## Bava Kamma Daf 22a

###### Bava Kamma 22a:1
[Bava Kamma 22a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/22a:1)

וְהָתַנְיָא: הַכֶּלֶב וְהַגְּדִי שֶׁדִּילְּגוּ; בֵּין מִלְּמַעְלָה לְמַטָּה, בֵּין מִלְּמַטָּה לְמַעְלָה – פְּטוּרִין! תַּרְגְּמַאּ רַב פָּפָּא: דְּאָפֵיךְ מֵיפָךְ – כַּלְבָּא בִּזְקִירָא וְגַדְיָא בִּסְרִיכָא. אִי הָכִי, אַמַּאי פְּטוּרִים? פָּטוּר מִנֶּזֶק שָׁלֵם, וְחַיָּיבִין בַּחֲצִי נֶזֶק.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **But isn’t it taught** in a *baraita*: **If a dog or a goat jumped,** regardless of **whether** they jumped **from above to below or from below to above,** their owners are **exempt** from all liability? **Rav Pappa interpreted** it in the following way: Their manners of movement **were changed** from the typical manner of movement for their species. The **dog** moved **by leaping [*bizkira*],** while the **goat** moved **by climbing [*bisrikha*].** The Gemara asks: **If that is so, why** are the owners **exempt** from liability? After all, they still caused damage. The Gemara answers: The *baraita* does not intend to say that they are completely exempt, but that they are **exempt from** paying **the full** cost of the **damage; they are,** however, **liable** to pay **half** the cost of **the damage,** as is the *halakha* in any case of damage caused by atypical behavior, as such acts are classified as Goring.


###### Bava Kamma 22a:2
[Bava Kamma 22a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/22a:2)

הַכֶּלֶב שֶׁנָּטַל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna teaches: With regard to **a dog that took** a cake that had been baked directly on hot coals, and went to a stack of grain to eat it, and it ate the cake and at the same time ignited the stack of grain with a coal that it had taken along with the cake, the owner of the dog must pay the full cost of the damage for the cake, and he must pay for half the cost of the damage to the stack of grain.


###### Bava Kamma 22a:3
[Bava Kamma 22a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/22a:3)

אִתְּמַר, רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אִשּׁוֹ – מִשּׁוּם חִצָּיו. וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: אִשּׁוֹ – מִשּׁוּם מָמוֹנוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
With regard to damage caused by a fire lit by one person spreading to a location other than where it was lit, the Gemara cites a dispute among the *amora’im*: **It was stated: Rabbi Yoḥanan says:** His liability for damage caused by **his fire is due to** its similarity to **his arrows,** meaning that damage caused by a fire in a location other than where it was lit is comparable to damage caused by an arrow shot at a distant target. **And Reish Lakish says:** His liability for the damage caused by **his fire is due to** its similarity to **his property;** he is responsible for this damage just as he is responsible for damage caused elsewhere by any of his possessions, e.g., one of his animals.


###### Bava Kamma 22a:4
[Bava Kamma 22a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/22a:4)

וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ – מַאי טַעְמָא לָא אָמַר כְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן? אָמַר לָךְ: חִצָּיו – מִכֹּחוֹ קָאָזְלִי, הַאי – לָא מִכֹּחוֹ קָאָזֵיל. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן – מַאי טַעְמָא לָא אָמַר כְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ? אָמַר לָךְ: מָמוֹנָא – אִית בֵּיהּ מַמָּשָׁא, הָא – לֵית בֵּיהּ מַמָּשָׁא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And what is the reason** that **Reish Lakish did not state** his opinion **in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yoḥanan?** The Gemara answers: He could have **said to you** that fire is not comparable to an arrow, as **an arrow proceeds** as a result **of his** direct **force,** while **this** fire **does not proceed** as a result **of his** direct **force,** but requires a wind to carry it from the location where it was lit to the location of the damage. The Gemara asks about the other opinion: **And what is the reason** that **Rabbi Yoḥanan did not state** his opinion **in accordance with** the opinion of **Reish Lakish?** The Gemara answers: He could have **said to you** that one’s fire is not comparable to his possessions, as **property is** a tangible **substance** but **this** fire **is not** a tangible **substance.**


###### Bava Kamma 22a:5
[Bava Kamma 22a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/22a:5)

תְּנַן: הַכֶּלֶב שֶׁנָּטַל חֲרָרָה כּוּ׳. בִּשְׁלָמָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: אִשּׁוֹ מִשּׁוּם חִצָּיו – חִצָּיו דְּכֶלֶב הוּא;

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara attempts to settle the dispute: **We learned** in the mishna: With regard to **a dog that took a cake** that had been baked directly on hot coals, and went to a stack of grain to eat it, and it ate the cake and at the same time ignited the stack of grain with a coal that it had taken along with the cake, the owner of the dog must pay the full cost of the damage for the cake, and he must pay for half the cost of the damage to the stack of grain. **Granted, according to the one who says** that one’s liability for damage caused by **his fire is due to** its similarity to **his arrows,** this fire is similar to **the arrows of the dog,** and therefore he must pay for half the cost of the damage caused by the dog’s force, as in a case of pebbles.


###### Bava Kamma 22a:6
[Bava Kamma 22a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/22a:6)

אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר: אִשּׁוֹ מִשּׁוּם מָמוֹנוֹ – הַאי אֵשׁ, לָאו מָמוֹנוֹ דְּבַעַל כֶּלֶב הוּא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But according to the one who says** that one’s liability for damage caused by **his fire is due to** its similarity to **his property, this fire** is **not the property of the owner of the dog;** rather, it is the property of the owner of the cake, so why is the owner of the dog liable?


###### Bava Kamma 22a:7
[Bava Kamma 22a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/22a:7)

אָמַר לָךְ רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – דְּאַדְּיֵיהּ אַדּוֹיֵי; דְּעַל חֲרָרָה מְשַׁלֵּם נֶזֶק שָׁלֵם, וְעַל מָקוֹם גַּחֶלֶת מְשַׁלֵּם חֲצִי נֶזֶק, וְעַל גָּדִישׁ כּוּלֵּהּ פָּטוּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **Reish Lakish** could have **said to you: With what are we dealing here?** We are dealing with a case where the dog took the coal and did not place the cake on the stack, rather **it threw it** onto the stack. The ruling of the mishna is: **For the cake** which the dog ate, the owner **must pay the full** cost of the **damage,** and **for the** specific **spot** on the stack of grain that was damaged by the throwing of the **coal** there, the owner must **pay for half** the cost of **the damage** as in a case of pebbles. **And for the stack** of grain **as a whole,** he is **exempt,** because his liability for damage caused by the spread of the fire is due to its similarity to his property, and in this case it was not his property.


###### Bava Kamma 22a:8
[Bava Kamma 22a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/22a:8)

וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן – דְּאַנְּחַהּ אַנּוֹחֵי; עַל חֲרָרָה וְעַל מְקוֹם גַּחֶלֶת מְשַׁלֵּם נֶזֶק שָׁלֵם, וְעַל הַגָּדִישׁ מְשַׁלֵּם חֲצִי נֶזֶק.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But Rabbi Yoḥanan** can explain the mishna in a more straightforward manner. It is discussing a case **where** the dog **placed** the cake with the coal directly on the stack of grain in order to eat the cake. Accordingly, the owner of the dog must **pay the full** cost of the **damage for the cake and for the** specific **spot** where the **coal** was put down, as these cases of damage were caused directly by the dog. **And for** the rest of **the stack** of grain, he must **pay for half** the cost of **the damage,** because in Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion one is liable for the damage caused by fire due to its similarity to arrows shot by his force. The damage to the rest of the stack of grain is an indirect result of the dog’s force, and therefore his liability is according the *halakhot* of pebbles.


###### Bava Kamma 22a:9
[Bava Kamma 22a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/22a:9)

תָּא שְׁמַע: גָּמָל טָעוּן פִּשְׁתָּן וְעָבַר בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים; נִכְנְסָה פִּשְׁתָּנוֹ לְתוֹךְ הַחֲנוּת (וְדָלְקוּ), [וְדָלְקָה] בְּנֵרוֹ שֶׁל חֶנְווֹנִי, וְהִדְלִיק אֶת הַבִּירָה – בַּעַל גָּמָל חַיָּיב. הִנִּיחַ חֶנְווֹנִי נֵרוֹ מִבַּחוּץ – חֶנְווֹנִי חַיָּיב. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בְּנֵר חֲנוּכָּה – פָּטוּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests: **Come** and **hear** a proof from a mishna (62b): In the case of **a camel** that was **laden with flax and was passing through the public domain,** and **its flax extended into a store** at the edge of the public domain, **and** the flax **caught fire from a lamp** in the store **belonging to the storekeeper, and** as a result of the burning flax the camel **set fire to the building** together with all its contents, **the owner of the camel** is **liable** for the damage. But if **the storekeeper placed his lamp outside** in the public domain, thereby causing the flax on the camel to catch fire, and consequently the building was set on fire, **the storekeeper** is **liable. Rabbi Yehuda says: In** a case where the lamp placed outside was **a Hanukkah lamp,** the storekeeper is **exempt** from liability, as there is a mitzva to place a Hanukkah lamp outside.


###### Bava Kamma 22a:10
[Bava Kamma 22a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/22a:10)

בִּשְׁלָמָא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר אִשּׁוֹ מִשּׁוּם חִצָּיו – חִצָּיו דְּגָמָל הוּא. אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר מִשּׁוּם מָמוֹנוֹ – הַאי אֵשׁ, לָאו מָמוֹנָא דְּבַעַל גָּמָל הוּא! אָמַר לָךְ רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – בִּמְסַכְסֶכֶת כׇּל הַבִּירָה כּוּלָּהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Granted, according to the one who says** that one’s liability for the damage caused by **his fire is due to** its similarity to **his arrows,** the fire in the store **is** similar to **the arrows of the camel,** and that is why the camel’s owner is liable. **But according to the one who says** that liability for the damage **is due to** its similarity to **his property, this fire** is **not the property of the owner of the camel.** The Gemara answers: **Reish Lakish** could have **said to you: With what are we dealing here?** We are dealing with a case **where** the camel moved the burning flax around and **ignited the entire building,** lighting one spot after another. The fire did not need to spread since the camel directly set the building on fire in each of those spots, and therefore this case is comparable to that of a dog who moved the coal around from place to place.


###### Bava Kamma 22a:11
[Bava Kamma 22a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/22a:11)

אִי הָכִי, אֵימָא סֵיפָא: אִם הִנִּיחַ חֶנְווֹנִי נֵרוֹ מִבַּחוּץ – חֶנְווֹנִי חַיָּיב. וְאִי בִּמְסַכְסֶכֶת – אַמַּאי חַיָּיב? בְּשֶׁעָמְדָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **If that is so, say the latter clause** of the mishna: If **the storekeeper placed his lamp outside, the storekeeper** is **liable. And if** the case is one **where** the camel **ignited** the entire building, spot by spot, **why** is the storekeeper **liable?** His fire did not spread through the building; it was the camel that moved it around from one place to another. The Gemara answers: The case is one **where** the camel did not move around, but rather **stood** still, but since there was an extremely large load of flax on its back, once it caught fire it ignited the entire building simultaneously.


###### Bava Kamma 22a:12
[Bava Kamma 22a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/22a:12)

עָמְדָה וְסִכְסְכָה – כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן דְּחֶנְווֹנִי פָּטוּר וּבַעַל גָּמָל חַיָּיב! אָמַר רַב הוּנָא בַּר מָנוֹחַ מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב אִיקָא: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – כְּגוֹן שֶׁעָמְדָה לְהַטִּיל מֵימֶיהָ;

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: If the camel **stood** without moving from place to place, but did shift the load on its back and thereby **ignited** the entire building, **all the more so** it should be **that the storekeeper** should be **exempt** from any liability **and the owner of** the **camel** should be **liable,** as it was his responsibility to move the camel away from there. **Rav Huna bar Manoah said in the name of Rav Ika: With what are we dealing here?** We are dealing with a case **where** the camel **stood** still in order **to urinate** and while doing so set the building ablaze; in that case the incident is deemed an accident as the owner could not have moved the camel from the spot.