## Bava Kamma Daf 41b

###### Bava Kamma 41b:1
[Bava Kamma 41b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/41b:1)

הֵיכָא דְּבָדַק צוּר וְשָׁחַט בּוֹ – דְּעַבְדֵיהּ כְּעֵין סְקִילָה, אֲבָל הֵיכָא דְּשַׁחְטֵיהּ בְּסַכִּין – לָא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
only in a case **where he checked** a sharp piece of **flint, and,** seeing that it did not have any defects, **slaughtered** the ox **with it.** In that case, one could say **that** by slaughtering it with a stone, **he performed the equivalent to stoning.** Therefore, it is prohibited to eat it. **But** in a case **where he slaughtered it with a knife** made of metal, one is **not** prohibited from eating it.


###### Bava Kamma 41b:2
[Bava Kamma 41b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/41b:2)

אָמְרִי: אַטּוּ סַכִּין כְּתִיבָא בְּאוֹרָיְיתָא? וְהָתְנַן: הַשּׁוֹחֵט בְּמַגַּל יָד, בְּצוֹר וּבְקָנֶה – שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁירָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Sages **said** in response: **Is that to say** that **it is written in the Torah** that slaughter must performed specifically with **a knife,** which would justify a distinction between slaughtering with a stone and a knife? **But didn’t we learn** in the mishna (*Ḥullin* 15b): With regard to **one who slaughters with a hand-sickle, with** a piece of **flint, or with a reed,** if these implements were suitable to be used for slaughter, **his slaughter is valid?**


###### Bava Kamma 41b:3
[Bava Kamma 41b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/41b:3)

וְהַשְׁתָּא דְּנָפְקָא לֵיהּ אִיסּוּר אֲכִילָה וְאִיסּוּר הֲנָאָה מִ״לֹּא יֵאָכֵל אֶת בְּשָׂרוֹ״, ״בַּעַל הַשּׁוֹר נָקִי״ לְמָה לִי? לַהֲנָאַת עוֹרוֹ. דְּסָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: בְּשָׂרוֹ הוּא דְּאָסוּר בַּהֲנָאָה, עוֹרוֹ נִשְׁתְּרֵי בַּהֲנָאָה; קָמַשְׁמַע לַן ״בַּעַל הַשּׁוֹר נָקִי״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And** according to Rabbi Abbahu, **now that he derives the prohibition of eating and the prohibition of deriving benefit from** the verse **“Its flesh shall not be eaten,” why do I** require the statement: **“The owner of the ox shall be clear”?** The Gemara answers: This is stated **to** prohibit **deriving benefit from its hide** after it has been killed; **as it could enter your mind to say that it is** specifically **its flesh from which it is prohibited to derive benefit,** as the verse states: “Its flesh shall not be eaten,” but **deriving benefit from its hide will be permitted.** Therefore, the Torah **teaches us** that **the owner of the ox shall be clear,** to indicate it is prohibited to derive benefit from any part of the ox.


###### Bava Kamma 41b:4
[Bava Kamma 41b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/41b:4)

וּלְהָנָךְ תַּנָּאֵי דְּמַפְּקִי לֵיהּ לְהַאי ״בַּעַל הַשּׁוֹר נָקִי״ לִדְרָשָׁה אַחֲרִינָא [כִּדְבָעֵינַן לְמֵימַר קַמַּן], הֲנָאַת עוֹרוֹ מְנָא לְהוּ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And according to those *tanna’im* who expound this** verse: **“The owner of the ox shall be clear,” for another interpretation, as we wish to state below, from where do they derive** this prohibition against **deriving benefit from** the ox’s **hide?**


###### Bava Kamma 41b:5
[Bava Kamma 41b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/41b:5)

נָפְקָא לְהוּ מֵ״אֶת בְּשָׂרוֹ״ – אֶת הַטָּפֵל לִבְשָׂרוֹ, מַאי נִיהוּ – עוֹרוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **They derive it from** the wording: **“Its flesh** may not be eaten [*velo ye’akhel **et besaro*****].”** The verse could have been formulated: *Velo ye’akhel besaro*, which already means: And its flesh shall not be eaten. The addition of the word “*et*” teaches that the prohibition applies also to **that which is secondary to the flesh.** And **what is that?** That is **its hide.**


###### Bava Kamma 41b:6
[Bava Kamma 41b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/41b:6)

וְהַאי תַּנָּא – ״אֶת״ לָא דָּרֵישׁ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara adds: **And this *tanna*,** who derives it from the statement: “The owner of the ox shall be clear,” **does not interpret** the word **“*et*”** as a means to derive new *halakhot*. He considers the word “*et*” to be an ordinary part of the sentence structure and not a source for exegetical exposition.


###### Bava Kamma 41b:7
[Bava Kamma 41b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/41b:7)

כִּדְתַנְיָא: שִׁמְעוֹן הָעַמְסוֹנִי, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ נְחֶמְיָה הָעַמְסוֹנִי, הָיָה דּוֹרֵשׁ כׇּל ״אֶתִּין״ שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה. כֵּיוָן שֶׁהִגִּיעַ לְ״אֶת ה׳ אֱלֹהֶיךָ תִּירָא״, פֵּירַשׁ. אָמְרוּ לוֹ תַּלְמִידָיו: רַבִּי, כׇּל ״אֶתִּין״ שֶׁדָּרַשְׁתָּ – מָה תְּהֵא עֲלֵיהֶן? אָמַר לָהֶם: כְּשֵׁם שֶׁקִּבַּלְתִּי שָׂכָר עַל הַדְּרִישָׁה, כָּךְ קִבַּלְתִּי שָׂכָר עַל הַפְּרִישָׁה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**As it is taught** in a *baraita*: **Shimon HaAmasoni, and some say** that it was **Neḥemya HaAmasoni, would interpret all** occurrences of the word **“*et*” in the Torah,** deriving additional *halakhot* with regard to the particular subject matter. **Once he reached** the verse: **“You shall fear the Lord your God”** (Deuteronomy 6:13), which is written with the added word “*et*,” **he withdrew** from this method of exposition, as whose fear could be an extension of the fear of God? **His students said to him: Our teacher, what will be with all** the occurrences of the word **“*et*” that you interpreted** until now? **He said to them: Just as I received reward for the exposition, so I received reward for** my **withdrawal** from using this method of exposition.


###### Bava Kamma 41b:8
[Bava Kamma 41b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/41b:8)

עַד שֶׁבָּא רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, וְלִימֵּד: ״אֶת ה׳ אֱלֹהֶיךָ תִּירָא״ – לְרַבּוֹת תַּלְמִידֵי חֲכָמִים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The word “*et*” in this verse was not explained **until Rabbi Akiva came and expounded: “You shall fear the Lord your God”:** The word “*et*” serves **to include Torah scholars,** i.e., that one is commanded to fear them just as one fears God. In any event, Shimon HaAmasoni no longer derived additional *halakhot* from the word *et*.


###### Bava Kamma 41b:9
[Bava Kamma 41b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/41b:9)

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״וּבַעַל הַשּׁוֹר נָקִי״ – רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: נָקִי מֵחֲצִי כוֹפֶר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **The Sages taught** with regard to the verse: **“But the owner of the ox shall be clear,”** that **Rabbi Eliezer says:** It means that **he shall be clear from paying half a ransom.** Although the owner of an innocuous ox that causes damage is liable to pay half the cost of the damage, if an ox kills a person its owner is not liable to pay any ransom.


###### Bava Kamma 41b:10
[Bava Kamma 41b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/41b:10)

אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: וַהֲלֹא הוּא עַצְמוֹ אֵין מִשְׁתַּלֵּם אֶלָּא מִגּוּפוֹ, ״הֲבִיאֵהוּ לְבֵית דִּין, וִישַׁלֶּם לָךְ״!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Akiva said to him:** Why is it necessary for the verse to teach this? **But isn’t** compensation for damage caused by an innocuous ox **itself** anyway **paid only from** the value of **its body?** Here too, its owner can say to the claimant: **Bring it to court and it will pay you,** i.e., you will be paid from its value. Since the ox is stoned, there is nothing from which he can receive payment. Therefore, according to your interpretation, the verse does not introduce any *halakha* that could not have been inferred by logic, and is therefore superfluous.


###### Bava Kamma 41b:11
[Bava Kamma 41b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/41b:11)

אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: כָּךְ אֲנִי בְּעֵינֶיךָ, שֶׁדִּינִי בָּזֶה שֶׁחַיָּיב מִיתָה? אֵין דִּינִי אֶלָּא כְּשֶׁהֵמִית אֶת הָאָדָם עַל פִּי עֵד אֶחָד, אוֹ עַל פִּי בְעָלִים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Is this how I** appear **in your eyes, that my derivation** from the verse is **in** reference to **this** case, that of an ox **that is liable** to be put to **death?** Obviously no verse would be required to teach this *halakha* in such a case. **My derivation is only** with regard to a case **where** the assumption that the ox **killed a person** is **based on** the testimony of **one witness, or** is **based on** the admission of **the owner.** Such proof is not sufficient for the ox to be put to death by stoning, but one might have thought that it is sufficient to require its owner to pay ransom.


###### Bava Kamma 41b:12
[Bava Kamma 41b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/41b:12)

עַל פִּי בְעָלִים?! מוֹדֶה בִּקְנָס הוּא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: If it is **based on** the admission of **the owner,** he clearly would not be liable to pay ransom, since **he** would be **admitting to** an act that results in **a fine,** in which case a person is exempt from paying the fine; so why would it be necessary for the verse to state this exemption?


###### Bava Kamma 41b:13
[Bava Kamma 41b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/41b:13)

קָסָבַר כּוּפְרָא – כַּפָּרָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: Rabbi Eliezer **holds** that **ransom** is for the purpose of **atonement,** and is not considered a fine. Accordingly, one might have assumed that even in a case where there is not conclusive testimony, the owner must pay ransom to atone for the killing. Therefore, the verse states that in the case of an innocuous ox, the owner is not liable to pay half a ransom.


###### Bava Kamma 41b:14
[Bava Kamma 41b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/41b:14)

תַּנְיָא אִידַּךְ, אָמַר לוֹ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: עֲקִיבָא, כָּךְ אֲנִי בְּעֵינֶיךָ, שֶׁדִּינִי בָּזֶה שֶׁחַיָּיב מִיתָה? אֵין דִּינִי אֶלָּא בְּמִתְכַּוֵּון לַהֲרוֹג אֶת הַבְּהֵמָה וְהָרַג אֶת הָאָדָם; לְגוֹי וְהָרַג יִשְׂרָאֵל; לִנְפָלִים וְהָרַג בֶּן קַיָּימָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**It is taught** in **another** *baraita* that **Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Akiva, is this how I** appear **in your eyes, that my derivation** from the verse is **in** reference to **this** case, that of an ox **that is liable** to be put to **death? My derivation is only** with regard to a case **where** the ox **intended to kill an animal but killed a person** instead; or where it intended **to** kill **a gentile but killed a Jew;** or where it intended **to** kill **a non-viable baby but killed a viable person.** An ox is not put to death if it intended to gore in a manner which would not render it liable to be put to death, even if it did gore in such a manner. In such a case, the owner of the ox must pay ransom. Therefore, the verse states that if it is an innocuous ox, the owner is exempt from paying half a ransom.


###### Bava Kamma 41b:15
[Bava Kamma 41b:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/41b:15)

הֵי אֲמַר לֵיהּ בְּרֵישָׁא? רַב כָּהֲנָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא אָמַר: ״מִתְכַּוֵּון״ אֲמַר לֵיהּ בְּרֵישָׁא. רַב טָבְיוֹמֵי מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא אָמַר: ״הֵמִית״ אֲמַר לֵיהּ בְּרֵישָׁא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
These two *baraitot* cite different responses that Rabbi Eliezer gave Rabbi Akiva. **Which** one of these explanations **did he say to him first? Rav Kahana said in the name of Rava: He first said to him** the explanation referring to the ox’s **intention** to kill someone for which it would not be liable to be put to death, and subsequently gave him the second explanation with regard to the testimony of a single witness, or the owner’s admission. **Rav Tavyumei said in the name of Rava: He first said to him** the explanation that it is a case where the assumption that the ox **killed** was based on one witness or its owner’s admission.


###### Bava Kamma 41b:16
[Bava Kamma 41b:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/41b:16)

רַב כָּהֲנָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא אָמַר ״מִתְכַּוֵּון״ אֲמַר לֵיהּ בְּרֵישָׁא – מָשָׁל לְצַיָּד שֶׁשּׁוֹלֶה דָּגִים מִן הַיָּם,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains the reasoning behind the two opinions: **Rav Kahana said in the name of Rava** that **first he said to him** the explanation involving the ox’s **intention,** since this opinion is preferable to the other one, against which a difficulty was raised earlier. This is **analogous to a fisherman pulling fish from the sea.**