## Bava Kamma Daf 58a

###### Bava Kamma 58a:1
[Bava Kamma 58a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/58a:1)

״לָא מִבַּעְיָא״ קָאָמַר: לָא מִבַּעְיָא אָכְלָה – דִּמְשַׁלֶּמֶת מַה שֶּׁנֶּהֱנֵית; אֲבָל נֶחְבְּטָה – אֵימָא מַבְרִיחַ אֲרִי מִנִּכְסֵי חֲבֵירוֹ הוּא, וּמַה שֶּׁנֶּהֱנֵית נָמֵי לָא מְשַׁלֵּם; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
one cannot make such an inference from Rav’s statement. Rav **is speaking** utilizing the style of: **It is not necessary,** and this is how to understand his statement: **It is not necessary** to state that if the animal fell into the garden and **ate** from its produce, **that** the owner **pays** for **the benefit that** it **derives. But** if the produce softened the blow of **striking** the ground and thereby the animal avoided injury, one might **say** that the owner of the animal should not pay, on the grounds that the owner of the garden may be viewed, analogously, to one who **repels a lion from another’s property.** In such a case, although the latter benefited from his action, he is not obligated to pay for it. Similarly in this case, one might think that the owner of the animal does **not pay even** for **the benefit that** the animal **derived.** For this reason Rav **teaches us** that the owner of the animal must pay for this benefit as well.


###### Bava Kamma 58a:2
[Bava Kamma 58a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/58a:2)

וְאֵימָא הָכִי נָמֵי!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **But** why not **say** that **this is indeed** the *halakha*, and the owner of the animal should be exempt for paying for the benefit of his animal not being injured?


###### Bava Kamma 58a:3
[Bava Kamma 58a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/58a:3)

מַבְרִיחַ אֲרִי מִנִּכְסֵי חֲבֵירוֹ – מִדַּעְתּוֹ הוּא, הַאי – לָאו מִדַּעְתּוֹ. אִי נָמֵי, מַבְרִיחַ אֲרִי מִנִּכְסֵי חֲבֵירוֹ – לֵית לֵיהּ פְּסֵידָא, הַאי – אִית לֵיהּ פְּסֵידָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: One who **repels a lion from another’s property** does so **with intent,** knowing that he would be ineligible for payment. By contrast, **this** owner of the garden did **not** act **with intent** and would have preferred for the incident not to have happened. **Alternatively,** one could say that one who **repels a lion from another’s property does not** thereby **have any loss** himself. By contrast, **this** owner of the garden **has a loss,** in that his produce is damaged.


###### Bava Kamma 58a:4
[Bava Kamma 58a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/58a:4)

הֵיכִי נָפַל? רַב כָּהֲנָא אָמַר: שֶׁהוּחְלְקָה בְּמֵימֵי רַגְלֶיהָ, רָבָא אָמַר: שֶׁדְּחָפַתָּה חֲבֶרְתָּהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **How did** the animal **fall?** In which case does this *halakha* apply? **Rav Kahana says: It slipped on its** own **urine. Rava says: Another** animal belonging to the same owner **pushed it,** causing it to fall there.


###### Bava Kamma 58a:5
[Bava Kamma 58a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/58a:5)

מַאן דְּאָמַר שֶׁדְּחָפַתָּה חֲבֶרְתָּהּ – כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן שֶׁהוּחְלְקָה בְּמֵימֵי רַגְלֶיהָ. וּמַאן דְּאָמַר שֶׁהוּחְלְקָה בְּמֵימֵי רַגְלֶיהָ – אֲבָל דְּחָפַתָּה חֲבֶרְתָּהּ, פָּשְׁעָה, וּמְשַׁלֶּמֶת מַה שֶּׁהִזִּיקָה; דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִיבְּעִי לָךְ עַבּוֹרֵי חֲדָא חֲדָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains: Rava, **the one who says that** the mishna is referring to a case where **another** animal **pushed it,** in which case the owner pays only for the benefit that the animal derived and is exempt from paying for the damage caused, holds that **all the more so** this *halakha* would apply in a case **where it slipped on its urine,** which is beyond the owner’s control. **But** Rav Kahana, **the one who says** that the mishna is referring to a case **where** the animal **slipped on its urine,** holds that if, **however, another** animal **pushed it,** this indicates that the owner **was negligent** and should have prevented this happening. Therefore, in such a case, the owner **pays** for **what** his animal **damaged, since** the owner of the garden **can say to** the owner of the animal: **You should have led** your animals **across one by one,** so that they would not be able to push each other.


###### Bava Kamma 58a:6
[Bava Kamma 58a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/58a:6)

אָמַר רַב כָּהֲנָא: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא בְּאוֹתָהּ עֲרוּגָה, אֲבָל מֵעֲרוּגָה לַעֲרוּגָה – מְשַׁלֶּמֶת מַה שֶּׁהִזִּיקָה. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ מֵעֲרוּגָה לַעֲרוּגָה, וַאֲפִילּוּ כׇּל הַיּוֹם כּוּלּוֹ – עַד שֶׁתֵּצֵא וְתַחֲזוֹר לְדַעַת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Kahana says: They taught only** that the owner pays for the benefit that it derives **in the same garden bed** into which it fell, **but** if it went **from** one **garden bed to** another **garden bed** and ate from that one, the owner **pays** for **what it damaged. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Even** if the animal goes **from** one **garden bed to** another **garden bed** and eats, **and even** if the animal continues going from one bed to another and eating for **the entire day,** the owner pays only for the benefit that the animal derived and not for what it damaged, **unless it leaves** the garden entirely **and returns with** the owner’s **knowledge.**


###### Bava Kamma 58a:7
[Bava Kamma 58a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/58a:7)

אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: לָא תֵּימָא עַד שֶׁתֵּצֵא לְדַעַת וְתַחֲזוֹר לְדַעַת, אֶלָּא כֵּיוָן שֶׁיָּצְתָה לְדַעַת – אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁחָזְרָה שֶׁלֹּא לְדַעַת. מַאי טַעְמָא? דַּאֲמַר לֵיהּ: כֵּיוָן דְּיָלְפָא, כֹּל אֵימַת דְּמִשְׁתַּמְטָא – לְהָתָם רָהֲטָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Pappa said,** explaining Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statement: **Do not say** this means: **Unless** the animal **leaves with** the owner’s **knowledge and returns with** his **knowledge; rather, once it leaves** the garden **with** the owner’s **knowledge, even if it returned without** his **knowledge,** the owner is liable to pay for what it damaged. **What is the reason** for this? It is **that** the owner of the garden can **say to** the owner of the animal: **Since** the animal **has** now **learned** that the garden is there with food to eat, **every time it strays it will run to there.**


###### Bava Kamma 58a:8
[Bava Kamma 58a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/58a:8)

יָרְדָה כְּדַרְכָּהּ וְהִזִּיקָה – מְשַׁלֶּמֶת מַה שֶּׁהִזִּיקָה. בָּעֵי רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: יָרְדָה כְּדַרְכָּהּ וְהִזִּיקָה בְּמֵי לֵידָה, מַהוּ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna teaches: If the animal **descended** into the garden **in its usual manner and caused damage** there, the owner **pays** for **what it damaged. Rabbi Yirmeya asks:** If the animal **descended in its usual manner and** gave birth to a calf there and **damaged** the produce **with amniotic fluid, what is** the *halakha*? Does the owner of the animal have to pay for this damage?


###### Bava Kamma 58a:9
[Bava Kamma 58a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/58a:9)

אַלִּיבָּא דְּמַאן דְּאָמַר תְּחִלָּתוֹ בִּפְשִׁיעָה וְסוֹפוֹ בְּאוֹנֶס חַיָּיב, לָא תִּיבְּעֵי לָךְ; כִּי תִּיבְּעֵי לָךְ – אַלִּיבָּא דְּמַאן דְּאָמַר תְּחִלָּתוֹ בִּפְשִׁיעָה וְסוֹפוֹ בְּאוֹנֶס פָּטוּר; מַאי?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara clarifies Rabbi Yirmeya’s question: **Do not raise the dilemma in accordance with** the opinion of **the one who says** that one is **liable** in a case of damage that is **initially through negligence and ultimately by accident,** since in this case the owner was negligent in allowing the animal to enter another person’s courtyard, although the actual causing of the damage was ultimately by accident. **When should you raise this dilemma?** Raise it **in accordance with** the opinion **of the one who says** that one is **exempt** in a case that is **initially through negligence and ultimately by accident. What** is the *halakha* in this case?


###### Bava Kamma 58a:10
[Bava Kamma 58a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/58a:10)

מִי אָמְרִינַן: כֵּיוָן דִּתְחִלָּתוֹ בִּפְשִׁיעָה וְסוֹפוֹ בְּאוֹנֶס – פָּטוּר; אוֹ דִלְמָא, הָכָא כּוּלַּהּ בִּפְשִׁיעָה הוּא – דְּכֵיוָן דְּקָא חָזֵי דִּקְרִיבָה לַהּ לְמֵילַד, אִיבְּעִי לֵיהּ לְנָטוֹרַהּ

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The two sides of the question are as follows: **Do we say** that, **since** this case is **initially through negligence and ultimately by accident,** he is **exempt** from liability? **Or perhaps here,** in this case, **it is entirely** due to his **negligence; since he saw that** the animal **was close to giving birth, he should have safeguarded it** adequately