## Bava Metzia Daf 95a

###### Bava Metzia 95a:1
[Bava Metzia 95a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95a:1)

עַד שֶׁיִּפְרוֹט לְךָ הַכָּתוּב ״יַחְדָּו״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**unless the verse specifies** that one is liable only where he curses both **together,** which it does not do in this case.


###### Bava Metzia 95a:2
[Bava Metzia 95a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95a:2)

אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה, לְחַלֵּק הָכָא לָא צָרִיךְ. מַאי טַעְמָא – סְבָרָא הוּא: מָה לִי קַטְלַהּ כּוּלָּהּ, מָה לִי קַטְלַהּ פַּלְגָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **You** can **even say** that Rabbi Natan’s derivation from the word “or” is in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Yoshiya,** as **here,** in the verse concerning a borrower’s liability, there is **no need** for the word “or” **to divide** the cases. **What is the reason?** The fact that injury and death are alone sufficient to engender liability **is** based on **logical reasoning,** as follows: **What** difference does it make **to me** if **it is entirely killed,** and **what** difference does it make **to me** if **it is partially killed,** i.e., injured? Either way, the animal is not in the state in which it was borrowed, so the borrower is liable to compensate the owner.


###### Bava Metzia 95a:3
[Bava Metzia 95a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95a:3)

גְּנֵיבָה וַאֲבֵידָה בְּשׁוֹאֵל מְנָא לַן?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The Gemara asks: **From where do we** derive the liability **of a borrower** in a case of **theft or loss?**


###### Bava Metzia 95a:4
[Bava Metzia 95a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95a:4)

וְכִי תֵּימָא: נֵילַף מִשְּׁבוּרָה וּמֵתָה, מָה לִשְׁבוּרָה וּמֵתָה – דְּלָא אֶפְשָׁר לְמִיטְרַח וְאֵתוֹיֵי, תֹּאמַר בִּגְנֵיבָה וַאֲבֵידָה דְּאֶפְשָׁר לְמִיטְרַח וְאֵתוֹיֵי!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if you would say: Let us derive it from** the fact that a borrower is liable if the animal entrusted to him was **injured or died,** because theft and loss are similar to injury and death in that they are cases of accidents, this derivation can be refuted. **What** is notable **about** a case where the animal was **injured or died?** It is notable in **that it is no** longer **possible to make an effort and bring** the animal back to its undamaged state, and so it is reasonable that the borrower is liable for such occurrences. **Shall you** also **say** this ruling **about** a case of **theft or loss, where it is** still **possible to make an effort** to locate **and bring** back the animal? Since the animal is still extant, perhaps the borrower should not be liable.


###### Bava Metzia 95a:5
[Bava Metzia 95a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95a:5)

אֶלָּא כִּי הָא דְּתַנְיָא: ״וְנִשְׁבַּר אוֹ מֵת״, אֵין לִי אֶלָּא שְׁבוּרָה וּמֵתָה. גְּנֵיבָה וַאֲבֵידָה מִנַּיִן? אָמַרְתָּ קַל וָחוֹמֶר: וּמָה שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר שֶׁפָּטוּר מִשְּׁבוּרָה וּמֵתָה, חַיָּיב בִּגְנֵיבָה וַאֲבֵידָה. שׁוֹאֵל שֶׁחַיָּיב בִּשְׁבוּרָה וּמֵתָה – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁחַיָּיב בִּגְנֵיבָה וַאֲבֵידָה? וְזֶה הוּא קַל וָחוֹמֶר שֶׁאֵין עָלָיו תְּשׁוּבָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** a borrower’s liability for theft and loss is derived **like that which is taught** in a *baraita*: From the verse: **“And it is injured or dies”** (Exodus 22:13), **I have** derived **only** that a borrower is liable if the animal is **injured or dies. From where** do I derive that he is liable in a case of **theft or loss? You can say** it is **an *a fortiori*** inference: **If a paid bailee, who is exempt from** liability in a case in which the animal is **injured or dies,** is nevertheless **liable in** a case of **theft or loss,** then with regard to **a borrower, who is liable** in a case in which the animal is **injured or dies, isn’t it logical that he should** also **be liable in** a case of **theft or loss? And this is an *a fortiori*** inference **that has no refutation.**


###### Bava Metzia 95a:6
[Bava Metzia 95a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95a:6)

מַאי ״אֵין עָלָיו תְּשׁוּבָה״? וְכִי תֵּימָא: אִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ, מָה לְשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר – שֶׁכֵּן מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל בְּטוֹעֵן טַעֲנַת לִסְטִים מְזוּיָּין,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **What** is added by the conclusion of the *baraita* that this is an *a fortiori* inference that **has no refutation?** The Gemara explains that the *baraita* anticipated the following rebuttal: **And if you would say** that the *a fortiori* inference **can be refuted** as follows: **What** is notable **about** the case of **a paid bailee?** It is notable **in that** he **pays** the **double payment when** he takes a false oath **stating the claim** that the deposit was taken by **an armed bandit.** If so, can you derive a *halakha* from the case of a paid bailee to that of a borrower, who pays only the principal in such a case? It would appear that a borrower does not always bear a more severe level of liability, and the *a fortiori* inference is thereby undermined.


###### Bava Metzia 95a:7
[Bava Metzia 95a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95a:7)

אֲפִילּוּ הָכִי קַרְנָא דְּשׁוֹאֵל עֲדִיפָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Anticipating this refutation, the *baraita* states that it is invalid because **even so,** the fact that **a borrower** is liable to pay **the principal** when he claims the deposit was taken by an armed bandit, without the ability to exempt himself by taking an oath, **is a greater** stringency than the fact that a paid bailee is liable for the double payment, but only if he takes a false oath to that effect. Consequently, a borrower has a more severe level of liability, and the *a fortiori* inference is valid.


###### Bava Metzia 95a:8
[Bava Metzia 95a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95a:8)

אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: קָסָבַר לִסְטִים מְזוּיָּין גַּזְלָן הוּא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Alternatively, **if you wish, say** that the *baraita* **holds** that **an armed bandit is** classified as **a robber.** The paid bailee is not liable for the double payment if he claims that the deposit was taken by an armed bandit, as the double payment is paid only for a false claim of theft, not robbery. Consequently, the basis of the refutation is flawed.


###### Bava Metzia 95a:9
[Bava Metzia 95a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95a:9)

אַשְׁכְּחַן לְחִיּוּב, לִפְטוּר מְנָא לַן?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **We have found** sources **for** the **liability** of a borrower in a case of theft or loss; **from where do we** derive a source **for** the *halakha* that in a case of theft or loss he is **exempt** if he had also borrowed the services of the owner at the same time as borrowing the animal? The verse describing his exemption from liability is stated only with regard to a case in which the animal entrusted to him is injured or dies (see Exodus 22:13).


###### Bava Metzia 95a:10
[Bava Metzia 95a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95a:10)

וְכִי תֵּימָא נֵילַף מִשְּׁבוּרָה וּמֵתָה, מָה לִשְׁבוּרָה וּמֵתָה – שֶׁכֵּן אוֹנֶס!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if you would say: Let us derive** it **from** the fact that a borrower who also borrowed the services of the owner is exempt if the animal is **injured or dies,** as the type of occurrence should not make any difference, then one can counter: **What** is notable **about** a case in which it is **injured or dies?** It is notable **in that it is an unavoidable accident,** and so it is reasonable that one’s liability be limited. Can you say the same in a case of theft or loss, which theoretically he could have prevented?


###### Bava Metzia 95a:11
[Bava Metzia 95a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95a:11)

אֶלָּא גָּמַר מִשּׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר. וְשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר גּוּפֵיהּ מְנָלַן? גָּמְרִי חִיּוּבָא דְּשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר מֵחִיּוּבָא דְּשׁוֹאֵל: מָה לְהַלָּן בִּבְעָלִים – פָּטוּר, אַף כָּאן בִּבְעָלִים – פָּטוּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, derive** the *halakha* that a borrower who also borrowed the services of the owner is exempt if the animal is injured or dies **from** the *halakha* of **a paid bailee,** who is exempt for theft and loss if he had borrowed the services of the owner at the same time as the animal. The Gemara asks: **But from where do we** derive that the exemption from liability also applies to **a paid bailee himself? We derive the** limitation of **liability of a paid bailee from the** limitation of **liability of a borrower: Just as below,** with regard to a borrower, for those cases in which the verse states that he is liable, it states that if he borrowed the animal together **with** the services of the **owner** that he is **exempt, so too, here,** with regard to a paid bailee, for those cases in which he is liable, if he undertook to safeguard the animal together **with** borrowing the services of the **owner,** then he is **exempt.**


###### Bava Metzia 95a:12
[Bava Metzia 95a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95a:12)

בְּמַאי גָּמַר? אִי בַּמָּה מָצִינוּ, אִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ כִּדְפָרְכִינַן: שֶׁכֵּן אוֹנֶס!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **Through what** method is this **derived? If** it is derived **through** an interpretive principle known as: **What do we find,** i.e., a comparison between cases with similar details, this **can be refuted, just as we refuted** the possibility of deriving a limitation on one’s liability in a case of theft or loss from a case in which the animal was injured or died. **Because** a case in which it is injured or dies **is an unavoidable accident,** it is reasonable that one’s liability be limited specifically to such circumstances.


###### Bava Metzia 95a:13
[Bava Metzia 95a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95a:13)

אֶלָּא, אָמַר קְרָא ״וְכִי יִשְׁאַל״ – וָיו מוֹסִיף עַל עִנְיָן רִאשׁוֹן, וְיִלְמַד עֶלְיוֹן מִתַּחְתּוֹן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** the *halakha* that a bailee who also borrowed the services of the owner is exempt if the animal is stolen or lost is derived as follows: **The verse states: “And if he borrows”** (Exodus 22:13). The conjunctive **“and”** indicates that the passage detailing the liability of a borrower **is adding to the first matter,** i.e., it should be seen as a continuation of the previous passage detailing the liability of a paid bailee. **And** therefore, **let the** case of a paid bailee **above be derived from** the case **below** of the borrower, including the exemption from liability in a case in which the services of the owner were borrowed at the same time as the animal.


###### Bava Metzia 95a:14
[Bava Metzia 95a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95a:14)

וְאַכַּתִּי שׁוֹאֵל מִשּׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר לָא גָּמַר, דְּאִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ: מָה לְשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר – שֶׁכֵּן פָּטוּר בִּשְׁבוּרָה וּמֵתָה, תֹּאמַר בְּשׁוֹאֵל שֶׁחַיָּיב בִּשְׁבוּרָה וּמֵתָה!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara raises a difficulty: **But still,** the *halakhot* of **a borrower cannot be derived from** those of **a paid bailee** though an *a fortiori* inference, **as** an attempt to do so **can be refuted** as follows: **What** is notable **about** the case of **a paid bailee?** It is notable **in that** he **is exempt in** a case in which the animal is **injured or died. Shall you** also **say** the same **for a borrower, who is liable in** a case in which the animal is **injured or dies?** Since a borrower has a more severe level of liability, perhaps the exemption from liability that exists in a case of theft or loss for a paid bailee is not in effect with regard to a borrower.


###### Bava Metzia 95a:15
[Bava Metzia 95a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95a:15)

אֶלָּא גְּנֵיבָה וַאֲבֵידָה בְּשׁוֹאֵל לְחִיּוּבָא מְנָלַן – דְּגָמַר מִשּׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר: דַּיּוֹ לַבָּא מִן הַדִּין לִהְיוֹת כַּנִּדּוֹן, מָה גְּנֵיבָה וַאֲבֵידָה דְּשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר בִּבְעָלִים – פָּטוּר, אַף גְּנֵיבָה וַאֲבֵידָה דְּשׁוֹאֵל נָמֵי בִּבְעָלִים – פָּטוּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** the *halakha* that a borrower who also borrowed the services of the owner is exempt if the animal is injured or dies is derived as follows: **From where did we** originally derive **the liability of a borrower in** a case of **theft or loss? It was derived** though an *a fortiori* inference **from** the fact that **a paid bailee** is liable. One of the principles of an *a fortiori* inference is that **it is sufficient for the** conclusion that **emerges from** an *a fortiori* **inference to be like** its **source.** In other words, a *halakha* derived by means of an *a fortiori* inference is no more stringent than the source from which it is derived. Accordingly, **just as** in a case of **theft or loss of** a deposit entrusted with **a paid bailee** who undertook to look after it together **with** borrowing the services of its **owner,** the bailee is **exempt, so too,** in a case of **theft or loss of** a deposit entrusted with **a borrower** who had borrowed it together **with** the services of its **owner,** the borrower is **exempt.**


###### Bava Metzia 95a:16
[Bava Metzia 95a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95a:16)

הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאִית לֵיהּ דַּיּוֹ, אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּלֵית לֵיהּ דַּיּוֹ מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **This works out well according to the one who accepts** the principle of: **It is sufficient. But according to the one who does not accept** the principle of: **It is sufficient, what can be said;** how does he derive a borrower’s exemption from liability in a case in which he borrowed an item together with its owner’s services and the item was lost or stolen?


###### Bava Metzia 95a:17
[Bava Metzia 95a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95a:17)

אֶלָּא אָמַר קְרָא ״וְכִי יִשְׁאַל״, וָיו מוֹסִיף עַל עִנְיָן רִאשׁוֹן, וְיִלְמַד עֶלְיוֹן מִתַּחְתּוֹן וְתַחְתּוֹן מֵעֶלְיוֹן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** it is derived as follows: **The verse states: “And if he borrows”** (Exodus 22:13). The conjunctive **“and”** indicates that the passage detailing the liability of a borrower **is adding to the first matter,** i.e., the *halakhot* of a paid bailee. **And** therefore **let the** case of a paid bailee **above be derived from** the case **below** of the borrower, **and** *halakhot* applying to the case **below,** of a borrower, can be derived **from the** case **above,** of a paid bailee.


###### Bava Metzia 95a:18
[Bava Metzia 95a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95a:18)

אִיתְּמַר: פְּשִׁיעָה בִּבְעָלִים, פְּלִיגִי בַּהּ רַב אַחָא וְרָבִינָא. חַד אָמַר: חַיָּיב, וְחַד אָמַר: פָּטוּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ An amoraic dispute **was stated:** With regard to a mishap that occurred due to a borrower’s **negligence** in safeguarding the deposit he borrowed together **with** the services of its **owner, Rav Aḥa and Ravina disagree. One** Sage **says** he is **liable, and one** Sage **says** he is **exempt.**


###### Bava Metzia 95a:19
[Bava Metzia 95a:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95a:19)

מַאן דְּאָמַר חַיָּיב, קָסָבַר: מִקְרָא נִדְרָשׁ לְפָנָיו, וְלֹא לִפְנֵי פָנָיו,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**The one who says** he is **liable holds** that **the verse** beginning: “And if he borrows,” which details the exemption from liability when one borrows an item together with its owner, **is expounded** in connection with the passage **preceding it,** i.e., that of a paid bailee, **but not** in connection with the passage **preceding the one preceding it,** i.e., that of a unpaid bailee.


###### Bava Metzia 95a:20
[Bava Metzia 95a:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95a:20)

הִלְכָּךְ ״אִם בְּעָלָיו עִמּוֹ״ אַשּׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם לָא כְּתִיב, וּפְשִׁיעָה נָמֵי בְּשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר וּבְשׁוֹאֵל לָא כְּתִיב. הִלְכָּךְ, בְּשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר וּבְשׁוֹאֵל לְחִיּוּב אָתְיָא בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר מִשּׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Accordingly,** the verse: **“If its owner is with him,** he does not pay” (Exodus 22:14), which appears in the passage of a borrower, **is not written in reference to an unpaid bailee,** and so that exemption from liability does not apply to him. **And in addition,** the liability for **negligence,** which appears in the passage of an unpaid bailee, **is not written in reference to a paid bailee or a borrower. Accordingly,** the **liability of a paid bailee and of a borrower** in a case of negligence **is derived** only **via an *a fortiori*** inference from the liability of an unpaid bailee, not from an explicit verse.


###### Bava Metzia 95a:21
[Bava Metzia 95a:21](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95a:21)

אֲבָל בִּבְעָלִים לִפְטוּר אַף בְּשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר וּבְשׁוֹאֵל – לָא. מַאי טַעְמָא: כִּי כְּתִיב ״אִם בְּעָלָיו עִמּוֹ לֹא יְשַׁלֵּם״ אַשּׁוֹאֵל וְאַשּׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר – אַהָנָךְ חִיּוּבֵי דִּכְתִיב בְּהוּ בְּהֶדְיָא הוּא דְּמִיכְּתִב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But** it is **not** possible to derive that **even a paid bailee and a borrower are exempt** in cases where they took hold of an item together **with** borrowing the services of its **owner** and a mishap occurred due to their negligence. **What is the reason** for this? **When it is written: “If its owner is with him, he does not pay,”** that is **in reference** only **to a borrower and to a paid bailee.** Even then, **it is written in reference to** only **those liabilities that are written explicitly with regard to them.** It is not written with regard to their liability for negligence, which is derived only through an *a fortiori* inference. Consequently, the borrower and the paid bailee are liable for negligence even in a case where they also borrowed the services of its owner.


###### Bava Metzia 95a:22
[Bava Metzia 95a:22](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95a:22)

מַאן דְּאָמַר פָּטוּר, קָסָבַר: מִקְרָא נִדְרָשׁ לְפָנָיו וְלִפְנֵי פָנָיו, וְכִי כְּתִיב ״אִם בְּעָלָיו עִמּוֹ״ – אַשּׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם נָמֵי כְּתִיב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Conversely, **the one who says** that a borrower is **exempt holds** that **the verse:** “And if he borrows,” which details the exemption from liability in a case where one borrows an item together with the services of its owner, **is expounded** in connection with the passage **preceding it,** i.e., that of a paid bailee, **and** also in connection with the passage **preceding the one preceding it,** i.e., that of a unpaid bailee. **And** accordingly, **when it is written: “If its owner is with him,** he does not pay,” this exemption **is written also in reference to an unpaid bailee,** limiting his liability even in a case of negligence.


###### Bava Metzia 95a:23
[Bava Metzia 95a:23](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95a:23)

תְּנַן: הַשּׁוֹאֵל הַפָּרָה וְשָׁאַל בְּעָלֶיהָ עִמָּהּ, הַשּׁוֹאֵל הַפָּרָה וְשָׂכַר בְּעָלֶיהָ עִמָּהּ, שָׁאַל בְּעָלֶיהָ אוֹ שְׂכָרָן וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׁאַל הַפָּרָה וּמֵתָה – פָּטוּר. וְאִילּוּ שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם לָא קָתָנֵי!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests proofs for each opinion: **We learned** in the mishna that in the case of **one who borrowed a cow and he borrowed** the services of **its owner** together **with it;** or **one who borrowed a cow and he hired its owner with it;** or if **one borrowed** the services of **the owner or hired him and afterward borrowed the cow;** in all such cases, if the cow **died,** the borrower is **exempt.** The Gemara explains the proof: The mishna mentions the exemption from liability with regard to a borrower, **whereas it does not teach** it with regard to **an unpaid bailee,** who is liable only for a mishap that was the result of his negligence. Presumably, this is because exemption from liability does not apply to a mishap that is the result of the bailee’s negligence.


###### Bava Metzia 95a:24
[Bava Metzia 95a:24](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95a:24)

וּלְטַעְמָיךְ: שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר מִי קָתָנֵי?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects the proof: **But** even **according to your reasoning, does it teach** exemption from liability with regard to **a paid bailee?** It does not, although it certainly applies to at least cases of theft and loss.


###### Bava Metzia 95a:25
[Bava Metzia 95a:25](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95a:25)

אֶלָּא תַּנָּא, מִילְּתָא

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** with regard to the ***tanna*** of the mishna, **the matter**