or children. Presumably, the treasurer has no right to these items because they are for the personal use of the donor’s wife and children, and are considered as if owned by them.


###### Bava Kamma 102b:9
[Bava Kamma 102b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/102b:9)

וְאַמַּאי? לֵימָא הָכָא נָמֵי: מִי הוֹדִיעוֹ לַצַבָּע – שֶׁיַּקְנֶה צִבְעוֹ לָאִשָּׁה? אֶלָּא לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּאָמְרִינַן [דִּשְׁלִיחוּתֵיהּ קָא עָבֵיד, וּכְיַד אִשְׁתּוֹ דָּמֵי? הָכָא נָמֵי] שְׁלִיחוּתֵיהּ קָא עָבֵיד, וּכְיַד בַּעַל הַבַּיִת דָּמֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rabbi Abbahu continues: **And why** is it so, i.e., why is it that the wife is considered the owner of the dyed clothing for which the husband paid? **Here also, let** us **say: Who informed the dyer that he should transfer his dye to the wife? Rather, is it not because we say that** the husband **is performing his assignment and,** as such, he is **like** an extension of **his wife’s hand? Here also,** in the case of one who purchases grain for another, the agent **is performing his assignment, and is like** an extension of the **customer’s hand.**


###### Bava Kamma 102b:10
[Bava Kamma 102b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/102b:10)

אָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא: לֹא; כׇּל הַמַּקְדִּישׁ נְכָסָיו – אֵין דַּעְתּוֹ עַל כְּסוּת אִשְׁתּוֹ וּבָנָיו.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects this explanation. **Rabbi Abba said: No,** the reason for the ruling of the mishna is that **the intention of anyone who consecrates his property is not upon the clothing of his wife and his children,** i.e., he does not intend to consecrate those items.


###### Bava Kamma 102b:11
[Bava Kamma 102b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/102b:11)

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַבִּי זֵירָא: וְכִי דַּעְתּוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם עַל תְּפִילָּיו? וּתְנַן: הַמַּקְדִּישׁ נְכָסָיו – מַעֲלִין לוֹ תְּפִילִּין! אָמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: אִין; דַּעְתּוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם עַל תְּפִילִּין – הַמַּקְדִּישׁ נְכָסָיו סָבַר: מִצְוָה קָא עָבֵידְנָא. וְאֵין דַּעְתּוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם עַל כְּסוּת אִשְׁתּוֹ וּבָנָיו – מִשּׁוּם אֵיבָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Zeira objects to** Rabbi Abba’s explanation: **And is it the intention of a person** who consecrates his property to do so **upon his phylacteries?** Presumably not. **And we learned** in a mishna (*Arakhin* 23b) that with regard to **one who consecrates** all of **his property,** his **phylacteries are evaluated for him** and consecrated. Apparently, lack of intent to consecrate a particular item does not prevent its consecration. **Abaye said to** Rabbi Zeira: **Yes, the intention of a person** who consecrates his property **is upon** his **phylacteries,** because **one who consecrates his property thinks** to himself: **I am performing a mitzva,** and he therefore intends to include his phylacteries; **but the intention of a person is not upon the clothing of his wife and his children, due to the enmity** that would be engendered if he consecrated their clothing.


###### Bava Kamma 102b:12
[Bava Kamma 102b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/102b:12)

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב אוֹשַׁעְיָא: וַהֲלֹא חַיָּיבֵי עֲרָכִין שָׁנוּ כָּאן, וּתְנַן: חַיָּיבֵי עֲרָכִין – מְמַשְׁכְּנִין אוֹתָן;

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Oshaya** also **objects to** Rabbi Abba’s explanation: **But is it not** so that the matter of **those who are obligated in valuations was taught here** in the mishna, **and we learned** in a mishna (*Arakhin* 21a): Concerning **those who are obligated in valuations,** the Temple treasury **seizes collateral from them** to force them to fulfill their vow.


###### Bava Kamma 102b:13
[Bava Kamma 102b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/102b:13)

וְכִי דַּעְתּוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם עַל עַצְמוֹ לְמַשְׁכְּנוֹ?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And is the intention of a person upon himself** to allow the treasurer **to seize collateral from him?** Presumably not. Nevertheless, collateral is seized from him, proving that one’s intention does not prevent consecration. Accordingly, even if it is assumed that he does not intend to consecrate the clothing of his wife or children, the clothing should nevertheless be consecrated. Why, then, is the clothing of his wife or children not consecrated?


###### Bava Kamma 102b:14
[Bava Kamma 102b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/102b:14)

אֶלָּא אָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא: כׇּל הַמַּקְדִּישׁ נְכָסָיו – נַעֲשָׂה כְּמִי שֶׁהִקְנָה לָהֶן כְּסוּת אִשְׁתּוֹ וּבָנָיו מֵעִיקָּרָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, Rabbi Abba** also holds that the reason the clothing is not consecrated is not due to his intent, and he **said** a different explanation: **Anyone who consecrates his property becomes as one who transferred his wife’s and his children’s clothing to them at the outset.** Therefore, the clothing did not belong to him at the time that he consecrated his property.


###### Bava Kamma 102b:15
[Bava Kamma 102b:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/102b:15)

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הַלּוֹקֵחַ שָׂדֶה בְּשֵׁם חֲבֵירוֹ – אֵין כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ לִמְכּוֹר. וְאִם אָמַר לוֹ: ״עַל מְנָת״ – כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ לִמְכּוֹר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The Gemara presents another situation in which one makes a purchase involving a third party. **The Sages taught:** In the case of **one who purchases a field in the name of another, he is not compelled to sell** it. **But if he said to him** at the time of the sale: I will purchase the field **on the condition** that he will sell it to me, **he is compelled to sell** it.


###### Bava Kamma 102b:16
[Bava Kamma 102b:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/102b:16)

מַאי קָאָמַר? אָמַר רַב שֵׁשֶׁת, הָכִי קָאָמַר: הַלּוֹקֵחַ שָׂדֶה מֵחֲבֵירוֹ בְּשֵׁם רֵישׁ גָּלוּתָא – אֵין כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ רֵישׁ גָּלוּתָא לִמְכּוֹר. וְאִם אָמַר ״עַל מְנָת״ – כּוֹפִין אֶת רֵישׁ גָּלוּתָא לִמְכּוֹר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Noting the ambiguity of this statement, the Gemara asks: **What is it saying? Rav Sheshet said** that **this** is what it **is saying:** With regard to **one who purchases a field from another,** claiming that he is acting **in the name of the Exilarch** or another dominant figure, so that others will be discouraged from contesting the sale, **the Exilarch is not compelled to sell** it to him, i.e., the Exilarch is not required to provide the purchaser with documentation that the field belongs to the purchaser. **But if** the purchaser **said** to the seller: I will purchase the field **on the condition** that the Exilarch will provide me with that documentation, **the Exilarch is compelled to sell** it to him, i.e., to provide him with the documentation.


###### Bava Kamma 102b:17
[Bava Kamma 102b:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/102b:17)

אָמַר מָר: הַלּוֹקֵחַ שָׂדֶה בְּשֵׁם רֵישׁ גָּלוּתָא – אֵין כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ רֵישׁ גָּלוּתָא לִמְכּוֹר. מִכְּלָל דְּמִקְנָא קַנְיָא לֵיהּ; לֵימָא פְּלִיגָא דִּבְנֵי מַעְרְבָא, דְּאָמְרִי: וְכִי מִי הוֹדִיעוֹ לְבַעַל חִטִּין – שֶׁיַּקְנֶה חִטִּין לְבַעַל הַבַּיִת?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara questions Rav Sheshet’s interpretation. **The Master said:** With regard to **one who purchases a field in the name of the Exilarch, the Exilarch is not compelled to sell** it to him. Since the *baraita* teaches only that the Exilarch is not required to provide the purchaser with documentation that the field is his, it can be understood **by inference that** the purchaser **has** nevertheless **acquired** the field **for himself. Let us say that** this interpretation of the *baraita* **disagrees with** the statement of **the residents of the West,** Eretz Yisrael, **who say: And who informed the owner of the wheat that he should transfer the wheat to the customer?** Since the seller assumed he was selling the field to the Exilarch, the Sages of Eretz Yisrael would hold that the sale does not take effect.


###### Bava Kamma 102b:18
[Bava Kamma 102b:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/102b:18)

אִי מִשּׁוּם הָא – לָא קַשְׁיָא; כְּגוֹן דְּאוֹדְעֵיהּ לְבַעַל שָׂדֶה, וְאוֹדְעִינְהוּ לְסָהֲדֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects this: **If** it is **due to this** inference that it is surmised that the *baraita* is in conflict with the opinion of the Sages of Eretz Yisrael, it is **not difficult,** as it can be said that the *baraita* is discussing a case **where** the purchaser **informed the owner of the field and informed the witnesses** that he intends to purchase the field for himself.


###### Bava Kamma 102b:19
[Bava Kamma 102b:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/102b:19)

אֶלָּא אֵימָא סֵיפָא: ״עַל מְנָת״ – כּוֹפִין אוֹתוֹ רֵישׁ גָּלוּתָא לִמְכּוֹר. אַמַּאי? וְלֵימָא רֵישׁ גָּלוּתָא: לָא יְקָרַיְיכוּ בָּעֵינָא, וְלָא זִילוּתַיְיכוּ בָּעֵינָא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects Rav Sheshet’s interpretation for a different reason. **Rather, say** that **the latter clause** is difficult, as it states that if the purchaser said to the seller: I will purchase the field **on the condition** that the Exilarch will sell it to me, **the Exilarch is compelled to sell** it to him. **Why** should the Exilarch be compelled to provide the purchaser with documentation? **But let the Exilarch say: I do not desire your esteem nor do I desire your disgrace,** i.e., I am not involved in your affairs. Since the Exilarch had not been party to the negotiations, how can a stipulation stated by the purchaser render him obligated?


###### Bava Kamma 102b:20
[Bava Kamma 102b:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/102b:20)

אֶלָּא אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, הָכִי קָאָמַר: הַלּוֹקֵחַ שָׂדֶה בְּשֵׁם חֲבֵירוֹ, רֵישׁ גָּלוּתָא –

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, Abaye said: This** is what the *baraita* **is saying:** With regard to **one who purchases a field in the name of his friend, the Exilarch,**