## Bava Metzia Daf 96a

###### Bava Metzia 96a:1
[Bava Metzia 96a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/96a:1)

רָבָא סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יוֹנָתָן וּמְתָרֵץ לִקְרָאֵי כְּרַבִּי יוֹנָתָן, דְּתַנְיָא: ״אִם בְּעָלָיו עִמּוֹ לֹא יְשַׁלֵּם״. מַשְׁמַע דְּאִיתֵיהּ בְּתַרְוַיְיהוּ, וּמַשְׁמַע נָמֵי דְּכִי אִיתֵיהּ בַּחֲדָא וְלֵיתֵיהּ בַּחֲדָא – פָּטוּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
By contrast, **Rava holds in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yonatan, and he explains the verses in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yonatan,** thereby arriving at the conclusion of the *baraita*, **as it is taught** in a *baraita*: **“If its owner is with him, he does not pay” teaches** about the case in **which** the owner **was** working for the borrower **at both** points in time, **and it also teaches** about the case in **which** he **was** working for him **at one** of those times **but not at** the other **one;** in both cases the borrower is **exempt.**


###### Bava Metzia 96a:2
[Bava Metzia 96a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/96a:2)

וּכְתִיב: ״בְּעָלָיו אֵין עִמּוֹ שַׁלֵּם יְשַׁלֵּם״ – מַשְׁמַע דְּלֵיתֵיהּ בְּתַרְוַיְיהוּ, מַשְׁמַע נָמֵי דְּכִי אִיתֵיהּ בַּחֲדָא וְלֵיתֵיהּ בַּחֲדָא – חַיָּיב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara raises an objection: **But it is** also **written: “If its owner is not with him, he shall pay.”** The verse **teaches** about the case in **which** the owner **was not** working for the borrower **at either** point in time, **and it also teaches** about the case in **which he was** working for him **at one** of those times **but not at** the other **one;** in both cases the borrower is **liable.**


###### Bava Metzia 96a:3
[Bava Metzia 96a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/96a:3)

לוֹמַר לָךְ: הָיָה עִמּוֹ בִּשְׁעַת שְׁאֵלָה – אֵין צָרִיךְ לִהְיוֹת עִמּוֹ בִּשְׁעַת שְׁבוּרָה וּמֵתָה, הָיָה עִמּוֹ בִּשְׁעַת שְׁבוּרָה וּמֵתָה – צָרִיךְ לִהְיוֹת עִמּוֹ בִּשְׁעַת שְׁאֵלָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
To reconcile the verses, one must say that the phrase “if its owner is with him” serves **to tell you** that if the owner **was with** the borrower, i.e., working for him, **at** the **time of borrowing,** then **he does not need to be with him at** the **time when** the animal is **injured or dies** for the exemption from liability to apply; but if he **was with him at** the **time when** the animal is **injured or dies, he** does **need to have been with him at** the **time of borrowing** for the exemption to apply.


###### Bava Metzia 96a:4
[Bava Metzia 96a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/96a:4)

אֵיפוֹךְ אֲנָא! מִסְתַּבְּרָא שְׁאֵלָה עֲדִיפָא, מִשּׁוּם דְּקָא מַיְיתֵי לַהּ לִרְשׁוּתֵיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara raises a difficulty: **I could reverse** the conclusion and say that the borrower’s exemption from liability is dependent upon the time when the animal was injured or died. The Gemara explains: **It is reasonable** that the exemption from liability should be dependent on the time of the borrowing because the **borrowing is** of **greater** significance, **as** with it the borrower **brings** the animal **into his domain.**


###### Bava Metzia 96a:5
[Bava Metzia 96a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/96a:5)

אַדְּרַבָּה, שְׁבוּרָה וּמֵתָה עֲדִיפָא, שֶׁכֵּן חַיָּיב בָּאוֹנָסִין!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara retorts: **On the contrary,** the time when the animal is **injured or dies is** of **greater** significance, because **that** point marks **when** the borrower **is** actually **liable** to pay **for** any **accidents** that occurred.


###### Bava Metzia 96a:6
[Bava Metzia 96a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/96a:6)

אִי לָא שְׁאֵלָה, שְׁבוּרָה וּמֵתָה מַאי עָבֵיד? וְאִי לָאו שְׁבוּרָה וּמֵתָה, שְׁאֵלָה מַאי עָבֵיד? אֲפִילּוּ הָכִי שְׁאֵלָה עֲדִיפָא, שֶׁכֵּן חַיָּיב בִּמְזוֹנוֹתֶיהָ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara responds: No, the borrowing is more significant. **Were it not for** the initial **borrowing, what** liability could be **caused** by the fact that the animal is **injured or dies?** The Gemara argues: **But** by the same logic, **were it not for** the fact that the animal is **injured or dies, what** liability could be **caused** by the act of **borrowing?** The Gemara concludes: **Even so,** the **borrowing is** of **greater** significance, **as** with it the borrower **is obligated to** provide the animal’s **sustenance** as long as it is entrusted with him.


###### Bava Metzia 96a:7
[Bava Metzia 96a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/96a:7)

רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר, אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְכִי יִשְׁאַל אִישׁ מֵעִם רֵעֵהוּ״, וְלֹא רֵעֵהוּ עִמּוֹ – ״שַׁלֵּם יְשַׁלֵּם״, הָא רֵעֵהוּ עִמּוֹ – פָּטוּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Ashi said** that the *halakha* that the borrower’s exemption from liability is dependent upon the time of the borrowing can be derived from the verse itself: **The verse states: “And when a man borrows from another…**he shall pay” (Exodus 22:13). The precise formulation of the verse indicates that he borrowed an item from another, **but** that **other** person **was not with him,** i.e., working for him, at the time. It is only in such a case that that verse concludes: **“He shall pay.”** By inference, when the **other person** is working **with him,** the borrower is **exempt.** Accordingly, it is clear that the critical moment is the time of the borrowing.


###### Bava Metzia 96a:8
[Bava Metzia 96a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/96a:8)

אִי הָכִי: ״בְּעָלָיו אֵין עִמּוֹ״, וְ״אִם בְּעָלָיו עִמּוֹ״ לְמָה לִי? אִי לָאו הָנָךְ, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: הַאי אוֹרְחֵיהּ דִּקְרָא הוּא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **If so, why do I** need the continuation of that verse: **“Its owner is not with him,” and** the next verse: **“If its owner is with him”?** According to Rav Ashi, the circumstances of the borrower’s liability and exemption can be derived from the beginning of the first verse. The Gemara explains: **If it were not for these** additional clauses, **I would say** that **this** phrase “from another” **is** simply **the** usual **manner of the verse,** and is not to be expounded to teach an exemption. Since the continuation of the verse and the next verse teach the actual exemption from liability, and the apparent contradiction between them raises the question of when the critical moment is, it is apparent that the beginning of the verse was written in order to be expounded, as Rav Ashi did.


###### Bava Metzia 96a:9
[Bava Metzia 96a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/96a:9)

בָּעֵי רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא שְׁאָלָהּ לְרִבְעָהּ, מַהוּ? כִּדְשָׁיְילִי אִינָשֵׁי בָּעֵינַן וּלְהָכִי לָא שָׁיְילִי אִינָשֵׁי, אוֹ דִלְמָא טַעְמָא מַאי – מִשּׁוּם הֲנָאָה, וְהַאי נָמֵי הָא אִית לֵיהּ הֲנָאָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **Rami bar Ḥama raises a dilemma:** If one **borrowed** an animal in order **to engage in bestiality with it,** a severe transgression (see Leviticus 18:23), **what is** the *halakha*; is the borrower liable for mishaps? The crux of the dilemma is: In order for him to be liable, **do we require** that the borrowing be for a purpose **similar to that** for **which people** typically **borrow** animals, **and** since **people do not** typically **borrow** animals **for this** purpose, the borrower is exempt? **Or perhaps, what is the reason** that a borrower is liable? It is **due to** the **benefit** he derives from the animal, **and** as **this** borrower, **too, has benefit** from the animal, he is liable for mishaps.


###### Bava Metzia 96a:10
[Bava Metzia 96a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/96a:10)

שְׁאָלָהּ לֵירָאוֹת בָּהּ, מַהוּ? מָמוֹנָא בָּעֵינַן וְהָאִיכָּא, אוֹ דִלְמָא מָמוֹנָא דְּאִית לֵיהּ הֲנָאָה מִינֵּיהּ בָּעֵינַן וְלֵיכָּא?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
A similar question: If **one borrowed** an item, not to use it but **to be seen with it,** so that people will assume that he is wealthy, **what is** the *halakha*? In order for him to be liable, **do we require** that he borrow an item **of monetary worth, and** that exists in this case? **Or, perhaps we require** that he borrow an item **of monetary worth from which he** also **derives** tangible **benefit, and** that does not exist in this case.


###### Bava Metzia 96a:11
[Bava Metzia 96a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/96a:11)

שְׁאָלָהּ לַעֲשׂוֹת בָּהּ פָּחוֹת מִפְּרוּטָה, מַהוּ? מָמוֹנָא בָּעֵינַן וְאִיכָּא, אוֹ דִלְמָא כׇּל פָּחוֹת מִפְּרוּטָה – לֹא כְּלוּם הִיא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Another question: If **one borrowed** an item **to perform** work **with it** that is worth **less than** the value of **one *peruta*, what is** the *halakha*? **Do we require** only that he borrow an item **of monetary worth, and** that exists in this case? **Or, perhaps any** benefit derived that is worth **less than one *peruta* is nothing,** i.e., it is legally considered to be of no monetary worth, and he is therefore exempt.


###### Bava Metzia 96a:12
[Bava Metzia 96a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/96a:12)

שָׁאַל שְׁתֵּי פָּרוֹת לַעֲשׂוֹת בָּהֶן פְּרוּטָה, מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן: זִיל בָּתַר שׁוֹאֵל וּמַשְׁאִיל, וְאִיכָּא? אוֹ דִּלְמָא: זִיל בָּתַר פָּרוֹת וְכֹל חֲדָא וַחֲדָא לֵיכָּא מָמוֹנָא?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Another question: If **one borrowed two cows to perform** work **with them** that will be worth the value of **one *peruta*** in total, **what is** the *halakha*? When appraising the value of the benefit derived, to see if it has monetary worth of one *peruta*, **do we say: Follow** the **borrower and lender,** i.e., appraise how much benefit the borrower received from the lender, **and** in this case **there is** benefit of the value of one *peruta*. **Or, perhaps we follow** the **cows, and** in this case, **each one** of the cows **does not** provide the borrower with **monetary worth** of one *peruta*.


###### Bava Metzia 96a:13
[Bava Metzia 96a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/96a:13)

שָׁאַל מִשּׁוּתָּפִין וְנִשְׁאַל לוֹ אֶחָד מֵהֶן, מַהוּ? כּוּלּוֹ בְּעָלָיו בָּעֵינַן – וְהָא לֵיכָּא, אוֹ דִלְמָא מֵהָהוּא פַּלְגָא דִּידֵיהּ מִיהָא מִיפְּטַר?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Another question: If **one borrowed** an item **from** two **partners, and** the services of **one of those** partners **were** also **borrowed by him, what is** the *halakha*? Does the exemption of borrowing an item together with its owner apply in this case? For the exemption to apply, **do we require all of** the item’s **owners** to be working for the borrower, **and** that does not exist in this case? **Or, perhaps** there is no such condition, but **in any event,** the borrower **should** at least **be exempt** from liability **for that half** of the item owned by the partner who is working for him.


###### Bava Metzia 96a:14
[Bava Metzia 96a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/96a:14)

שׁוּתָּפִין שֶׁשָּׁאֲלוּ וְנִשְׁאַל לְאֶחָד מֵהֶן, מַהוּ? כּוּלּוֹ שׁוֹאֵל בָּעֵינַן, וְלֵיכָּא? אוֹ דִלְמָא בְּהָהִיא פַּלְגָא דְּשַׁיְילֵיהּ מִיהַת מִיפְּטַר?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Another question: In the case of **partners who borrowed** an item **and** its owner’s services **were** also **borrowed by one of them, what is** the *halakha*? For the exemption to apply, **do we require** that the owner be working for **all the borrowers, and** that does not exist in this case? **Or, perhaps** there is no such condition, but **in any event,** the partner who borrowed only the item **should** at least **be exempt** from liability **for the half** of the animal **that** the partner, whom the owner worked for, **had borrowed.**


###### Bava Metzia 96a:15
[Bava Metzia 96a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/96a:15)

שָׁאַל מֵהָאִשָּׁה וְנִשְׁאַל בַּעְלָהּ, אִשָּׁה שֶׁשָּׁאֲלָה וְנִשְׁאַל לַבַּעַל, מַהוּ? קִנְיַן פֵּירוֹת כְּקִנְיַן גּוּף דָּמֵי, אוֹ לָא?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Another question: If **one borrowed** an item **from a woman, and** the services of **her husband were** also **borrowed** by him, or where **a woman borrowed** an item **and** its owner’s services **were** also **borrowed by** her **husband, what is** the *halakha*? A husband has the right to use his wife’s property. These questions are dependent on whether **ownership of** the right to use an item and the **profits** it engenders **is tantamount to ownership of the** item **itself or not.**


###### Bava Metzia 96a:16
[Bava Metzia 96a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/96a:16)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: הָאוֹמֵר לִשְׁלוּחוֹ צֵא וְהִשָּׁאֵל לִי עִם פָּרָתִי, מַהוּ? ״בְּעָלָיו״ מַמָּשׁ בָּעֵינַן וְלֵיכָּא, אוֹ דִלְמָא שְׁלוּחוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם כְּמוֹתוֹ, וְאִיכָּא?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Ravina said to Rav Ashi:** In the case of **one who says to his agent: Go and lend your** services to somebody **on my behalf** together **with** lending **my cow** to that person, **what is** the *halakha*? For the exemption to apply, do **I require** that the cow’s **actual owner** work for the borrower, **and** in this case that does not exist? **Or perhaps,** since the legal status of **a person’s agent is like** that of **himself,** it is sufficient if his agent works for the borrower, **and** accordingly, the necessary conditions exist.


###### Bava Metzia 96a:17
[Bava Metzia 96a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/96a:17)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אַוְיָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: בַּעַל – פְּלוּגְתָּא דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, שָׁלִיחַ – פְּלוּגְתָּא דְּרַבִּי יוֹנָתָן וְרַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Avya, said to Rav Ashi:** This question concerning **a husband** is subject to **a dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish.** And the question concerning **an agent** is subject to **a dispute between Rabbi Yonatan and Rabbi Yoshiya.**


###### Bava Metzia 96a:18
[Bava Metzia 96a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/96a:18)

בַּעַל – פְּלוּגְתָּא דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ. דְּאִיתְּמַר: הַמּוֹכֵר שָׂדֵהוּ לַחֲבֵירוֹ לְפֵירוֹת, רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אוֹמֵר: מֵבִיא וְקוֹרֵא, רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אוֹמֵר: מֵבִיא וְאֵינוֹ קוֹרֵא,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara clarifies: The question concerning **a husband** is subject to **a dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish** pertaining to the requirement to bring the first fruits of one’s field to the Temple and recite the accompanying declaration (see Deuteronomy, chapter 26): **As it was stated:** With regard to **one who sells his field to another,** not outright but **for its produce, Rabbi Yoḥanan says:** The buyer **brings** the first fruits **and recites** the declaration, whereas **Reish Lakish says:** The buyer **brings** the first fruits **but does not recite** the declaration.


###### Bava Metzia 96a:19
[Bava Metzia 96a:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/96a:19)

רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אוֹמֵר מֵבִיא וְקוֹרֵא: קִנְיַן פֵּירוֹת כְּקִנְיַן הַגּוּף דָּמֵי. וְרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אוֹמֵר מֵבִיא וְאֵינוֹ קוֹרֵא: קִנְיַן פֵּירוֹת לָאו כְּקִנְיַן הַגּוּף דָּמֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains: They disagree about whether it is justifiable for the buyer to recite the declaration, since in that declaration he refers to the land as: “The land which You, the Lord, have given me” (Deuteronomy 26:10), i.e., he states that the land belongs to him. **Rabbi Yoḥanan says** that the buyer **brings** the first fruits **and recites** the declaration, because he holds that **ownership** of the right to use land and **its produce is tantamount to ownership of the** land **itself.** Accordingly, the buyer is considered to be the owner of the land and he may consequently recite the declaration. **And Reish Lakish says** that the buyer **brings** the first fruits **but does not recite** the declaration, because he holds that **ownership of** the right to use land and **its produce is not tantamount to ownership of the** land **itself.** Accordingly, the buyer is not considered to be the owner of the land and is consequently unable to recite the declaration.


###### Bava Metzia 96a:20
[Bava Metzia 96a:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/96a:20)

שָׁלִיחַ – פְּלוּגְתָּא דְּרַבִּי יוֹנָתָן וְרַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה. דְּתַנְיָא: הָאוֹמֵר לְאַפּוֹטְרוֹפּוֹס: כׇּל נְדָרִים שֶׁתְּהֵא אִשְׁתִּי נוֹדֶרֶת מִכָּאן עַד שֶׁאָבֹא מִמָּקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי – הָפֵר לָהּ, וְהֵפֵיר לָהּ, יָכוֹל יְהוּ מוּפָרִין, תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אִישָׁהּ יְקִימֶנּוּ וְאִישָׁהּ יְפֵרֶנּוּ״, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה. רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן אוֹמֵר: מָצִינוּ בְּכׇל מָקוֹם שֶׁשְּׁלוּחוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם כְּמוֹתוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara clarifies the second disagreement: The question concerning **an agent** is subject to **a dispute between Rabbi Yonatan and Rabbi Yoshiya, as it is taught** in a *baraita*: If there is **one who says to a steward** appointed to take care of his household: **All vows that my wife will vow from now until I come** back **from such and such a place,** you should **nullify** them **for her** in my stead, **and** the steward **annulled** them **for her,** one **might** have thought that **they would be nullified.** To dispel this notion, **the verse states** with regard to a vow taken by a wife: **“Her husband sustains it and her husband nullifies it”** (Numbers 30:14), which indicates that only her husband is able to do so, and no one else; this is **the statement of Rabbi Yoshiya. Rabbi Yonatan says: We have found everywhere** in *halakha* that the legal status of **a person’s agent is like** that of **himself.** Since the steward was the agent of the husband, his nullification of the vows is effective.


###### Bava Metzia 96a:21
[Bava Metzia 96a:21](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/96a:21)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב עִילִישׁ לְרָבָא: הָאוֹמֵר לְעַבְדּוֹ צֵא וְהִשָּׁאֵל עִם פָּרָתִי, מַהוּ? תִּיבְּעֵי לְמַאן דְּאָמַר שְׁלוּחוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם כְּמוֹתוֹ, תִּיבְּעֵי לְמַאן דְּאָמַר שְׁלוּחוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם אֵינוֹ כְּמוֹתוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Another question: **Rav Ilish said to Rava:** In the case of **one who says to his** Canaanite **slave: Go and lend your** services to another together **with** lending **my cow** to that person, **what is** the *halakha*? **Let the dilemma be raised according to the one who says** that the legal status of **a person’s agent is like** that of **himself,** and **let the dilemma be raised according to the one who says** that the legal status of **a person’s agent is not like** that of **himself.**


###### Bava Metzia 96a:22
[Bava Metzia 96a:22](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/96a:22)

תִּיבְּעֵי לְמַאן דְּאָמַר שְׁלוּחוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם כְּמוֹתוֹ, הָנֵי מִילֵּי שָׁלִיחַ – דְּבַר מִצְוָה הוּא. אֲבָל עֶבֶד, דְּלָאו בַּר מִצְוָה – לָא. אוֹ דִלְמָא אֲפִילּוּ לְמַאן דְּאָמַר אֵין שְׁלוּחוֹ שֶׁל אָדָם כְּמוֹתוֹ, הָנֵי מִילֵּי שָׁלִיחַ. אֲבָל עֶבֶד, יַד עֶבֶד כְּיַד רַבּוֹ דָּמְיָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara elaborates: **Let the dilemma be raised according to the one who says** that the legal status of **a person’s agent is like** that of **himself,** as follows: Does **this matter** apply only to **an agent,** who **is obligated in mitzvot,** just like the one who appointed him; **but** for **a slave, who is not** fully **obligated in mitzvot,** the principle does **not** apply? **Or perhaps, even according to the one who says** that the legal status of **a person’s agent is not like** that of **himself,** maybe **that matter** applies to **an agent,** who is a free, independent person. **But** in the case of **a slave,** since he has no independence from his master, as the **possession of a slave is like** the **possession of his master,** i.e., anything that the slave acquires is automatically acquired by his master, perhaps if the slave’s services are borrowed it is the same as if the master himself had been borrowed.


###### Bava Metzia 96a:23
[Bava Metzia 96a:23](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/96a:23)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: מִסְתַּבְּרָא יַד עֶבֶד כְּיַד רַבּוֹ דָּמְיָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rava **said to** Rav Ilish: **It stands to reason** that since the **possession of a slave is like** the **possession of his master,** then one who borrows both another’s item and the services of his slave is exempt from liability.


###### Bava Metzia 96a:24
[Bava Metzia 96a:24](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bava%20Metzia/r/96a:24)

בָּעֵי רָמֵי בַּר חָמָא: בַּעַל בְּנִכְסֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **Rami bar Ḥama raises a dilemma:** What level of liability does **a husband** bear **with regard to his wife’s** usufruct **property?** This is property belonging to the wife that the husband has the right to use and to enjoy its profits while they are married, but that is returned to her upon termination of the marriage.