## Beitzah Daf 37b

###### Beitzah 37b:1
[Beitzah 37b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Beitzah/r/37b:1)

דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי דּוֹסָא, דְּתַנְיָא: רַבִּי דּוֹסָא אוֹמֵר, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ: אַבָּא שָׁאוּל אוֹמֵר, הַלּוֹקֵחַ בְּהֵמָה מֵחֲבֵרוֹ מֵעֶרֶב יוֹם טוֹב, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא מְסָרָהּ לוֹ אֶלָּא בְּיוֹם טוֹב — הֲרֵי הִיא כְּרַגְלֵי הַלּוֹקֵחַ. וְהַמּוֹסֵר בְּהֵמָה לָרוֹעֶה, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא מְסָרָהּ לוֹ אֶלָּא בְּיוֹם טוֹב — הֲרֵי הִיא כְּרַגְלֵי הָרוֹעֶה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
is **not in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Dosa. As it is taught** in a *baraita*: **Rabbi Dosa says, and some say Abba Shaul says: One who purchases an animal from another on the eve of a Festival, even if he did not deliver it to him until the Festival** itself, **it is as the feet of the purchaser. And one who delivers his animal to a shepherd, even if he did not deliver it to him until the Festival** itself, **it is as the feet of the shepherd.** The mishna, on the other hand, teaches that an animal delivered to a shepherd remains as the feet of the owner, therefore apparently contradicting Rabbi Dosa.


###### Beitzah 37b:2
[Beitzah 37b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Beitzah/r/37b:2)

אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבִּי דּוֹסָא, וְלָא קַשְׁיָא: כָּאן בְּרוֹעֶה אֶחָד, כָּאן בִּשְׁנֵי רוֹעִים. דַּיְקָא נָמֵי דְּקָתָנֵי: לִבְנוֹ אוֹ לָרוֹעֶה, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects the assertion that this is a contradiction. **You** can **even say** that the mishna is in accordance with **Rabbi Dosa, and** it is **not difficult. Here,** in the *baraita*, it is referring **to** a town that has only **one shepherd.** In that case the owner knows with certainty beforehand that he will be delivering his animal to this shepherd over the course of the Festival, and therefore the animal’s place of rest is established as being identical to that of the shepherd. **There,** however, the mishna is referring **to** a town where there are **two shepherds.** Since the issue of which of them will receive this animal is undetermined when the Festival begins, the animal remains as the feet of its owner. The Gemara strengthens this assertion that the mishna is dealing with a case where there are two shepherds: The language of the mishna **is also precise** in accordance with this interpretation, **as it teaches: To his son or to a shepherd,** suggesting that initially he did not know to whom he would give the animal. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, **learn from this** that this is so.


###### Beitzah 37b:3
[Beitzah 37b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Beitzah/r/37b:3)

אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי דּוֹסָא. וּמִי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הָכִי? וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הֲלָכָה כִּסְתַם מִשְׁנָה, וּתְנַן: הַבְּהֵמָה וְהַכֵּלִים כְּרַגְלֵי הַבְּעָלִים!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabba bar bar Ḥana said** that **Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The *halakha* is in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Dosa,** that animals given to a shepherd are as the feet of the shepherd. The Gemara asks: **And did Rabbi Yoḥanan** actually **say this? But didn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say** a general principle that **the *halakha*** always **follows an unattributed** statement in **a mishna? And we learned** in the mishna: **Animals and vessels are as the feet of the owner.** One who delivers his animal to his son or to a shepherd, it is as the feet of the owner.


###### Beitzah 37b:4
[Beitzah 37b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Beitzah/r/37b:4)

וְלָאו אוֹקֵימְנָא — כָּאן בְּרוֹעֶה אֶחָד, כָּאן בִּשְׁנֵי רוֹעִים!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **And did we not establish** that the *baraita* of Rabbi Dosa is dealing with a different case than the mishna, that **here** in the *baraita* it is dealing **with** a town with **one shepherd,** whereas **there** in the mishna it is dealing **with** a town with **two shepherds?** There is consequently no contradiction between establishing the halakha both in accordance with Rabbi Dosa and in accordance with the mishna.


###### Beitzah 37b:5
[Beitzah 37b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Beitzah/r/37b:5)

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: שְׁנַיִם שֶׁשָּׁאֲלוּ חָלוּק אֶחָד בְּשׁוּתָּפוּת, זֶה לֵילֵךְ בּוֹ שַׁחֲרִית לְבֵית הַמִּדְרָשׁ, וְזֶה לִיכָּנֵס בּוֹ עַרְבִית לְבֵית הַמִּשְׁתֶּה. זֶה עֵרַב עָלָיו לַצָּפוֹן, וְזֶה עֵרַב עָלָיו לַדָּרוֹם. זֶה שֶׁעֵרַב עָלָיו לַצָּפוֹן — מְהַלֵּךְ לַצָּפוֹן כְּרַגְלֵי מִי שֶׁעֵרַב עָלָיו לַדָּרוֹם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **The Sages taught:** In the case of **two** people **who borrowed one robe in partnership** from a third party, **this** person in order **to go to the study hall with it** in the **morning and that** person in order **to enter** a wedding **feast with it** in the **evening,** and **this one made a joining** of Shabbat boundaries [*eiruv teḥumin*] **for himself to the north** in order to reach his destination, **and that** one **made an *eiruv* for himself to the south** in order to reach his destination, **the one who made an *eiruv* for himself to the north may walk** with the robe only **to the north** as far **as** it is permitted for **the feet of the one who made an *eiruv* for himself to the south,** i.e., he may go north only as far as the other borrower may go.


###### Beitzah 37b:6
[Beitzah 37b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Beitzah/r/37b:6)

וָזֶה שֶׁעֵרַב עָלָיו לַדָּרוֹם — מְהַלֵּךְ לַדָּרוֹם כְּרַגְלֵי מִי שֶׁעֵרַב עָלָיו לַצָּפוֹן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** similarly, **the one who made an *eiruv* for himself to the south may walk** with the robe **to the south** only as far **as** is permitted for the **feet of the one who made an *eiruv* for himself to the north,** as the robe is as the feet of both borrowers and may go only as far as both of them may walk. If each of them placed his *eiruv* at a distance of one thousand cubits from their house, to the north and south respectively, they may each walk, without the robe, three thousand cubits from their regular dwelling-place, one partner toward the north and the other partner toward the south. The three thousand cubits are comprised of the thousand cubits from the house to the *eiruv* plus another two thousand, the standard Shabbat limit, from the location of the *eiruv*. The one whose *eiruv* is in the north may not wear the robe farther than one thousand cubits north of his house, as he would then be going beyond the farthest extent of the other’s Shabbat limit, and vice versa for the one whose *eiruv* is in the south.


###### Beitzah 37b:7
[Beitzah 37b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Beitzah/r/37b:7)

וְאִם מִצְּעוּ אֶת הַתְּחוּם — הֲרֵי זֶה לֹא יְזִיזֶנָּה מִמְּקוֹמָהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if they made** their respective **limits** end **in the center,** i.e., if one placed his *eiruv* two thousand cubits from the house to the south, so that the house is his farthest limit to the north, and the other placed his *eiruv* two thousand cubits to the north of the house, the house being his farthest limit to the south, **then each** of them **may not move** the robe **from its place** at all.


###### Beitzah 37b:8
[Beitzah 37b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Beitzah/r/37b:8)

אִתְּמַר: שְׁנַיִם שֶׁלָּקְחוּ חָבִית וּבְהֵמָה בְּשׁוּתָּפוּת, רַב אָמַר: חָבִית מוּתֶּרֶת וּבְהֵמָה אֲסוּרָה. וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: חָבִית נָמֵי אֲסוּרָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara records a dispute between *amora’im*. **It was said:** In the case of **two** people **who purchased a barrel** of wine **or an animal in partnership** before a Festival, in order to divide the contents of the barrel or the meat of the animal between them on the Festival itself, what is the *halakha* if the two people have different Shabbat limits? **Rav said:** The **barrel is permitted** to each of them, and each may take his portion on the Festival and transfer it within his respective Shabbat limit, which is also applicable to Festivals; **but** the **animal is prohibited,** and each portion of it may be transferred only within the limits that are shared by both purchasers. **And Shmuel said:** The **barrel is also prohibited** to be transferred beyond the limits shared by both people.


###### Beitzah 37b:9
[Beitzah 37b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Beitzah/r/37b:9)

מַאי קָסָבַר רַב? אִי קָא סָבַר יֵשׁ בְּרֵירָה — אֲפִילּוּ בְּהֵמָה תִּשְׁתְּרֵי! וְאִי קָסָבַר אֵין בְּרֵירָה — אֲפִילּוּ חָבִית נָמֵי אֲסוּרָה!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara questions the opinion of Rav, who distinguished between the case of the barrel and that of the animal. **What does Rav hold? If he holds** that **there is** retroactive **designation,** so that after the division of the barrel it becomes clarified retroactively which portion belonged to which partner, and the Festival place of rest for each portion is established at the start of the Festival in accordance with the person who will later become its owner, then **even** the **animal should be permitted. And if he holds** that **there is no** retroactive **designation,** so that at the start of the Festival both portions of the animal belong jointly to both of them and may therefore be transferred only within the limits shared by both people, then **even** the **barrel should be prohibited.**


###### Beitzah 37b:10
[Beitzah 37b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Beitzah/r/37b:10)

לְעוֹלָם קָסָבַר יֵשׁ בְּרֵירָה, וְשַׁנְיָא בְּהֵמָה — דְּקָא יָנְקִי תְּחוּמִין מֵהֲדָדֵי. אָמְרִי לֵיהּ רַב כָּהֲנָא וְרַב אַסִּי לְרַב: לְאִיסּוּר מוּקְצֶה לֹא חָשְׁשׁוּ, לְאִיסּוּר תְּחוּמִין חָשְׁשׁוּ?! שָׁתֵיק רַב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **Actually,** the explanation for Rav is that **he holds there is** retroactive **designation,** and the reason Rav was stringent in the case of the animal is that **an animal is different, as** the **limits absorb from each other.** A live animal cannot be divided into two parts for ownership; each part of its body depends on and is nourished by the other. Consequently, even if the designation of the respective portions takes place retroactively, each portion continues to draw from the other part, so that at the time of division the two portions are once again mixed together. **Rav Kahana and Rav Asi said to Rav:** If that is your rationale, this indicates that the Sages **were not concerned about the prohibition of *muktze*,** as it is not assumed that each of them removed the portion of his partner from his mind, thereby prohibiting it from his own use, and yet **they were concerned about the prohibition of** Shabbat **limits.** Isn’t this illogical? **Rav was silent** and offered no response.


###### Beitzah 37b:11
[Beitzah 37b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Beitzah/r/37b:11)

מַאי הָוֵי עֲלַהּ? רַבִּי הוֹשַׁעְיָא אָמַר: יֵשׁ בְּרֵירָה. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אֵין בְּרֵירָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **What** conclusion **was** reached **about** this issue? **Rabbi Hoshaya said:** In general, **there is** retroactive **designation,** and they can therefore each transport their portions of both the barrel and the animal to their respective places. **And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: There is no** retroactive **designation,** and therefore they may not move their portions of either the barrel or the animal except within the limits shared by both of them.


###### Beitzah 37b:12
[Beitzah 37b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Beitzah/r/37b:12)

וְסָבַר רַבִּי הוֹשַׁעְיָא יֵשׁ בְּרֵירָה? וְהָתְנַן: הַמֵּת בְּבַיִת, וְלוֹ פְּתָחִים הַרְבֵּה — כּוּלָּן טְמֵאִים. נִפְתַּח אֶחָד מֵהֶן — הוּא טָמֵא, וְכוּלָּן טְהוֹרִים. חִשֵּׁב לְהוֹצִיאוֹ בְּאֶחָד מֵהֶן, אוֹ בַּחַלּוֹן שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ אַרְבָּעָה עַל אַרְבָּעָה — מַצֶּלֶת עַל הַפְּתָחִים כּוּלָּן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And does Rabbi Hoshaya** really **hold there is** retroactive **designation? But didn’t we learn** in a mishna: If there is **a corpse in a house that has many entrances, all** the entrances **are ritually impure,** i.e., everything situated in the space of the entrance becomes impure, even in the part that lies beyond a closed door, separating it from the corpse. Since any of the entrances might be used to remove the corpse, and none are designated for that purpose, all are rendered impure. However, **if one of them was** subsequently **opened,** then the space of **that** particular entrance **is impure, while all the others are pure,** as it is assumed that that the corpse will be removed by way of the open door. Even if none of the entrances was actually open, if **one** merely **intended to remove** the corpse **through** a particular **one of** the entrances **or through a window that is** at least **four by four** handbreadths in size, this intention of his **saves all the** other **entrances** from impurity.


###### Beitzah 37b:13
[Beitzah 37b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Beitzah/r/37b:13)

בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: וְהוּא שֶׁחִשֵּׁב עָלָיו עַד שֶׁלֹּא יָמוּת הַמֵּת. וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: אַף מִשֶּׁיָּמוּת הַמֵּת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The details of this last *halakha* are disputed by *tanna’im*. **Beit Shammai say: And this** applies only **if he had this intention before the dead person died,** so that at the time of death it was known which entrance would be used. **And Beit Hillel say:** It applies **even** if he had this intention only **after the dead person died.**


###### Beitzah 37b:14
[Beitzah 37b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Beitzah/r/37b:14)

וְאִתְּמַר עֲלַהּ, אָמַר רַבִּי הוֹשַׁעְיָא: לְטַהֵר אֶת הַפְּתָחִים מִכָּאן וּלְהַבָּא. מִכָּאן וּלְהַבָּא — אִין, לְמַפְרֵעַ — לָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And it is stated with regard to this** mishna: **Rabbi Hoshaya said:** When Beit Hillel said that the other entrances are pure even if one thought of removing the corpse via a particular entrance only after the person died, they meant only **to purify the entrances from that point and onward;** from the moment of his intention there is no more impurity in the other entrances. From this the Gemara infers: **From here and onward: Yes,** the other entrances are saved from impurity, but **retroactively: No.** Whatever was in the doorways before this intent was formulated has already contracted ritual impurity and this cannot be reversed retroactively by one’s subsequent thoughts. This indicates that the principle of retroactive designation is not accepted by Rabbi Hoshaya.


###### Beitzah 37b:15
[Beitzah 37b:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Beitzah/r/37b:15)

אֵפוֹךְ, רַבִּי הוֹשַׁעְיָא אָמַר: אֵין בְּרֵירָה, וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: יֵשׁ בְּרֵירָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara resolves this contradiction in the following manner: **Reverse** the presentation of their opinions given above, and say: **Rabbi Hoshaya said: There is no** retroactive **designation, and Rabbi Yoḥanan said: There is** retroactive **designation.**


###### Beitzah 37b:16
[Beitzah 37b:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Beitzah/r/37b:16)

וּמִי אִית לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בְּרֵירָה? וְהָאָמַר רַב אַסִּי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הָאַחִין שֶׁחָלְקוּ — לָקוֹחוֹת הֵן, וּמַחְזִירִין זֶה לָזֶה בַּיּוֹבֵל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara questions this resolution: **And does Rabbi Yoḥanan** really **accept** the principle of retroactive **designation? But didn’t Rav Asi say** that **Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Brothers who divided** property received as an inheritance **are** considered **purchasers** from each other, **and** as purchasers of land **they must return** the portions **to each other in the Jubilee** year, at which point they may redistribute the property? This demonstrates that Rabbi Yoḥanan does not hold that it is retroactively established that each brother’s portion was designated for him directly upon their father’s death, but rather it is considered that all the land was joint property until the brothers traded or bought their respective portions from each other.


###### Beitzah 37b:17
[Beitzah 37b:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Beitzah/r/37b:17)

וְכִי תֵּימָא: כִּי לֵית לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בְּרֵירָה — בִּדְאוֹרָיְיתָא, אֲבָל בִּדְרַבָּנַן — אִית לֵיהּ,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if you should say: When does Rabbi Yoḥanan not accept** the principle of retroactive **designation?** Only **in** regard to matters that are **Torah law,** but **he does hold** of retroactive designation **in** regard to matters of **rabbinic law,** such as the *halakhot* of Shabbat limits; this would account for the discrepancy.


###### Beitzah 37b:18
[Beitzah 37b:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Beitzah/r/37b:18)

וּבִדְרַבָּנַן מִי אִית לֵיהּ? וְהָתָנֵי אַיּוֹ —

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But does he accept** retroactive designation **in** matters of **rabbinic law? Didn’t** the Sage **Ayo teach** otherwise in regard to the *halakhot* of joining of Shabbat boundaries [*eiruv teḥumin*]? As it was taught in a mishna: One who has heard that a rabbi will be coming to a place near his town to deliver a lesson on Shabbat, but is unsure where the lecture will take place, may place two *eiruvin* on Shabbat eve in two different directions, while stipulating that only the *eiruv* on the side where the rabbi will teach will take effect. Furthermore, if he hears that two rabbis will be coming to two different locations, he may place two *eiruvin* and stipulate that he will decide on Shabbat which rabbi he prefers, and consequently which of the two *eiruvin* will take effect.


###### Beitzah 37b:19
[Beitzah 37b:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Beitzah/r/37b:19)

רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אֵין אָדָם מַתְנֶה עַל שְׁנֵי דְּבָרִים כְּאֶחָד, אֶלָּא: אִם בָּא חָכָם לַמִּזְרָח — עֵירוּבוֹ לַמִּזְרָח, לַמַּעֲרָב — עֵירוּבוֹ לַמַּעֲרָב, וְאִילּוּ לְכָאן וּלְכָאן — לָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Ayo taught in a *baraita* that **Rabbi Yehuda** disagreed with this *halakha* and **said: A person may not make a stipulation with regard to two** contradictory **things at once,** and therefore if two Sages will be arriving, his condition is of no effect. **Rather,** it is true that in the first case, where he knows that a rabbi is coming but does not know from which direction, he may place two *eiruvin* and stipulate that **if the rabbi comes from the east his *eiruv* in the east** will take effect, and if the rabbi comes **from the west, his *eiruv* in the west** will take effect. **However,** in the second case, when two rabbis come to the two locations, one of them arriving **here and** the other arriving **there,** and one wants to place two *eiruvin* and decide on Shabbat which of the two lectures he will attend, this he may **not** do; that would require the identity of the functional *eiruv* to be determined retroactively, and one’s place of rest must be determined when Shabbat begins.