## Bava Metzia Daf 3b

###### Bava Metzia 3b:1
[Bava Metzia 3b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/3b:1)

וְהַאי בְּכוּלֵּיהּ בָּעֵי דְּלוֹדֵי לֵיהּ. וְהַאי דְּלָא אוֹדִי – אִשְׁתְּמוֹטֵי הוּא דְּקָא מִישְׁתְּמֵט מִינֵּיהּ, סָבַר: עַד דְּהָווּ לִי זוּזִי וּפָרַעְנָא לֵיהּ, וְאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא: רְמִי שְׁבוּעָה עֲלֵיהּ כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלוֹדֵי לֵיהּ בְּכוּלֵּיהּ,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** in order not to exhibit insolence, **this** person **wants to admit to** the creditor **with regard to all of** the debt, **and this** fact **that he denies** owing him in part is because he reasons: If I admit to him with regard to all of the debt, he will lodge a claim against me with regard to all of it, and right now I do not have the money to pay. **He was evading** his creditor, and **thought:** I will continue doing so **until I have money, and** then **I will pay** him all of it. This rationalization enables one to falsely deny part of a claim. **And** therefore, **the Merciful One states: Impose an oath on him, in order** to ensure **that he will admit to him with regard to all of** the debt.


###### Bava Metzia 3b:2
[Bava Metzia 3b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/3b:2)

אֲבָל הַעֲדָאַת עֵדִים, דְּלֵיכָּא לְמֵימַר הָכִי – אֵימָא לָא. קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן קַל וָחוֹמֶר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But** in a case where **the testimony of witnesses** renders him liable to pay part of the debt, **as one cannot say this** explanation since this logic applies only when it is the debtor admitting to part of the claim, **say** that he has **no** intention to repay the debt at all, and he is completely dishonest and therefore his oath is worthless. Therefore, the *baraita* **teaches us** that the defendant’s obligation to take an oath is derived by means of **an *a fortiori*** inference.


###### Bava Metzia 3b:3
[Bava Metzia 3b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/3b:3)

וּמַאי קַל וָחוֹמֶר? וּמָה פִּיו שֶׁאֵין מְחַיְּיבוֹ מָמוֹן – מְחַיְּיבוֹ שְׁבוּעָה, עֵדִים שֶׁמְּחַיְּיבִין אוֹתוֹ מָמוֹן – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁמְּחַיְּיבִין אוֹתוֹ שְׁבוּעָה?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains: **And what** is the explanation of this ***a fortiori*** inference? It should be explained as follows: **If** admitting to part of a claim by **his** own **mouth, which does not render him liable** to pay the **money** he admitted to owing, nevertheless **obligates him** to take **an oath,** with regard to the testimony of **witnesses, which does render him liable** to pay **money, is it not logical that it should obligate him** to take **an oath** with regard to the remaining sum?


###### Bava Metzia 3b:4
[Bava Metzia 3b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/3b:4)

וּפִיו אֵין מְחַיְּיבוֹ מָמוֹן?! וְהָא הוֹדָאַת בַּעַל דִּין כְּמֵאָה עֵדִים דָּמֵי!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **But does** the admission of **his** own **mouth not render him liable** to pay **money? But isn’t** the legal status of **the admission of a litigant similar to** that of **one hundred witnesses?**


###### Bava Metzia 3b:5
[Bava Metzia 3b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/3b:5)

מַאי ״מָמוֹן״ – קְנָס. וּמָה פִּיו שֶׁאֵין מְחַיְּיבוֹ קְנָס, מְחַיְּיבוֹ שְׁבוּעָה! עֵדִים שֶׁמְּחַיְּיבִין אוֹתוֹ קְנָס, אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁמְּחַיְּיבִין אוֹתוֹ שְׁבוּעָה!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **What** is the **money** that one is not liable to pay based on his own admission? It is referring to the payment of **a fine [*kenas*].** In all cases where the Torah imposes a fine, if the defendant admits his liability voluntarily he is not required to pay it. Therefore, the *a fortiori* inference is as follows: **If** the admission of one’s own **mouth, which does not render him liable** to pay **a fine,** nevertheless **renders him liable** to take **an oath** with regard to the part of the claim to which he did not admit, with regard to the testimony of **witnesses, which does render him liable** to pay **a fine, is it not logical that it should render him liable** to take **an oath** with regard to the remaining sum?


###### Bava Metzia 3b:6
[Bava Metzia 3b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/3b:6)

מָה לְפִיו – שֶׁכֵּן מְחַיְּיבוֹ קׇרְבָּן, תֹּאמַר בְּעֵדִים שֶׁאֵין מְחַיְּיבִין אוֹתוֹ קׇרְבָּן!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara attempts to refute the inference: **What** is notable **about** the admission of one’s **mouth?** It is notable **in that it renders him liable** to bring **an offering.** One who admits that he transgressed a prohibition unwittingly is obligated to bring an offering for atonement. **Would you say** that the *halakhot* of admission apply **with regard to** the testimony of **witnesses, which,** in a case where they testify that one transgressed a prohibition, **does not obligate him** to bring **an offering** if he denies it?


###### Bava Metzia 3b:7
[Bava Metzia 3b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/3b:7)

הָא לָא קַשְׁיָא: רַבִּי חִיָּיא כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר סְבִירָא לֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר: עֵדִים מְחַיְּיבִין אוֹתוֹ קׇרְבָּן מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **This** is **not difficult. Rabbi Ḥiyya holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says** that the testimony of **witnesses renders him liable** to bring **an offering,** based on **an *a fortiori*** inference.


###### Bava Metzia 3b:8
[Bava Metzia 3b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/3b:8)

דִּתְנַן: אָמְרוּ לוֹ שְׁנַיִם ״אָכַלְתָּ חֵלֶב״, וְהוּא אוֹמֵר ״לֹא אָכַלְתִּי״, רַבִּי מֵאִיר מְחַיֵּיב, וַחֲכָמִים פּוֹטְרִים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**As we learned** in a mishna (*Karetot* 11b): If **two** witnesses **say to** a person: **You ate** forbidden **fat, and he says: I did not eat** it, **Rabbi Meir deems** him **liable** to bring an offering **and the Rabbis deem** him **exempt** from bringing an offering.


###### Bava Metzia 3b:9
[Bava Metzia 3b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/3b:9)

אָמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר: אִם הֱבִיאוּהוּ שְׁנַיִם לִידֵי מִיתָה חֲמוּרָה, לֹא יְבִיאוּהוּ לִידֵי קׇרְבָּן הַקַּל? אָמְרוּ לוֹ: מָה אִם יִרְצֶה לוֹמַר ״מֵזִיד הָיִיתִי״ – יִפָּטֵר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Meir said** to the Rabbis: **If two** witnesses can **cause** a person **to** receive the **death** penalty, which is **a severe** penalty, **can they not** also **cause** one **to** receive **the light** penalty of having to bring **an offering?** The Rabbis **said to him: What if he** would **want to say: I** sinned **intentionally?** Wouldn’t he be **exempt?** Since one does not bring an offering for an intentional sin, the testimony of witnesses has no bearing in this matter, as they cannot prove that his transgression was unwitting. Therefore, even if he claims that he did not sin at all, the testimony does not obligate him to bring an offering.


###### Bava Metzia 3b:10
[Bava Metzia 3b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/3b:10)

אֶלָּא: מָה לְפִיו – שֶׁכֵּן מְחַיְּיבוֹ אָשָׁם! אָשָׁם הַיְינוּ קׇרְבָּן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests another refutation: **Rather, what** is notable **about** the admission of one’s **mouth?** It is notable **in that it renders** a robber **liable** to bring **a guilt-offering.** One who admits that he robbed another is required to bring a guilt-offering for atonement, whereas if witnesses testify that he robbed another he is not obligated to bring a guilt-offering. The Gemara answers: **A guilt-offering is** the same as any other **offering,** about which there is a dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis as to whether the testimony of witnesses renders one liable to bring an offering.


###### Bava Metzia 3b:11
[Bava Metzia 3b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/3b:11)

אֶלָּא: מָה לְפִיו – שֶׁכֵּן מְחַיְּיבוֹ חוֹמֶשׁ. הָא לָא קַשְׁיָא, רַבִּי חִיָּיא כְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר סְבִירָא לֵיהּ, כִּי הֵיכִי דִּמְחַיֵּיב לֵיהּ קׇרְבָּן מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר – מְחַיֵּיב לֵיהּ חוֹמֶשׁ מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests another refutation: **Rather, what** is notable **about** the admission of one’s **mouth?** It is notable **in that it renders** one who unlawfully possessed the money of another **liable** to pay an additional **one-fifth** of the value of that money when he returns it of his own accord (see Leviticus 5:20–26). By contrast, if witnesses testify that he unlawfully possessed the money of another, he is not obligated to add one-fifth to his payment. The Gemara answers: **This** is **not difficult; Rabbi Ḥiyya holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. Just as** Rabbi Meir holds that the testimony of witnesses **renders** one **liable** to bring **an offering due to an *a fortiori*** inference, he also holds that the testimony of witnesses **renders** one **liable** to add **one-fifth, via an *a fortiori*** inference.


###### Bava Metzia 3b:12
[Bava Metzia 3b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/3b:12)

אֶלָּא: מָה לְפִיו – שֶׁכֵּן אֵינוֹ בְּהַכְחָשָׁה וּבַהֲזָמָה, תֹּאמַר בְּעֵדִים שֶׁיֶּשְׁנָן בְּהַכְחָשָׁה וּבַהֲזָמָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests another refutation: **Rather, what** is notable **about** the admission of one’s **mouth?** It is notable **in that it is not** subject **to contradiction or to** refutation as applies to the testimony of **conspiring** witnesses, as the testimony of witnesses cannot negate the admission of a litigant. **Would you say** the same *halakhot* **with regard to witnesses, who are** subject **to contradiction and to** refutation as **conspiring** witnesses? Evidently, the testimony of witnesses is weaker, in some aspects, than the admission of a litigant.


###### Bava Metzia 3b:13
[Bava Metzia 3b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/3b:13)

אֶלָּא אָתְיָא מֵעֵד אֶחָד: וּמָה עֵד אֶחָד שֶׁאֵין מְחַיְּיבוֹ מָמוֹן, מְחַיְּיבוֹ שְׁבוּעָה – עֵדִים שֶׁמְּחַיְּיבִין אוֹתוֹ מָמוֹן, אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁמְּחַיְּיבִין אוֹתוֹ שְׁבוּעָה!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** Rabbi Ḥiyya’s *a fortiori* inference is apparently **derived from** the *halakha* of the testimony of **one witness. If** the testimony of **one witness, which does not render** the defendant **liable** to pay **money, obligates him** to take **an oath** to contradict the testimony, **is it not logical that** the testimony of two **witnesses, which render** one **liable** to pay **money,** also **obligates him** to take **an oath?**


###### Bava Metzia 3b:14
[Bava Metzia 3b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/3b:14)

מָה לְעֵד אֶחָד שֶׁכֵּן עַל מָה שֶׁהוּא מֵעִיד הוּא נִשְׁבָּע,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects this inference: **What** is notable **about** the testimony of **one witness?** It is notable **in that** the defendant **takes an oath with regard to the matter concerning which he testifies,** not with regard to other claims raised by the claimant.