## Bava Kamma Daf 25a

###### Bava Kamma 25a:1
[Bava Kamma 25a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/25a:1)

לֹא אָדוּן קֶרֶן מִקֶּרֶן, אֲנִי אָדוּן קֶרֶן מֵרֶגֶל – וּמָה בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁהֵקֵל עַל הַשֵּׁן וְעַל הָרֶגֶל, בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים – הֶחְמִיר בַּקֶּרֶן; מָקוֹם שֶׁהֶחְמִיר עַל הַשֵּׁן וְעַל הָרֶגֶל, בִּרְשׁוּת הַנִּיזָּק – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁנַּחְמִיר בַּקֶּרֶן?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**will not derive an inference** with regard to **Goring from** a different case of **Goring. I will** instead **derive an inference** with regard to **Goring from Trampling: And if in a place where** the Torah **was lenient with regard to** damage classified as **Eating and Trampling,** specifically **in the public domain,** as the owner is exempt from liability, nevertheless the Torah was **strict with regard to** damage classified as **Goring,** requiring him to pay half the cost of the damage, then in **a place where** the Torah **was strict with regard to** damage classified as **Eating and Trampling,** specifically **on the property of the injured** party as the animal’s owner is obligated to pay the full cost of the damage, **is it not right that we** should **be** equally **strict with regard to** damage classified as **Goring** and require payment of the full cost of the damage in this case as well?


###### Bava Kamma 25a:2
[Bava Kamma 25a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/25a:2)

אָמְרוּ לוֹ: דַּיּוֹ לַבָּא מִן הַדִּין – לִהְיוֹת כַּנִּדּוֹן. מָה בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים – חֲצִי נֶזֶק, אַף בִּרְשׁוּת הַנִּיזָּק – חֲצִי נֶזֶק.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Rabbis **said to him:** Here as well, **it is sufficient for the** conclusion that **emerges from** an *a fortiori* **inference to be like** its **source,** and therefore, **just as** one is liable to pay **half** the cost of **the damage** classified as Goring **in the public domain, so too,** for damage classified as Goring **on the property of the injured** party he will be liable to pay only **half** the cost of **the damage,** as ultimately your inference still depends on the fact that for Goring in the public domain one pays half the cost of the damage.


###### Bava Kamma 25a:3
[Bava Kamma 25a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/25a:3)

**גְּמָ׳** וְרַבִּי טַרְפוֹן לֵית לֵיהּ דַּיּוֹ?! וְהָא דַּיּוֹ דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא הוּא! דְּתַנְיָא: מִדִּין קַל וְחוֹמֶר – כֵּיצַד? ״וַיֹּאמֶר ה׳ אֶל מֹשֶׁה: וְאָבִיהָ יָרֹק יָרַק בְּפָנֶיהָ, הֲלֹא תִכָּלֵם שִׁבְעַת יָמִים?!״ – קַל וְחוֹמֶר לַשְּׁכִינָה, אַרְבָּעָה עָשָׂר יוֹם! אֶלָּא דַּיּוֹ לַבָּא מִן הַדִּין לִהְיוֹת כַּנִּדּוֹן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**GEMARA:** **And** is it true that **Rabbi Tarfon does not accept** the principle of: **It is sufficient** for the conclusion that emerges from an *a fortiori* inference to be like its source? **But** that cannot be, as the principle that begins with: **It is sufficient, is** an aspect **of Torah law, as it is taught** in a *baraita*: The Sages said that one of the ways in which the Torah may be interpreted is **by an *a fortiori* inference. How** is this **so?** It is written (Numbers 12:14): **“And the Lord said to Moses: If her father had but spit in her face, should she not hide in shame seven days?** Let her be shut up seven days outside the camp, and after that she shall be brought in again,” and therefore, using **an *a fortiori*** inference it can be derived **that** if **the Divine Presence** reprimanded her, she should hide in shame for **fourteen days.** Why was Miriam banished for only seven days? **Rather,** it is because **it is sufficient** for the conclusion **that emerged from the** *a fortiori* **inference to be like the source** of the inference. Consequently, this principle is mandated by the Torah itself.


###### Bava Kamma 25a:4
[Bava Kamma 25a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/25a:4)

כִּי לֵית לֵיהּ דַּיּוֹ – הֵיכָא דְּמִפְּרִיךְ קַל וָחוֹמֶר; הֵיכָא דְּלָא מִפְּרִיךְ קַל וָחוֹמֶר – אִית לֵיהּ דַּיּוֹ. הָתָם – שִׁבְעָה דִּשְׁכִינָה לָא כְּתִיבִי; אֲתָא קַל וָחוֹמֶר אַיְיתִי אַרְבֵּסַר, אֲתָא דַּיּוֹ אַפֵּיק שִׁבְעָה, וְאוֹקֵי שִׁבְעָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **When** Rabbi Tarfon **does not accept** the principle: **It is sufficient,** it is **where** this principle completely **refutes** the ***a fortiori*** inference, leaving no *halakha* derived from it. But **where it does not** completely **refute** the ***a fortiori*** inference, Rabbi Tarfon **accepts** the principle: **It is sufficient.** Consequently, **there,** with regard to Miriam, the **seven** days during which she deserved to be banished from the camp due to the rebuke **of the Divine Presence were not written,** so **the *a fortiori*** inference **came** and **brought** those days plus additional days, adding up to a total of **fourteen,** and then the principle: **It is sufficient, came** and **removed seven** days **and left seven** days intact. Consequently, the *a fortiori* inference was effective with regard to the seven days during which she was banished from the camp.


###### Bava Kamma 25a:5
[Bava Kamma 25a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/25a:5)

אֲבָל הָכָא – חֲצִי נֶזֶק כְּתִיב; וַאֲתָא קַל וָחוֹמֶר וְאַיְיתִי חֲצִי נֶזֶק אַחֲרִינָא, וְנַעֲשָׂה נֶזֶק שָׁלֵם; אִי דָּרְשַׁתְּ דַּיּוֹ – אִפְּרִיךְ לֵיהּ קַל וָחוֹמֶר!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But here,** payment for **half** the cost of **the damage is written** explicitly in the Torah with regard to the *halakha* of Goring in the public domain, **and the *a fortiori*** inference **comes and brings an additional** payment for **half** the cost of **the damage, forming** a payment of **the full** cost of the **damage. If you interpret** the *halakha* employing the principle: **It is sufficient,** to reduce the payment to half the cost of the damage, this completely **refutes** the ***a fortiori*** inference, as no *halakha* would be derived from the inference; the initial payment for half the cost of the damage was written explicitly in the Torah. Consequently, in this case, Rabbi Tarfon does not employ the principle: It is sufficient.


###### Bava Kamma 25a:6
[Bava Kamma 25a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/25a:6)

וְרַבָּנַן, שִׁבְעָה דִשְׁכִינָה כְּתִיבִי – ״תִּסָּגֵר שִׁבְעַת יָמִים״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And** how do **the Rabbis** understand this matter? How do they respond to Rabbi Tarfon’s reasoning? The Gemara answers: In their opinion, the **seven** days during which Miriam had to be banished due to the reprimand she received **from the Divine Presence** are in fact **written** in the Torah: **“Let her be shut up seven days.”** This indicates that the *a fortiori* inference is not required to teach the *halakha* of the seven days she was banished, as it would have added only the extra seven days. This means that according to the Rabbis, there is a source in the Torah that the principle: It is sufficient, is employed even when it refutes the *a fortiori* inference completely.


###### Bava Kamma 25a:7
[Bava Kamma 25a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/25a:7)

וְרַבִּי טַרְפוֹן, הָהוּא ״תִּסָּגֵר״ – דְּדָרְשִׁינַן דַּיּוֹ הוּא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And** what would **Rabbi Tarfon** say about that reasoning? The Gemara answers: He would say that **this** verse: **“Let her be shut up** seven days,” is necessary to teach us the basic fact **that we interpret** the *halakha* according to the principle: **It is sufficient** for the conclusion that emerges from an *a fortiori* inference to be like its source.


###### Bava Kamma 25a:8
[Bava Kamma 25a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/25a:8)

וְרַבָּנַן, כְּתִיב קְרָא אַחֲרִינָא – ״וַתִּסָּגֵר מִרְיָם״. וְרַבִּי טַרְפוֹן, הָהוּא – דַּאֲפִילּוּ בְּעָלְמָא דָּרְשִׁינַן דַּיּוֹ, וְלֹא תֹּאמַר: הָכָא – מִשּׁוּם כְּבוֹדוֹ שֶׁל מֹשֶׁה, אֲבָל בְּעָלְמָא לָא; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And** what would **the Rabbis** say in response? The Gemara answers: They would point out that **a different verse is written** about Miriam: **“And Miriam was shut up** outside the camp seven days” (Numbers 12:15). The Gemara asks: **And** how would **Rabbi Tarfon** respond to that? The Gemara answers: **That** verse teaches **that we interpret** the *halakha* according to the principle: **It is sufficient, even generally,** and not only in this specific case. **And** this point is necessary so that **you do not say: Here** the principle: It is sufficient, is employed **due to respect for Moses, but generally** that is **not** done. This verse therefore **teaches us** that this is not so.


###### Bava Kamma 25a:9
[Bava Kamma 25a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/25a:9)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְאַבָּיֵי: וְהָא הַאי תַּנָּא, דְּלָא דָּרֵישׁ דַּיּוֹ, וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא מִפְּרִיךְ קַל וָחוֹמֶר! דְּתַנְיָא: קֶרִי בְּזָב מִנַּיִין? וְדִין הוּא, מָה טָהוֹר בְּטָהוֹר – טָמֵא בְּטָמֵא; טָמֵא בְּטָהוֹר – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁיְּהֵא טָמֵא בְּטָמֵא?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Pappa said to Abaye:** Is the fundamental principle: It is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an *a fortiori* inference to be like its source, actually accepted by all authorities? **But** there is **this *tanna*, who does not interpret** the *halakha* in accordance with the principle: **It is sufficient, even though** it is a case where the principle **does not refute** the ***a fortiori*** inference completely. **As it is taught** in a *baraita*: **From where** is it derived that the **semen of a man who experiences a gonorrhea-like discharge [*zav*]** imparts ritual impurity by someone carrying it as well as by coming into contact with it, just as the actual gonorrhea-like discharge does? **It is a logical derivation** from an *a fortiori* inference: **Just as** spittle, which is **ritually pure** when coming **from** a person who is **ritually pure,** is **impure** when coming **from** someone like a *zav* who is **impure, is it not logical that** semen, which is **impure** when coming **from** someone who is **pure, should be impure** when coming **from** someone who is **impure?**


###### Bava Kamma 25a:10
[Bava Kamma 25a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/25a:10)

וְקָא מַיְיתֵי לַהּ בֵּין לְמַגָּע בֵּין לְמַשָּׂא. וְאַמַּאי? נֵימָא: אַהֲנִי קַל וָחוֹמֶר לְמַגָּע, אַהֲנִי דַּיּוֹ לְאַפּוֹקֵי מַשָּׂא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** the *tanna* **brings** this derivation and applies it **whether** discussing ritual impurity imparted **by contact** or **whether** discussing impurity imparted **by carrying. And why** is this the case? **Let us say: The *a fortiori*** inference **is effective in** teaching that the semen of a *zav* imparts ritual impurity **by contact** alone, as is the *halakha* with regard to the semen of a pure man, and the principle: **It is sufficient, is effective** by limiting the scope of the *a fortiori* inference **to exclude** the semen of a *zav* from imparting ritual impurity **by carrying.** Since the *tanna* does not formulate his derivation in this manner, it appears that he rejects the principle: It is sufficient, in all situations.


###### Bava Kamma 25a:11
[Bava Kamma 25a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/25a:11)

וְכִי תֵּימָא: לְמַגָּע לָא אִצְטְרִיךְ קַל וָחוֹמֶר, דְּלָא גָּרַע מִגַּבְרָא טָהוֹר; אִיצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: ״מִקְּרֵה לָיְלָה״ כְּתִיב – מִי שֶׁקִּרְיוֹ גּוֹרֵם לוֹ; יָצָא זֶה, שֶׁאֵין קִרְיוֹ גּוֹרֵם לוֹ – אֶלָּא דָּבָר אַחֵר גָּרַם לוֹ; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if you would say** that the ***a fortiori*** inference **was not necessary** to teach that the seminal emission of the *zav* imparts ritual impurity **by contact, as it is** certainly **no less** impure **than** if it had come from **a man** who was **pure,** so the inference was necessary only to teach that the semen of a *zav* imparts impurity by carrying, this is not correct. In fact, it **was necessary** to teach this point, as it may **enter your mind to say** that since **it is written** in the verse: “If there be among you any man that is not clean because of something that **happens to him by night”** (Deuteronomy 23:11), this means that a seminal emission is ritually impure if it came from **someone who** had something **happen to him,** and this **causes him** to experience the emission, but the verse is **excluding this** *zav*, who did **not** have something **happen to him** to **cause him** to experience the emission, but **rather another matter,** i.e., his gonorrhea-like condition, **caused him** to experience the emission. Consequently, it **teaches us** that this is incorrect.


###### Bava Kamma 25a:12
[Bava Kamma 25a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/25a:12)

מִידֵּי ״וְלֹא דָּבָר אַחֵר״ כְּתִיב?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Abaye responded: In the verse “something that happens to him by night,” **is it** also **written: But not another matter?** This limiting clause is not written in the verse, and therefore the *halakha* that the semen of a *zav* imparts ritual impurity by contact can be understood from the explicit verse in the Torah, and there is no need to derive it from an *a fortiori* inference. Therefore, the only function of the *a fortiori* inference is to teach the halakha that the semen of a *zav* imparts impurity by carrying. Applying the principle: It is sufficient, would refute the *a fortiori* inference completely, so there is no proof that the *tanna* would apply the principle in all circumstances.


###### Bava Kamma 25a:13
[Bava Kamma 25a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/25a:13)

וּמַאן תַּנָּא דְּשָׁמְעַתְּ לֵיהּ דְּאָמַר: שִׁכְבַת זֶרַע שֶׁל זָב מְטַמְּאָה בְּמַשָּׂא? לָא רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, וְלָא רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ. דִּתְנַן: שִׁכְבַת זֶרַע שֶׁל זָב מְטַמְּאָה בְּמַגָּע, וְאֵין מְטַמְּאָה בְּמַשָּׂא; דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר. וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אוֹמֵר: אַף מְטַמְּאָה בְּמַשָּׂא, לְפִי שֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר בְּלֹא צִחְצוּחֵי זִיבָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Once the Gemara raised the issue, it clarifies: **And who is the *tanna*** about whom **you heard that he said: Semen of a *zav* imparts ritual impurity by carrying?** It was **not Rabbi Eliezer and not Rabbi Yehoshua. As we learned** in a *baraita*: **Semen of a *zav* imparts ritual impurity by contact but** it **does not impart ritual impurity by carrying;** this is **the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. And Rabbi Yehoshua says:** It **also imparts ritual impurity by carrying, as it is impossible** for semen to emerge **without small drops of gonorrhea-like discharge [*ziva*]** accompanying it.


###### Bava Kamma 25a:14
[Bava Kamma 25a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/25a:14)

עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ הָתָם – אֶלָּא שֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר בְּלֹא צִחְצוּחֵי זִיבָה, הָא לָאו הָכִי – לָא! אֶלָּא הַאי תַּנָּא הוּא – דִּתְנַן: לְמַעְלָה מֵהֶן

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Yehoshua says there** that the semen of a *zav* imparts ritual impurity by carrying **only because it is impossible** for semen to emerge **without small drops of *ziva*** accompanying it. This indicates that **if not for this** reason, the semen would **not** impart ritual impurity by carrying, according to the opinions of both Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Eliezer. The Gemara explains: **Rather,** it must be that **this *tanna* is** the one who holds the opinion that the semen of a *zav* imparts ritual impurity by carrying, **as we learned** in a mishna listing the sources of ritual impurity (*Kelim* 1:3): **Of a greater degree than** the ritual impurities listed previously in the mishna, i.e., the impurity of a creeping animal, semen, and one who contracted ritual impurity from a corpse,