## Bava Kamma Daf 73b

###### Bava Kamma 73b:1
[Bava Kamma 73b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/73b:1)

לָאו כְּדִיבּוּר דָּמֵי, וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי סָבַר: תּוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִיבּוּר כְּדִיבּוּר דָּמֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**are not like** one testimony of continuous **speech,** but are considered separate testimonies, and therefore the testimony concerning the theft remains valid. **And Rabbi Yosei maintains that** the legal status of a pause **within** the time required **for speaking** a short phrase **is like** that of continuous **speech,** and therefore the testimony about the theft is disqualified together with the testimony concerning the slaughter.


###### Bava Kamma 73b:2
[Bava Kamma 73b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/73b:2)

וְסָבַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: תּוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִיבּוּר כְּדִיבּוּר דָּמֵי? וְהָתְנַן: ״הֲרֵי זוֹ תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה, תְּמוּרַת שְׁלָמִים״ – הֲרֵי זוֹ תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **But does Rabbi Yosei** really **maintain** that the legal status of a statement interrupted or retracted **within** the time **required for speaking** a short phrase **is like** that of continuous **speech? But didn’t we learn** otherwise in a mishna (*Temura* 25b): If one designates an animal by saying: **This** animal **is hereby a substitute for a burnt-offering, a substitute for a peace-offering,** he has issued two contradictory statements and therefore **this** animal **is** considered **a substitute for a burnt-offering,** i.e., only the first part of his statement is accepted. This is **the statement of Rabbi Meir.**


###### Bava Kamma 73b:3
[Bava Kamma 73b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/73b:3)

רַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹמֵר: אִם לְכָךְ נִתְכַּוֵּון מִתְּחִילָּה, הוֹאִיל וְאִי אֶפְשָׁר לִקְרוֹת שְׁנֵי שֵׁמוֹת כְּאֶחָד – דְּבָרָיו קַיָּימִין. וְאִם אָמַר: ״תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה״, וְנִמְלַךְ וְאָמַר: ״תְּמוּרַת שְׁלָמִים״ – הֲרֵי זוֹ תְּמוּרַת עוֹלָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Yosei says: If he intended this** outcome **from the outset,** that the animal should serve both as the substitute of a burnt-offering and as the substitute of a peace-offering, **since it is impossible** for one **to call it** by **two names at once,** i.e., the only way he can make his intent known is by issuing these two apparently contradictory declarations consecutively, **his statement stands,** and the animal has the status of both a substitute for a burnt-offering and a substitute for a peace-offering. **But if he said:** This animal is **a substitute for a burnt**-**offering and** then **changed his mind and said: A substitute for a peace-offering, it is a substitute for a burnt-offering.**


###### Bava Kamma 73b:4
[Bava Kamma 73b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/73b:4)

וְהָוֵינַן בַּהּ: נִמְלַךְ – פְּשִׁיטָא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And we discussed** this ruling: If he **changed his mind** before saying: A substitute for a peace-offering, it is **obvious** that he cannot remove the status he already applied to the animal, and the animal certainly remains a substitute for a burnt-offering. Rabbi Yosei would not have issued such an obvious ruling.


###### Bava Kamma 73b:5
[Bava Kamma 73b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/73b:5)

וְאָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: נִמְלַךְ בְּתוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִיבּוּר קָאָמְרִינַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And Rav Pappa said** in response to this question: **We are speaking** of a case where the individual **changed his mind within the time required for speaking** a short phrase. Rabbi Yosei holds that when one adds to a statement after a pause, even if the addition was made within a short time, it is considered a separate statement, which does not reverse the initial declaration. This contradicts the explanation given for the *baraita* cited above, according to which Rabbi Yosei maintains that when one adds to an existing statement within the time required for speaking a short phrase it is considered continuous speech.


###### Bava Kamma 73b:6
[Bava Kamma 73b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/73b:6)

אָמְרִי: תְּרֵי ״תּוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִיבּוּר״ הָוֵי – חַד כְּדֵי שְׁאֵילַת תַּלְמִיד לְרַב, וְחַד כְּדֵי שְׁאֵילַת הָרַב לְתַלְמִיד. כִּי לֵית לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי – כְּדֵי שְׁאֵילַת תַּלְמִיד לְרַב ״שָׁלוֹם עָלֶיךָ רַבִּי וּמוֹרִי״, דִּנְפִישׁ; כְּדֵי שְׁאֵילַת הָרַב לְתַלְמִיד ״שָׁלוֹם עָלֶיךָ״ – אִית לֵיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Sages **say** in response: **There are two** time frames that are referred to as being **within the time required for speaking** a short phrase. **One is the time required for a student to greet a rabbi, and** the other **one is the time required for the rabbi to greet a student. When does Rabbi Yosei hold** that a statement added within the time required for speaking a short phrase is **not** considered continuous speech? When the words are added **within the time required for a student to greet his rabbi** using the phrase: **Peace be upon you, my rabbi and teacher, as** that **is a long** pause. By contrast, if the statement is added **within the** shorter **time** frame **required for the rabbi to greet his student: Peace be upon you,** Rabbi Yosei **is of** the opinion **that** the added words constitute speech that is continuous with the original statement.


###### Bava Kamma 73b:7
[Bava Kamma 73b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/73b:7)

אָמַר רָבָא: עֵדִים שֶׁהוּכְחֲשׁוּ וּלְבַסּוֹף הוּזַּמּוּ – נֶהֱרָגִין. דְּהַכְחָשָׁה תְּחִילַּת הֲזַמָּה הִיא, אֶלָּא שֶׁלֹּא נִגְמְרָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **Rava says: Witnesses** to a capital crime **who were** first **contradicted** by two other witnesses, and **ultimately they,** the first set of witnesses, **were rendered conspiring witnesses, are killed,** in accordance with the punishment for conspiring witnesses involved in a capital case, despite the fact that their testimony was already disqualified prior to the discovery of their conspiracy. The reason is that the **contradiction** of testimony **is the start of determining that** testimony is **conspiring** testimony, **only** the process **has not** yet **been completed** at the time of the contradiction.


###### Bava Kamma 73b:8
[Bava Kamma 73b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/73b:8)

אָמַר רָבָא: מְנָא אָמֵינָא לַהּ? דְּתַנְיָא: ״מְעִידַנִי בְּאִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי שֶׁסִּימֵּא אֶת עֵין עַבְדּוֹ וְהִפִּיל אֶת שִׁינּוֹ״ – שֶׁהֲרֵי הָרַב אוֹמֵר כֵּן; וְנִמְצְאוּ זוֹמְמִין – מְשַׁלְּמִין דְּמֵי עַיִן לָעֶבֶד.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava said: From where do I say** that this is so? **As it is taught** in a *baraita* (*Tosefta*, *Makkot* 1:3) that if witnesses say: **We testify with regard to so-and-so that he blinded his** Canaanite **slave’s eye and** afterward **knocked out his tooth,** and therefore the master is obligated to pay him compensation for the value of his tooth, **as that is what the master says,** i.e., this testimony is advantageous to the master, **and** subsequently **they were found** to be **conspiring witnesses, they pay** the **value of an eye to the slave.**


###### Bava Kamma 73b:9
[Bava Kamma 73b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/73b:9)

הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא כִּדְקָתָנֵי, דְּלֵיכָּא כַּת אַחֲרִינָא; מְשַׁלְּמִין דְּמֵי עַיִן לָעֶבֶד?! בָּתַר דְּמַפְּקִי לֵיהּ לְחֵירוּת – דְּמֵי עֵינוֹ קָבָעֵי שַׁלּוֹמֵי?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rava explains that the *baraita* as written is problematic: **What are the circumstances** of this case? **If we say that** it is exactly **as it is taught** in the *baraita*, i.e., **that there is no other set** of witnesses other than those whose statement is quoted in the *baraita* and the opposing set of witnesses who establish them as conspiring witnesses, several problems arise: First, why should they **pay** the **value of an eye to the slave? After emancipating him** by testifying that his master has blinded him, should **they be required to pay** him the **value of his eye?**


###### Bava Kamma 73b:10
[Bava Kamma 73b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/73b:10)

וְעוֹד, דְּמֵי כּוּלֵּיהּ עֶבֶד לְרַב בָּעֵי לְשַׁלּוֹמֵי! וְעוֹד, ״שֶׁהֲרֵי הָרַב אוֹמֵר כֵּן״ – הָרַב מִי נִיחָא לֵיהּ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And furthermore, they should be required to pay** the **value of the entire slave to the master,** as they intended to cause him to lose ownership of his slave through their false testimony. **And furthermore,** why does the *baraita* say: **As that is what the master says,** i.e., this testimony is advantageous to the master. **Is it** really **satisfactory to the master** that his slave be emancipated as a result of this testimony?


###### Bava Kamma 73b:11
[Bava Kamma 73b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/73b:11)

אֶלָּא לָאו כְּגוֹן דַּאֲתוֹ בֵּי תְרֵי, וְאָמְרִי: ״הִפִּיל אֶת שִׁינּוֹ, סִימֵּא אֶת עֵינוֹ״ – דְּבָעֵי מֵיתִיב לֵיהּ הָרַב דְּמֵי עֵינוֹ; וַאֲתוֹ בֵּי תְרֵי מְצִיעָאֵי, וְאָמְרִי: ״עֵינוֹ, וַהֲדַר שִׁינּוֹ״ – דְּלָא בָּעֵי לְמִיתַּב לֵיהּ אֶלָּא דְּמֵי שִׁינּוֹ, דְּקָא מַכְחֲשִׁי לֵיהּ קַמָּאֵי לִמְצִיעָאֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** it must be that this case involves another, competing, testimony that is not mentioned in the *baraita*. **Is it not** correct to say that the *baraita* is dealing with a case **where** prior to the testimonies mentioned in the *baraita* **two** other witnesses **came and said:** The master first **knocked out** the slave’s **tooth** and then **blinded his eye, in** which case **the master is required** to emancipate the slave and also **to give him** the **value of his eye; and** then **an intermediate** set of **two** witnesses **came and said** the testimony quoted in the *baraita*, that first the master blinded the slave’s **eye and then** knocked out **his tooth?** According to this account the master would still be required to emancipate the slave, but **he would be required to give him only** the **value of his tooth,** which is much less than the value of an eye. **In** this case the testimony of **the first** set of witnesses **contradicts** the testimony of **the intermediate ones.**


###### Bava Kamma 73b:12
[Bava Kamma 73b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/73b:12)

וְהַיְינוּ ״שֶׁהֲרֵי הָרַב אוֹמֵר כֵּן״ – דְּנִיחָא לֵיהּ בְּמַאי דְּקָאָמְרִי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And this is** the meaning of the clause: **As that is what the master says,** i.e., this testimony is advantageous to the master. It means **that what** the intermediate witnesses **say,** i.e., that he owes the value of a tooth, **is satisfactory to him,** as according to the claim of the first set, he owes the value of an eye. Since there are now contradictory testimonies, the testimony stating the claim of a loss of lesser value is accepted, and in that case the master would have to pay the slave only for the value of his tooth, in addition to emancipating him. This judgment corresponds exactly to the testimony of the intermediate set of witnesses.


###### Bava Kamma 73b:13
[Bava Kamma 73b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/73b:13)

וְקָתָנֵי: ״וְנִמְצְאוּ זוֹמְמִין״ – מְצִיעָאֵי, ״מְשַׁלְּמִין דְּמֵי עַיִן לָעֶבֶד״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** the *baraita* subsequently **teaches: And** then **the intermediate** set of witnesses **were found to be conspiring witnesses,** as a third set of witnesses testified that the intermediate set was not at the scene of the incident at all. Therefore, the intermediate set of witnesses **pays** the **value of an eye to the slave** less the value of a tooth, as this is the amount of monetary damage the slave stood to incur as a result of their testimony.


###### Bava Kamma 73b:14
[Bava Kamma 73b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/73b:14)

שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: הַכְחָשָׁה – תְּחִילַּת הֲזַמָּה הִיא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rava concludes his proof: **Learn from** the *baraita* that the **contradiction** of testimony **is the start of determining that** testimony is **conspiring** testimony. Although the testimony of the intermediate set of witnesses had already been contradicted before it was shown to be conspiring testimony, nevertheless, they can still be established as conspiring witnesses at that later stage, which means that they must pay an amount equivalent to the loss they were attempting to cause through their testimony.


###### Bava Kamma 73b:15
[Bava Kamma 73b:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/73b:15)

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: לָא,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Abaye said: No.** There is another possible interpretation for the *baraita*, which answers the questions raised above and yet does not serve as proof for Rava’s opinion. According to this interpretation, the contradictory testimony was given after, not before, the testimony mentioned in the *baraita*.


###### Bava Kamma 73b:16
[Bava Kamma 73b:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/73b:16)

דְּאַפְכִינְהוּ וְאַזְּמִינְהוּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
It is possible that the *baraita* is discussing a case **where** a second set of witnesses both **reversed** the order of events, by testifying that the tooth was knocked out before the blinding of the eye, **and** at the same time **rendered** the first set witnesses **as conspiring witnesses,** by testifying that those original witnesses were not at the scene of the supposed events they claimed to have witnessed. It can be argued, albeit in a far-fetched manner, that the testimony of the first set of witnesses is considered to be to the master’s advantage even at this stage, because he knows what really happened, as reflected in the testimony of the later witnesses. Accordingly, Rava maintains that there are a total of three sets of witnesses in the case of the *baraita*, while Abaye says that there are only two sets.


###### Bava Kamma 73b:17
[Bava Kamma 73b:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Kamma/r/73b:17)

מִמַּאי?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Abaye elaborates: **From where** do I say that my interpretation of the *baraita* is correct?