## Bava Kamma Daf 10b

###### Bava Kamma 10b:1
[Bava Kamma 10b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/10b:1)

אִי דִּבְלָאו אִיהוּ לָא אָזְלָא – פְּשִׁיטָא! אֶלָּא דִּבְלָאו אִיהוּ אָזְלָא – מַאי קָא עָבֵיד?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**If** the fire **would not have spread** to another person’s field **without him** adding bundles the fire, it **is obvious** that he alone is liable for the damage because he alone did everything that led to the damage. **Rather,** the case must be one where the fire **would have spread** even **without him.** The Gemara asks: But if that is the case, **what did he do** by adding bundles of wood? The fire would have spread without him, so he did not cause even part of the damage. It is apparent, then, that the mishna is not referring to this case.


###### Bava Kamma 10b:2
[Bava Kamma 10b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/10b:2)

מַתְקֵיף לָהּ רַב פָּפָּא, וְהָא אִיכָּא הָא דְּתַנְיָא: חֲמִשָּׁה שֶׁיָּשְׁבוּ עַל סַפְסָל אֶחָד וְלֹא שְׁבָרוּהוּ, וּבָא אֶחָד וְיָשַׁב עָלָיו וּשְׁבָרוֹ – הָאַחֲרוֹן חַיָּיב. וְאָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: כְּגוֹן פָּפָּא בַּר אַבָּא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Pappa objects to** the claim of the *baraita* that the mishna refers only to one specific case: **But isn’t there** also **that which is taught** in a *baraita*: With regard to a case in which **five** people **were sitting on one bench [*safsal*] and it did not break, and** then **one** additional person **came and sat upon it and broke it** with his added weight, **the latter** individual is **liable** for all the damage. **And Rav Pappa said** by way of clarification that this applies in a case **where** the last individual to sit down was as heavy as **Pappa bar Abba.** Since he could have potentially broken it even on his own, he had no right to use it. In this case, even though the weight of the first five individuals was presumably a contributing factor in causing the damage, since the damage was ultimately caused by the additional weight of the last individual, he is liable for all of the damage. Seemingly, this is an additional example of the mishna’s principle, and the *baraita* should have mentioned it.


###### Bava Kamma 10b:3
[Bava Kamma 10b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/10b:3)

הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא דִּבְלָאו אִיהוּ לָא אִיתְּבַר – פְּשִׁיטָא. אֶלָּא דִּבְלָאו אִיהוּ נָמֵי אִיתְּבַר – מַאי קָעָבֵיד?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects this suggestion: **What are the circumstances? If we say that without him** the bench **would never have broken** under the weight of the first five people, then it **is obvious** that the last individual is liable for all the damage, as ultimately it was his action alone that caused the damage. **Rather,** it must be that **even without him** the bench **would have broken** under the weight of the first five people, and the last individual sat down just as it was about to break. The Gemara asks: But if that is the case, **what did he do,** i.e., why should he be liable at all? It is apparent, then, that the mishna is not referring to this case.


###### Bava Kamma 10b:4
[Bava Kamma 10b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/10b:4)

סוֹף סוֹף, מַתְנִיתָא הֵיכָא מִתָּרְצָא?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **Ultimately, how is the *baraita*** cited by Rav Pappa to be **explained?** As the Gemara explained, the ruling of the *baraita* is understandable only if it is referring to a case where the bench would not have broken without him. But if that is the case, as the Gemara noted, it is obvious and therefore unnecessary to state it.


###### Bava Kamma 10b:5
[Bava Kamma 10b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/10b:5)

לָא צְרִיכָא; דִּבְלָאו אִיהוּ הָוֵי מִיתְּבַר בִּתְרֵי שָׁעֵי, וְהַשְׁתָּא אִיתְּבַר בַּחֲדָא שָׁעָה; דְּאָמְרִי לֵיהּ: אִי לָאו אַתְּ – הָוֵי יָתְבִינַן טְפֵי פּוּרְתָּא, וְקָיְימִין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains: **No,** it is **necessary** in a case **where without him it would have broken in two hours, and now it broke in one hour.** The *baraita* teaches that the last individual alone is liable and not the first five, **as they can say to** the last individual: **Were it not for you, we would have sat a little bit more and** then **stood up;** consequently, the bench would never have broken. Therefore, it was ultimately you who caused the bench to break, and therefore only you are liable.


###### Bava Kamma 10b:6
[Bava Kamma 10b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/10b:6)

וְלֵימָא לְהוּ: אִי לָאו אַתּוּן – בְּדִידִי לָא הֲוָה מִיתְּבַר!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects this suggestion, because in that situation the last individual would have a valid counterclaim: **But let him say to them: Were it not for you** continuing to sit on the bench after I sat down, the bench would not have broken, as **under my** weight alone **it would not have broken.** Accordingly, we should share the liability for damaging it.


###### Bava Kamma 10b:7
[Bava Kamma 10b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/10b:7)

לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּבַהֲדֵי דְּסָמֵיךְ בְּהוּ, תְּבַר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara offers a different suggestion: **No,** it is **necessary** in a case **where** instantaneously, **as he was leaning upon** the other five people, **the bench broke.**


###### Bava Kamma 10b:8
[Bava Kamma 10b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/10b:8)

פְּשִׁיטָא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: If so, it **is obvious** that he alone is liable, as his action alone caused the damage, and the other five could not have done anything to prevent it as he was leaning upon them.


###### Bava Kamma 10b:9
[Bava Kamma 10b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/10b:9)

מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא, כֹּחוֹ – לָאו כְּגוּפוֹ דָּמֵי; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּכֹחוֹ כְּגוּפוֹ דָּמֵי, דְּכֹל הֵיכָא דְּגוּפוֹ תָּבַר – כֹּחוֹ נָמֵי תָּבַר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains: The ruling is necessary **lest you say** that when one causes damage with **one’s direct force** it **is not equivalent to** a situation where one causes damage with **one’s body.** If he broke the bench by actually sitting down upon it, his action would be considered a direct act of damage completed with his body and he alone would be liable even though the other peoples’ weight was a contributing factor. In this case, since he broke the bench by merely leaning upon the others sitting there, it is his force that led to the damage, not his body, and one might have thought that since the weight of the others certainly contributed to the breakage they should share liability. Therefore, the *baraita* **teaches us that** causing damage with **one’s direct force is equivalent to** causing damage with **one’s body.** And it teaches that the *halakha* is **that anywhere that** one would be liable if **his body broke** something, one is **also** liable if **his force broke** something.


###### Bava Kamma 10b:10
[Bava Kamma 10b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/10b:10)

וְתוּ לֵיכָּא? וְהָא אִיכָּא הָא דְּתַנְיָא: הִכּוּהוּ עֲשָׂרָה בְּנֵי אָדָם בְּעֶשֶׂר מַקְלוֹת, בֵּין בְּבַת אַחַת בֵּין בָּזֶה אַחַר זֶה, וָמֵת – כּוּלָּן פְּטוּרִין. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בְּתֵירָא אוֹמֵר: בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה – הָאַחֲרוֹן חַיָּיב, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁקֵּירַב אֶת מִיתָתוֹ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara continues to consider the possibility that there are additional cases covered by the mishna’s ruling aside from the one listed in the *baraita*: **And are there not more** cases? **But isn’t there** also the case of **that which is taught** in a *baraita*: If one **was beaten by ten people with ten sticks, whether** they beat him **simultaneously or one after the other, and he died, they are all exempt** from liability for killing him. **Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says:** Where they beat him **sequentially, the last** individual to beat him alone **is liable, because he hastened his death.** In this case, the other individuals contributed to the man’s death, but the last one alone is liable. Why didn’t the *baraita* also mention this case?


###### Bava Kamma 10b:11
[Bava Kamma 10b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/10b:11)

בִּקְטָלָא לָא קָמַיְירֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains: The *baraita* **is not speaking of** one’s liability to receive **the death penalty,** only of one’s liability to pay damages.


###### Bava Kamma 10b:12
[Bava Kamma 10b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/10b:12)

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: בִּפְלוּגְתָּא לָא קָמַיְירֵי. וְלָא?! וְהָא אוֹקֵימְנַן דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי! דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי – וּכְרַבָּנַן, מוֹקְמִינַן; כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בְּתֵירָא – וְלָא כְּרַבָּנַן, לָא מוֹקְמִינַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if you wish, say** instead that the *baraita* **is not speaking of** an issue that is the subject of **a dispute.** The Gemara asks: **But isn’t** it? **But didn’t we uphold that** the case stated in the *baraita* concerning a pit is subject to a dispute, and **it is not in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi, but of the Rabbis? The Gemara explains: **We will interpret** the *baraita* to be **in accordance with** the opinion of **the Rabbis and not** to be **in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi, but **we will not interpret** it to be **in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira and not in accordance with** the opinion of **the Rabbis.** In other words, although we will interpret the *baraita* as referring to a case that is subject to a dispute, that applies only if it is in accordance with the majority opinion in that dispute.


###### Bava Kamma 10b:13
[Bava Kamma 10b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/10b:13)

חַבְתִּי בְּתַשְׁלוּמֵי נִזְקוֹ. ״חַבְתִּי בְּנִזְקוֹ״ לָא קָתָנֵי, אֶלָּא ״בְּתַשְׁלוּמֵי נִזְקוֹ״,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna teaches: In any case in which I facilitated part of the damage it caused, **I am liable for payments** of restitution **for damage it** caused, as if I were the one who facilitated the entire damage. The Gemara notes that the mishna **does not teach: I am liable for the damage it** caused, **rather:** I am liable **for payments** of restitution **for damage it** caused. The Hebrew terms: Payments of restitution [*tashlumim*], and: To complete [*lehashlim*], share the same Hebrew root. This alludes to the *halakha* that the payment of damages is required only in order to complete the injured party’s compensation, which is already partially accounted for, as the injured party is able to recover his dead animal’s current value by selling its carcass. Accordingly, the one liable for the damage is not required to pay the animal’s prior value; rather, he must pay only the difference in its value from before it was damaged and its current state.


###### Bava Kamma 10b:14
[Bava Kamma 10b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/10b:14)

תְּנֵינָא לְהָא דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: תַּשְׁלוּמֵי נֶזֶק – מְלַמֵּד שֶׁהַבְּעָלִים מִטַּפְּלִין בַּנְּבֵילָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara notes: **We** already **learned this, as the Sages taught** in a *baraita*: The mishna uses the term: **Payments** of restitution **for damage,** as opposed to simply stating: One is liable for the damage caused, to allude to the *halakha* that the one who is liable must pay only for the decrease in the value of the animal. This assumes that the injured party is able to recover his animal’s current value by selling the carcass. Therefore, the mishna **teaches that the owner** of the injured animal **attends to,** i.e., retains ownership of, **the animal carcass** so that, if he wishes to, he may sell it and keep the proceeds.


###### Bava Kamma 10b:15
[Bava Kamma 10b:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/10b:15)

מְנָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי? אָמַר רַבִּי אַמֵּי, דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״מַכֵּה נֶפֶשׁ בְּהֵמָה, יְשַׁלְּמֶנָּה״ – אַל תִּקְרֵי ״יְשַׁלְּמֶנָּה״, אֶלָּא ״יַשְׁלִימֶנָּה״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **From where are these matters** derived? **Rabbi Ami said: As the verse states: “One who strikes an animal shall pay for it [*yeshallemenna*]”** (Leviticus 24:18). **Do not read** the final word ***yeshallemenna*,** meaning he shall pay for it; **rather,** read it as though it were vocalized as ***yashlimenna*,** meaning he shall complete it, to teach that he shall complete the injured party’s compensation, which is already partially accounted for by the injured party’s right to sell his animal’s carcass.


###### Bava Kamma 10b:16
[Bava Kamma 10b:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/10b:16)

רַב כָּהֲנָא אָמַר, מֵהָכָא: ״אִם טָרֹף יִטָּרֵף יְבִאֵהוּ עֵד, הַטְּרֵפָה לֹא יְשַׁלֵּם״ – ״עַד טְרֵפָה יְשַׁלֵּם״, טְרֵפָה עַצְמָהּ לֹא יְשַׁלֵּם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Kahana said** that this *halakha* is derived **from here:** The verse states with regard to a case where an animal was entrusted with a paid bailee who did not fulfill his duty to safeguard it, and the animal was attacked by a wild beast: **“If it be torn in pieces, let him bring a witness, the torn animal he shall not pay”** (Exodus 22:12). Rav Kahana expounds the verse to mean that **he shall pay** only up **until** the value of the **torn animal;** but **he shall not pay** for the **torn animal itself.** In other words, he pays only the difference in value between the animal before it was injured and its current torn state. If the owner of the injured animal wishes to fully recover his loss he must sell the animal’s carcass and keep the proceeds.


###### Bava Kamma 10b:17
[Bava Kamma 10b:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/10b:17)

חִזְקִיָּה אָמַר, מֵהָכָא: ״וְהַמֵּת יִהְיֶה לוֹ״ – לַנִּיזָּק.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Ḥizkiyya said** that this *halakha* is derived **from here:** The verse states with regard to a person’s ox that fatally gored another ox: “He shall pay an ox for the ox, **and the carcass shall be his”** (Exodus 21:36), meaning the carcass belongs **to the injured** party, the owner of the gored animal.


###### Bava Kamma 10b:18
[Bava Kamma 10b:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/10b:18)

וְכֵן תָּנָא דְּבֵי חִזְקִיָּה: ״וְהַמֵּת יִהְיֶה לוֹ״ – לַנִּיזָּק. אַתָּה אוֹמֵר לַנִּיזָּק, אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא לַמַּזִּיק? אָמַרְתָּ: לֹא כָּךְ הָיָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And similarly, the school of Ḥizkiyya taught** in a *baraita*: The verse states: **“And the carcass shall be his”** (Exodus 21:36). The verse means the carcass belongs **to the injured** party. Do **you say** it belongs **to the injured** party? **Or** perhaps **it** belongs **only to the one liable for the damage?** To this suggestion, **you should say: It could not have been that.**


###### Bava Kamma 10b:19
[Bava Kamma 10b:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/10b:19)

מַאי ״לֹא כָּךְ הָיָה״?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **What** does the *baraita* mean by: **It could not have been that?**


###### Bava Kamma 10b:20
[Bava Kamma 10b:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/10b:20)

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: אִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ נְבֵילָה דְּמַזִּיק הָוְיָא, לִיכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא ״שׁוֹר תַּחַת הַשּׁוֹר״, וְלִישְׁתּוֹק; ״וְהַמֵּת יִהְיֶה לוֹ״ לְמָה לִי? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ – לַנִּיזָּק.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Abaye said: If it enters your mind** to say that the **animal carcass is** the property **of the one liable for the damage, let the Merciful One write:** “He shall pay **an ox for the ox,” and** then **be silent** and state no more. **Why do I** need the verse to continue: **“And the carcass shall be his”? Conclude from it** that the carcass belongs **to the injured** party.


###### Bava Kamma 10b:21
[Bava Kamma 10b:21](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/10b:21)

וּצְרִיכָא; דְּאִי כְּתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״מַכֵּה בְּהֵמָה יְשַׁלְּמֶנָּה״ – מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא שְׁכִיחָא; אֲבָל טְרֵפָה, דִּשְׁכִיחָא – אֵימָא לָא; צְרִיכָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara notes: **And** it is **necessary** to have multiple sources for this *halakha*, **as if the Merciful One wrote** only: **“One who strikes an animal shall pay for it,”** I could claim that only in that case does one have to pay for only part of the damage **because it is an uncommon** occurrence. **But** in the case of **a torn animal, which is a common** occurrence, **I will say** that his liability should **not** be limited to the difference in value between what the animal had been worth and the carcass, but he should pay for the entire value of the injured animal. Therefore, it is **necessary** to explicitly state the *halakha* also in that case.


###### Bava Kamma 10b:22
[Bava Kamma 10b:22](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/10b:22)

וְאִי אַשְׁמוֹעִינַן טְרֵפָה – מִשּׁוּם דְּמִמֵּילָא; אֲבָל מַכֵּה בְּהֵמָה, דִּבְיָדַיִם – אֵימָא לָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if** the Torah **had taught us only** the case of **a torn animal,** I could claim that only in that case does one have to pay for only part of the damage **because** the damage occurred **by itself,** i.e., it was not directly caused by the one liable for it. **But** in the case of **one who strikes an animal,** who does so **by** direct **action, I will say that** his liability should **not** be limited. Therefore, it is necessary to explicitly state the *halakha* also in that case.


###### Bava Kamma 10b:23
[Bava Kamma 10b:23](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/10b:23)

וְאִי אַשְׁמוֹעִינַן הָנֵי תַּרְתֵּי – הָא מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא שְׁכִיחָא, וְהָא מִשּׁוּם דְּמִמֵּילָא; אֲבָל ״וְהַמֵּת יִהְיֶה לוֹ״ – דִּשְׁכִיחָא וּבְיָדַיִם, אֵימָא לָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if** the Torah **had taught us only these two** cases, I could claim that only in those cases does one have to pay for only part of the damage, **this** one **because** it is **an uncommon** occurrence, **and that** one **because** the damage occurred **by itself. But** in a case where one’s ox gores another’s ox, of which the Torah states: **“And the carcass shall be his,” which is a common** occurrence, and the damage is considered to have been inflicted **by** its owner’s direct **action,** since it was under his guard, **I will say** his liability should **not** be limited.


###### Bava Kamma 10b:24
[Bava Kamma 10b:24](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/10b:24)

וְאִי אַשְׁמוֹעִינַן ״הַמֵּת יִהְיֶה לוֹ״ – מִשּׁוּם דְּמָמוֹנָא קָא מַזֵּיק; אֲבָל הָכָא, דִּבְגוּפָא מַזֵּיק – אֵימָא לָא, צְרִיכָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if** the Torah **had taught us** only the case in the verse **“And the carcass shall be his,”** I could claim that only in that case does one have to pay for only part of the damage **because** it is one’s **property** that **causes damage. But here,** in the case of one who strikes another’s animal, **where one causes damage with** one’s own **body, I will say** his liability should **not** be limited. Therefore, it is **necessary** to explicitly state the *halakha* in each case.


###### Bava Kamma 10b:25
[Bava Kamma 10b:25](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/10b:25)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב כָּהֲנָא לְרַב: אֶלָּא טַעְמָא דִּכְתַב רַחֲמָנָא ״וְהַמֵּת יִהְיֶה לוֹ״, הָא לָאו הָכִי הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: נְבֵילָה – דְּמַזִּיק הָוְיָא?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Kahana said to Rav: But** according to the statement of Ḥizkiyya, as explained by Abaye, **the** only **reason** the injured party retains ownership of the carcass is **that the Merciful One wrote: “And the carcass shall be his,”** but were **it not for that I would say** that **the carcass is** the property **of the one liable for the damage.**


###### Bava Kamma 10b:26
[Bava Kamma 10b:26](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/10b:26)

הַשְׁתָּא אִי אִית לֵיהּ לְדִידֵיהּ כַּמָּה טְרֵיפוֹת – יָהֵיב לֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר מָר: ״יָשִׁיב״ – לְרַבּוֹת שָׁוֶה כֶּסֶף, וַאֲפִילּוּ סוּבִּין; דִּידֵיהּ מִבַּעְיָא?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rav Kahana questions the need for the Torah to teach this: **Now, if** the one liable for the damage **had** in his possession the carcasses of **several torn animals, he could give** the injured party a carcass as payment, **as the Master said** above (7a): The verse states: **“He shall recompense”** (Exodus 21:34), **to include** items **worth money, and even bran,** a relatively inferior commodity, as valid items with which to pay restitution. **Is it necessary** for the Torah to teach that he can pay restitution with **his,** i.e., the injured party’s, animal carcass? Granting ownership of the carcass to the injured party seems pointless, because even had the Torah granted it to the one liable for the damage, he could give it to the injured party as payment.


###### Bava Kamma 10b:27
[Bava Kamma 10b:27](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/10b:27)

לֹא נִצְרְכָא אֶלָּא לִפְחַת נְבֵילָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains: It **is necessary only for** the issue of who sustains the loss due to the **diminishing** value **of the carcass** between its death and when the case is brought before the court. By granting ownership of the carcass to the injured party from the moment of the animal’s death, the Torah limits the damages to the difference between the value of the animal when it was alive and its value immediately after it is killed, irrespective of what happens to the carcass afterward.


###### Bava Kamma 10b:28
[Bava Kamma 10b:28](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/10b:28)

לֵימָא פְּחַת נְבֵילָה תַּנָּאֵי הִיא? דְּתַנְיָא: ״אִם טָרֹף יִטָּרֵף יְבִיאֵהוּ עֵד״ –

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **Shall we say** that the issue of the **diminishing** value **of the carcass is** a dispute between ***tanna’im*? As it is taught** in a *baraita*: The verse states with regard to a case where an animal was entrusted with a paid bailee and was attacked by a wild beast: **“If it be torn in pieces, let him bring a witness [*ed*]”** (Exodus 22:12).