## Bava Metzia Daf 95b

###### Bava Metzia 95b:1
[Bava Metzia 95b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95b:1)

דִּכְתִיבָא בְּהֶדְיָא – קָתָנֵי, דְּאָתְיָא מִדְּרָשָׁא – לָא קָתָנֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**that is explicitly written** in the Torah **he teaches,** and those matters **that are derived through interpretation he does not teach.** Consequently, no proof can be brought from the mishna.


###### Bava Metzia 95b:2
[Bava Metzia 95b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95b:2)

תָּא שְׁמַע: שְׁאָלָהּ וְשָׁאַל בְּעָלֶיהָ עִמָּהּ, שְׂכָרָהּ וְשָׂכַר בְּעָלֶיהָ עִמָּהּ, שְׁאָלָהּ וְשָׂכַר בְּעָלֶיהָ עִמָּהּ, שְׂכָרָהּ וְשָׁאַל בְּעָלֶיהָ עִמָּהּ, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהַבְּעָלִים עוֹשִׂין מְלָאכָה בְּמָקוֹם אַחֵר, וָמֵתָה – פָּטוּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests: **Come** and **hear** a proof from a *baraita*: If **one borrowed** an animal **and borrowed** the services of **its owner with it,** or **rented it and hired its owner with it,** or **borrowed it and hired its owner with it,** or **rented it and borrowed** the services of **its owner with it;** in all of these cases, **although the owner performed** the **work** for him **in another place,** i.e., not near the animal, **and it dies,** the borrower or renter is **exempt.**


###### Bava Metzia 95b:3
[Bava Metzia 95b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95b:3)

סַבְרוּהָ הָא מַנִּי – רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא, דְּאָמַר: שׂוֹכֵר כְּשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר דָּמֵי! וְהָא הַאי תַּנָּא קָתָנֵי מִילְּתָא דְּאָתְיָא מִדְּרָשָׁא, וְאִילּוּ שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם לָא קָתָנֵי!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara notes: The scholars in the study hall **assumed that this** *baraita* is in accordance with **whose** opinion? It **is** in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Yehuda, who says** that **one who rents** an item is responsible for it **like a paid bailee.** According to his understanding, the *baraita* teaches that the exemption from liability applies to both a borrower and a paid bailee. Consequently, the *baraita* can serve as a proof: **Doesn’t this *tanna* teach** even **a matter that is derived through interpretation,** i.e., the fact that exemption from liability applies to a paid bailee, **while he** still **does not teach** that it applies to **an unpaid bailee?** It would appear that this is a proof that exemption from liability does not apply to an unpaid bailee, since it does not apply to a mishap that is the result of the bailee’s negligence.


###### Bava Metzia 95b:4
[Bava Metzia 95b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95b:4)

הָא מַנִּי – רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא, דְּאָמַר: שׂוֹכֵר כְּשׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם דָּמֵי, וְתַנָּא שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם, וְהוּא הַדִּין לְשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara refutes this proof, as one could counter: In accordance with **whose** opinion is **this** *baraita*? It **is** in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Meir, who says** that the liability of **one who rents** an item **is like** that of **an unpaid bailee. And,** according to his understanding, the *baraita* **teaches** that the exemption from liability applies to **an unpaid bailee, and** it is understood that **the same is true for a paid bailee.** Understood like this, the *baraita* explicitly applies the exemption from liability to a case of negligence. Since, ultimately, it is unclear according to whose opinion the *baraita* is taught, no proof can be drawn from it.


###### Bava Metzia 95b:5
[Bava Metzia 95b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95b:5)

אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא כִּדְמַחְלֵיף רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ וְתָנֵי: שׂוֹכֵר כֵּיצַד מְשַׁלֵּם? רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: כְּשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: כְּשׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**If you wish, say** that the *baraita* can be understood as referring to an unpaid bailee, even if it is assumed to be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. **As Rabba bar Avuh reversed** their opinions **and taught: How does one who rents** an item **pay** in the case of a mishap? **Rabbi Meir says: Like a paid bailee. Rabbi Yehuda says: Like an unpaid bailee.**


###### Bava Metzia 95b:6
[Bava Metzia 95b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95b:6)

אָמַר רַב הַמְנוּנָא: לְעוֹלָם הוּא חַיָּיב עַד שֶׁתְּהֵא פָּרָה וְחוֹרֵשׁ בָּהּ, חֲמוֹר וּמְחַמֵּר אַחֲרֶיהָ, וְעַד שֶׁיְּהוּ בְּעָלִים מִשְּׁעַת שְׁאֵילָה עַד שְׁעַת שְׁבוּרָה וּמֵתָה. אַלְמָא קָסָבַר ״בְּעָלָיו עִמּוֹ״ – אַכּוּלַּהּ מִילְּתָא מַשְׁמַע.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **Rav Hamnuna says** that the exemption from liability when one borrows an item together with the services of its owner exists only in very specific circumstances: A borrower **is always liable, unless** the item entrusted to him **is a cow and** its owner **plows with it** in the service of the borrower, or it is **a donkey and** its owner **drives it** by walking **behind it** in the service of the borrower, i.e., the owner and his animal are engaged in the same work. **And** even so, the borrower will not be exempt **unless the owner** is working for him **from** the **time of the borrowing** of the animal **until** the **time when it is injured or dies.** The Gemara notes: **Evidently,** Rav Hamnuna **holds** that the phrase: **“Its owner is with him”** (Exodus 22:14), **teaches** that the exemption from liability applies only when the owner is working for the borrower **for the entire matter.**


###### Bava Metzia 95b:7
[Bava Metzia 95b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95b:7)

מֵתִיב רָבָא: שְׁאָלָהּ וְשָׁאַל בְּעָלֶיהָ עִמָּהּ, שְׂכָרָהּ וְשָׂכַר בְּעָלֶיהָ עִמָּהּ, שְׂכָרָהּ וְשָׁאַל בְּעָלֶיהָ עִמָּהּ, שְׁאָלָהּ וְשָׂכַר בְּעָלֶיהָ עִמָּהּ, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהַבְּעָלִים עוֹשִׂין מְלָאכָה בְּמָקוֹם אַחֵר וָמֵתָה – פָּטוּר. מַאי לָאו ״בִּמְלָאכָה אַחֶרֶת״?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava raises an objection** from the *baraita* cited previously: If **one borrowed** an animal **and borrowed** the services of **its owner with it,** or **rented it and hired its owner with it,** or **rented it and borrowed** the services of **its owner with it,** or **borrowed it and hired its owner with it;** in all these cases, **although the owner performed** the **work** for him **in another place,** i.e., not near the animal, **and it died,** the borrower or renter is **exempt.** Rava explains how the *baraita* poses a challenge: **What, is it not** referring to a case where the owner was engaged **with different work** than his animal? The *baraita* proves that the exemption from liability applies even in such a case.


###### Bava Metzia 95b:8
[Bava Metzia 95b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95b:8)

לָא, בְּאוֹתָהּ מְלָאכָה. אֶלָּא, מַאי ״מָקוֹם אַחֵר״? דְּקָא מְרַפֵּי וְאָזֵיל קַמַּהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects this: **No,** the *baraita* is referring to a case where the owner was engaged **with** the **same work** as the animal. The Gemara asks: **But,** if so, **what** does the *baraita* mean by saying: He performed the work **in another place?** The Gemara explains: For example, it is a case **where** the owner **loosens** the hard soil with a hoe **while walking ahead** of the animal. He is engaged in the same work, but not in the same place.


###### Bava Metzia 95b:9
[Bava Metzia 95b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95b:9)

וְהָא מִדְּסֵיפָא ״עַל גַּבָּהּ״ הָוֵי, רֵישָׁא בִּמְלָאכָה אַחֶרֶת, דְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: שְׁאָלָהּ וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׁאַל בְּעָלֶיהָ, שְׂכָרָהּ וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׂכַר בְּעָלֶיהָ עִמָּהּ, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהַבְּעָלִים חוֹרְשִׁין עַל גַּבָּהּ וָמֵתָה – חַיָּיב!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara raises a difficulty: **But from** the fact that **the latter clause** of the *baraita* is referring to a case where the owner was working **alongside it,** it may be inferred that **the first clause,** i.e., the passage of the *baraita* cited above, is referring to a case where the owner was engaged **with different work. As the latter clause teaches:** If **he borrowed it and afterward borrowed** the services of **its owner,** or **rented it and afterward hired its owner with it,** in both these cases, **although the owner was plowing alongside it and** at that time **it died,** the borrower or renter is **liable.**


###### Bava Metzia 95b:10
[Bava Metzia 95b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95b:10)

אָמְרִי: רֵישָׁא וְסֵיפָא בְּאוֹתָהּ מְלָאכָה, וְרֵישָׁא רְבוּתָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן, וְסֵיפָא רְבוּתָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן. רֵישָׁא רְבוּתָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן, דְּאַף עַל גַּב דְּלָאו עַל גַּבָּהּ אֶלָּא בְּאוֹתָהּ מְלָאכָה, כֵּיוָן דַּהֲווֹ בְּעָלִים בִּשְׁעַת שְׁאֵילָה – פָּטוּר. וְסֵיפָא רְבוּתָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן, דְּאַף עַל גַּב דְּעַל גַּבָּהּ, כֵּיוָן דְּלָא הֲווֹ בְּעָלִים בִּשְׁעַת שְׁאֵילָה – חַיָּיב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
In resolution of this difficulty, the Sages **say:** Both **the first clause and the latter clause** pertain to a case where the owner was engaged **with the same work** as the animal. **And** the difference in formulation of the two clauses is because **the first clause teaches us a novelty and the latter clause teaches us a novelty. The first clause teaches us the novelty that although** the owner **was not** actually working **alongside** his animal **but** was merely engaged **with the same work, since** the **owner was** working for the borrower **at** the **time of the borrowing,** the borrower is **exempt. The latter clause teaches us the novelty that although** the owner **was** actually working **alongside** his animal, **since** the **owner was not** working for the borrower **at** the **time of the borrowing,** the borrower is **liable.**


###### Bava Metzia 95b:11
[Bava Metzia 95b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95b:11)

הַאי מַאי?! אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא רֵישָׁא בִּמְלָאכָה אַחֶרֶת, וְסֵיפָא בְּאוֹתָהּ מְלָאכָה – הַיְינוּ רְבוּתָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara is puzzled: **What is this? Granted, if you say** that **the first clause** is referring to a case where the owner is engaged **in different work** than his animal, **and the latter clause** is referring to a case where he is engaged **in** the **same work** as his animal, then **this is the novelty** of mentioning what type of work he did: It teaches that it is irrelevant whether the owner did or did not work together with his animal. Rather, the liability of the borrower depends on whether or not the owner was working for the borrower when he entrusted the borrower with his animal.


###### Bava Metzia 95b:12
[Bava Metzia 95b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95b:12)

אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ רֵישָׁא וְסֵיפָא בְּאוֹתָהּ מְלָאכָה, מַאי רְבוּתָא? אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי בְּאוֹתָהּ מְלָאכָה הָוֵי!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But if you say** that **the first clause and the latter clause** both pertain to a case where the owner is engaged **in** the **same work** as his animal, **what is the novelty** of mentioning what type of work he did? Both **this** clause **and that** clause concern similar cases, in which the owner is engaged **in** the **same work** as his animal. It is therefore apparent that the clauses concern different cases. The first clause teaches that the borrower is exempt even in a case where the owner was engaged in different work than his animal. The first part of Rav Hamnuna’s ruling, that the owner needs to be engaged in the same work as his animal, is thereby refuted.


###### Bava Metzia 95b:13
[Bava Metzia 95b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95b:13)

וְעוֹד, תַּנְיָא: מִמַּשְׁמַע שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״אִם בְּעָלָיו עִמּוֹ לֹא יְשַׁלֵּם״ אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁאִם בְּעָלָיו אֵין עִמּוֹ שַׁלֵּם יְשַׁלֵּם? אֶלָּא מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״בְּעָלָיו אֵין עִמּוֹ״ – לוֹמַר לָךְ: הָיָה עִמּוֹ בִּשְׁעַת שְׁאֵילָה – אֵין צָרִיךְ לִהְיוֹת עִמּוֹ בִּשְׁעַת שְׁבוּרָה וּמֵתָה, הָיָה עִמּוֹ בִּשְׁעַת שְׁבוּרָה וּמֵתָה – צָרִיךְ לִהְיוֹת עִמּוֹ בִּשְׁעַת שְׁאֵילָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And furthermore,** even the second part of Rav Hamnuna’s ruling, that the exemption applies only when the owner was working for the borrower from the time of the borrowing of the animal until the time of the mishap, can be refuted, as **it is taught** in a *baraita*: **From the implication of that which is stated: “If its owner is with him, he does not pay”** (Exodus 22:14), **do I not** already **know** what is stated in the next verse, **that “if its owner is not with him, he shall pay”** (Exodus 22:13)? **Rather, what** is the meaning when **the verse states: “Its owner is not with him”?** It serves **to tell you:** If **he was with him,** i.e., working for him, **at** the **time of borrowing, he does not need to be with him at** the **time when** the animal is **injured or dies** for the exemption from liability to apply; but if he **was with him at** the **time when** the animal is **injured or dies, he** does **need to have been with him at** the **time of borrowing** for the exemption from liability to apply.


###### Bava Metzia 95b:14
[Bava Metzia 95b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95b:14)

וְתַנְיָא אִידַּךְ: מִמַּשְׁמַע שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״בְּעָלָיו אֵין עִמּוֹ שַׁלֵּם יְשַׁלֵּם״ אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁאִם בְּעָלָיו עִמּוֹ לֹא יְשַׁלֵּם? אֶלָּא מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״אִם בְּעָלָיו עִמּוֹ״? לוֹמַר לְךָ: כֵּיוָן שֶׁיָּצְאָה מֵרְשׁוּת מַשְׁאִיל שָׁעָה אַחַת בִּבְעָלִים וָמֵתָה – פָּטוּר. תְּיוּבְתָּא דְּרַב הַמְנוּנָא. תְּיוּבְתָּא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And it is taught** in **another** *baraita*: **From the implication of that which is stated: “If its owner is not with him, he shall pay,” do I not** already **know** what is stated in the preceding verse, **that “if its owner is with him, he does not pay”? Rather, what** is the meaning when **the verse states: “If its owner is with him”?** It serves **to tell you: Once** the animal **has left the domain of the lender,** i.e., its owner, and has been entrusted to the borrower, **with** its **owner** working for the borrower at that time, even for only **one moment, and** then **it dies,** the borrower is **exempt.** The Gemara concludes: **The refutation** of the opinion **of Rav Hamnuna** provided by these *baraitot* **is** indeed **a conclusive refutation.**


###### Bava Metzia 95b:15
[Bava Metzia 95b:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95b:15)

אַבָּיֵי סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה, וּמְתָרֵץ לִקְרָאֵי כְּרַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה. רָבָא סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יוֹנָתָן, וּמְתָרֵץ לִקְרָאֵי כְּרַבִּי יוֹנָתָן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The Gemara explains how the first of these *baraitot* arrives at its conclusion: **Abaye holds in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yoshiya,** that when the Torah mentions two details together in reference to a *halakha*, it is presumed that the *halakha* applies only when both details are in effect (see 94b), **and he** likewise **explains the** two **verses in accordance with Rabbi Yoshiya. Rava holds in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yonatan,** that it is presumed that the *halakha* applies even when only one of the details is in effect, **and he explains the verses in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yonatan.**


###### Bava Metzia 95b:16
[Bava Metzia 95b:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95b:16)

אַבָּיֵי סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה וּמְתָרֵץ לִקְרָאֵי כְּרַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה: ״בְּעָלָיו אֵין עִמּוֹ שַׁלֵּם יְשַׁלֵּם״, טַעְמָא דְּלֵיתֵיהּ בְּתַרְוַיְיהוּ, הָא אִיתֵיהּ בַּחֲדָא וְלֵיתֵיהּ בַּחֲדָא – פָּטוּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara clarifies: When the Torah refers to an owner working for the borrower, it should be understood as referring to the time of the borrowing and the time of the mishap. According to Rabbi Yoshiya’s opinion, this indicates that the owner worked for him at both times, whereas according to Rabbi Yonatan’s opinion, this implies that he worked for him at either time. Based on this, Abaye and Rava explain the verses: **Abaye holds in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yoshiya, and he** likewise **explains the** two **verses in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yoshiya,** thereby arriving at the conclusion of the *baraita*, as follows: From the verse: **“If its owner is not with him, he shall pay,”** it appears that **the reason** the borrower is liable is **that** the owner **was not** working for him **at either** point in time. By inference, if **he** worked for him **at one** of those times **but not at** the other **one,** the borrower is **exempt.**


###### Bava Metzia 95b:17
[Bava Metzia 95b:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95b:17)

וְהָא כְּתִיב: ״אִם בְּעָלָיו עִמּוֹ לֹא יְשַׁלֵּם״, טַעְמָא דְּאִיתֵיהּ בְּתַרְוַיְיהוּ, הָא אִי אִיתֵיהּ בַּחֲדָא וְלֵיתֵיהּ בַּחֲדָא – מִחַיַּיב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara raises an objection: **But isn’t it written: “If its owner is with him, he does not pay”?** From this verse it appears that **the reason** the borrower is exempt is **that** the owner **was** working for him **at both** points in time. By inference, **if he was** working for him **at one** of those times **but not at** the other **one,** the borrower is **liable.** The two verses appear to contradict each another.


###### Bava Metzia 95b:18
[Bava Metzia 95b:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/95b:18)

לוֹמַר לָךְ: הָיָה עִמּוֹ בִּשְׁעַת שְׁאֵילָה – אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לִהְיוֹת עִמּוֹ בִּשְׁעַת שְׁבוּרָה וּמֵתָה, הָיָה עִמּוֹ בִּשְׁעַת שְׁבוּרָה וּמֵתָה – צָרִיךְ לִהְיוֹת עִמּוֹ בִּשְׁעַת שְׁאֵילָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
To reconcile the verses, one must say that the phrase “if its owner is with him” serves **to tell you:** If **he was with him,** i.e., working for him, **at** the **time of borrowing, he does not need to be with him at** the **time when** the animal is **injured or dies** for the exemption from liability to apply; but if he **was with him at** the **time when** the animal is **injured or dies, he** does **need to have been with him at** the **time of borrowing** for the exemption to apply.