## Bava Metzia Daf 32b

###### Bava Metzia 32b:1
[Bava Metzia 32b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/32b:1)

מִדִּבְרֵי שְׁנֵיהֶם נִלְמַד צַעַר בַּעֲלֵי חַיִּים דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא. וַאֲפִילּוּ רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן לָא קָאָמַר, אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא מְסַיְּימִי קְרָאֵי. אֲבָל מְסַיְּימִי קְרָאֵי דָּרְשִׁינַן קַל וָחוֹמֶר, מִשּׁוּם מַאי? לָאו מִשּׁוּם צַעַר בַּעֲלֵי חַיִּים דָּרְשִׁינַן?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**From the statements of both of** these *tanna’im* it can be **learned** that the requirement to prevent **suffering to animals** is **by Torah law. As even Rabbi Shimon says** that he disagreed with the opinion of the Rabbis **only because the verses are not** clearly **defined; but** had the **verses** been clearly **defined, we** would have **learned** the same ***a fortiori*** inference. **Due to what** factor can that inference be learned? **What, is it not due to** the matter of **suffering of animals,** which is a factor in unloading and not a factor in loading, that **we** would have **learned** the *a fortiori* inference?


###### Bava Metzia 32b:2
[Bava Metzia 32b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/32b:2)

דִּלְמָא מִשּׁוּם דְּאִיכָּא חֶסְרוֹן כִּיס. וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: וּמָה טְעִינָה דְּלֵית בַּהּ חֶסְרוֹן כִּיס – חַיָּיב, פְּרִיקָה דְּאִית בַּהּ חֶסְרוֹן כִּיס, לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects that proof. **Perhaps** the *a fortiori* inference is **due to** the fact **that there is** the factor of **monetary loss** in unloading but not in loading, **and this is what** the Rabbis **are saying: If** in the case of **loading, where** if one fails to assist the owner **there is no** potential **monetary loss,** one is **obligated** to help load the animal, in the case of **unloading, where** if one fails to assist the owner **there is** potential **monetary loss,** is it **not all the more so** clear that one is required to unload the burden?


###### Bava Metzia 32b:3
[Bava Metzia 32b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/32b:3)

וּטְעִינָה אֵין בָּהּ חֶסְרוֹן כִּיס? מִי לָא עָסְקִינַן דְּאַדְּהָכִי וְהָכִי בָּטֵיל מִשּׁוּקֵיהּ, אִי נָמֵי אָתוּ גַּנָּבֵי וְשָׁקְלִי כֹּל מָה דְּאִיכָּא בַּהֲדֵיהּ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **But is there no** potential **monetary loss in loading? Are we not** also **dealing** with a case **where in the meanwhile,** while the owner waits for assistance, he will be **prevented from** bringing **his** merchandise to the **marketplace** in time to sell it; **alternatively, thieves** might **come and take all** the merchandise **that is there with him?** Therefore, no *a fortiori* inference can be learned on the basis of monetary loss, and the inference must be based on the matter of the suffering of animals.


###### Bava Metzia 32b:4
[Bava Metzia 32b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/32b:4)

תֵּדַע דְּצַעַר בַּעֲלֵי חַיִּים דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, דְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי אוֹמֵר: אִם הָיָה עָלָיו יָתֵר [עַל] מַשָּׂאוֹ – אֵין זָקוּק לוֹ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״תַּחַת מַשָּׂאוֹ״, מַשּׂאוֹי שֶׁיָּכוֹל לַעֲמוֹד בּוֹ. לָאו מִכְּלָל דְּתַנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר זָקוּק לוֹ? מַאי טַעְמָא? לָאו מִשּׁוּם דְּצַעַר בַּעֲלֵי חַיִּים דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara cites an additional proof: **Know that** the requirement to prevent **suffering to animals** is **by Torah law, as it is taught** in **the latter clause** of the mishna: **Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: If there was** a burden **upon** the animal **greater than** its typical **burden, one need not attend to it, as it is stated: “Under its burden”** (Exodus 23:5). Rabbi Yosei holds that the obligation to unload an animal is with regard to **a burden that** the animal **can bear;** does this **not** indicate **by inference that the first *tanna* holds** that **he must attend to it** to unload a burden that is greater than its typical burden? **What is the reason** for this ruling; is it **not due to** the fact **that** the requirement to prevent **suffering to animals** is **by Torah law?**


###### Bava Metzia 32b:5
[Bava Metzia 32b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/32b:5)

דִּלְמָא ״בְּתַחַת מַשָּׂאוֹ״ פְּלִיגִי, דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי סָבַר: דָּרְשִׁינַן ״תַּחַת מַשָּׂאוֹ״, מַשּׂאוֹי שֶׁיָּכוֹל לַעֲמוֹד בּוֹ, וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: לָא דָּרְשִׁינַן ״תַּחַת מַשָּׂאוֹ״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects that proof: **Perhaps** it is with regard to the meaning of the phrase **“under its burden”** that they **disagree, as Rabbi Yosei** HaGelili **holds that we interpret** the phrase **“under its burden”** to mean: **A burden that** the animal **can bear. And the Rabbis hold** that **we do not interpret** the phrase **“under its burden”** in this manner.


###### Bava Metzia 32b:6
[Bava Metzia 32b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/32b:6)

תֵּדַע דְּצַעַר בַּעֲלֵי חַיִּים לָאו דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, דְּקָתָנֵי רֵישָׁא: הָלַךְ וְיָשַׁב לוֹ וְאָמַר לוֹ הוֹאִיל וְעָלֶיךָ מִצְוָה לִפְרוֹק, פְּרוֹק פָּטוּר, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר עִמּוֹ. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ צַעַר בַּעֲלֵי חַיִּים דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, מָה לִי אִיתֵיהּ לְמָרֵיהּ בַּהֲדֵיהּ, וּמָה לִי כִּי לֵיתֵיהּ לְמָרֵיהּ בַּהֲדֵיהּ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara cites an additional proof: **Know that** the requirement to prevent **suffering to animals** is **not by Torah law, as it is taught** in **the former clause** of the mishna: If the owner **went, and sat, and said** to a passerby: **Since** there is **a mitzva** incumbent **upon you to unload** the burden, **unload** it, the passerby is **exempt, as it is stated:** “You shall release it **with him”** (Exodus 23:5). **And if it enters your mind that** the requirement to prevent **suffering to animals** is **by Torah law, what** is it **to me** if **its owner is** working **with** the passerby **and what** is it **to me** if **its owner is not** working **with** the passerby? The animal suffers in both cases.


###### Bava Metzia 32b:7
[Bava Metzia 32b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/32b:7)

לְעוֹלָם צַעַר בַּעֲלֵי חַיִּים דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, מִי סָבְרַתְּ פָּטוּר פָּטוּר לִגְמָרֵי? וְדִלְמָא פָּטוּר בְּחִנָּם, וְחַיָּיב בְּשָׂכָר. וְהָכִי קָאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא: כִּי אִיתֵיהּ לְמָרֵיהּ בַּהֲדֵיהּ – עֲבֵד גַּבֵּיהּ בְּחִנָּם, וְכִי לֵיתֵיהּ לְמָרֵיהּ בַּהֲדֵיהּ – עֲבֵד גַּבֵּיהּ בְּשָׂכָר, וּלְעוֹלָם צַעַר בַּעֲלֵי חַיִּים דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects that proof: **Actually,** one could say that the requirement to prevent **suffering to animals** is **by Torah law.** And when the *tanna* exempts the passerby when the owner does not participate in unloading the burden, **do you maintain** that **exempt** means **completely exempt? Perhaps** it means that the passerby is **exempt** from unloading the burden **for free, but** is **obligated** to do so **for remuneration; and this** is what **the Merciful One said:** If **its owner is** working **with** the passerby, **perform** the unloading **with him for free; and** if **its owner is not** working **with** the passerby, **perform** the unloading **for him for remuneration. And actually,** the requirement to prevent **suffering to animals** is **by Torah law.**


###### Bava Metzia 32b:8
[Bava Metzia 32b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/32b:8)

(סִימַן בֶּהֱמַת, בֶּהֱמַת, אוֹהֵב, שׂוֹנֵא, רַבְצָן).

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara presents **a mnemonic** for a series of proposed proofs cited by the Gemara: **Animal of; animal of; friend; enemy; collapser.**


###### Bava Metzia 32b:9
[Bava Metzia 32b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/32b:9)

לֵימָא מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ: בֶּהֱמַת גּוֹי מִטַּפֵּל בָּהּ כְּבֶהֱמַת יִשְׂרָאֵל. אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא צַעַר בַּעֲלֵי חַיִּים דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא – מִשּׁוּם הָכִי מִטַּפֵּל בָּהּ כְּבֶהֱמַת יִשְׂרָאֵל, אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ צַעַר בַּעֲלֵי חַיִּים לָאו דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, אַמַּאי מִטַּפֵּל בָּהּ כְּבֶהֱמַת יִשְׂרָאֵל? הָתָם מִשּׁוּם אֵיבָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Let us say** that a *baraita* **supports** Rava’s opinion that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law: If one encounters **the animal of a gentile** collapsed under its burden, **he tends to it** and unloads its burden, **as** he would **the animal of a Jew.** The Gemara reasons: **Granted, if you say** that the requirement to prevent **suffering to animals** is **by Torah law,** it is **due to that** reason that **he tends to it as** he would **the animal of a Jew. But if you say** that the requirement to prevent **suffering to animals** is **not by Torah law, why does he tend to it as** he would **the animal of a Jew?** The Gemara rejects the proof: **There** one tends to the animal **due to enmity** that would arise if gentiles see Jews assisting their own people and not gentiles. The obligation is not due to the requirement to prevent suffering of animals.


###### Bava Metzia 32b:10
[Bava Metzia 32b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/32b:10)

הָכִי נָמֵי מִסְתַּבְּרָא, דְּקָתָנֵי: אִם הָיְתָה טְעוּנָה יֵין נֶסֶךְ – אֵין זָקוּק לָהּ. אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא לָאו דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא – מִשּׁוּם הָכִי אֵין זָקוּק לָהּ, אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא – אַמַּאי אֵין זָקוּק לָהּ? הָכִי קָאָמַר: וּלְהַטְעִינָהּ יֵין נֶסֶךְ אֵין זָקוּק לָהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**So too, it is reasonable** to explain the *baraita* in this manner, **as it is taught** in another *baraita*: **If** the animal of a gentile **was loaded** with **wine** used for **a libation** to idolatry, and the animal is collapsed under its burden, a Jew **does not attend to it. Granted, if you say** that the requirement to prevent suffering of animals is **not by Torah law,** it is **due to that** reason **that he does not attend to it. But if you say** that the obligation is **by Torah law, why does he not attend to it;** isn’t the animal suffering? The Gemara answers that **this** is what the *tanna* **is saying: And to load** the animal with **wine** used for **a libation** to idolatry, **he does not attend to it.** Loading an animal does not alleviate its suffering. Furthermore, the refusal of the Jew to handle the libation wine will not cause enmity, because he can explain that his religion precludes him from handling these materials.


###### Bava Metzia 32b:11
[Bava Metzia 32b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/32b:11)

תָּא שְׁמַע: בֶּהֱמַת גּוֹי וּמַשּׂאוֹי יִשְׂרָאֵל, ״וְחָדַלְתָּ״. וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ צַעַר בַּעֲלֵי חַיִּים דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, אַמַּאי ״וְחָדַלְתָּ״? ״עָזֹב תַּעֲזֹב״ מִבְּעֵי לֵיהּ! לְעוֹלָם צַעַר בַּעֲלֵי חַיִּים דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, הָתָם בִּטְעִינָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests: **Come** and **hear** proof from a *baraita*: If one encounters **the animal of a gentile** collapsed under **the burden of a Jew,** he may refuse to unload the burden, as it is written: “If you see the donkey of him that hates you collapsed under its burden, **you shall forgo** passing him by; you shall release it with him” (Exodus 23:5). By employing the phrase “you shall forgo,” the verse indicates that there are circumstances in which one may forgo unloading the animal. The Gemara reasons: And **if you say** that the requirement to prevent **suffering to animals** is **by Torah law, why** is there the option of: **“You shall forgo”?** The Torah **should have** commanded only: **“You shall release it** with him.” The Gemara answers: **Actually,** say that the requirement to prevent **suffering to animals** is **by Torah law,** and **there** the *baraita* is referring to a case **of loading,** where suffering of animals is not a factor.


###### Bava Metzia 32b:12
[Bava Metzia 32b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/32b:12)

אִי הָכִי, אֵימָא סֵיפָא: בֶּהֱמַת יִשְׂרָאֵל וּמַשּׂאוֹי גּוֹי ״עָזֹב תַּעֲזֹב״. וְאִי בִּטְעִינָה, אַמַּאי ״עָזֹב תַּעֲזֹב״? מִשּׁוּם צַעֲרָא דְּיִשְׂרָאֵל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **If so, say the latter clause** of the *baraita*: With regard to a case involving **the animal of a Jew** collapsed under **the burden of a gentile,** it is written: **“You shall release it.” And if** the *baraita* is referring to a case **of loading,** where suffering of animals is not a factor, **why** does the *baraita* state: **“You shall release it”?** The Gemara answers: It is **because in that case,** there is **suffering of the Jew,** who is delayed while waiting for the animal to be loaded.


###### Bava Metzia 32b:13
[Bava Metzia 32b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/32b:13)

אִי הָכִי, אֲפִילּוּ רֵישָׁא נָמֵי! רֵישָׁא בְּחַמָּר גּוֹי סֵיפָא בְּחַמָּר יִשְׂרָאֵל. מַאי פָּסְקַתְּ? סְתָמָא דְּמִלְּתָא אִינִישׁ בָּתַר חֲמָרֵיהּ אָזֵיל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **If so,** then the *halakha* should be the same **even** in the **first clause.** Why is there no requirement to prevent the suffering of the Jewish partner in that case? The Gemara answers: The ruling of **the first clause** is stated **with regard to a gentile donkey driver,** and the Jewish owner of the burden is absent. The ruling of **the latter clause** is stated **with regard to a Jewish donkey driver** and one is obligated to prevent his suffering. The Gemara asks: On **what** basis did **you** arrive at this **definitive assertion** that the animal of a Jew is driven by that Jew and the animal of a gentile is driven by that gentile? The Gemara answers: The **typical** state **of matters** is that **a person follows his donkey.** The first clause addressed the case of a gentile’s donkey, so presumably its driver is gentile. The latter clause addressed the case of a Jew’s donkey, so presumably its driver is a Jew.


###### Bava Metzia 32b:14
[Bava Metzia 32b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/32b:14)

וְהָא ״וְחָדַלְתָּ״ וְ״עָזֹב תַּעֲזֹב״ בִּפְרִיקָה הוּא דִּכְתִיבִי!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara questions the explanation that the *baraita* is referring to cases involving loading. **But isn’t it with regard to unloading that** the phrases cited in the *baraita*: **“You shall forgo** passing him by,” **and: “You shall release it,” are written?**


###### Bava Metzia 32b:15
[Bava Metzia 32b:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/32b:15)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָא מַנִּי? רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי הִיא, דְּאָמַר: צַעַר בַּעֲלֵי חַיִּים לָאו דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers that **he said to him:** Indeed, the fact that one need not unload the burden from the donkey in the first clause of the *baraita* indicates that the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is not by Torah law. In accordance with **whose** opinion **is this** *baraita*? **It is** in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, who says** that the requirement to prevent **suffering to animals** is **not by Torah law.** That is the minority opinion, as the Rabbis disagree.


###### Bava Metzia 32b:16
[Bava Metzia 32b:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/32b:16)

תָּא שְׁמַע: אוֹהֵב לִפְרוֹק וְשׂוֹנֵא לִטְעוֹן – מִצְוָה בְּשׂוֹנֵא, כְּדֵי לָכוֹף אֶת יִצְרוֹ. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ צַעַר בַּעֲלֵי חַיִּים דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, הָא עֲדִיף לֵיהּ? אֲפִילּוּ הָכִי, כְּדֵי לָכוֹף אֶת יִצְרוֹ עָדִיף.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests: **Come** and **hear** proof from a *baraita*: If one encounters **a friend** whose animal collapsed and it is necessary **to unload** its burden, **and** one also encounters **an enemy** who needs assistance **to load** a burden onto his animal, **the mitzva** is **to** assist **the enemy, in order to subjugate** one’s evil **inclination.** The Gemara reasons: **And if it enters your mind** that the requirement to prevent **suffering to animals** is **by Torah law, that** option, to unload his friend’s animal, **is** the **preferable** course of action **for him.** The Gemara answers: Even if the requirement to prevent suffering to animals is by Torah law, **even so,** loading his enemy’s animal **in order to subjugate his** evil **inclination is preferable.**


###### Bava Metzia 32b:17
[Bava Metzia 32b:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/32b:17)

תָּא שְׁמַע: שׂוֹנֵא שֶׁאָמְרוּ – שׂוֹנֵא יִשְׂרָאֵל וְלֹא שׂוֹנֵא אוּמּוֹת הָעוֹלָם. אִי אָמְרַתְּ צַעַר בַּעֲלֵי חַיִּים דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, מָה לִי שׂוֹנֵא יִשְׂרָאֵל וּמָה לִי שׂוֹנֵא אוּמּוֹת הָעוֹלָם?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests: **Come** and **hear** proof from a *baraita*. **The enemy** with regard to **which they stated** the *halakha* that one must assist with his animal is **a Jewish enemy and not a gentile enemy.** The Gemara asks: **If you say** that the requirement to prevent **suffering to animals** is **by Torah law, what** is it **to me** if it is **a Jewish enemy and what** is it **to me** if it is **a gentile enemy?** In either case, failure to unload the burden will cause the animal suffering.


###### Bava Metzia 32b:18
[Bava Metzia 32b:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/32b:18)

מִי סָבְרַתְּ אַשּׂוֹנֵא דִקְרָא קָאֵי? אַשּׂוֹנֵא דְמַתְנִיתִין קָאֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **Do you maintain** that the reference in the *baraita* to an enemy **applies to the enemy** mentioned **in the verse:** “If you see the donkey of him that hates you collapsed under its burden…you shall release it with him”? **It applies to the enemy** mentioned **in the *baraita*** cited above, in which the *tanna* taught that loading a burden onto an enemy’s animal is preferable to unloading a burden from a friend’s animal.


###### Bava Metzia 32b:19
[Bava Metzia 32b:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/32b:19)

תָּא שְׁמַע:

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests: **Come** and **hear** proof from a *baraita*: