## Bava Metzia Daf 94a

###### Bava Metzia 94a:1
[Bava Metzia 94a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/94a:1)

כָּךְ וְכָךְ גַּבְרֵי אִיכָּא בַּהֲדַן, כָּךְ וְכָךְ כַּלְבֵי אִיכָּא בַּהֲדַן, כָּךְ וְכָךְ זוּקָתָא פְּסִיקָא לַן. וַאֲזַל וּשְׁקַל מִינֵּיהּ, מַאי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הֲרֵי הוֹלִיכָן לִמְקוֹם גְּדוּדֵי חַיָּה וְלִסְטִים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
we have **such and such men with us; such and such dogs with us,** and **such and such slings [*zukata*] with us.** In other words, we are fully protected and you should not dare to take anything from us. If the thief subsequently **went and took** an animal **from him, what** is the *halakha*? Rava **said to** Abaye: It is as though **he has taken them to a place of groups of beasts and bandits,** as his taunting of the thief motivated the theft.


###### Bava Metzia 94a:2
[Bava Metzia 94a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/94a:2)

**מַתְנִי׳** מַתְנֶה שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם לִהְיוֹת פָּטוּר מִשְּׁבוּעָה, וְהַשּׁוֹאֵל לִהְיוֹת פָּטוּר מִלְּשַׁלֵּם, נוֹשֵׂא שָׂכָר וְהַשּׂוֹכֵר לִהְיוֹת פְּטוּרִין מִשְּׁבוּעָה וּמִלְּשַׁלֵּם. כׇּל הַמַּתְנֶה עַל מַה שֶּׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה – תְּנָאוֹ בָּטֵל,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**MISHNA:** The *halakhot* of bailees stated in the previous mishna apply to standard cases. The *halakha* is that in any case involving monetary matters the parties may agree to special terms. Therefore, **an unpaid bailee may stipulate** with the owner **that** he will **be exempt from** taking **an oath** if the item is lost, **and** similarly, **a borrower** may stipulate **that** he will **be exempt from** having **to pay,** and **a paid bailee or a renter** can stipulate **that** he will **be exempt from** taking **an oath and from** having **to pay,** as one can relinquish his monetary rights. With regard to matters that do not involve monetary claims, **anyone who stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, his stipulation is void.**


###### Bava Metzia 94a:3
[Bava Metzia 94a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/94a:3)

וְכׇל תְּנַאי שֶׁיֵּשׁ מַעֲשֶׂה בִּתְחִילָּתוֹ – תְּנָאוֹ בָּטֵל. וְכׇל שֶׁאֶפְשָׁר לוֹ לְקַיְּימוֹ בְּסוֹפוֹ, וְהִתְנָה עִמּוֹ מִתְּחִילָּתוֹ – תְּנָאוֹ קַיָּים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And any condition that is preceded by an action,** i.e., the agreement is formulated with the promise of an action followed by a statement that this action will be carried out only under certain terms, **the condition is void** and the promise remains intact. The condition must be stated before the action. **And** with regard to any condition **that one can ultimately fulfill, but he stipulated with him initially,** i.e., in practice the action is performed first, followed by the fulfillment of the condition, nevertheless, because it was formulated in the proper manner, with the condition first, **his condition is valid.** If the condition cannot be fulfilled at all, once the action has been carried out the condition is void.


###### Bava Metzia 94a:4
[Bava Metzia 94a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/94a:4)

**גְּמָ׳** אַמַּאי? מַתְנֶה עַל מַה שֶּׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה הוּא, וְכׇל הַמַּתְנֶה עַל מַה שֶּׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה תְּנָאוֹ בָּטֵל!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**GEMARA:** The Gemara asks a question with regard to the mishna’s statement that bailees can issue conditions and change the liabilities imposed on them by Torah law: **Why** are they able to do so? This **is** a case of one who **stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah,** as the Torah determines who takes an oath and who must pay, **and** with regard to **anyone who stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, his condition is void.**


###### Bava Metzia 94a:5
[Bava Metzia 94a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/94a:5)

הָא מַנִּי – רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא, דְּאָמַר: בְּדָבָר שֶׁבְּמָמוֹן – תְּנָאוֹ קַיָּים. דְּתַנְיָא: הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשָּׁה ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת לִי עַל מְנָת שֶׁאֵין לִיךְ עָלַי שְׁאֵר כְּסוּת וְעוֹנָה״ – הֲרֵי זוֹ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת, וּתְנָאוֹ בָּטֵל, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: בְּדָבָר שֶׁבְּמָמוֹן – תְּנָאוֹ קַיָּים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains: In accordance with **whose** opinion **is this** mishna? **It is** that of **Rabbi Yehuda, who says** that if the condition that runs counter to that which is written in the Torah is referring **to monetary matters, his condition is valid. As it is taught** in a *baraita*: With regard to **one who says to a woman: You are hereby betrothed to me on the condition that you have no** claim **against me** to give you **food, clothing, and conjugal rights, she is betrothed but his condition is void;** this is **the statement of Rabbi Meir. And Rabbi Yehuda said: With regard to monetary matters,** i.e., her food and clothing, **his condition is valid.**


###### Bava Metzia 94a:6
[Bava Metzia 94a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/94a:6)

וּמִי מָצֵית מוֹקְמַתְּ לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה? אֵימָא סֵיפָא: כׇּל הַמַּתְנֶה עַל מַה שֶּׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה – תְּנָאוֹ בָּטֵל, אֲתָאן לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר! הָא לָא קַשְׁיָא: לְעוֹלָם רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא, וְסֵיפָא – בְּדָבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ שֶׁל מָמוֹן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara raises a difficulty: **But can you establish** the mishna **in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yehuda? Say the latter clause** of the mishna: **Anyone who stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, his condition is void.** In this clause **we arrive at** the opinion of **Rabbi Meir.** The Gemara answers: **This** is **not difficult,** as **actually** you can explain that the mishna **is** in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Yehuda, and the latter clause** is referring **to non-monetary matters.**


###### Bava Metzia 94a:7
[Bava Metzia 94a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/94a:7)

אֵימָא סֵיפָא: כׇּל תְּנַאי שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ מַעֲשֶׂה בִּתְחִילָּתוֹ – תְּנָאוֹ בָּטֵל, מַאן שָׁמְעַתְּ לֵיהּ דְּאִית לֵיהּ הָא סְבָרָא – רַבִּי מֵאִיר, דְּתַנְיָא: אַבָּא חֲלַפְתָּא אִישׁ כְּפַר חֲנַנְיָא אָמַר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי מֵאִיר: תְּנַאי קוֹדֵם לַמַּעֲשֶׂה – הֲרֵי זֶה תְּנַאי, מַעֲשֶׂה קוֹדֵם לַתְּנַאי – אֵינוֹ תְּנַאי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara continues to question this explanation: But **say the latter clause** from near the end of the mishna: **And any condition that is preceded by an action, the condition is void. Who have you heard who accepts this reasoning?** It is **Rabbi Meir, as it is taught** in a *baraita*: **Abba Ḥalafta, from** the **village of Ḥananya, said in the name of Rabbi Meir:** If **a condition** was stated **before the action, this is** a valid **condition,** but if **the action** came **before the condition, it is not** a valid **condition.**


###### Bava Metzia 94a:8
[Bava Metzia 94a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/94a:8)

אֶלָּא כּוּלַּהּ רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא, וְשָׁאנֵי הָכָא, דְּמֵעִיקָּרָא לָא שַׁעְבֵּד נַפְשֵׁיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** the Gemara retracts the previous explanation and states that the **entire** mishna **is** in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Meir.** Why, then, is the bailee exempt from payment or an oath? Because **here it is different, as at the outset he did not obligate himself** in the *halakhot* of a bailee as stated in the Torah. Before he entered into the agreement, he clearly stated that he is unwilling to accept upon himself the liabilities of a paid or an unpaid bailee by Torah law.


###### Bava Metzia 94a:9
[Bava Metzia 94a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/94a:9)

תָּנָא: וּמַתְנֶה שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר לִהְיוֹת כְּשׁוֹאֵל. בְּמַאי? בִּדְבָרִים?! אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: בְּשֶׁקָּנוּ מִיָּדוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
A Sage **taught** in a *baraita*: Just as a bailee can issue a condition that he should be exempt, the converse is also possible: **A paid bailee can stipulate to be like a borrower,** i.e., he can accept upon himself all the responsibilities of a borrower. The Gemara asks: **By what** means is this commitment binding? Is it merely **by speech** alone? Mere speech is not sufficient to demonstrate a commitment of this kind. **Shmuel said:** No; it is referring to a case **where** the owner **performed** an act of **acquisition with** the bailee affirming this arrangement. The obligation goes into effect only if there was an act of acquisition.


###### Bava Metzia 94a:10
[Bava Metzia 94a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/94a:10)

וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא בְּשֶׁלֹּא קָנוּ מִיָּדוֹ, בְּהָהִיא הֲנָאָה דְּקָא נָפֵיק לֵיהּ קָלָא דְּאִינִישׁ מְהֵימְנָא הוּא – גָּמַיר וּמְשַׁעְבֵּד נַפְשֵׁיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: You** may **even say** that it is referring to a situation **where** the owner **did not perform** an act of **acquisition with** the bailee, and even so he is liable as a borrower. The reason is that **by** means of **that benefit** he receives from the fact **that a rumor goes out about him that he is** a **trustworthy person, he** commits wholeheartedly to **obligate himself,** even by means of a verbal promise alone. Therefore, there is no need for a formal act of acquisition.


###### Bava Metzia 94a:11
[Bava Metzia 94a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/94a:11)

וְכׇל שֶׁאֶפְשָׁר לוֹ לְקַיְּימוֹ בְּסוֹפוֹ וְכוּ׳. אָמַר רַב טַבְלָא אָמַר רַב: זוֹ דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן תֵּימָא. אֲבָל חֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר לוֹ לְקַיְּימוֹ בְּסוֹפוֹ וְהִתְנָה עָלָיו מִתְּחִילָּתוֹ – תְּנָאוֹ קַיָּים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna teaches: With regard to **any** condition **that ultimately can be fulfilled,** if he stipulated it initially, his condition is valid. **Rav Tavla says** that **Rav says: This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima, but the Rabbis say: Even though one cannot ultimately fulfill** the condition, **and he stipulated with regard to it initially, his condition is valid.**


###### Bava Metzia 94a:12
[Bava Metzia 94a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/94a:12)

דְּתַנְיָא: ״הֲרֵי זֶה גִּיטִּךְ עַל מְנָת שֶׁתַּעֲלִי לָרָקִיעַ, עַל מְנָת שֶׁתֵּרְדִי לַתְּהוֹם, עַל מְנָת שֶׁתִּבְלְעִי קָנֶה שֶׁל מֵאָה אַמָּה, עַל מְנָת שֶׁתַּעַבְרִי אֶת הַיָּם הַגָּדוֹל בְּרַגְלַיִךְ״, נִתְקַיֵּים הַתְּנַאי – הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט, לֹא נִתְקַיֵּים הַתְּנַאי – אֵינוֹ גֵּט.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**As it is taught** in a *baraita*: If a man said to his wife: **This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you ascend to the skies,** or **on the condition that you descend to the depths;** or **on the condition that you swallow a reed of one hundred cubits** in size; or **on the condition that you cross the Great Sea by foot,** only if **the condition was fulfilled** and she did as he demanded **is this** a valid **bill of divorce,** but if **the condition was not fulfilled** it is **not** a valid **bill of divorce.** According to this *tanna*, the condition is binding despite the fact that it cannot be fulfilled in practice.


###### Bava Metzia 94a:13
[Bava Metzia 94a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/94a:13)

רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן תֵּימָא אוֹמֵר: כָּזֶה – גֵּט. כְּלָל אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן תֵּימָא: כֹּל שֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר לוֹ לְקַיְּימוֹ בְּסוֹפוֹ, וְהִתְנָה עָלָיו מִתְּחִילָּתוֹ – אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא כְּמַפְלִיגָהּ וְכָשֵׁר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima says:** A document **such as this is** a valid **bill of divorce.** The condition is negated, and therefore the bill of divorce is valid even though the condition was not fulfilled. As **Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima stated a principle:** With regard to **any** condition **that one cannot ultimately fulfill,** i.e., a condition that cannot be fulfilled at all, **and** yet **he stipulated** to this effect, even if he did so **initially, he is** considered **as only exaggerating, and** the document is **valid.** The supposed condition is not taken seriously and is not binding.


###### Bava Metzia 94a:14
[Bava Metzia 94a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/94a:14)

אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַב: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן תֵּימָא. אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: מַתְנִיתִין נָמֵי דַּיְקָא, דְּקָתָנֵי: כׇּל שֶׁאֶפְשָׁר לוֹ לְקַיְּימוֹ בְּסוֹפוֹ וְהִתְנָה עָלָיו מִתְּחִילָּתוֹ – תְּנָאוֹ קַיָּים, הָא אִי אֶפְשָׁר לוֹ לְקַיְּימוֹ – תְּנָאוֹ בָּטֵל. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Naḥman says** that **Rav says:** The ***halakha*** is **in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: The mishna is also precisely** formulated in accordance with this opinion, **as it teaches:** With regard to **any** condition **that ultimately he can fulfill, and he stipulated with regard to it initially, his condition is valid.** This indicates that if **he cannot fulfill it, his condition is void.** The Gemara affirms: One can **learn from this** formulation that the unattributed mishna does in fact represent the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima.


###### Bava Metzia 94a:15
[Bava Metzia 94a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/94a:15)

**הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ הַשּׂוֹכֵר אֶת הַפּוֹעֲלִים.**


###### Bava Metzia 94a:16
[Bava Metzia 94a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/94a:16)

מַתְנִי׳ **הַשּׁוֹאֵל** אֶת הַפָּרָה וְשָׁאַל בְּעָלֶיהָ עִמָּהּ, אוֹ שָׂכַר בְּעָלֶיהָ עִמָּהּ, שָׁאַל הַבְּעָלִים אוֹ שְׂכָרָן וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׁאַל אֶת הַפָּרָה וָמֵתָה – פָּטוּר, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״אִם בְּעָלָיו עִמּוֹ לֹא יְשַׁלֵּם״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**MISHNA:** In the case of **one who borrowed a cow and borrowed** the services of **its owner with it, or** he borrowed a cow and **hired its owner with it,** or he **borrowed** the services of **the owner or hired him and afterward borrowed the cow;** in all such cases, if the cow **died,** the borrower is **exempt** from liability. Although a borrower is generally liable to pay if a cow he borrowed dies, here he is exempt, **as it is stated: “If its owner is with him, he does not pay”** (Exodus 22:14).