## Bava Kamma Daf 66b

###### Bava Kamma 66b:1
[Bava Kamma 66b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/66b:1)

אוֹמֵר לוֹ: ״הֲרֵי שֶׁלְּךָ לְפָנֶיךָ״. וְהַאי, כֵּיוָן דִּמְטָא עִידָּן אִיסּוּרָא – וַדַּאי מִיָּיאַשׁ; וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ יֵאוּשׁ קוֹנֶה, אַמַּאי אוֹמֵר לוֹ: ״הֲרֵי שֶׁלְּךָ לְפָנֶיךָ״? דְּמֵי מְעַלְּיָא בָּעֵי שַׁלּוֹמֵי לֵיהּ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
the robber may nonetheless return the worthless bread to the owner and **say to him: That which is yours is before you,** and no compensation is required. Rav Yosef states his objection: **But** in **this** case, **once the time of** the **prohibition** of leavened bread **arrives,** the owner **certainly despairs** of recovering his now-worthless bread. **And if it enters your mind** to say that the owner’s **despair** causes the robber to **acquire** the stolen item, **why** can **he say to him: That which is yours is before you? He should be required to pay** the owner **full-fledged money** rather than return the worthless food, as the bread now belongs to the robber.


###### Bava Kamma 66b:2
[Bava Kamma 66b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/66b:2)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: כִּי קָאָמֵינָא אֲנָא – זֶה מִתְיָיאֵשׁ וְזֶה רוֹצֶה לִקְנוֹת; הַאי – זֶה מִתְיָיאֵשׁ וְזֶה אֵינוֹ רוֹצֶה לִקְנוֹת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rava **said to** him in response: **When I say** that the thief acquires the stolen item upon the owner’s despair of recovery it is when **this** owner **despairs, and that** thief **wants to acquire** the item. In **this** case, **this** one **despairs but that** one **does not wish to acquire** the worthless bread.


###### Bava Kamma 66b:3
[Bava Kamma 66b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/66b:3)

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי לְרַבָּה: ״קׇרְבָּנוֹ״ – וְלֹא הַגָּזוּל. הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא לִפְנֵי יֵאוּשׁ, לְמָה לִי קְרָא? פְּשִׁיטָא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Abaye raised an objection to Rabba** from a *baraita*. The verse: “If his offering is a burnt-offering of the herd” (Leviticus 1:3), indicates that one’s offering must be **“his offering,” but not** an animal **stolen** from another. **What are the circumstances** of the case referred to by the *baraita*? **If we say** it is dealing with a stolen animal that the robber consecrates and sacrificed **before** the owner’s **despair** of recovery, **why do I** need **a verse** to teach this? It **is obvious** that this is disqualified, as one cannot even consecrate an animal that does not belong to him.


###### Bava Kamma 66b:4
[Bava Kamma 66b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/66b:4)

אֶלָּא לָאו לְאַחַר יֵאוּשׁ? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ יֵאוּשׁ לָא קָנֵי!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, is it not** referring to one who seeks to consecrate and sacrifice a stolen animal **after** the owner’s **despair?** And yet the *baraita* teaches that the animal cannot be consecrated by the thief. **Conclude from** the *baraita* that the owner’s **despair** of recovering a stolen item **does not** cause the thief to **acquire** it, as if it belonged to him he would be able to consecrate and sacrifice it.


###### Bava Kamma 66b:5
[Bava Kamma 66b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/66b:5)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: וְלִיטַעְמָיךְ, הָא דְּתַנְיָא: ״מִשְׁכָּבוֹ״ – וְלֹא הַגָּזוּל,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava said to** Abaye in refutation of this proof: **And according to your reasoning,** consider **that which is taught** in a *baraita*: It is written with regard to a *zav*, a man who experiences a gonorrhea-like discharge: “And whoever touches his bedding shall wash his clothes and bathe himself in water and be impure until the evening” (Leviticus 15:5). This indicates that bedding on which a *zav* lies can become ritually impure and impart impurity only if it is **“his bedding,” but not** if it is **stolen** bedding.


###### Bava Kamma 66b:6
[Bava Kamma 66b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/66b:6)

הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא דִּגְזַל עַמְרָא וְעַבְדֵיהּ מִשְׁכָּב, מִי אִיכָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר שִׁינּוּי מַעֲשֶׂה לָא קָנֵי? אֶלָּא מַאי אִית לָךְ לְמֵימַר – דִּגְזַל מִשְׁכָּב דְּחַבְרֵיהּ; הָכִי נָמֵי – דִּגְזַל קׇרְבָּן דְּחַבְרֵיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**What are the circumstances** of the case discussed in the *baraita*? **If we say that he robbed** another of **wool and made it into bedding, is there anyone who says that** a physical **change** that results from **an action** performed to a stolen item **does not** cause the thief to **acquire it? Rather, what have you to say?** The *baraita* must be speaking of a case in **which** the *zav* **robbed another** of **bedding. So too,** the previous *baraita* is dealing with one **who robbed another** of **an offering,** already consecrated. The reason this animal does not atone for the thief is that a consecrated animal cannot be stolen and become the thief’s property, as it belongs to the Temple treasury wherever it is located.


###### Bava Kamma 66b:7
[Bava Kamma 66b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/66b:7)

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי לְרַב יוֹסֵף: עוֹרוֹת שֶׁל בַּעַל הַבַּיִת – מַחְשָׁבָה מְטַמְּאָתָן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Abaye raised an objection to Rav Yosef** from a mishna (*Kelim* 26:8): With regard to **hides belonging to a homeowner,** one’s **thought renders them susceptible to** contracting **ritual impurity.** Hides and leather are susceptible to contracting impurity only if they are in a finished state. If a private individual uses a piece of hide or leather for a certain purpose, e.g., as a cot or a table top, and decides that this will be its fixed purpose, it is considered a finished product and is susceptible to contracting impurity.


###### Bava Kamma 66b:8
[Bava Kamma 66b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/66b:8)

וְשֶׁל עַבְּדָן – אֵין מַחְשָׁבָה מְטַמְּאָתָן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But** with regard to hides **belonging to a leatherworker, thought does not render them susceptible to ritual impurity.** Since this individual sells leather to others, when he uses a piece of leather for a household purpose and decides that this will be its fixed purpose, this is not considered a finished state, as he is likely to change his mind and sell the leather to one who will process it further and put it to a different use.


###### Bava Kamma 66b:9
[Bava Kamma 66b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/66b:9)

שֶׁל גַּנָּב – מַחְשָׁבָה מְטַמְּאָתָן, שֶׁל גַּזְלָן – אֵין מַחְשָׁבָה מְטַמְּאָתָן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The mishna continues: If the hides are those **of a thief,** who has stolen them from another, the thief’s **thought renders them susceptible to ritual impurity.** If they are those **of a robber** his **thought does not render them susceptible to ritual impurity,** because he is not considered the owner of the hide. The difference is that unlike the case of a thief, who steals items stealthily, the identity of a robber, who takes the item openly, is known to the owner, and the owner harbors hope of finding the robber and getting the item back. Consequently, he does not despair of recovering his property.


###### Bava Kamma 66b:10
[Bava Kamma 66b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/66b:10)

רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: חִילּוּף הַדְּבָרִים – שֶׁל גַּזְלָן מַחְשָׁבָה מְטַמְּאָתָן, וְשֶׁל גַּנָּב אֵין מַחְשָׁבָה מְטַמְּאָתָן; לְפִי שֶׁלֹּא נִתְיָיאֲשׁוּ הַבְּעָלִים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Shimon says** that **the matters are reversed:** In the case **of a robber,** the robber’s **thought renders them susceptible to ritual impurity.** If the hides are those **of a thief, thought does not render them susceptible to ritual impurity, because the owners have not despaired** of recovering them and the thief has not acquired the hide. Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning is that a robber, who seizes items brazenly, is a more difficult criminal to apprehend and bring to justice than a thief.


###### Bava Kamma 66b:11
[Bava Kamma 66b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/66b:11)

וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ, יֵאוּשׁ קֹנֶה! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – כְּגוֹן שֶׁקִּיצְּעָן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** although the two *tanna’im* of the mishna disagree as to which situation involves an owner’s despair of recovery, whether robbery or theft, in any event one can **conclude from** this mishna that the **despair** of the owner causes the thief or robber to **acquire** the item, as otherwise the perpetrator’s thoughts about the hide would have no effect on its status with regard to ritual impurity. Rav Yosef **said to** Abaye in response: **With what are we dealing here** in this mishna? It is a case **where** the thief or robber **trimmed** the leather by cutting it. Although trimming a piece of leather is not a sufficient change to constitute an act of acquisition by itself, it is effective in conjunction with the owner’s despair.


###### Bava Kamma 66b:12
[Bava Kamma 66b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/66b:12)

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַבָּה בַּר רַב חָנָן: וַהֲלֹא עִיצְבָּא שָׁנוּ כָּאן, וְעִיצְבָּא אֵין צְרִיכָה קִיצּוּעַ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabba bar Rav Ḥanan objects to this** answer: **But** is it **not** the case that **they taught** this mishna **here** with regard to a leather table **top [*itzba*]? And** a leather table **top does not require trimming,** either due to the fact that its edges are not seen or because it is merely ornamental. Since it does not require trimming, this action should not be considered an act of acquisition at all.


###### Bava Kamma 66b:13
[Bava Kamma 66b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/66b:13)

דִּתְנַן: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁאֵין חֶסְרוֹן מְלָאכָה – מַחְשָׁבָה מְטַמְּאָתוֹ, יֵשׁ חֶסְרוֹן מְלָאכָה – אֵין מַחְשָׁבָה מְטַמְּאָתוֹ; חוּץ מִן הָעֵיצְבָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**As we learned** in the previous mishna (*Kelim* 26:7): **Wherever there is no work lacking** for an item to be considered finished, one’s **thought renders it susceptible to ritual impurity; when there is** still some **work lacking** for the item to be considered finished, **thought does not render it susceptible to ritual impurity, except for** the case of a leather table **top.** Although further work is required to smooth out the edges, one’s thought can render it susceptible to impurity because people do not care if this leather table top has uneven edges. It is with regard to this case of a table top that the mishna distinguishes between a homeowner and a leatherworker. Therefore, Rav Yosef’s explanation is rejected.


###### Bava Kamma 66b:14
[Bava Kamma 66b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/66b:14)

אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: הַאי מִילְּתָא קְשִׁי בַּהּ רַבָּה לְרַב יוֹסֵף עֶשְׂרִין וְתַרְתֵּין שְׁנִין, וְלָא אִיפַּרְקָה עַד דְּיָתֵיב רַב יוֹסֵף בְּרֵישָׁא, וּפָרְקַהּ: שִׁינּוּי הַשֵּׁם – כְּשִׁינּוּי מַעֲשֶׂה דָּמֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests a different answer. **Rather, Rava said** that **this matter was a difficulty** posed by **Rabba to Rav Yosef for twenty-two years, and it was not resolved until Rav Yosef sat as the head** of the yeshiva **and resolved it** in the following manner: **A change in name** of an item, representing a change in status, **is similar to** a physical **change** brought about by **an action.**


###### Bava Kamma 66b:15
[Bava Kamma 66b:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/66b:15)

שִׁינּוּי מַעֲשֶׂה מַאי טַעְמָא – הָתָם מֵעִיקָּרָא עֵצִים, הַשְׁתָּא כֵּלִים; שִׁינּוּי הַשֵּׁם נָמֵי – מֵעִיקָּרָא קָרוּ לֵיהּ ״מַשְׁכָּא״, וְהַשְׁתָּא ״אַבַּרְזִין״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**What is the reason** that a physical **change** through **an action** causes the thief to acquire the item? It is because **there** the stolen items were **initially** just **wood,** and **now** they are **vessels.** The same can be said for **a change in name as well: Initially they called it a hide, and now** they call it a table **top [*abrazin*].**


###### Bava Kamma 66b:16
[Bava Kamma 66b:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/66b:16)

וַהֲרֵי מָרִישׁ – דְּאִיכָּא שִׁינּוּי הַשֵּׁם, דְּמֵעִיקָּרָא ״כְּשׁוּרָא״ וְהַשְׁתָּא ״טְלָלָא״; וּתְנַן: עַל הַמָּרִישׁ הַגָּזוּל שֶׁבְּנָאוֹ בְּבִירָה שֶׁנּוֹטֵל דָּמָיו, מִפְּנֵי תַּקָּנַת הַשָּׁבִים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks a question with regard to changes in name: **But** what about the case of **a beam, where there is a change in name, as initially,** when it was stolen, it was called **a beam, and now,** after it has been placed in a building, it is called **a joist [*telala*], and** yet **we learned** in a mishna (*Gittin* 55a): **With regard to a stolen beam that** a robber **had built into** a large **building,** the court ruled **that** the owner **should** receive **its** value in **money** rather than demand that the robber demolish the house to return the beam itself, **because of an ordinance** instituted **for the penitent,** i.e., to encourage robbers to admit their crime and reimburse the owner of the stolen item.


###### Bava Kamma 66b:17
[Bava Kamma 66b:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/66b:17)

טַעְמָא מִפְּנֵי תַּקָּנַת הַשָּׁבִים,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
This mishna indicates that **the** only **reason** the robber does not have to return the beam itself is **because of** this **ordinance** instituted **for the penitent.**