## Bava Metzia Daf 10b

###### Bava Metzia 10b:1
[Bava Metzia 10b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/10b:1)

רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: כִּי תַּקִּינוּ לֵיה רַבָּנַן אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת – בְּעָלְמָא, בְּשָׂדֶה דְּבַעַל הַבַּיִת לָא תַּקִּינוּ לֵיה רַבָּנַן. וְאַף עַל גַּב דִּזְכָה לֵיהּ רַחֲמָנָא בְּגַוַּהּ, כִּי זְכָה לֵיהּ רַחֲמָנָא – לְהַלּוֹכֵי בַּהּ וּלְנַקּוֹטֵי פֵּיאָה, לְמִיהְוֵי חֲצֵירוֹ לָא זְכָה לֵיהּ רַחֲמָנָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Pappa said** a different answer: **When the Sages instituted** an ordinance that one’s **four** square **cubits** effect acquisition of property **for him,** that was **in the world,** i.e., on public land. But **the Sages did not institute** this mode of acquisition **for him in a field belonging to an owner. And even though the Merciful One accorded** a poor person certain **rights in** a landowner’s field during the distribution of *pe’a*, this mode of acquisition is not included in those rights; **when the Merciful One accorded him rights** it was specifically **to walk in** the field **and to collect *pe’a*,** but **the Merciful One did not accord him the right** that the field **be considered his courtyard** with regard to acquiring *pe’a*. Therefore, the mishna in tractate *Pe’a* does not contradict the statement of Reish Lakish.


###### Bava Metzia 10b:2
[Bava Metzia 10b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/10b:2)

אָמַר רָבָא, מוֹתֵיב רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב בַּר אִידִי נְזִיקִין: רָאָה אֶת הַמְּצִיאָה וְנָפַל לוֹ עָלֶיהָ וּבָא אַחֵר וְהֶחְזִיק בָּהּ, זֶה שֶׁהֶחְזִיק בָּהּ זָכָה בַּהּ. וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת שֶׁל אָדָם קוֹנוֹת לוֹ בְּכׇל מָקוֹם – נִקְנוֹ לֵיהּ אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת דִּידֵיהּ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
As mentioned previously, **Rava said** that **Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi raises an objection** to this from a mishna in ***Nezikin*.** The Gemara elaborates: The mishna here states that if one **saw a found item and fell upon it, and another came and seized it, the one who seized it acquired it. And if you say** that **a person’s four** square **cubits effect acquisition** of property **for him everywhere, let his four** square **cubits effect acquisition** of the found item **for him.**


###### Bava Metzia 10b:3
[Bava Metzia 10b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/10b:3)

הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן, דְּלָא אֲמַר ״אֶקְנֵי״. וְאִי תַּקּוּן רַבָּנַן, כִּי לָא אֲמַר מַאי הָוֵי! כֵּיוָן דְּנָפַל עָלֶיהָ, גַּלִּי דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּבִנְפִילָה נִיחָא לֵיהּ דְּנִקְנֵי, בְּאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת לָא נִיחָא לֵיהּ דְּנִקְנֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **Here we are dealing with** a case **where he did not say: I will acquire** it. The Gemara asks: **But if the Sages instituted** an ordinance that one’s four square cubits effect acquisition of property for him, then even in a case **when he did not say:** I will acquire the item, **what of it?** The item should still be his. The Gemara answers: **Since he fell upon it, he revealed his intention that it is satisfactory for him to acquire** the item **by falling** on it, and **it is not satisfactory for him to acquire** the item **through** the ordinance concerning his **four** square **cubits.** Since he decided to forgo the mode of acquisition instituted by the Sages, he does not acquire the found item.


###### Bava Metzia 10b:4
[Bava Metzia 10b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/10b:4)

רַב שֵׁשֶׁת אָמַר: כִּי תַּקִּינוּ רַבָּנַן, בְּסִמְטָא דְּלָא דָּחֲקִי רַבִּים. בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים דְּקָא דָחֲקִי רַבִּים, לָא תַּקִּינוּ רַבָּנַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Sheshet said** a different answer: **When the Sages instituted** that one’s four square cubits effect acquisition of property for him, that was **in** a place like **an alleyway, where the multitudes do not crowd,** so the four square cubits surrounding a person can temporarily be considered his property and enable him to acquire an item; but **the Sages did not institute** this mode of acquisition **in the public domain, where the multitudes crowd.**


###### Bava Metzia 10b:5
[Bava Metzia 10b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/10b:5)

וְהָא בְּכׇל מָקוֹם קָאָמַר!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **But** doesn’t the wording of Reish Lakish’s statement indicate that there is no such limitation, as **he says** that the area of four square cubits surrounding a person effects acquisition of property for him **everywhere?** The indication is that this is true even in the public domain.


###### Bava Metzia 10b:6
[Bava Metzia 10b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/10b:6)

כׇּל מָקוֹם – לְאֵתוֹיֵי צִידֵּי רְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: The word **everywhere** is not to be taken literally; it was stated **to include** even **the sides of the public domain,** areas that are adjacent to the public domain but not actually part of it. Since the multitudes do not crowd there, one who is standing there acquires an item that is in his four square cubits.


###### Bava Metzia 10b:7
[Bava Metzia 10b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/10b:7)

וְאָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ מִשּׁוּם אַבָּא כֹּהֵן בַּרְדְּלָא: קְטַנָּה אֵין לָהּ חָצֵר, וְאֵין לָהּ אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי יַנַּאי אָמַר: יֵשׁ לָהּ חָצֵר, וְיֵשׁ לָהּ אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **And Reish Lakish says** another *halakha* **in the name of Abba Kohen Bardela: A minor girl does not have** the ability to acquire property by means of her **courtyard, and she does not have** the ability to acquire property by means of her **four** square **cubits. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Yannai** that **she has** the ability to acquire property by means of her **courtyard, and she has** the ability to acquire property by means of her **four** square **cubits.**


###### Bava Metzia 10b:8
[Bava Metzia 10b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/10b:8)

בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי? מָר סָבַר חָצֵר מִשּׁוּם יָדָהּ אִיתְרַבַּאי, כִּי הֵיכִי דְּאִית לַהּ יָד – חָצֵר נָמֵי אִית לַהּ. וּמָר סָבַר חָצֵר מִשּׁוּם שְׁלִיחוּת אִיתְרַבַּאי, וְכִי הֵיכִי דִּשְׁלִיחוּת לֵית לַהּ – חָצֵר נָמֵי לֵית לַהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **With regard to what do they disagree?** The Gemara explains: One **Sage,** Rabbi Yannai, **holds** that placing an item in **a courtyard is included** as a valid means of acquisition **due to** the fact that it acts as **her hand. Just as** a minor girl **has** the ability to acquire property with her **hand, she also has** the ability to acquire property by means of her **courtyard. And** one **Sage,** Abba Kohen Bardela, **holds** that placing an item in **a courtyard is included** as a valid means of acquisition **due to** the option of acquiring property via **agency; and just as** a minor girl **has no** power of **agency,** as a minor cannot appoint an agent, **she does not have** the ability to acquire property by means of her **courtyard either.**


###### Bava Metzia 10b:9
[Bava Metzia 10b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/10b:9)

מִי אִיכָּא מַאן דְּאָמַר חָצֵר מִשּׁוּם שְׁלִיחוּת אִיתְרַבַּאי? וְהָתַנְיָא: ״בְּיָדוֹ״ – אֵין לִי אֶלָּא יָדוֹ. גַּגּוֹ, חֲצֵירוֹ וְקַרְפֵּיפוֹ מִנַּיִן – תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״הִמָּצֵא תִמָּצֵא״, מִכׇּל מָקוֹם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **Is there anyone who says** that **a courtyard is included** as a valid means of acquisition **due to** the option of acquiring property via **agency? But isn’t it taught** in a *baraita*: The verse states: “If the theft shall be found in his possession alive, whether it is an ox, or a donkey, or a sheep, he shall pay double” (Exodus 22:3)” From the term **“in his possession [*beyado*],” I have** derived **only** a case where the stolen item is found in **his hand [*yado*]. From where** do I derive that the same *halakha* applies if it is found on **his roof,** in **his yard, or** in **his enclosure? The verse states** the repetitive phrase **“if** the theft **shall be found [*himmatze timmatze*],”** to indicate that the same *halakha* applies **in any case,** i.e., in any location that the stolen item is found.


###### Bava Metzia 10b:10
[Bava Metzia 10b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/10b:10)

וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ חָצֵר מִשּׁוּם שְׁלִיחוּת אִיתְרַבַּאי, אִם כֵּן מָצִינוּ שָׁלִיחַ לִדְבַר עֲבֵירָה, וְקַיְימָא לַן אֵין שָׁלִיחַ לִדְבַר עֲבֵירָה!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains: **And if it enters your mind** that **a courtyard is included** as a valid means of acquisition **due to agency, if so, we have found** a case where there is **agency for a transgression,** i.e., theft. **But we maintain** that **there is no agency for transgression.** If one sends an agent to violate a transgression on his behalf, the agent is liable for the transgression and is not considered to be acting on behalf of the one who sent him.


###### Bava Metzia 10b:11
[Bava Metzia 10b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/10b:11)

אָמַר רָבִינָא: הֵיכָא אָמְרִינַן דְּאֵין שָׁלִיחַ לִדְבַר עֲבֵירָה – הֵיכָא דְּשָׁלִיחַ בַּר חִיּוּבָא הוּא, אֲבָל בְּחָצֵר דְּלָאו בַּר חִיּוּבָא הוּא – מִיחַיַּיב שׁוֹלְחוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Ravina said:** That *baraita* poses no problem, as **where do we say that there is no agency for transgression?** It is **where** the **agent** himself **is subject to liability** for transgression. Consequently, the agent is liable, not the one who sent him. **But in** the case of **a courtyard, which is not subject to liability, its sender,** i.e., its owner, **is liable.**


###### Bava Metzia 10b:12
[Bava Metzia 10b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/10b:12)

אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשָּׁה וְעֶבֶד: ״צְאוּ גִּנְבוּ לִי״ – דְּלָאו בְּנֵי חִיּוּבָא נִינְהוּ, הָכִי נָמֵי דְּמִיחַיַּיב שׁוֹלְחָן?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **If that is so,** then in a case of **one who says to a woman or a slave: Go out and steal for me, is the one who sent them indeed liable, since they are not subject to liability?** Married women and slaves have no property of their own from which one could collect payment.


###### Bava Metzia 10b:13
[Bava Metzia 10b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/10b:13)

אָמְרַתְּ אִשָּׁה וְעֶבֶד – בְּנֵי חִיּוּבָא נִינְהוּ, וְהַשְׁתָּא מִיהָא לֵית לְהוּ לְשַׁלּוֹמֵי. דִּתְנַן: נִתְגָּרְשָׁה הָאִשָּׁה, נִשְׁתַּחְרֵר הָעֶבֶד – חַיָּיבִין לְשַׁלֵּם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **You can say** in response: **A woman and a slave** are not comparable to a courtyard, as **they are subject to liability** if they steal; **and** only **now, in any event, they do not have** the means **to pay.** This is **as we learned** in a mishna (*Bava Kamma* 87a) concerning a married woman or Canaanite slave who injured another person: If **the woman becomes divorced** or **the slave becomes emancipated,** and they then have their own money, **they are liable to pay** for the damage they inflicted. Evidently, although it is not possible to collect payment from them, they are liable for their actions.


###### Bava Metzia 10b:14
[Bava Metzia 10b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/10b:14)

רַב סַמָּא אָמַר: הֵיכָא אָמְרִינַן אֵין שָׁלִיחַ לִדְבַר עֲבֵירָה – הֵיכָא דְּאִי בָּעֵי עָבֵיד וְאִי בָּעֵי לָא עָבֵיד, אֲבָל חָצֵר דִּבְעַל כֻּרְחֵיהּ מוֹתֵיב בַּהּ, מִיחַיַּיב שׁוֹלְחוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Samma stated** a different resolution to the difficulty based on the *baraita*: **Where do we say** that **there is no agency for transgression?** It is specifically in a case **where if** the agent **wants** to execute his assignment **he can do** so, **and if he wants** to refrain from executing it **he can** also opt to **not do** it. **But** in the case of **a courtyard, where** one **places** items **without its consent, its sender,** i.e., its owner, **is liable.**


###### Bava Metzia 10b:15
[Bava Metzia 10b:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/10b:15)

מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ כֹּהֵן דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ לְיִשְׂרָאֵל: צֵא וְקַדֵּשׁ לִי אִשָּׁה גְּרוּשָׁה, אִי נָמֵי אִישׁ דְּאָמַר לַהּ לְאִשָּׁה: אַקִּפִי לִי קָטָן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **What is** the practical difference **between** the answers of Ravina and Rav Samma? The practical difference **between them** is in the case of **a priest who said to an Israelite: Go out and betroth a divorced woman for me.** It is prohibited for a priest to betroth a divorcée, while it is permitted for an Israelite to do so. **Alternatively,** the difference is in the case of **a man who said to a woman: Round** the corners of the head of **a minor boy for me.** Rounding the corners of a man’s head, and a man having the corners of his head rounded, are prohibited in the verse: “You shall not round the corners of your head” (Leviticus 19:27), but they are prohibited only for men and not for women.


###### Bava Metzia 10b:16
[Bava Metzia 10b:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/10b:16)

לְהָךְ לִישָּׁנָא דְּאָמַר כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּאִי בָּעֵי עָבֵיד אִי בָּעֵי לָא עָבֵיד – לָא מִיחַיַּיב שׁוֹלְחוֹ. הָנֵי נָמֵי אִי בָּעֵי עָבֵיד, אִי בָּעֵי לָא עָבֵיד – לָא מִיחַיַּיב שׁוֹלְחָן. לְהָךְ לִישָּׁנָא דְּאָמְרַתְּ כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּשָׁלִיחַ לָאו בַּר חִיּוּבָא מִיחַיַּיב שׁוֹלְחוֹ, הָנֵי נָמֵי כֵּיוָן דְּלָאו בְּנֵי חִיּוּבָא נִינְהוּ – מִיחַיַּיב שׁוּלְחָן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains: **According to the formulation in which** it was **said** that **anywhere that if** the agent **wants** to execute his assignment **he can do** so and **if he wants** to refrain from executing it **he can** opt to **not do** it **the one who sent him is not liable** for the transgression but rather the agent is liable, in **these** cases **too,** since **if** the agent **wants** to execute his assignment **he can do** so, and **if he wants** to refrain from executing it **he can** opt to **not do** it, **the one who sent them is not liable.** But **according to the formulation in which** it was **said** that **wherever an agent is not subject to liability the one who sent him is liable,** in **these** cases **too, since** the agents **are not subject to liability, the one who sent them is liable.**


###### Bava Metzia 10b:17
[Bava Metzia 10b:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/10b:17)

וּמִי אִיכָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר חָצֵר לָאו מִשּׁוּם יָדָהּ אִיתְרַבַּאי? וְהָתַנְיָא: ״יָדָהּ״, אֵין לִי אֶלָּא יָדָהּ. גַּגָּהּ, חֲצֵירָהּ וְקַרְפֵּיפָהּ מִנַּיִן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְנָתַן״ מִכׇּל מָקוֹם!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks about the explanation of the opinion of Abba Kohen Bardela: **But is there anyone who says** that placing an item in **a courtyard is not included** as a valid means of acquisition **due to** the fact that it acts as **her hand? But isn’t it taught** in a *baraita*: From the verse: “And he writes her a scroll of severance, and he gives it **in her hand”** (Deuteronomy 24:1), **I have** derived **only** that a woman is divorced if her husband places the bill of divorce in **her hand. From where** is it derived that even if he places it on **her roof,** in **her courtyard, or in her enclosure,** she is divorced? **The verse states: “And he gives,”** indicating that she is divorced **in any case.** Apparently one’s courtyard is considered an extension of his hand with regard to acquiring property, in this case, the bill of divorce.


###### Bava Metzia 10b:18
[Bava Metzia 10b:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/10b:18)

לְעִנְיַן גֵּט כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּחָצֵר מִשּׁוּם יָדָהּ אִיתְרַבַּאי, כִּי פְּלִיגִי לְעִנְיַן מְצִיאָה. מָר סָבַר:

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **With regard to a bill of divorce everyone agrees that** placing an item in **a courtyard is included** as a valid means of acquisition **due to** the fact that it acts as **her hand. When they disagree,** it is **with regard to** acquiring **a found item** that was discovered in her courtyard. One **Sage,** Rabbi Yannai, **holds** that