## Bekhorot Daf 26a

###### Bekhorot 26a:1
[Bekhorot 26a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bekhorot/r/26a:1)

הָא בַּעַל מוּם שְׁרֵי, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא הִתִּירוּ מוּמְחֶה! תַּנָּא: כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּלֹא הִתִּירוֹ מוּמְחֶה — תָּם קָרֵי לֵיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But** in the case of **a blemished** firstborn, use of its wool is **permitted, even though an expert did not deem** the animal **permitted** for slaughter. This contradicts the statement of Rabbi Asi. The Gemara answers: It is possible that the ***tanna* of** that *baraita* **calls** the animal **unblemished wherever an expert did not** yet **deem** the firstborn **permitted** for slaughter, even if it was physically blemished.


###### Bekhorot 26a:2
[Bekhorot 26a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bekhorot/r/26a:2)

לֵימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי: הַתּוֹלֵשׁ צֶמֶר מִבְּכוֹר תָּם, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנּוֹלַד בּוֹ מוּם וּשְׁחָטוֹ — אָסוּר. בְּכוֹר בַּעַל מוּם שֶׁתָּלַשׁ מִמֶּנּוּ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ מֵת — עֲקַבְיָא בֶּן מַהֲלַלְאֵל מַתִּיר, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹסְרִים. אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: לֹא בָּזֶה הִתִּיר עֲקַבְיָא בֶּן מַהֲלַלְאֵל, אֶלָּא בִּשְׂעַר בְּכוֹר בַּעַל מוּם שֶׁנָּשַׁר וְהִנִּיחוֹ בַּחַלּוֹן, וְאַחַר כָּךְ שְׁחָטוֹ — בָּזֶה עֲקַבְיָא בֶּן מַהֲלַלְאֵל מַתִּיר, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹסְרִין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara remarks: **Let us say** that the interpretation of Reish Lakish is **the subject of** a dispute between ***tanna’im*,** as the *baraita* states: With regard to **one who plucks the wool from an unblemished firstborn, even though it** later **developed a blemish and** the owner **slaughtered it,** use of the wool is **prohibited.** In the case of **a blemished firstborn from which one plucked** wool, **and it subsequently died, Akavya ben Mahalalel deems** the wool **permitted and the Rabbis deem** it **prohibited. Rabbi Yehuda said:** It was **not with regard to that** case **that Akavya ben Mahalalel deemed** use of the wool **permitted. Rather,** it was in a case **of the hair of a blemished firstborn** animal **that shed** from the animal **and one placed** the hair **in a compartment, and thereafter one slaughtered** the animal. **In that** case **Akavya ben Mahalalel deems** use of the wool **permitted, and the Rabbis deem** its use **prohibited.**


###### Bekhorot 26a:3
[Bekhorot 26a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bekhorot/r/26a:3)

אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: מוֹדֶה אַבָּא חֲלַפְתָּא בְּזֶה שֶׁהוּא מוּתָּר, אֲבָל בְּיִיחוּד אָמְרוּ חֲכָמִים: יַנִּיחֶנּוּ בַּחַלּוֹן, שֶׁמָּא יֵשׁ תִּקְוָה. שְׁחָטוֹ — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל מוּתָּר, מֵת — עֲקַבְיָא בֶּן מַהֲלַלְאֵל מַתִּיר וַחֲכָמִים אוֹסְרִים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The *baraita* continues: **Rabbi Yosei says:** My **father, Ḥalafta, concedes** to Akavya ben Mahalalel **in this** case of a slaughtered firstborn **that** use of the wool **is permitted. Indeed [*aval*], the Rabbis said explicitly: One places it in a compartment,** as **perhaps there is a hope** that use of the wool will ultimately be permitted, since if **he slaughters** the animal **all agree** that use of the wool is **permitted.** But if the animal **dies** by other means, **Akavya ben Mahalalel deems** use of the wool **permitted and the Rabbis deem** it **prohibited.**


###### Bekhorot 26a:4
[Bekhorot 26a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bekhorot/r/26a:4)

רַבִּי יוֹסֵי — הַיְינוּ תַּנָּא קַמָּא! אֶלָּא לָאו הִתִּירוֹ מוּמְחֶה אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara raises a difficulty: If that is the explanation of their dispute, the opinion of **Rabbi Yosei is** identical to the opinion of **the first *tanna*** in the *baraita*, as both hold that use of the wool of a slaughtered blemished firstborn is permitted and the dispute between Akavya ben Mahalalel and the Rabbis applies to a case where the animal dies by other means. **Rather, is it not** correct to say the dispute **between them** concerns the requirement that **an expert deem** the animal **permitted** for slaughter?


###### Bekhorot 26a:5
[Bekhorot 26a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bekhorot/r/26a:5)

דְּתַנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: הִתִּירוֹ מוּמְחֶה — אִין, וְאִי לָא — לָא, וַאֲתָא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי לְמֵימַר: אַף עַל גַּב דְּלֹא הִתִּירוֹ מוּמְחֶה!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara elaborates: **As the first *tanna* holds:** If **an expert deemed** the animal **permitted** before its wool was shed, then **yes,** use of the wool is permitted after the animal has been slaughtered; **but if not,** then use of the wool is **not** permitted. **And Rabbi Yosei comes to say** that **even** in a case **where an expert did not deem** the firstborn **permitted** for slaughter before its wool was shed, use of the wool is still permitted. If so, the interpretation of Reish Lakish is the subject of the dispute between the first *tanna* and Rabbi Yosei: The first *tanna* agrees with that opinion and Rabbi Yosei rejects it.


###### Bekhorot 26a:6
[Bekhorot 26a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bekhorot/r/26a:6)

אָמַר רָבָא: לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אִי הִתִּירוֹ מוּמְחֶה — אִין, אִי לֹא הִתִּירוֹ — לָא, וְשָׁלֹשׁ מַחְלוֹקוֹת בַּדָּבָר, דְּתַנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: פְּלִיגִי בְּמֵת, וְהוּא הַדִּין לִשְׁחָטוֹ, וְהַאי דְּקָמִיפַּלְגִי בְּמֵת — לְהוֹדִיעֲךָ כֹּחוֹ דַּעֲקַבְיָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava said: No,** the interpretation of Reish Lakish is not the subject of their dispute, **as everyone agrees that if an expert deemed** the animal **permitted** before its wool was shed, then **yes,** use of the wool is permitted, but **if** an expert **did not deem** the animal **permitted** beforehand then the use of its wool is **not** permitted. **And there are three disputes concerning** this **matter, as the first *tanna* holds:** Akavya ben Mahalalel and the Rabbis **disagree** with regard to a case where the firstborn **died, and the same is true,** i.e., they disagree, in a case where **he slaughtered it. And** the reason **that** the first *tanna* states **they disagree** specifically in a case where it **died** is **to convey to you the far-reaching** nature of the opinion **of Akavya,** i.e., that he deems use of the wool permitted even if the animal was not slaughtered.


###### Bekhorot 26a:7
[Bekhorot 26a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bekhorot/r/26a:7)

וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה סָבַר: בְּמֵת — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל אָסוּר, כִּי פְּלִיגִי — בִּשְׁחָטוֹ, וַאֲתָא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי לְמֵימַר: בִּשְׁחָטוֹ — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל מוּתָּר, כִּי פְּלִיגִי — בְּמֵת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And Rabbi Yehuda holds:** With regard to a firstborn that **died, all,** i.e., Akavya ben Mahalalel and the Rabbis, **agree** that use of the wool is **prohibited,** and **when they disagree** it is with regard to a case where the owner **slaughtered** the animal. **And Rabbi Yosei comes to say: Where he slaughtered it, all agree** that use of the wool is **permitted,** and **when they disagree** it is with regard to a case where the animal **died.**


###### Bekhorot 26a:8
[Bekhorot 26a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bekhorot/r/26a:8)

אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, הוֹאִיל וּתְנַן בִּבְחִירָתָא כְּוָותֵיהּ, דִּתְנַן: שְׂעַר בְּכוֹר בַּעַל מוּם שֶׁנָּשַׁר וְהִנִּיחוֹ בַּחַלּוֹן, וְאַחַר כָּךְ שְׁחָטוֹ — עֲקַבְיָא בֶּן מַהֲלַלְאֵל מַתִּיר, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹסְרִין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Naḥman says:** The ***halakha*** is **in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yehuda, since we learned** a mishna **in our preferred** tractate **in accordance with his** opinion. **As we learned** in a mishna (*Eduyyot* 5:6): In the case of **the hair of a blemished firstborn** animal **that shed** from the animal **and one placed** the hair **in a compartment, and thereafter he slaughtered** the animal, **Akavya ben Mahalalel deems** use of the wool **permitted and the Rabbis deem** its use **prohibited** even after the animal’s death.


###### Bekhorot 26a:9
[Bekhorot 26a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bekhorot/r/26a:9)

אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: מַתְנִיתִין נָמֵי דַּיְקָא, דִּתְנַן: צֶמֶר הַמְדוּלְדָּל בַּבְּכוֹר, אֶת שֶׁנִּרְאֶה עִם הַגִּיזָּה — מוּתָּר, וְאֶת שֶׁאֵינוֹ נִרְאֶה — אָסוּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: The mishna is also precisely** formulated so that this conclusion can be inferred, **as we learned** in the latter clause of the mishna: With regard to **wool** that was not completely shed **which is dangling from a firstborn** animal, **that which appears** to be part **of the fleece** is **permitted** when the animal is shorn after its death, **and that which does not appear** to be part of the fleece is **prohibited.**


###### Bekhorot 26a:10
[Bekhorot 26a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bekhorot/r/26a:10)

מַנִּי? אִילֵּימָא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי; וּבְמַאי? אִילֵימָא בִּשְׁחָטוֹ — בֵּין עֲקַבְיָא בֵּין רַבָּנַן, אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי מִשְׁרָא שָׁרֵי!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak explains the proof: In accordance with **whose** opinion is this ruling? **If we say** it is in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Yosei,** that is difficult: **But in what** case did he issue this ruling? **If we say** it was in a case **where he slaughtered it** that cannot be correct, as **whether** the *halakha* follows the opinion of **Akavya** or **whether** it follows the opinion of **the Rabbis,** in both **this** case of wool that appears to be part of the fleece **and that** case where it does not, the use of the wool is **permitted.**


###### Bekhorot 26a:11
[Bekhorot 26a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bekhorot/r/26a:11)

וְאֶלָּא בְּמֵת? וְאִי רַבָּנַן — אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי מֵיסָר אָסְרִי, וְאִי עֲקַבְיָא — אִיפְּכָא מִיבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ: נִרְאֶה עִם הַגִּיזָּה — אָסוּר, דְּמִיתָה קָאָסְרָה לֵיהּ; אֵינוֹ נִרְאֶה עִם הַגִּיזָּה — מוּתָּר, דְּמֵעִיקָּרָא תְּלִישׁ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** if one says this is referring to a case **where** the animal **died,** that too is difficult. **But** that cannot be correct either, since **if** the *halakha* is in accordance with **the Rabbis,** then both **this** wool **and that** wool are **prohibited. And if** the *halakha* is in accordance with **Akavya,** then the mishna **should have** stated the **opposite** ruling: If the dangling wool **appears** to be part **of the fleece** it is **prohibited, as** the **death** of the animal **renders it prohibited** because it is considered attached to the animal; if it **does not appear** to be part **of the fleece** it is **permitted, as it was** considered **detached from the beginning,** before the animal died.


###### Bekhorot 26a:12
[Bekhorot 26a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bekhorot/r/26a:12)

אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, וּבְמַאי? אִילֵימָא בְּמֵת — בֵּין לַעֲקַבְיָא בֵּין לְרַבָּנַן, אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי מֵיסָר אָסְרִי!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** it is **obvious** that this clause of the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Yehuda. And in what** case does the mishna’s ruling apply? **If we say** it is referring **to** a case where the animal **died,** then **whether** the *halakha* is in accordance with the opinion of **Akavya** or **whether** it is in accordance with the opinion of **the Rabbis,** in both **this** case of wool that appears to be part of the fleece **and that** case where it does not, the use of the wool is **prohibited.**


###### Bekhorot 26a:13
[Bekhorot 26a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bekhorot/r/26a:13)

אֶלָּא לָאו בִּשְׁחָטוֹ? וְאִי עֲקַבְיָא — אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי מִשְׁרָא שָׁרֵי! אֶלָּא לָאו רַבָּנַן הִיא? וּשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: בִּשְׁחָטוֹ פְּלִיגִי. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, is it not** referring **to** a case where **he slaughtered** the animal? **And** consequently, **if** the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of **Akavya,** then in both **this** case of wool that appears to be part of the fleece **and that** case where it does not, use of the wool **is permitted. Rather, is it not** correct to say the mishna **is** in accordance with the opinion of **the Rabbis? And** accordingly, one may **conclude from it** that Akavya and the Rabbis **disagree in** a case where **he slaughtered** the animal? The Gemara affirms: Indeed, **conclude from it** that this is so.


###### Bekhorot 26a:14
[Bekhorot 26a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bekhorot/r/26a:14)

בָּעֵי רַבִּי יַנַּאי: הַתּוֹלֵשׁ צֶמֶר מֵעוֹלָה תְּמִימָה, מַהוּ? תּוֹלֵשׁ? מִי אִיכָּא מַאן דְּשָׁרֵי? אֶלָּא, צֶמֶר שֶׁנִּתְלַשׁ מֵעוֹלָה תְּמִימָה, מַהוּ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **Rabbi Yannai raises a dilemma:** With regard to **one who plucks wool from an unblemished burnt offering** which was later slaughtered, **what is** the *halakha*? The Gemara expresses surprise: If one intentionally violates a prohibition and **plucks** the wool from an unblemished consecrated animal, **is there anyone who deems** it **permitted?** All agree that use of the wool is prohibited in such a case. **Rather,** Rabbi Yannai’s question was: With regard to **wool that was torn out** by itself **from an unblemished burnt offering, what is** the *halakha*?


###### Bekhorot 26a:15
[Bekhorot 26a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bekhorot/r/26a:15)

דְּחַטָּאת וְאָשָׁם לָא תִּיבְּעֵי לָךְ, דְּכֵיוָן דִּלְכַפָּרָה אָתוּ — לָא מְשַׁהוּ לְהוּ. דִּבְכוֹר וּמַעֲשֵׂר נָמֵי, דְּכֵיוָן דְּלָאו לְכַפָּרָה אָתוּ — מְשַׁהוּ לְהוּ. כִּי תִּיבְּעֵי לָךְ דְּעוֹלָה, מַאי? כֵּיוָן

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara elaborates: **Do not raise the dilemma** concerning the wool **of a sin offering and a guilt offering. Since** these offerings **come for atonement** the owner **does not keep them** longer than necessary, and therefore there is no reason to deem the wool prohibited. Likewise, with regard to the wool **of a firstborn and** an animal **tithe** offering there is **also** no dilemma. **Since they do not come for atonement one** might **keep them** longer than necessary, and therefore the wool is prohibited in order to prevent one from violating the prohibition against shearing the animal or using it for labor. Rather, **when you raise the dilemma,** it is with regard to the wool **of a burnt offering. What** is the *halakha*? Does one say that **since**