## Bava Metzia Daf 91a

###### Bava Metzia 91a:1
[Bava Metzia 91a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/91a:1)

לֹא שֶׁאָדָם רַשַּׁאי לְהָמִיר, אֶלָּא שֶׁאִם הֵמִיר – מוּמָר, וְסוֹפֵג אֶת הָאַרְבָּעִים. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָא מַנִּי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא, דְּאָמַר: לָאו שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה לוֹקִין עָלָיו.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
It is taught at the beginning of tractate *Temura* that the Torah prohibits the substitution of a non-consecrated animal for a consecrated one. The mishna teaches (*Temura* 2a): That is **not** to say **that it is permitted for a person to effect substitution; rather** it means **that if one substituted** a non-sacred animal for a consecrated animal, **the substitution takes effect.** The non-sacred animal becomes consecrated, the consecrated animal remains sacred, **and** the one who substituted the non-sacred animal **incurs the forty** lashes. This indicates that one is held liable for mere speech, even without any accompanying action. Reish Lakish **said to him:** In accordance with **whose** opinion **is this** mishna? **It is** in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Yehuda, who says** that **one is flogged for** violating **a prohibition that does not involve an action.** By contrast, the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who maintain that one is punished only for a transgression that includes a full-fledged action.


###### Bava Metzia 91a:2
[Bava Metzia 91a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/91a:2)

וּמִי מָצֵית מוֹקְמַתְּ לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה? וְהָא קָתָנֵי רֵישָׁא: הַכֹּל מְמִירִין, אֶחָד הָאֲנָשִׁים וְאֶחָד הַנָּשִׁים, וְהָוֵינַן בָּהּ: ״הַכֹּל״ לְאֵתוֹיֵי מַאי? לְאֵתוֹיֵי יוֹרֵשׁ, וּדְלָא כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **But can you establish** and explain that mishna **in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yehuda?** After all, **it teaches** in **the first clause: Everyone substitutes** a non-sacred animal for a consecrated animal, **both men and women. And we discussed** this statement by asking the following question: This term: **Everyone,** serves **to add what?** What is the *tanna* including by this phrase? We answered that it serves **to add an heir,** who can substitute an animal for an animal he inherited that was designated as an offering. **And** this clause is **not in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yehuda.**


###### Bava Metzia 91a:3
[Bava Metzia 91a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/91a:3)

דְּאִי כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, הָאָמַר: יוֹרֵשׁ אֵינוֹ מֵמִיר, יוֹרֵשׁ אֵינוֹ סוֹמֵךְ! הַאי תַּנָּא סָבַר לַהּ כְּווֹתֵיהּ בַּחֲדָא, וּפָלֵיג עֲלֵיהּ בַּחֲדָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara elaborates: **As, if** it were **in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yehuda, doesn’t he say** that **an heir cannot effect substitution,** and **an heir cannot place** his hands on the head of an offering? The Gemara refutes this difficulty: This is not a conclusive proof, as it is possible to say that **this *tanna*** of the mishna in *Temura* **holds in accordance with** the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda **with regard to one** matter **and disagrees with him with regard to one** other matter.


###### Bava Metzia 91a:4
[Bava Metzia 91a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/91a:4)

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: הַחוֹסֵם אֶת הַפָּרָה וְדָשׁ בָּהּ – לוֹקֶה, וּמְשַׁלֵּם אַרְבָּעָה קַבִּין לְפָרָה וּשְׁלֹשָׁה קַבִּין לַחֲמוֹר. וְהָא אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה וָמֵת, וְאֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה וּמְשַׁלֵּם. אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הָא מַנִּי – רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא, דְּאָמַר: לוֹקֶה וּמְשַׁלֵּם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **The Sages taught: One who muzzles a cow and threshes with it is flogged, and** in addition **he must pay** the owner of the cow **four *kav* for a cow,** the usual amount it consumes while threshing, **and three *kav* for a donkey.** The Gemara asks: **But isn’t** there a principle that an offender **is not flogged and** also punished by **death, and** likewise **he is not flogged and** rendered liable to **pay?** One who transgresses a prohibition is liable to receive only one punishment for a single offense. **Abaye said:** In accordance with **whose** opinion **is this** ruling? **It is** that of **Rabbi Meir, who says** in general that one can be **flogged and** be liable to **pay.**


###### Bava Metzia 91a:5
[Bava Metzia 91a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/91a:5)

רָבָא אָמַר: ״אֶתְנַן״ אָסְרָה תּוֹרָה, וַאֲפִילּוּ בָּא עַל אִמּוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava said** that there is a difference between the transgression itself, which is between the offender and God, for which he is liable to be flogged, and the loss he caused the owner of the cow, for which he must pay restitution. The **Torah prohibits** one from bringing as an offering an animal given as the **payment** to a prostitute for services rendered (Deuteronomy 23:19); **and** this prohibition applies **even** if the man in question **engaged in intercourse with his own mother,** which is a capital offence. Although this man would certainly not be rendered liable to pay compensation by a court, as he is liable to receive court-imposed capital punishment, nevertheless, since he is technically liable to pay compensation, the money is subject to the prohibition as well. In this case too, despite the fact that the court cannot compel one to pay for the produce his cow ate, he does owe this sum. Furthermore, if the owner of the produce were to seize this sum from him, the court would not force him to return the money.


###### Bava Metzia 91a:6
[Bava Metzia 91a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/91a:6)

רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: מִשְּׁעַת מְשִׁיכָה אִיחַיַּיב לֵהּ בִּמְזוֹנוֹתֶיהָ, וּמִילְקָא לָא לָקֵי עַד שְׁעַת חֲסִימָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Pappa stated** a different answer: **From the time of** his **pulling** of the cow to rent it for threshing **he was rendered obligated to** provide **its sustenance** when it threshes, **but** as **for flogging, he is not** liable to be **flogged until the** actual **time of muzzling.** In other words, he was liable to pay the monetary payment before he incurred liability to receive lashes, which means that they are two separate liabilities.


###### Bava Metzia 91a:7
[Bava Metzia 91a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/91a:7)

אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: הָנֵי מִילֵּי בְּעוֹ מִינַּאי דְּבֵי רַב פָּפָּא בַּר אַבָּא, וּפְשַׁטִי לְהוּ לְאִיסּוּרָא – חֲדָא כְּהִלְכְתָא, וַחֲדָא דְּלָאו כְּהִלְכְתָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
In relation to the above discussion, **Rav Pappa said: These matters,** stated below, **were raised as a dilemma to me** by the members of **the house** of **Rav Pappa bar Abba, and I resolved** these matters **for them** by saying **that** there is **a prohibition** in both cases. **One** of my decisions was **in accordance with the *halakha*, and** the other **one** was **not in accordance with the *halakha*.**


###### Bava Metzia 91a:8
[Bava Metzia 91a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/91a:8)

בְּעוֹ מִינַּאי: מַהוּ לָלוּשׁ אֶת הָעִיסָּה בְּחָלָב? וּפְשַׁטִי לְהוּ לְאִיסּוּרָא כְּהִלְכְתָא, דְּתַנְיָא: אֵין לָשִׁין אֶת הָעִיסָּה בְּחָלָב, וְאִם לָשׁ – כׇּל הַפַּת כּוּלָּהּ אֲסוּרָה, מִפְּנֵי הֶרְגֵּל עֲבֵירָה. כַּיּוֹצֵא בוֹ: אֵין טָשִׁין אֶת הַתַּנּוּר בְּאַלְיָה, וְאִם טָשׁ – כׇּל הַפַּת כּוּלָּהּ אֲסוּרָה, עַד שֶׁיַּסִּיק אֶת הַתַּנּוּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**They** first **raised** this **dilemma before me: What is** the *halakha* with regard to the possibility **of kneading dough with milk? And I resolved** it **for them** by saying **that** there is **a prohibition, in accordance with the *halakha*. As it is taught** in a *baraita*: **One may not knead dough with milk,** lest one eat this bread with meat, **and if he kneaded** dough in this manner **the entire loaf is forbidden, because** he will become **accustomed to sin. Similarly, one may not smear over an oven with** the fat of an animal’s **tail, and if he did smear** the oven in this manner then **the entire loaf** baked in that oven **is forbidden,** lest he eat it with milk, **until he heats the oven** without bread for long enough to burn off the fat.


###### Bava Metzia 91a:9
[Bava Metzia 91a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/91a:9)

וְאִידָּךְ בְּעוֹ מִינַּאי: מַהוּ לְהַכְנִיס מִין וְשֶׁאֵינוֹ מִינוֹ לַדִּיר? וּפְשַׁטִי לְהוּ לְאִיסּוּרָא דְּלָאו כְּהִלְכְתָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And the other question they asked of me** was as follows: **What is** the *halakha* with regard to **bringing in** a male animal and a female animal **of different species** together **into** a single **pen?** Is there a concern that they might mate, which would violate the prohibition against crossbreeding animals? **And I resolved** it **for them** by saying **that** there is **a prohibition,** but this was **not in accordance with the *halakha*.**


###### Bava Metzia 91a:10
[Bava Metzia 91a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/91a:10)

דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: וּבִמְנָאֲפִים – עַד שֶׁיִּרְאוּ כְּדֶרֶךְ הַמְנָאֲפִים. וּבְכִלְאַיִם – עַד שֶׁיַּכְנִיס כְּמִכְחוֹל בַּשְּׁפוֹפֶרֶת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**As Shmuel says: With regard to adulterers,** the witnesses must observe **from when they appear as** behaving **in the manner of adulterers,** and they do not need to directly observe the actual moment of the act of intercourse. **But** with regard to one who crossbreeds two animals **of diverse kinds,** he is liable only if witnesses attest **that he inserted** the male organ into the female **like a brush into a tube.** This clearly shows that crossbreeding is punishable only if performed manually, not if the animals were merely enclosed together.


###### Bava Metzia 91a:11
[Bava Metzia 91a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/91a:11)

מֵתִיב רַב אַחָדְבוּי בַּר אַמֵּי: אִילּוּ נֶאֱמַר ״בְּהֶמְתְּךָ לֹא תַרְבִּיעַ״ הָיִיתִי אוֹמֵר, לֹא יֶאֱחוֹז אָדָם הַבְּהֵמָה בְּשָׁעָה שֶׁעוֹלֶה עָלֶיהָ זָכָר, תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״כִּלְאַיִם״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Aḥadvoi bar Ami raises an objection** against this opinion, from a *baraita*: **Had** the Torah **stated** merely: **“You shall not let your cattle copulate,” I would have said** that it is prohibited to assist animals in their mating at all, and consequently **a person may not hold the** female **animal when a male mounts it.** Therefore, **the verse states:** “You shall not let your cattle copulate **with a diverse kind”** (Leviticus 19:19), which indicates that it is prohibited to mate only different species, but not animals of the same type.


###### Bava Metzia 91a:12
[Bava Metzia 91a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/91a:12)

לָאו מִכְּלָל דְּכִלְאַיִם אֲחִיזָה נָמֵי לָא? מַאי ״אֲחִיזָה״ – הַכְנָסָה, וְאַמַּאי קָרֵי לַהּ ״אֲחִיזָה״ – לִישָּׁנָא מְעַלְּיָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Can one **not** derive from here **by inference that with regard to diverse kinds, holding** the animal **is also not** allowed? This indicates that not only is the act of crossbreeding itself prohibited, but any type of assistance is also prohibited, e.g., restraining the female animal. But if this is the case, placing two animals in the same pen should also be considered a violation. The Gemara refutes this argument: **What** is the meaning of the term: **Holding?** It means **the insertion** of the sexual organ, **and why does** the *tanna* **call it holding?** This is **a euphemism.**


###### Bava Metzia 91a:13
[Bava Metzia 91a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/91a:13)

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: מִין בְּמִינוֹ, מוּתָּר לְהַכְנִיס כְּמִכְחוֹל בַּשְּׁפוֹפֶרֶת, וַאֲפִילּוּ מִשּׁוּם פְּרִיצוּתָא לֵיכָּא. מַאי טַעְמָא – בַּעֲבִידְתֵּיהּ טְרִיד. מֵתִיב רַב אַחָדְבוּי בַּר אַמֵּי:

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Yehuda says:** If one desires to mate an animal of one **species with** an animal **of its** own **species,** it is **permitted to insert** the male organ into the female **like a brush into a tube, and there is not even** a concern **due to licentiousness** and immoral thoughts here. **What is the reason** for this lenient ruling? It is because he is **occupied with his work,** and therefore his mind will not entertain sinful thoughts. **Rav Aḥadvoi bar Ami raises an objection** against this: