## Bava Metzia Daf 116a

###### Bava Metzia 116a:1
[Bava Metzia 116a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/116a:1)

יַתִּירָא הוּא, כֵּיוָן דְּיַתִּירָא הוּא – שִׁדְיֵיהּ אַרֵיחַיִם וָרָכֶב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**is superfluous** and therefore includes other utensils as well. **Since it is superfluous, apply it** as another prohibition **upon the lower and upper millstones.**


###### Bava Metzia 116a:2
[Bava Metzia 116a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/116a:2)

אֲבָל הָכָא, ״כִּי אִם צְלִי אֵשׁ״ לָאו יַתִּירָא הוּא, דְּמִבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא: בְּשָׁעָה שֶׁיֶּשְׁנוֹ בְּקוּם אֱכוֹל צָלִי, יֶשְׁנוֹ – בְּבַל תֹּאכַל נָא. בְּשָׁעָה שֶׁאֵינוֹ בְּקוּם אֱכוֹל צָלִי – אֵינוֹ בְּבַל תֹּאכַל נָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But here,** with regard to the Paschal offering, the phrase **“but roasted with fire” is not superfluous, as he requires it for that which is taught** in a *baraita*: **At the time when one is included in** the mitzva **to arise** and **eat** the **roasted** Paschal offering, **he is** also **included in** the prohibition **not to eat** of it **raw,** but **at a time when one is not included in** the mitzva **to arise** and **eat the roasted** Paschal offering, **he is not** included **in** the prohibition **not to eat** of it **raw** either. Consequently, one who eats the Paschal offering at that time is not liable to receive lashes.


###### Bava Metzia 116a:3
[Bava Metzia 116a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/116a:3)

תַּנְיָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוּדָה: חָבַל זוּג שֶׁל סַפָּרִים וְצֶמֶד שֶׁל פָּרוֹת – חַיָּיב שְׁתַּיִם. זֶה בְּעַצְמוֹ וְזֶה בְּעַצְמוֹ – אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The Gemara returns to the dispute concerning the lower and upper millstones. It **is taught** in a *baraita* **in accordance with** the opinion **of Rav Yehuda:** If one **took as collateral barbers’ scissors [*zog*] or a pair of cows,** he is **liable** to receive **two** sets of lashes. If he took **this** one blade of the pair of scissors **by itself or that** one cow **by itself,** he is **liable** to receive **only one** set of lashes. According to this *tanna*, he is not liable for the general prohibition.


###### Bava Metzia 116a:4
[Bava Metzia 116a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/116a:4)

וְתַנְיָא אִידַּךְ: חָבַל זוּג שֶׁל סַפָּרִים וְצֶמֶד שֶׁל פָּרוֹת, יָכוֹל לֹא יְהֵא חַיָּיב אֶלָּא אַחַת – תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״לֹא יַחֲבֹל רֵיחַיִם וָרָכֶב״. מָה רֵיחַיִם וָרֶכֶב שֶׁהֵן מְיוּחָדִין שְׁנֵי כֵּלִים וְעוֹשִׂין מְלָאכָה אַחַת, וְחַיָּיב עַל זֶה בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ וְעַל זֶה בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ – אַף כׇּל דְּבָרִים שֶׁהֵן שְׁנֵי כֵּלִים מְיוּחָדִים וְעוֹשִׂין מְלָאכָה אַחַת – חַיָּיב עַל זֶה בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ וְעַל זֶה בִּפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** it **is taught** in **another** *baraita*: If one **took as collateral barbers’ scissors or a pair of cows,** one **might** have thought that he is **liable** to receive **only one** set of lashes. Therefore, **the verse states: “He may not take as collateral the lower or upper millstone,”** which indicates that **just as the lower and upper millstones are unique** in that they are **two** distinct **vessels and** they **perform one task** together, and nevertheless one is **liable separately for this and separately for that, so too,** with regard to **all items that are** composed of **two individual vessels,** such as barbers’ scissors or a pair of cows, **and** they **perform one task,** he is **liable separately for this and separately for that.**


###### Bava Metzia 116a:5
[Bava Metzia 116a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/116a:5)

הָהוּא גַּבְרָא דַּחֲבַל סַכִּינָא דְּאַשְׁכַּבְתָּא מֵחַבְרֵיהּ. אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּאַבָּיֵי, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: זִיל אַהְדְּרֵיהּ, דְּהָוֵי לֵיהּ כְּלִי שֶׁעוֹשִׂים בּוֹ אוֹכֶל נֶפֶשׁ, וְתָא קוּם בְּדִינָא עֲלֵהּ. רָבָא אָמַר: לָא צְרִיךְ לְמֵיקַם בְּדִינָא עֲלֵהּ, וְיָכוֹל לִטְעוֹן עַד כְּדֵי דְּמֵיהֶן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The Gemara relates: There was **a certain man who took as collateral a slaughtering knife from another. He came before Abaye** to ask him what to do. Abaye **said to him: Go** and **return it, as it is a vessel used in the preparation of food,** and it is therefore forbidden to take as collateral, **and go stand in judgment,** i.e., litigate with the debtor in court, **concerning** how much money he owes you. **Rava said:** He does **not have to stand in judgment for this.** Since the knife is in his possession, **he can claim** the amount of the debt **up to its value.**


###### Bava Metzia 116a:6
[Bava Metzia 116a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/116a:6)

וְאַבָּיֵי לֵית לֵיהּ הָהִיא סְבָרָא: מַאי שְׁנָא מֵהָנְהוּ עִיזֵּי דְּאָכְלִי חוּשְׁלָא בִּנְהַרְדְּעָא, וַאֲתָא מָרָא דְחוּשְׁלָא וּתְפַס לְהוּ וְקָא טָעֵין טוּבָא. וַאֲמַר אֲבוּהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל יָכוֹל לִטְעוֹן עַד כְּדֵי דְּמֵיהֶן!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And does Abaye not accept that reasoning,** that one who seized an item belonging to a debtor may claim the sum owed to him up to the value of the item? In **what** way **is** it **different from** the incident involving **those goats that ate peeled barley [*ḥushla*] in Neharde’a, and the owner of the peeled barley came and seized** the goats and **claimed** that their owner was indebted to him for **a large** amount, **and Shmuel’s father,** who acted as a judge in this case, **said** that **he can claim** a sum **up to their value?**


###### Bava Metzia 116a:7
[Bava Metzia 116a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/116a:7)

הָתָם לָאו מִידֵּי (דַּעֲבִדָא) [דַּעֲבִיד] לְאוֹשׁוֹלֵי וּלְאוֹגוֹרֵי הוּא. הָכָא מִידֵּי דַּעֲבִיד לְאוֹשׁוֹלֵי וּלְאוֹגוֹרֵי הוּא. דִּשְׁלַח רַב הוּנָא בַּר אָבִין: דְּבָרִים הָעֲשׂוּיִין לְהַשְׁאִיל וּלְהַשְׂכִּיר, וְאָמַר לְקוּחִין הֵן בְּיָדִי – אֵינוֹ נֶאֱמָן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers that there is a difference between the two cases: **There,** a goat **is an item that** is **not usually lent** out **or rented.** Consequently, the one who possesses them has a presumptive right of ownership upon which he can base his claim. Conversely, **here,** the slaughtering knife is **an item that** is **usually lent** out **or rented.** Therefore, he is not deemed credible without proof that it is his merely by virtue of its being in his possession. The Gemara supports this distinction: **As Rav Huna bar Avin sent** the following ruling: In a case of **items that are usually lent** out **or rented, and** one in possession of them **says: They were acquired by me, he is not deemed credible** by this claim alone. He must provide further proof, as he might have borrowed or rented them.


###### Bava Metzia 116a:8
[Bava Metzia 116a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/116a:8)

וְרָבָא לֵית לֵיהּ הַאי סְבָרָא? וְהָא רָבָא אַפֵּיק זוּגָא דְסַרְבָּלָא וְסִפְרָא דְאַגָּדְתָּא מִיַּתְמֵי בִּדְבָרִים הָעֲשׂוּיִין לְהַשְׁאִיל וּלְהַשְׂכִּיר! אָמַר לָךְ רָבָא: הַאי נָמֵי, כֵּיוָן דְּמִיפַּגְמָא – קָפְדִי אִינָשֵׁי וְלָא מוֹשְׁלִי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And does Rava not accept this reasoning? But didn’t Rava** himself **remove scissors** used **for wool and a scroll of *aggada* from** the possession of **orphans as items that are usually lent** out **or rented?** The Gemara answers: **Rava** could have **said to you:** With regard to **this** slaughtering knife **too, since** it is likely to **be damaged, people are particular and do not lend** it out. Therefore, it is not considered an item that is typically lent out, and the one in possession of it can claim the money owed to him up to the value of the knife.


###### Bava Metzia 116a:9
[Bava Metzia 116a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/116a:9)

**הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ הַמְקַבֵּל **