## Bava Kamma Daf 43b

###### Bava Kamma 43b:1
[Bava Kamma 43b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/43b:1)

מִיהוּ, בֶּן חוֹרִין דִּמְשַׁלֵּם כּוֹפֶר עַל פִּי עַצְמוֹ – וְהֵיכִי דָּמֵי? דְּאִי אֲתוֹ סָהֲדֵי וְאַסְהִידוּ בֵּיהּ דִּקְטַל, וְלָא יָדְעִי אִי תָּם הֲוָה אִי מוּעָד הֲוָה, וַאֲמַר מָרֵיהּ דְּמוּעָד הוּא, דִּמְשַׁלֵּם כּוֹפֶר עַל פִּי עַצְמוֹ – הֵיכָא דְּלֵיכָּא עֵדִים, מְשַׁלֵּם דָּמִים;

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**but** there is a distinction between the two cases. With regard to an ox killing **a freeman,** there is a scenario **where** the owner **pays ransom based on his own** admission. **And what are the circumstances? If witnesses came and testified that** the ox **killed** a freeman and is therefore liable to be killed by stoning, **but they did not know whether it was innocuous** or **if it was forewarned, and its owner said that it was forewarned.** In this case, the owner **pays ransom based on his own** admission, since the ox is liable to be killed, and the ransom is for atonement and does not constitute a fine. Therefore, even **where there are no witnesses,** and the ox is therefore not liable to be killed by stoning for killing a person, nevertheless, the owner at least **pays** the monetary **value** of the victim based on his admission.


###### Bava Kamma 43b:2
[Bava Kamma 43b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/43b:2)

גַּבֵּי עֶבֶד, שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְשַׁלֵּם קְנָס עַל פִּי עַצְמוֹ – וְהֵיכִי דָּמֵי? דְּאִי אֲתוֹ עֵדִים וְאַסְהִידוּ בֵּיהּ דִּקְטַל, וְלָא יָדְעִי אִי תָּם הֲוָה אִי מוּעָד הֲוָה, וַאֲמַר מָרֵיהּ מוּעָד הוּא – לָא מִשְׁתַּלַּם קְנָס עַל פִּי עַצְמוֹ. הֵיכָא דְּלֵיכָּא עֵדִים – לָא מְשַׁלֵּם דָּמִים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
By contrast, **with regard to** an ox killing **a slave,** there is a scenario **where** one **does not pay the fine** of thirty shekels **based on his own** admission. **And what are the circumstances** where one would be liable to pay this fine due to his own admission? **If witnesses came and testified that** the ox **killed** a slave, **but they did not know whether it was innocuous** or **if it was forewarned, and its owner said that it was forewarned.** In this case, even though the ox is liable to be killed, the owner **does not pay the fine based on his own** admission, due to the principle that one does not pay a fine based on his own admission. Therefore, in a case **where there are no witnesses, he does not** even **pay** the **value** of the victim based on his own admission.


###### Bava Kamma 43b:3
[Bava Kamma 43b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/43b:3)

מֵתִיב רַב שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר רַב יִצְחָק: כֹּל שֶׁחַיָּיב בְּבֶן חוֹרִין – חַיָּיב בְּעֶבֶד, בֵּין בְּכוֹפֶר בֵּין בְּמִיתָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak raises an objection** from a *baraita* that states a principle: In **any** scenario **where** a person is **liable for** his ox killing **a freeman,** he is **liable for** his ox killing a Canaanite **slave, whether with regard to** liability to pay **ransom or with regard to** the ox being put to **death.**


###### Bava Kamma 43b:4
[Bava Kamma 43b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/43b:4)

כּוֹפֶר בְּעֶבֶד מִי אִיכָּא?! אֶלָּא לָאו דָּמִים?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The wording of the *baraita* is unclear: **Is there a ransom** to be paid **in** the case of **a slave?** Ransom is paid only for the killing of a freeman. **Rather, is it not** referring to payment of the **value** of the victim? This poses a difficulty for Rabba’s opinion that one is not liable to pay the value of the victim for admitting to his ox’s killing of a slave.


###### Bava Kamma 43b:5
[Bava Kamma 43b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/43b:5)

אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: הוּא מוֹתֵיב לַהּ וְהוּא מְפָרֵק לַהּ, אִיכָּא דְאָמְרִי: אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבָּה – הָכִי קָתָנֵי: כֹּל שֶׁחַיָּיב בְּבֶן חוֹרִין בְּכַוָּונָה עַל פִּי עֵדִים, כּוֹפֶר – חַיָּיב בְּעֶבֶד קְנָס. וְכֹל שֶׁחַיָּיב בְּבֶן חוֹרִין שֶׁלֹּא בְּכַוָּונָה עַל פִּי עֵדִים, דָּמִים – חַיָּיב בְּעֶבֶד שֶׁלֹּא בְּכַוָּונָה עַל פִּי עֵדִים, דָּמִים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**There are** those **who say** that **he,** Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak, **raised the objection and he resolved it,** and **there are** those **who say** it was **Rabba** who **said to him** in response, that **this is what** the *baraita* **is teaching:** In **any** scenario **where** a person is **liable** to pay **ransom for** his ox killing **a freeman,** e.g., where it gored **intentionally based on** the testimony of **witnesses,** he is **liable** to pay **a fine for** his ox killing **a slave. And** in **any** scenario **where** one is **liable** to pay the **value** of the victim **for** his ox killing **a freeman,** e.g., where it gored **unintentionally based on** the testimony of **witnesses, for a slave** too, one is **liable** to pay the **value,** namely, where it gored **unintentionally based on** the testimony of **witnesses.** Accordingly, one does not pay the value of a slave based on his own admission, although he does pay the value of a freeman if he admits that his ox killed him.


###### Bava Kamma 43b:6
[Bava Kamma 43b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/43b:6)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: אִי הָכִי, אִשּׁוֹ שֶׁלֹּא בְּכַוָּונָה עַל פִּי עֵדִים – נְשַׁלֵּם דָּמִים!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava said to** Rabba: **If that is so,** that one is liable to pay the value of the victim in cases where he is exempt from paying ransom, then if a person burns another to death **unintentionally** with **his fire,** and the proof is **based on** the testimony of **witnesses, he should,** likewise, at least **pay** the **value** of the victim.


###### Bava Kamma 43b:7
[Bava Kamma 43b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/43b:7)

וּמְנָא לֵיהּ לְרָבָא דְּלָא מְשַׁלֵּם?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And from where does Rava** know **that he does not pay** the value of the victim if he started the fire unintentionally?


###### Bava Kamma 43b:8
[Bava Kamma 43b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/43b:8)

אִילֵּימָא מִדִּתְנַן: הָיָה גְּדִי כָּפוּת לוֹ, וְעֶבֶד סָמוּךְ לוֹ וְנִשְׂרַף עִמּוֹ – חַיָּיב. עֶבֶד כָּפוּת לוֹ, וּגְדִי סָמוּךְ לוֹ וְנִשְׂרַף עִמּוֹ – פָּטוּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**If we say** that it is **from what we learned** in a mishna (61b): If one ignites a heap of grain and **there was a goat bound** to an item adjacent **to it, and** there was also **a slave adjacent to it** but not bound, **and** they were **burned** together **with** the heap of grain, he is **liable** to pay for the heap of grain and for the goat. If the **slave** was **bound to it** in such a way that he was unable to flee from the fire, **and** the **goat** was **adjacent to it, and** they were **burned with it,** he is **exempt** from liability. Apparently, there is no liability even if he unintentionally burned the slave to death.


###### Bava Kamma 43b:9
[Bava Kamma 43b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/43b:9)

הָאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: כְּגוֹן שֶׁהִצִּית בְּגוּפוֹ שֶׁל עֶבֶד, דְּקָם לֵיהּ בִּדְרַבָּה מִינֵּיהּ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara comments: If this is Rava’s source, there is no proof from here. **Didn’t Reish Lakish say** that the mishna is referring to a case **where he ignited the body of the slave** directly, in which case he is exempt from paying damages **because he receives the greater** punishment **of them?** Since he is liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment for killing the slave, he is not liable to pay damages. Therefore, this does not serve as proof that one is not liable to pay the value of a fire victim.


###### Bava Kamma 43b:10
[Bava Kamma 43b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/43b:10)

וְאֶלָּא מֵהָא דְּתַנְיָא: חוֹמֶר בְּאֵשׁ מִבְּבוֹר – שֶׁהָאֵשׁ מוּעֶדֶת לֶאֱכוֹל בֵּין דָּבָר הָרָאוּי לָהּ בֵּין דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין רָאוּי לָהּ, מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בְּבוֹר. וְאִילּוּ שֶׁהָאֵשׁ מְשַׁלֶּמֶת שֶׁלֹּא בְּכַוָּונָה דָּמִים – מַה שֶּׁאֵין כֵּן בְּבוֹר, לָא קָתָנֵי!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** if Rava’s proof is **rather from that which is taught** in a *baraita* (10a): The **stringency that applies to Fire as opposed to Pit** is **that** the one responsible for **Fire is** considered **forewarned** with regard **to** its **consuming both something that is fitting for it and something that is not fitting for it,** i.e., both flammable and non-flammable items. **This is not so with regard to Pit,** as damages are not paid for everything that can be damaged by a pit. **But** the *baraita* **does not teach: That** with regard to **Fire,** one is liable to **pay** the **value** of the victim even if the fire was ignited **unintentionally. This is not so with regard to Pit.** This would seem to support Rava’s opinion that one is not liable to pay the value of an unintentional victim of fire.


###### Bava Kamma 43b:11
[Bava Kamma 43b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/43b:11)

דִּלְמָא תְּנָא וְשַׁיַּיר?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara comments: If this is Rava’s source, there is no proof from here. **Perhaps** the *baraita* **taught** one distinction **and omitted** another; it simply did not enumerate all the differences.


###### Bava Kamma 43b:12
[Bava Kamma 43b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/43b:12)

אֶלָּא רָבָא גּוּפֵיהּ אִבְּעוֹיֵי מִבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ: אִשּׁוֹ שֶׁלֹּא בְּכַוָּונָה – מִי מְשַׁלֵּם דָּמִים, אוֹ לָא?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** Rava’s statement should not be understood as an objection to Rabba’s opinion, as **Rava himself had a dilemma** with regard to the matter: If a person burns another to death **unintentionally** with **his fire, does he pay** the **value** of the victim **or not?**


###### Bava Kamma 43b:13
[Bava Kamma 43b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/43b:13)

מִי אָמְרִינַן: גַּבֵּי שׁוֹר הוּא דִּבְכַוָּונָה מְשַׁלֵּם כּוֹפֶר – שֶׁלֹּא בְּכַוָּונָה מְשַׁלֵּם דָּמִים; אֲבָל אִשּׁוֹ, דִּבְכַוָּונָה לָא מְשַׁלֵּם כּוֹפֶר – שֶׁלֹּא בְּכַוָּונָה נָמֵי לָא מְשַׁלֵּם דָּמִים; אוֹ דִלְמָא, כֵּיוָן דְּגַבֵּי שׁוֹרוֹ שֶׁלֹּא בְּכַוָּונָה – אַף עַל גַּב דְּלֵיכָּא כּוֹפֶר, מְשַׁלֵּם דָּמִים; גַּבֵּי אִשּׁוֹ נָמֵי, אַף עַל גַּב דִּבְכַוָּונָה לָא מְשַׁלֵּם כּוֹפֶר, שֶׁלֹּא בְּכַוָּונָה מִיהַת מְשַׁלֵּם דָּמִים?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara elaborates on the question: **Do we say** that it **is specifically with regard to** death caused by one’s **ox, where** if it was done **intentionally he pays ransom** and **where** it was done **unintentionally he pays** the victim’s monetary **value** instead; **but** with regard to death caused by **his fire, where** even if it was done **intentionally he does not pay ransom,** if it was done **unintentionally he does not pay** the **value either? Or perhaps, since with regard to** the case where **his ox** gored **unintentionally, although there is no** liability to pay **ransom,** nevertheless, **he** at least **pays** the **value** of the victim. One should say that **with regard to his fire too, even though** in a case where it was done **intentionally he does not pay ransom,** when it was done **unintentionally, he should pay** the **value in any event.**


###### Bava Kamma 43b:14
[Bava Kamma 43b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/43b:14)

וְלָא יָדְעִינַן, תֵּיקוּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara concludes: **And we do not know** the solution to this dilemma, which **shall stand** unresolved.


###### Bava Kamma 43b:15
[Bava Kamma 43b:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/43b:15)

כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: ״כֹּפֶר״; מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״אִם כֹּפֶר״? לְרַבּוֹת כּוֹפֶר שֶׁלֹּא בְּכַוָּונָה – כְּכוֹפֶר בְּכַוָּונָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ With regard to Rabba’s statement that for an ox that killed a person unintentionally one is exempt from paying ransom, the Gemara relates that **when Rav Dimi came** from Eretz Yisrael, he reported that **Rabbi Yoḥanan says:** It would have been sufficient for the verse to state: **“A ransom** is laid on him.” **What** is the meaning when **the verse states: “If a ransom** is laid on him” (Exodus 21:30)? It is **to include** liability to pay **ransom** in a case where the ox killed **unintentionally,** just **as** one is liable to pay **ransom** when it killed **intentionally,** in contrast to Rabba’s opinion.


###### Bava Kamma 43b:16
[Bava Kamma 43b:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/43b:16)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, עֶבֶד נָמֵי – מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״אִם עֶבֶד״? לְרַבּוֹת עֶבֶד שֶׁלֹּא בְּכַוָּונָה – כְּעֶבֶד בְּכַוָּונָה! וְכִי תֵּימָא הָכִי נָמֵי, וְהָאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: שׁוֹר שֶׁהֵמִית אֶת הָעֶבֶד שֶׁלֹּא בְּכַוָּונָה – פָּטוּר מִשְּׁלֹשִׁים שְׁקָלִים!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Abaye said to** Rav Dimi: **If** Rabbi Yoḥanan’s interpretation **is so,** it should be implemented with regard to the fine for a Canaanite **slave as well,** and it would have been sufficient for the verse to state: The ox gores a slave or a maidservant, he shall give to their master thirty shekels of silver. **What** is the meaning when **the verse states: “If** the ox gores **a slave”** (Exodus 21:32)? It is **to include** liability in a case where the ox killed a Canaanite **slave unintentionally,** just **as** when it killed **a slave intentionally. And if you would say** that **indeed** this is the *halakha*, **but doesn’t Reish Lakish say** that for **an ox that killed a slave unintentionally** its owner is **exempt from** paying the **thirty shekels?**


###### Bava Kamma 43b:17
[Bava Kamma 43b:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/43b:17)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: גַּבְרָא אַגַּבְרָא קָא רָמֵית?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rav Dimi **said to** Abaye: **Are you setting** the statement of one **man against** the statement of another **man?** It could be that although Reish Lakish maintains that he is exempt, Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that he is liable.


###### Bava Kamma 43b:18
[Bava Kamma 43b:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/43b:18)

כִּי אֲתָא רָבִין, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: ״עֶבֶד״; מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״אִם עֶבֶד״? לְרַבּוֹת עֶבֶד שֶׁלֹּא בְּכַוָּונָה – כְּעֶבֶד בְּכַוָּונָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**When Ravin came** from Eretz Yisrael, he confirmed that this is the opinion of **Rabbi Yoḥanan,** as he **says** that it would have been sufficient for the verse to state: “The ox gores a **slave.” What** is the meaning when **the verse states: “If** the ox gores **a slave”?** It is **to include** liability in a case where the ox killed **a slave unintentionally,** just **as** when it killed **a slave intentionally.**


###### Bava Kamma 43b:19
[Bava Kamma 43b:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/43b:19)

וּלְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ נָמֵי, נֵימָא: מִדְּ״עֶבֶד״ – ״אִם עֶבֶד״ לָא דָּרֵישׁ, ״כֹּפֶר״ – ״אִם כֹּפֶר״ נָמֵי לָא דָּרֵישׁ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests: **And** according **to Reish Lakish, let us say similarly** that **from** the fact **that he does not interpret** the difference between the terms **“a slave”** and **“if a slave”** to derive an additional *halakha*, it may be inferred that **he does not interpret** the difference between the terms **“a ransom”** and **“if a ransom” either,** and holds that ransom is not paid if the incident was unintentional.


###### Bava Kamma 43b:20
[Bava Kamma 43b:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/43b:20)

אָמְרִי: לָא; ״עֶבֶד״ – ״אִם עֶבֶד״ לָא דָּרֵישׁ, ״כֹּפֶר״ – ״אִם כֹּפֶר״ דָּרֵישׁ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Sages **said: No,** that is not a valid comparison. Although Reish Lakish **does not interpret** the difference between the terms **“a slave”** and **“if a slave,” he does interpret** the difference between the terms **“a ransom”** and **“if a ransom.”**


###### Bava Kamma 43b:21
[Bava Kamma 43b:21](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/43b:21)

וּמַאי שְׁנָא? ״עֶבֶד״ – ״אִם עֶבֶד״ לָא כְּתִיב בִּמְקוֹם תַּשְׁלוּמִין, ״כֹּפֶר״ – ״אִם כֹּפֶר״ כְּתִיב בִּמְקוֹם תַּשְׁלוּמִין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And what is different** between the two verses? The terms **“a slave”** and **“if a slave” are not written where** the liability for **payment** is stated, but rather in the presentation of the case: “If the ox gores a slave.” Therefore, the use of the word “if” is warranted. By contrast, the terms **“a ransom”** and **“if a ransom” are written where** the liability for **payment** is stated, where it would have been sufficient for the verse to state: “A ransom is laid on him.” Therefore, the superfluous word “if” lends itself to interpretation to include liability to pay ransom even in a case where the killing was unintentional.


###### Bava Kamma 43b:22
[Bava Kamma 43b:22](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/43b:22)

וְכֵן בְּבֵן אוֹ בְּבַת. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״אוֹ בֵן יִגָּח אוֹ בַת יִגָּח״ – לְחַיֵּיב עַל הַקְּטַנִּים כַּגְּדוֹלִים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna teaches: **And the same** *halakha* applies **in** a case where the ox killed **a boy or in** a case where it killed **a girl. The Sages taught:** The verse states: **“Whether it has gored a son or has gored a daughter”** (Exodus 21:31), **to deem** the owner **liable for** the death of **minors** just **as for adults.**


###### Bava Kamma 43b:23
[Bava Kamma 43b:23](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/43b:23)

וַהֲלֹא דִּין הוּא – הוֹאִיל וְחִיֵּיב אָדָם בְּאָדָם, וְחִיֵּיב שׁוֹר בְּאָדָם; מָה כְּשֶׁחִיֵּיב אָדָם בְּאָדָם – לָא שְׁנָא בֵּין קְטַנִּים לִגְדוֹלִים, אַף כְּשֶׁחִיֵּיב שׁוֹר בְּאָדָם – לֹא תַּחְלוֹק בּוֹ בֵּין קְטַנִּים לִגְדוֹלִים!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The *baraita* asks: **And** could **this not** be derived through **logical inference? Since** the Torah **renders a person liable** to receive court-imposed capital punishment **for** killing another **person, and,** similarly, **renders an ox liable** to be killed **for** killing **a person,** it should be derived that **just as when** the Torah **renders a person liable for** killing **a person** the Torah makes **no distinction between** killing **minors and** killing **adults, so too, when it renders an ox liable** to be killed **for** killing **a person, do not differentiate with regard to it between minors and adults.**


###### Bava Kamma 43b:24
[Bava Kamma 43b:24](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/43b:24)

וְעוֹד, קַל וָחוֹמֶר הוּא: וּמָה אָדָם בְּאָדָם – שֶׁלֹּא עָשָׂה בּוֹ קְטַנִּים כִּגְדוֹלִים, חִיֵּיב בּוֹ עַל הַקְּטַנִּים כִּגְדוֹלִים;

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And furthermore, it** could be inferred ***a fortiori*: If** in the case of **a person** killing **a person** the Torah **does not render minors** entirely **like adults with regard to this** act, inasmuch as minors are exempt from liability for killing, but nevertheless **it renders** a person **liable for** killing **minors** as well **as adults,**