## Bava Kamma Daf 26a

###### Bava Kamma 26a:1
[Bava Kamma 26a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/26a:1)

מִידֵּי כּוּלֵּיהּ קָאָמְרִינַן?! פַּלְגָא קָאָמְרִינַן!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **Are we saying** that based on the *a fortiori* inference one should have to pay the **full** cost of the damage caused in the public domain for Eating and Trampling? That would be false, as the verse indicating one’s liability to pay the full cost of the damage limits the application to damage caused in “the field of another.” **We are saying** only that he should be liable for **half** the cost of the damage there, just as with regard to Goring.


###### Bava Kamma 26a:2
[Bava Kamma 26a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/26a:2)

אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְחָצוּ אֶת כַּסְפּוֹ״ – כַּסְפּוֹ שֶׁל זֶה, וְלֹא כַּסְפּוֹ שֶׁל אַחֵר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects this as well: This is also incorrect, as **the verse states** with regard to the payment of half the damages: **“And divide its monetary value”** (Exodus 21:35). The use of the expression “its monetary value,” and not “the monetary value,” emphasizes that it is specifically **the price of this** ox that caused damage classified as Goring whose money will be divided, i.e., the owner of the ox will be obligated to pay half the cost of the damage, **but not the price of another,** i.e., not in other cases of damage caused by one’s ox.


###### Bava Kamma 26a:3
[Bava Kamma 26a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/26a:3)

וְלֹא תְּהֵא שֵׁן וָרֶגֶל חַיֶּיבֶת בִּרְשׁוּת הַנִּיזָּק אֶלָּא חֲצִי נֶזֶק – מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר מִקֶּרֶן; וּמָה קֶרֶן, שֶׁבִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים חַיֶּיבֶת – בִּרְשׁוּת הַנִּיזָּק אֵינָהּ מְשַׁלֶּמֶת אֶלָּא חֲצִי נֶזֶק; שֵׁן וָרֶגֶל, שֶׁבִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים פְּטוּרָה – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁבִּרְשׁוּת הַנִּיזָּק מְשַׁלֵּם חֲצִי נֶזֶק?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests a derivation from a different inference: **And let** one be held **liable** to pay **only half** the cost of **the damage** caused by **Eating and Trampling** even if the incident took place **on the property of the injured** party. This can be inferred **via** an ***a fortiori*** inference drawn **from Goring,** as follows: **And if** for damage classified as **Goring,** which is governed by a stricter *halakha*, as one is held **liable** for damage classified as Goring even if it occurs **in the public domain,** yet one nevertheless **pays only half** the cost of **the damage** caused **on the property of the injured** party, then with regard to damage classified as **Eating and Trampling,** which are governed by more lenient *halakhot*, as one is completely **exempt** from liability for damage caused **in the public domain, is it not right that** he should have to **pay** only **half** the cost of **the damage** caused **on the property of the injured** party?


###### Bava Kamma 26a:4
[Bava Kamma 26a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/26a:4)

אָמַר קְרָא: ״יְשַׁלֵּם״ – תַּשְׁלוּמִין מְעַלְּיָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **The verse states** with regard to Eating and Trampling: “The best of his field and the best of his vineyard **he shall pay”** (Exodus 22:4). The intent of the verse is to emphasize that the owner of the ox pays **a proper,** meaning complete, amount of **payment,** and not half the cost of the damage.


###### Bava Kamma 26a:5
[Bava Kamma 26a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/26a:5)

וְלֹא תְּהֵא קֶרֶן בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים חַיָּיב – מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר; וּמָה שֵׁן וָרֶגֶל, שֶׁבִּרְשׁוּת הַנִּיזָּק נֶזֶק שָׁלֵם – בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים פְּטוּרָה; קֶרֶן, שֶׁבִּרְשׁוּת הַנִּיזָּק חֲצִי נֶזֶק – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁבִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים פְּטוּרָה?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests a derivation from a different inference: **And let** one **not** be held **liable** at all with regard to damage classified as **Goring in the public domain.** This can be inferred **via** an ***a fortiori*** inference, as follows: **And if** for damage classified as **Eating and Trampling, for which** one is liable to pay **the full** cost of **the damage** for incidents that took place **on the property of the injured** party, one is completely **exempt** for damage caused **in the public domain,** then with regard to damage classified as **Goring,** which is governed by a more lenient *halakha*, as one is held **liable** for only **half** the cost of **the damage** caused **on the property of the injured** party, **is it not right that** one should be **exempt in the public domain?**


###### Bava Kamma 26a:6
[Bava Kamma 26a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/26a:6)

אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, אָמַר קְרָא: ״יֶחֱצוּן״ – אֵין חֲצִי נֶזֶק חָלוּק לֹא בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים וְלֹא בִּרְשׁוּת הַיָּחִיד.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The verse states** in reference to an innocuous ox: “And the carcass **they shall** also **divide”** (Exodus 21:35), to indicate that **there is no difference** with regard to the payment of **half** the cost of **the damage, whether** the damage occurs **in a public domain or** whether it occurs **on private property.**


###### Bava Kamma 26a:7
[Bava Kamma 26a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/26a:7)

וִיהֵא אָדָם חַיָּיב בְּכוֹפֶר – מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר; וּמָה שׁוֹר, שֶׁאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב בְּאַרְבָּעָה דְּבָרִים – חַיָּיב בְּכוֹפֶר; אָדָם, שֶׁחַיָּיב בְּאַרְבָּעָה דְּבָרִים – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁיְּהֵא חַיָּיב בְּכוֹפֶר?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests a derivation from a different inference: **And let a person** who inadvertently kills another be **liable to pay ransom.** This can be inferred **via** an ***a fortiori*** inference, as follows: **And if** the owner of an **ox,** who **is not liable** to pay the **four types of indemnity,** i.e., pain, medical costs, loss of livelihood, and humiliation, if his ox injures a person, is nevertheless **liable to pay ransom** if it killed someone, then with regard to **a person, who is liable** to pay the **four types of indemnity** if he injures another, **is it not right that he should be liable to pay ransom** if he were to kill him?


###### Bava Kamma 26a:8
[Bava Kamma 26a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/26a:8)

אָמַר קְרָא: ״כְּכֹל אֲשֶׁר יוּשַׁת עָלָיו״; ״עָלָיו״ – וְלֹא עַל אָדָם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **The verse states** with regard to an ox killing a person: “He shall give for the redemption of his life **whatever is imposed upon him”** (Exodus 21:30). **“Upon him”:** This means upon the owner of an ox who kills a person, **but not upon a person** who kills another.


###### Bava Kamma 26a:9
[Bava Kamma 26a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/26a:9)

וִיהֵא שׁוֹר חַיָּיב בְּאַרְבָּעָה דְּבָרִים – מִקַּל וְחוֹמֶר; וּמָה אָדָם, שֶׁאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב בְּכוֹפֶר – חַיָּיב בְּאַרְבָּעָה דְּבָרִים; שׁוֹר, שֶׁחַיָּיב בְּכוֹפֶר – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁיְּהֵא חַיָּיב בְּאַרְבָּעָה דְּבָרִים?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests the reverse derivation: **And let** the owner of **an ox** that injured a person be **liable** to pay the **four types of indemnity.** This can be inferred **via** an ***a fortiori*** inference, as follows: **And if a person, who is not obligated to pay ransom** if he kills someone, **is** nevertheless **liable** to pay **four types of indemnity** if he injures another, then with regard to the owner of **an ox,** who **is liable to pay ransom, is it not right that he should** also **be liable** to pay the **four types of indemnity?**


###### Bava Kamma 26a:10
[Bava Kamma 26a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/26a:10)

אָמַר קְרָא: ״אִישׁ בַּעֲמִיתוֹ״ – וְלֹא שׁוֹר בַּעֲמִיתוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **The verse states** with regard to this matter: “And if **a man** maims **another”** (Leviticus 24:19), from which it can be derived that this *halakha* applies when a man harms another person **but not** when **an ox** harms **another** person.


###### Bava Kamma 26a:11
[Bava Kamma 26a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/26a:11)

אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: רֶגֶל שֶׁדָּרְסָה עַל גַּבֵּי תִּינוֹק בַּחֲצַר הַנִּיזָּק, מַהוּ שֶׁתְּשַׁלֵּם כּוֹפֶר? מִי אָמְרִינַן: מִידֵּי דְּהָוֵה אַקֶּרֶן – קֶרֶן, כֵּיוָן דַּעֲבַד תְּרֵי וּתְלָתָא זִמְנֵי – אוֹרְחֵיהּ הוּא, וּמְשַׁלֵּם כּוֹפֶר; הָכָא נָמֵי לָא שְׁנָא;

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **A dilemma was raised before** the Sages: With regard to **Trampling,** in the case of an animal **that tramples a child in the courtyard of the injured** party and kills the child, **what is** the *halakha* with regard to the liability of the owner of the animal **to pay ransom?** The Gemara explains the different sides of the question: **Do we say** that this *halakha* is **just as it is with regard to Goring?** Accordingly, just as with regard to **Goring, once** an animal has gored **two or three times** this becomes defined as **its usual manner** and therefore it is deemed forewarned **and** the owner must **pay ransom** in the event that it kills a person by an act classified as Goring, **here too it is not different,** as with regard to the category of Trampling the owner is deemed forewarned from the start and he must therefore pay ransom.


###### Bava Kamma 26a:12
[Bava Kamma 26a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/26a:12)

אוֹ דִלְמָא, קֶרֶן כַּוּוֹנָתוֹ לְהַזִּיק, הַאי אֵין כַּוּוֹנָתוֹ לְהַזִּיק?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Or perhaps,** should we say that the *halakha* with regard to **Goring** is more stringent, as Goring requires the animal’s **intent to cause damage,** and that is why the owner must pay ransom in the event of a death; but in a case of Trampling, where there is **no intent to cause damage,** the owner would be exempt from paying ransom?


###### Bava Kamma 26a:13
[Bava Kamma 26a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/26a:13)

תָּא שְׁמַע: הִכְנִיס שׁוֹרוֹ לַחֲצַר בַּעַל הַבַּיִת שֶׁלֹּא בִּרְשׁוּת, וּנְגָחוֹ לְבַעַל הַבַּיִת וָמֵת; הַשּׁוֹר – בִּסְקִילָה, וּבְעָלָיו – בֵּין תָּם בֵּין מוּעָד, מְשַׁלֵּם כּוֹפֶר שָׁלֵם; דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests: **Come** and **hear** a solution to this dilemma from a *baraita*: If one **brought his ox into the courtyard of a homeowner without** his **permission, and it gored the homeowner and he died, the ox** is killed **by stoning and the owner** of the ox is obligated to **pay** the **full** amount of the **ransom,** regardless of **whether** the animal was **innocuous or forewarned.** This is **the statement of Rabbi Tarfon.**


###### Bava Kamma 26a:14
[Bava Kamma 26a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/26a:14)

כּוֹפֶר שָׁלֵם בְּתָם, לְרַבִּי טַרְפוֹן – מְנָא לֵיהּ? לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּסָבַר לֵיהּ כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי, דְּאָמַר: תָּם מְשַׁלֵּם חֲצִי כוֹפֶר בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים – וּמַיְיתֵי לַהּ מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר מֵרֶגֶל? אַלְמָא אִיכָּא כּוֹפֶר בְּרֶגֶל!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara proceeds to clarify: **From where** does **Rabbi Tarfon** derive that **with regard to an innocuous** ox the owner must also pay the **full** amount of the **ransom?** Is it **not because he holds in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says** that the owner of **an innocuous** ox that killed a person **pays half** the **ransom** if the incident took place **in the public domain? And he derived** this ruling **via** an ***a fortiori*** inference **from** the *halakhot* of **Trampling:** And if in a case of Trampling, for which one is exempted entirely from liability when it occurs in the public domain, one must nevertheless pay the full ransom if the incident took place on the property of the injured party, with regard to Goring, for which one must pay half the ransom when it occurs in the public domain, is it not right that one should be obligated to pay full ransom for an incident that took place on the property of the injured party? **Evidently,** it is clear that **there is a ransom** payment **in** the case of **Trampling.**


###### Bava Kamma 26a:15
[Bava Kamma 26a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/26a:15)

אָמַר רַב שִׁימִי מִנְּהַרְדְּעָא: תַּנָּא – מִנְּזָקִין דְּרֶגֶל מַיְיתֵי לַהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Shimi of Neharde’a said:** It is possible to explain that **the *tanna* derived** his *a fortiori* inference **from damage** caused **by Trampling:** And if in a case of Trampling, for which one is completely exempt from liability when it happens in the public domain, one pays the full cost of the damage done on the property of the injured party, with regard to Goring, for which one must pay half the ransom payment if the ox kills a person in the public domain, is it not right that one would certainly be obligated to pay the full ransom if the person was killed on his own property? According to this reasoning there is no indication that one pays a ransom payment in the case of a child that was killed by Trampling.


###### Bava Kamma 26a:16
[Bava Kamma 26a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/26a:16)

וְלִפְרוֹךְ: מָה לִנְזָקִין דְּרֶגֶל – שֶׁכֵּן יֶשְׁנָן בְּאֵשׁ! מִטָּמוּן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **But** if this is the basis for Rabbi Tarfon’s opinion, **let** the Gemara **refute** it in this way: **What** can be learned about ransom **from damage** caused **by Trampling? These** same *halakhot* **apply to Fire;** nevertheless, there is no obligation to pay ransom when a person is killed by Fire, as was stated explicitly in a *baraita* above (10a). Consequently, the attempt to derive an *a fortiori* inference about ransom from Trampling is obviously flawed. The Gemara answers: The *a fortiori* inference can be **based on** the damage to **concealed** articles caused by Trampling on the property of the injured party. One would be exempt for damage such as this if it were caused by Fire.


###### Bava Kamma 26a:17
[Bava Kamma 26a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/26a:17)

מָה לְטָמוּן – שֶׁכֵּן יֶשְׁנוֹ בְּבוֹר! מִכֵּלִים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara responds to this challenge with a different one: **What** is notable about damage **to concealed** articles caused by Trampling? It is notable **in that these** same *halakhot* **apply to** the category of **Pit,** but nevertheless there is no ransom paid if a person is killed by a pit. Consequently, an attempt to derive an *a fortiori* inference about ransom from this *halakha* is obviously flawed. The Gemara answers: The *a fortiori* inference can be **based on** damage caused to **vessels** by Trampling on the property of the injured party. One would be exempt for damage of this nature if it were caused by a pit.


###### Bava Kamma 26a:18
[Bava Kamma 26a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/26a:18)

מָה לְכֵלִים – שֶׁיֶּשְׁנָן בְּאֵשׁ! מִכֵּלִים טְמוּנִים. מָה לְכֵלִים טְמוּנִים – שֶׁיֶּשְׁנָן בְּאָדָם!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects this as well: **What** is notable about damage caused **to vessels** by Trampling? It is notable **in that these** same *halakhot* **apply to** the category of **Fire.** The Gemara answers: The *a fortiori* inference can be **based on** damage caused to **concealed vessels** by Trampling. In this case, one would be liable for Trampling but exempt from liability for both Fire and Pit, so this can be the basis for the ransom payment, via the *a fortiori* inference stated by Rav Shimi of Neharde’a. The Gemara rejects this as well: **What** is notable about damage caused **to concealed vessels** by Trampling? It is notable **in that these** same *halakhot* **apply to** the category of **Man,** as a person is liable for damage to these items but does not pay ransom if he inadvertently kills another person.


###### Bava Kamma 26a:19
[Bava Kamma 26a:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/26a:19)

אֶלָּא לָאו שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ מִכּוֹפֶר דְּרֶגֶל מַיְיתֵי לַהּ? אַלְמָא אִיכָּא כּוֹפֶר בְּרֶגֶל! שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, isn’t it** correct to **conclude from it** that since the *halakhot* of the ransom payment with regard to Goring cannot be deduced from the *halakhot* of damages with regard to Trampling, the *tanna* **derived** his *a fortiori* inference **based on** the *halakhot* of **ransom** in a case **of Trampling,** and therefore it may be concluded that **apparently there is ransom** in a case **of Trampling?** The Gemara affirms: **Conclude from it** that this is so. Consequently, in the case of a child trampled to death by Trampling while on his parents’ property, the owner of the animal must pay ransom.


###### Bava Kamma 26a:20
[Bava Kamma 26a:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/26a:20)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא מִדִּפְתִּי לְרָבִינָא: הָכִי נָמֵי מִסְתַּבְּרָא – דְּאִיכָּא כּוֹפֶר בְּרֶגֶל; דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ לֵיכָּא כּוֹפֶר בְּרֶגֶל – וְתַנָּא מִנְּזָקִין דְּרֶגֶל מַיְיתֵי לַהּ, לִפְרוֹךְ: מָה לִנְזָקִין דְּרֶגֶל – שֶׁכֵּן יֶשְׁנָן בְּרֶגֶל!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: So too, it is reasonable** to say **that there is** an obligation to pay **ransom** in a case **of Trampling, as, if it enters your mind** to say that **there is no** obligation to pay **ransom** in a case **of Trampling, and the *tanna* derived** his *a fortiori* inference **from damage** caused **by Trampling, let** the Gemara **refute it** in this way: **What** is notable about **damage** caused **by Trampling?** It is notable **in that these** same *halakhot* **apply to Trampling,** while there is no obligation to pay ransom in a case of Trampling. In other words, it would be possible to derive the obligation to pay a full ransom where a person was killed by the Goring of an innocuous ox while on the property of the victim only if there is also an obligation to pay ransom where the person was killed by Trampling.


###### Bava Kamma 26a:21
[Bava Kamma 26a:21](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/26a:21)

אֶלָּא לָאו שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ מִכּוֹפֶר דְּרֶגֶל מַיְיתֵי לַהּ? אַלְמָא אִיכָּא כּוֹפֶר בְּרֶגֶל! שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, isn’t it** correct to **conclude from it** that an *a fortiori* inference must be **based on** the obligation to pay **ransom** in a case **of Trampling,** and therefore it may be concluded that **evidently, there is** an obligation to pay **ransom** in a case **of Trampling?** The Gemara affirms: **Conclude from it** that this is so.


###### Bava Kamma 26a:22
[Bava Kamma 26a:22](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/26a:22)

**מַתְנִי׳** אָדָם מוּעָד לְעוֹלָם – בֵּין שׁוֹגֵג בֵּין מֵזִיד, בֵּין עֵר בֵּין יָשֵׁן. סִימֵּא אֶת עֵין חֲבֵירוֹ וְשִׁיבֵּר אֶת הַכֵּלִים – מְשַׁלֵּם נֶזֶק שָׁלֵם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**MISHNA:** The legal status of **a person** is **always** that of one **forewarned.** Therefore, **whether** the damage was **unintentional or intentional, whether** he was **awake** while he caused the damage **or asleep,** whether **he blinded another’s eye or broke vessels, he must pay the full** cost of **the damage.**


###### Bava Kamma 26a:23
[Bava Kamma 26a:23](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/26a:23)

**גְּמָ׳** קָתָנֵי ״סִימֵּא אֶת עֵין חֲבֵירוֹ״ דּוּמְיָא דְּ״שִׁיבֵּר אֶת הַכֵּלִים״; מָה הָתָם – נֶזֶק אִין, אַרְבָּעָה דְּבָרִים לָא; אַף סִימֵּא אֶת עֵין חֲבֵירוֹ – נֶזֶק אִין, אַרְבָּעָה דְּבָרִים לָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**GEMARA:** The Gemara infers: It **teaches** in the mishna: **He blinded another’s eye,** and presumably this is **similar to** the other example: **Broke vessels.** From this it can be inferred that **just as there,** in the case of the broken vessels, **yes,** one must pay for the **damage** he caused but he does **not** pay **the four types of indemnity, so too,** in a case where **he blinds another, yes,** he must pay for the **damage** he caused, but he does **not** pay **the four types of indemnity,** since he caused the injury while asleep or unintentionally.