## Bekhorot Daf 46b

###### Bekhorot 46b:1
[Bekhorot 46b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bekhorot/r/46b:1)

**גְּמָ׳** אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: אֵין הָרֹאשׁ פּוֹטֵר בִּנְפָלִים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**GEMARA:** **Shmuel says:** In a case where **the head** of a fetus emerged and then went back into the womb, the offspring is not considered to have been born and **does not exempt** the next fetus from the obligation of redemption of the firstborn, e.g., if its twin brother was born first. Shmuel says this *halakha* specifically **in** a case of **miscarriage,** i.e., where the fetus whose head emerged was a stillborn and the one that was eventually born first is a viable offspring. But in a case where both are viable offspring, the emergence of the head is considered birth.


###### Bekhorot 46b:2
[Bekhorot 46b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bekhorot/r/46b:2)

מַאי טַעְמָא? ״כֹּל אֲשֶׁר נִשְׁמַת רוּחַ חַיִּים בְּאַפָּיו״ — כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּנִשְׁמַת רוּחַ חַיִּים בְּאַפָּיו הוּא דַּחֲשִׁיב רֵישֵׁיהּ, אִידַּךְ לָא חֲשִׁיב רֵישֵׁיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **What is the reason** for Shmuel’s ruling? The verse states: **“All in whose nostrils was the breath of the spirit of life”** (Genesis 7:22), from which it is derived: **Anywhere that** one has **the breath of the spirit of life,** i.e., if it is viable, one goes **by its nostrils,** i.e., **its head is considered significant.** But with regard to **another** offspring, one that is not viable, **its head is not considered significant.**


###### Bekhorot 46b:3
[Bekhorot 46b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bekhorot/r/46b:3)

תְּנַן: הַבָּא אַחַר נְפָלִים, שֶׁיָּצָא רֹאשׁוֹ חַי, וּבֶן תִּשְׁעָה שֶׁיָּצָא רֹאשׁוֹ מֵת. קָתָנֵי מִיהָא ״רֹאשׁוֹ!״ מַאי ״רֹאשׁוֹ?״ רוּבּוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara raises a difficulty: **We learned** in the mishna: What is a firstborn with regard to inheritance but not with regard to redemption from a priest? It is a son **who came after the miscarriage** of an underdeveloped fetus, even **where** the **head** of the underdeveloped fetus **emerged alive; and** a fully developed **nine-**month**-old** fetus **whose head emerged dead.** Although the mishna addresses a nine-month-old fetus as well, **in any event** it **teaches** with regard to a miscarriage that **its head** exempts the offspring born after it. The Gemara responds: **What** is the meaning of the term: **Its head?** It means its head and **most of** the body.


###### Bekhorot 46b:4
[Bekhorot 46b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bekhorot/r/46b:4)

וְלִיתְנֵי ״רוּבּוֹ״! בְּדִין הוּא דְּאִיבְּעִי לֵיהּ לְמִיתְנֵי רוּבּוֹ, וְאַיְּידֵי דְּקָא בָעֵי לְמִיתְנֵי סֵיפָא בֶּן תִּשְׁעָה שֶׁיָּצָא רֹאשׁוֹ מֵת — טַעְמָא דְּרֹאשׁוֹ מֵת, הָא רֹאשׁוֹ חַי — הַבָּא אַחֲרָיו בְּכוֹר לַנַּחֲלָה נָמֵי לָא הָוֵי, תְּנָא רֵישָׁא נָמֵי רֹאשׁוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **But** if so, **let** the mishna **teach: Most of it.** The Gemara answers: **By right,** the mishna **should have taught: Most of it, but** it did not do so, **since** in **the latter clause** of the mishna it **needs to teach:** A fully developed **nine-**month**-old** fetus **whose head emerged dead.** It is inferred from there that the **reason** the subsequent son is the firstborn with regard to inheritance is **that** the **head** of this fetus emerged **dead, but** if it was a nine**-**month**-**old fetus whose **head** emerged **alive,** then the fetus **that comes after it is not a firstborn with regard to inheritance either.** Therefore, the *tanna* of the mishna **taught** in **the first clause also** that **the head** of a miscarriage exempts the subsequent son, to maintain stylistic uniformity.


###### Bekhorot 46b:5
[Bekhorot 46b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bekhorot/r/46b:5)

וּמַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן, דְּכֵיוָן דְּמַפֵּיק לֵיהּ רֵישֵׁיהּ הָוֵה [לֵיהּ] לֵידָה? תְּנֵינָא: הוֹצִיא רֹאשׁוֹ, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהֶחְזִירוֹ — הֲרֵי זֶה כְּיָלוּד!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And** according to this interpretation, **what is** the mishna **teaching us?** Is it **that once** the offspring **reached out its head** from the womb **it is** considered **a birth? We learn** this in a mishna with regard to the fetus of an animal (*Ḥullin* 68a): If a fetus **reached out its head, although it returned** the head, the halakhic status of **that** fetus is **like** that of **a newborn,** whose consumption is permitted only by its own slaughter.


###### Bekhorot 46b:6
[Bekhorot 46b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bekhorot/r/46b:6)

וְכִי תֵּימָא: אַשְׁמוֹעִינַן בְּהֵמָה, וְקָא מַשְׁמַע לַן בְּאָדָם, דְּאָדָם מִבְּהֵמָה לָא יָלֵיף — דְּלֵית לַהּ פְּרוֹזְדוֹר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if you would say** that the mishna there **teaches us** this *halakha* with regard to **animals, and** the mishna here **teaches us** that the same *halakha* applies **to a human,** this does not resolve the difficulty. The Gemara first explains why two rulings might be necessary with regard to people and animals: The reason is **that** the *halakha* of **a human cannot be derived from** that of **an animal, as** the animal **has no concealed opening,** i.e., the opening of an animal’s womb is not hidden. Consequently, one might have thought that only in the case of an animal is the emergence of the head considered a birth. By contrast, in humans, where the woman’s thighs conceal the opening of the womb and the emergence of the head alone is not noticeable, perhaps the emergence of the head is not considered a full-fledged birth.


###### Bekhorot 46b:7
[Bekhorot 46b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bekhorot/r/46b:7)

בְּהֵמָה מֵאָדָם לָא יָלְפָא — מִשּׁוּם דַּחֲשִׁיב פַּרְצוּף פָּנִים דִּידֵיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Conversely, had this ruling been taught only with regard to humans, one would have said that the *halakha* of **animals cannot be derived from** that of **a human because the countenance of** a person’s **face is significant,** as people are created in the image of God. This is not so with regard to animals.


###### Bekhorot 46b:8
[Bekhorot 46b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bekhorot/r/46b:8)

הָא נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא: יָצָא כְּדַרְכּוֹ — מִשֶּׁיָּצָא רוֹב רֹאשׁוֹ, וְאֵיזֶהוּ רוֹב רֹאשׁוֹ? מִשֶּׁתֵּצֵא פַּדַּחְתּוֹ. תְּיוּבְתָּא דִשְׁמוּאֵל, תְּיוּבְתָּא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
After clarifying why both rulings are necessary, the Gemara explains why this does not resolve the difficulty: **We learn that** ruling with regard to people **also,** in a mishna (*Nidda* 28a): If the fetus **emerged in** the **usual manner,** head first, it is considered born only **when most of its head emerges. And what is** considered **most of its head?** It is **from when its forehead emerges.** Accordingly, there was no need for the mishna here to state the *halakha* with regard to the head of a nine-month-old fetus, and the mention of a head with regard to a miscarriage contradicts the opinion of Shmuel. The Gemara comments: **The refutation of** the opinion of **Shmuel** is indeed **a conclusive refutation.**


###### Bekhorot 46b:9
[Bekhorot 46b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bekhorot/r/46b:9)

אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ: פַּדַּחַת פּוֹטֶרֶת בְּכׇל מָקוֹם, חוּץ מִן הַנַּחֲלָה. מַאי טַעְמָא? ״יַכִּיר״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא, וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ לַנַּחֲלָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ Concerning this matter, **Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says:** The emergence of **a forehead** alone in the case of a person **exempts,** i.e., is considered a birth, **in all cases, except with regard to inheritance.** If a son reached out his head alone and then brought it back, after which his twin brother was born, the second brother is the firstborn with regard to inheritance. **What is the reason? The Merciful One states:** “For **he shall recognize** the firstborn, the son of the hated, by giving him a double portion of all that he has” (Deuteronomy 21:17), and recognition is not attained by emergence of the forehead alone. **And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Even with regard to inheritance** the emergence of a forehead is sufficient.


###### Bekhorot 46b:10
[Bekhorot 46b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bekhorot/r/46b:10)

בְּכׇל מָקוֹם, לְאֵיתוֹיֵי מַאי? לְאֵיתוֹיֵי הָא דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: גִּיּוֹרֶת שֶׁיָּצְאָה פַּדַּחַת וְלָדָהּ בְּגַיּוּתָהּ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ נִתְגַּיְּירָה — אֵין נוֹתְנִין לָהּ יְמֵי טוּמְאָה וִימֵי טׇהֳרָה, וְאֵינָהּ מְבִיאָה קׇרְבַּן לֵידָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: When Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says the emergence of a forehead alone in the case of a person exempts **in all cases, what** does this comprehensive phrase serve **to include?** The Gemara answers that it serves **to include that which the Sages taught:** With regard to **a female convert whose offspring reached out its forehead** alone **in her gentile state, and then she converted** and gave birth to the entire child, **one does not assign to her the days of ritual impurity and the days of ritual purity** of a Jewish woman who gave birth. **And** likewise **she does not bring the offering** that a woman is obligated to sacrifice after giving **birth,** as the child is considered to have been born while the mother was still a gentile.


###### Bekhorot 46b:11
[Bekhorot 46b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bekhorot/r/46b:11)

מֵיתִיבִי: ״יַכִּיר״ — זוֹ הַכָּרַת פָּנִים, וְאֵיזוֹ הִיא הַכָּרַת פָּנִים? פַּרְצוּף פָּנִים עִם הַחוֹטֶם. תָּנֵי: ״עַד הַחוֹטֶם״. תָּא שְׁמַע: אֵין מְעִידִים אֶלָּא עַל פַּרְצוּף פָּנִים עִם הַחוֹטֶם. תְּנִי: ״עַד הַחוֹטֶם״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara **raises an objection to** the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan from a *baraita*: When the verse states: **“He shall recognize”** (Deuteronomy 21:17), **this** is referring to **the recognition of the face. And what** exactly **is the recognition of the face?** It is recognizing **the countenance of the face with the nose.** This indicates that the forehead alone is insufficient. The Gemara answers: **Teach** the *baraita* as saying: **Up to,** but not including, **the nose.** The Gemara suggests: **Come** and **hear** a mishna (*Yevamot* 120a): **One can testify** that a man died, in order to permit his wife to remarry, **only** if he can attest **to** seeing **the countenance of the face with the nose,** as this allows one to identify the individual definitively. Once again, the Gemara answers that one should **teach: Up to,** but not including, **the nose.**


###### Bekhorot 46b:12
[Bekhorot 46b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bekhorot/r/46b:12)

תָּא שְׁמַע: פַּדַּחַת בְּלֹא פַּרְצוּף פָּנִים, פַּרְצוּף פָּנִים בְּלֹא פַּדַּחַת — אֵין מְעִידִין עַד שֶׁיְּהוּ שְׁנֵיהֶם עִם הַחוֹטֶם. וְאָמַר אַבָּיֵי, וְאִיתֵּימָא רַב כָּהֲנָא: מַאי קְרָאָה? ״הַכָּרַת פְּנֵיהֶם עָנְתָה בָּם״! שָׁאנֵי עֵדוּת אִשָּׁה, דְּאַחְמִירוּ בַּהּ רַבָּנַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests: **Come** and **hear** another proof: If people saw **the forehead** of a dead person **without the countenance of the face,** or **the countenance of the face without the forehead, they cannot testify** that he died and render his wife permitted to remarry **until** they see **both** the countenance of the face and the forehead, **with the nose. And Abaye says, and some say** it was **Rav Kahana** who says: **What is the verse** from which it is derived? **“The recognition of their countenance does witness against them”** (Isaiah 3:9), and there is no recognition of a face without the nose. The Gemara answers: **Testimony** enabling **a woman** to remarry **is different, as the Sages were stringent with regard to it.** Therefore, they required greater proof than with regard to the *halakhot* of a firstborn.


###### Bekhorot 46b:13
[Bekhorot 46b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bekhorot/r/46b:13)

וּמִי אַחְמִירוּ? וְהָא תְּנַן: הוּחְזְקוּ לִהְיוֹת מַשִּׂיאִים עֵד מִפִּי עֵד, מִפִּי אִשָּׁה, מִפִּי עֶבֶד, מִפִּי שִׁפְחָה! כִּי אַקִּילוּ רַבָּנַן בְּסוֹפָהּ, בִּתְחִלָּתָהּ לָא אַקִּילוּ רַבָּנַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And were the Sages stringent** with regard to this testimony? **But didn’t we learn** in a mishna (*Yevamot* 122a): The Sages **established** that they **would** allow a woman to **marry** again based on testimony that is generally not accepted, such as **testimony** based on **hearsay,** i.e., the testimony of one man which was heard from another man who saw her husband die, **from a woman’s testimony, from** a Canaanite **slave’s testimony, or from** a Canaanite **maidservant’s testimony?** The Gemara answers that **when the Sages were lenient** it was **with regard to the end** of the testimony, i.e., to accept testimony that a husband had died even from individuals just mentioned. But **the Sages were not lenient with regard to its beginning,** i.e., the basic clarification of whether the witnesses properly identified the dead person when they saw him.


###### Bekhorot 46b:14
[Bekhorot 46b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Bekhorot/r/46b:14)

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא:

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if you wish, say** instead that Rabbi Yoḥanan can resolve the difficulty as follows: