## Bava Metzia Daf 4a

###### Bava Metzia 4a:1
[Bava Metzia 4a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/4a:1)

תֹּאמַר בְּעֵדִים, שֶׁעַל מַה שֶּׁכָּפַר הוּא נִשְׁבָּע.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Would you say** the same **with regard to** two **witnesses,** in **which** case the defendant **takes an oath with regard to** the claim **that he denies,** and not with regard to the debt about which they testify?


###### Bava Metzia 4a:2
[Bava Metzia 4a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/4a:2)

אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: אָתֵי מִגִּלְגּוּל שְׁבוּעָה דְּעֵד אֶחָד.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, Rav Pappa said:** Rabbi Ḥiyya’s *a fortiori* inference **is derived from the extension of an oath** that the testimony **of one witness** obligates him to take. Once a defendant is obligated to take an oath, the plaintiff can demand that he take an oath with regard to other claims that he has against him as well.


###### Bava Metzia 4a:3
[Bava Metzia 4a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/4a:3)

מָה לְגִלְגּוּל שְׁבוּעָה דְּעֵד אֶחָד, שֶׁכֵּן שְׁבוּעָה גּוֹרֶרֶת שְׁבוּעָה, תֹּאמַר בְּעֵדִים – דְּמָמוֹן קָא מְחַיְּיבִי!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects this: **What** is notable **about the extension of an oath** that is obligated by the testimony **of one witness?** It is notable **in that** one **oath leads to** another **oath.** The obligation to take the second oath is not caused directly by the witness. **Would you say** the same **in** the case of **witnesses, whose** testimony **renders** the defendant **liable** to pay **money?** Incurring liability to pay one part of the claim does not extend further and incur liability to pay the rest.


###### Bava Metzia 4a:4
[Bava Metzia 4a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/4a:4)

פִּיו יוֹכִיחַ. מָה לְפִיו שֶׁכֵּן אֵינוֹ בְּהַכְחָשָׁה – עֵד אֶחָד יוֹכִיחַ שֶׁיֶּשְׁנוֹ בְּהַכְחָשָׁה וּמְחַיְּיבוֹ שְׁבוּעָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara responds: The admission of one’s **mouth can prove** that an element other than an oath can cause the defendant to be obligated to take an oath with regard to the rest of the claim. Although the *a fortiori* inference from admission alone was already rejected, due to the claim of: **What** is notable **about** the admission of one’s **mouth,** it is notable **in that it is not** subject **to contradiction;** the testimony of **one witness can prove** that even testimony **that is** subject **to contradiction renders** one **liable** to take **an oath.**


###### Bava Metzia 4a:5
[Bava Metzia 4a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/4a:5)

מָה לְעֵד אֶחָד, שֶׁכֵּן עַל מַה שֶּׁמֵּעִיד הוּא נִשְׁבָּע, תֹּאמַר בְּעֵדִים – שֶׁעַל מַה שֶּׁכָּפַר הוּא נִשְׁבָּע! פִּיו יוֹכִיחַ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The *a fortiori* inference from the testimony of one witness was also rejected, as **what** is notable **about** the extension of an oath resulting from the testimony of **one witness?** It is notable **in that** the defendant **takes an oath with regard to** the matter concerning that which **he testifies. Would you say** the same **with regard to** two **witnesses,** in **which** case the defendant **takes an oath with regard to** the claim **that he denies?** Admission to part of a claim by one’s **mouth can prove** this difference irrelevant, as a defendant can be required to take an oath even with regard to a claim that he denies.


###### Bava Metzia 4a:6
[Bava Metzia 4a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/4a:6)

וְחָזַר הַדִּין: לֹא רְאִי זֶה כִּרְאִי זֶה, וְלֹא רְאִי זֶה כִּרְאִי זֶה. הַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן שֶׁעַל יְדֵי טַעֲנָה וּכְפִירָה הֵן בָּאִין, וְנִשְׁבָּע. אַף אֲנִי אָבִיא עֵדִים, שֶׁעַל יְדֵי טַעֲנָה וּכְפִירָה הֵם בָּאִין – וְנִשְׁבָּע.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And the derivation has reverted** to its starting point. At this point, the *halakha* is derived from a combination of the two sources: **The aspect of this** case, admission, **is not like the aspect of that** case, the extension of an oath resulting from the testimony of one witness, **and the aspect of that** case **is not like the aspect of this** case. **Their common denominator is that** these cases **come** before the court **with a claim and** its **denial, and** the defendant is obligated to **take an oath. I will also include** in the obligation to take an oath the case of Rabbi Ḥiyya, where there is testimony of two **witnesses** about part of the debt, **which comes** before the court **with a claim and** its **denial. And** therefore the defendant is obligated to **take an oath.** This is the inference to which Rabbi Ḥiyya was referring.


###### Bava Metzia 4a:7
[Bava Metzia 4a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/4a:7)

מָה לְהַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן, שֶׁכֵּן לֹא הוּחְזַק כַּפְרָן. תֹּאמַר בְּעֵדִים שֶׁכֵּן הוּחְזַק כַּפְרָן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects this: **What** is notable **about their common denominator,** i.e., the common denominator shared by admission to part of a claim by the defendant and the extension of an oath resulting from the testimony of one witness? It is notable **in that** the defendant **does not assume the presumptive status of one who** falsely **denies** his debts. He has not been proven to be lying, so he is trusted to take an oath. **Would you say** the same **with regard to** the case of two **witnesses** who contradict the defendant’s denial of the plaintiff’s claim, **where** the defendant **assumes the presumptive status of one who** falsely **denies** his debts? In this case, he is no longer deemed trustworthy and his oath may not be credible.


###### Bava Metzia 4a:8
[Bava Metzia 4a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/4a:8)

וּבְעֵדִים מִי הוּחְזַק כַּפְרָן! וְהָאָמַר רַב אִידִי בַּר אָבִין אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: הַכּוֹפֵר בְּמִלְוֶה – כָּשֵׁר לְעֵדוּת. בְּפִיקָּדוֹן – פָּסוּל לְעֵדוּת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **But in** a case where his denial is contradicted by two **witnesses, does he assume the presumptive status of one who** falsely **denies** his debts? **But doesn’t Rav Idi bar Avin say** that **Rav Ḥisda says: One who denies** a claim that he received **a loan** and is contradicted by witnesses **is fit to bear witness** in a different case. He does not assume the status of a confirmed liar, as perhaps he intended to return the money afterward and denied the claim only in order to buy time until he acquired the necessary funds to repay the loan. By contrast, if one denies receiving **a deposit** and witnesses testify that he is lying, he is **disqualified from bearing witness** in other cases, as in that case he has no reason to buy time and is clearly a robber. Therefore, Rabbi Ḥiyya’s *a fortiori* inference stands.


###### Bava Metzia 4a:9
[Bava Metzia 4a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/4a:9)

אֶלָּא פָּרֵיךְ הָכִי: מָה לְהַצַּד הַשָּׁוֶה שֶׁבָּהֶן – שֶׁכֵּן אֵינָן בְּתוֹרַת הֲזָמָה, תֹּאמַר בְּעֵדִים שֶׁיֶּשְׁנָן בְּתוֹרַת הֲזָמָה!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, refute** the inference **like this: What** is notable **about their common denominator,** i.e., the common denominator shared by admission to part of a claim by the defendant and the extension of an oath resulting from the testimony of one witness? It is notable **in that** these cases **are not** subject **to the *halakhot* of conspiring** witnesses. Even if witnesses testify that the single witness lied, he is not required to pay the defendant the sum that he sought to require him to pay, which is the punishment exacted upon conspiring witnesses. **Would you say** the same *halakhot* **with regard to** two **witnesses, who are subject to the *halakhot* of conspiring** witnesses?


###### Bava Metzia 4a:10
[Bava Metzia 4a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/4a:10)

הָא לָא קַשְׁיָא: רַבִּי חִיָּיא תּוֹרַת הֲזָמָה לָא פָּרֵיךְ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects this: **This** is **not difficult,** as **Rabbi Ḥiyya does not refute** this inference based on the punishment accompanying **the *halakhot* of conspiring** witnesses. In other words, Rabbi Ḥiyya does not accept this refutation, as while this *halakha* does not apply at all to the admission of a defendant, it does apply to the testimony of a single witness in that if two witnesses testify that the single witness is a conspiring witness, his testimony is rendered void.


###### Bava Metzia 4a:11
[Bava Metzia 4a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/4a:11)

אֶלָּא דְּקָאָמַר וְתַנָּא תּוּנָא מִי דָּמֵי? הָתָם לְמַלְוֶה אִית לֵיהּ סָהֲדֵי, לְלֹוֶה לֵית לֵיהּ סָהֲדֵי דְּלָא מַסֵּיק לֵיהּ וְלָא מִידֵּי, דְּאִי הֲווֹ לֵיהּ סָהֲדֵי לְלֹוֶה דְּלָא מַסֵּיק לֵיהּ וְלָא מִידֵּי – לָא בָּעֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא לְאִשְׁתְּבוֹעֵי, הָכָא כִּי הֵיכִי דַּאֲנַן סָהֲדֵי בְּהַאי – אֲנַן סָהֲדֵי בְּהַאי, וַאֲפִילּוּ הָכִי מִשְׁתַּבְעִי!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **But** with regard to that **which** was **stated** (3a): **And the *tanna*** of the mishna also **taught** a similar *halakha* to that of Rabbi Ḥiyya, there is a difficulty. **Is** the case of the mishna **comparable** to the *halakha* of Rabbi Ḥiyya? **There,** in the case of witnesses to a loan, **the creditor has witnesses** to support his claim that there was a loan while **the debtor does not have witnesses** to support his claim **that he does not owe** the creditor **anything. As, if the debtor had witnesses** to support his claim **that he does not owe** the creditor **anything, Rabbi Ḥiyya would not require him to take an oath.** By contrast, **here,** in the case of the mishna, **just as it is clear to us that this** claimant has a right to the garment, as he is holding it, so too, **is it clear to us that that** other claimant has a right to the garment, as he is also holding it. **Yet nevertheless,** in the mishna each party is required to **take an oath.**


###### Bava Metzia 4a:12
[Bava Metzia 4a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/4a:12)

אֶלָּא כִּי אִיתְּמַר ״וְתַנָּא תּוּנָא״ – אַאִידַּךְ דְּרַבִּי חִיָּיא אִיתְּמַר, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא: ״מָנֶה לִי בְּיָדְךָ״ וְהַלָּה אוֹמֵר: ״אֵין לְךָ בְּיָדִי אֶלָּא חֲמִישִּׁים זוּז, וְהֵילָךְ״ – חַיָּיב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, when** the phrase **was stated: And the *tanna*** of the mishna also **taught** a similar *halakha*, **it was stated with regard to another** statement **of Rabbi Ḥiyya. As Rabbi Ḥiyya says:** If one says to another: **I** have **one hundred dinars in your possession, and the other says** in response: **You have only fifty dinars in my possession, and here you are,** handing him the money, he **is obligated** to take an oath that he does not owe the remainder.


###### Bava Metzia 4a:13
[Bava Metzia 4a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/4a:13)

מַאי טַעְמָא – ״הֵילָךְ״ נָמֵי כְּמוֹדֶה מִקְצָת הַטְּעָנָה דָּמֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**What is the reason?** One who says: **Here you are,** while immediately giving the money, **is also** considered **like one who admits to part of the claim.** It cannot be reasoned that by immediately handing over the amount to which he admits, the defendant thereby reduces the claim by the fifty dinars that he denies owing, and he is consequently exempt from taking an oath like any defendant who denies the claim entirely.


###### Bava Metzia 4a:14
[Bava Metzia 4a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/4a:14)

וְתַנָּא תּוּנָא: שְׁנַיִם אוֹחֲזִין בְּטַלִּית.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Concerning this ruling of Rabbi Ḥiyya, the Gemara comments: **And the *tanna*** of the mishna **taught** a similar *halakha*, citing the mishna beginning: If **two** people came to court **holding a garment.**


###### Bava Metzia 4a:15
[Bava Metzia 4a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/4a:15)

וְהָא הָכָא, כֵּיוָן דְּתָפֵיס – אֲנַן סָהֲדֵי דְּמַאי דְּתָפֵיס הֵילָךְ הוּא, וְקָתָנֵי: יִשָּׁבַע.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains the comparison: **And here,** in the mishna, **since** each one **grasps** half the garment, **it is clear to us that what one grasps is** in his possession, just as if the other one had said to him: **Here you are,** I am giving it to you. **And** the mishna **teaches** that **he takes an oath.** Evidently, in a case where one denies part of a claim that is brought against him, and with regard to the rest of the claim he says to the claimant: Here you are, he is obligated to take an oath.


###### Bava Metzia 4a:16
[Bava Metzia 4a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/4a:16)

וְרַב שֵׁשֶׁת אָמַר ״הֵילָךְ פָּטוּר״. מַאי טַעְמָא? כֵּיוָן דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ ״הֵילָךְ״, הָנֵי זוּזִי דְּקָא מוֹדֵי בְּגַוַּיְיהוּ – כְּמַאן דְּנָקֵיט לְהוּ מַלְוֶה דָּמֵי. בְּאִינָךְ חֲמִשִּׁים הָא לָא מוֹדֵי, הִלְכָּךְ לֵיכָּא הוֹדָאַת מִקְצָת הַטְּעָנָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And Rav Sheshet says:** One who says about part of the claim: **Here you are,** and denies the rest of the claim, is **exempt** from taking an oath about the rest. **What is the reason? Since he said to him: Here you are, those dinars that he admitted** to owing **are** considered **as if the creditor has them** in his possession already, and **with regard to the other fifty** dinars, the defendant **did not admit** to owing them. **Therefore, there is no admission to part of the claim.**


###### Bava Metzia 4a:17
[Bava Metzia 4a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/4a:17)

וּלְרַב שֵׁשֶׁת קַשְׁיָא מַתְנִיתִין! אָמַר לְךָ רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: מַתְנִיתִין תַּקָּנַת חֲכָמִים הִיא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **But according to** the opinion of **Rav Sheshet, the mishna is difficult,** as it seems to be a comparable case and yet an oath is required. The Gemara answers: **Rav Sheshet** could have **said to you:** The oath mentioned in **the mishna is a rabbinic ordinance,** which pertains specifically to that case. In general, a debtor who immediately hands over the money that he admits to owing is exempt from taking an oath.


###### Bava Metzia 4a:18
[Bava Metzia 4a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/4a:18)

וְאִידַּךְ? אִין תַּקָּנַת חֲכָמִים הִיא. וּמִיהוּ, אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא מִדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא ״הֵילָךְ״ חַיָּיב – מְתַקְּנִי רַבָּנַן שְׁבוּעָה כְּעֵין דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא, אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ מִדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא ״הֵילָךְ״ פָּטוּר – מְתַקְּנִי רַבָּנַן שְׁבוּעָה דְּלֵיתָא דִּכְווֹתַהּ בִּדְאוֹרָיְיתָא?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** how would **the other** *amora*, Rabbi Ḥiyya, respond to this assertion? **Indeed,** he would agree that **it is a rabbinic ordinance. However, granted, if you say** that **by Torah law** one who says: **Here you are,** is **obligated** to take an oath, that explains why **the Sages instituted** the **oath** mentioned in the mishna, as it is **similar to** an oath administered **by Torah** law. **But if you say** that **by Torah** law one who says: **Here you are,** is **exempt** from taking an oath, **would the Sages institute an oath that has no corresponding** oath **in Torah law?** Clearly, there is a basis for the oath instituted by the Sages in Torah law, and that basis is the case where the defendant says: Here you are.


###### Bava Metzia 4a:19
[Bava Metzia 4a:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/4a:19)

מֵיתִיבִי:

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara **raises an objection** to the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya from a *baraita*: