## Chullin Daf 134a

###### Chullin 134a:1
[Chullin 134a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/134a:1)

וּרְמִינְהוּ: ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁהַמַּתָּנוֹת שֶׁלִּי״ – נוֹתֵן לְכׇל כֹּהֵן שֶׁיִּרְצֶה!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara objects: **But** one can **raise a contradiction** from a *baraita*: If a priest sells his animal to an Israelite and stipulates: I am selling it **on the condition that the gifts are mine,** the Israelite is not obligated to give the gifts to that priest. Rather, he **gives** the gifts **to any priest that he wants.** Since the priest sold his animal, the priest cannot issue a condition involving the gifts, as they no longer belong to him but to the entire tribe of priests. The *baraita* indicates that the Israelite is nevertheless obligated to give the gifts, which apparently contradicts the ruling of the mishna.


###### Chullin 134a:2
[Chullin 134a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/134a:2)

״עַל מְנָת״ אַ״חוּץ״ קָא רָמֵית? ״חוּץ״ – שִׁיּוּרָא, ״עַל מְנָת״ – לָאו שִׁיּוּרָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara responds: Do **you raise a contradiction** from a *baraita* that discusses a case where the priest states: **On the condition** that the gifts are mine, **with regard to** the case of the mishna, where the priest states: **Except** for the gifts? That is not a contradiction, as the word **except** is a term of **retention,** i.e., the priest retains the gifts and does not sell them to the Israelite. By contrast, the term: **On the condition,** is **not** one of **retention,** as the priest does not keep the gifts for himself but instead stipulates that the buyer must give the gifts to him. The priest is not authorized to issue such a stipulation and it is therefore disregarded entirely, and because the Israelite owns the gifts he must give them to a priest.


###### Chullin 134a:3
[Chullin 134a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/134a:3)

וּרְמִינְהוּ: ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁהַמַּתָּנוֹת שֶׁלִּי״ – הַמַּתָּנוֹת שֶׁלּוֹ! בְּהָא פְּלִיגִי: מָר סָבַר ״עַל מְנָת״ – שִׁיּוּרָא הוּא, וּמָר סָבַר ״עַל מְנָת״ – לָאו שִׁיּוּרָא הוּא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara objects: **But** one may **raise a contradiction** against the previous *baraita* from another *baraita*: If a priest sells his animal to an Israelite and stipulates: I am selling it **on the condition that the gifts are mine, the gifts are his** and the Israelite must give the gifts to that priest. The Gemara responds: There is a dispute between the *tanna’im* of these *baraitot*, and **they disagree with regard to this** matter: One **Sage,** the *tanna* of the second *baraita*, **holds** that the term: **On the condition, is** one of **retention,** and the priest therefore retains possession of the gifts. **And** one **Sage,** the *tanna* of the first *baraita*, **holds** that: **On the condition, is not** a term of **retention,** and the priest is not authorized to stipulate that the buyer must give the gifts to him.


###### Chullin 134a:4
[Chullin 134a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/134a:4)

אָמַר לוֹ: מְכוֹר לִי בְּנֵי מֵעֶיהָ וְכוּ׳. אָמַר רַב: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁשָּׁקַל לְעַצְמוֹ, אֲבָל שָׁקַל לוֹ טַבָּח – הַדִּין עִם הַטַּבָּח. וְרַב אַסִּי אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ שָׁקַל לוֹ טַבָּח – הַדִּין עִמּוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna teaches that if one **said to** a butcher: **Sell me the innards** of a cow that you slaughtered, and there were gifts, i.e., the maw, included with it, the buyer gives the gifts to the priest and does not deduct its value from the money that he pays to the butcher. If he bought the innards by weight, the buyer gives the maw to the priest and deducts its value from the money he pays to the butcher. With regard to innards purchased by weight, **Rav says:** The Sages **taught** that the buyer gives the maw to the priest **only when** the buyer **weighed** the innards **for himself** when purchasing them. In such a case, the priest claims the maw from the buyer. **But** if the **butcher weighed** the innards **for** the buyer, **the judgment is** also **with the butcher,** i.e., the priest may claim the maw from either the butcher or the buyer. **And Rav Asi says: Even** if the **butcher weighed** the innards **for** the buyer, **the judgment is with** the buyer alone.


###### Chullin 134a:5
[Chullin 134a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/134a:5)

לֵימָא בִּדְרַב חִסְדָּא קָא מִיפַּלְגִי, דְּאָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: גָּזַל וְלֹא נִתְיָיאֲשׁוּ הַבְּעָלִים, וּבָא אַחֵר וַאֲכָלוֹ – רָצָה מִזֶּה גּוֹבֶה, רָצָה מִזֶּה גּוֹבֶה. דְּמָר אִית לֵיהּ דְּרַב חִסְדָּא, וּמָר לֵית לֵיהּ דְּרַב חִסְדָּא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests: **Let us say** that **they disagree with regard to** a statement **of Rav Ḥisda, as Rav Ḥisda said:** In a case where one **robbed** another of an item, **and the owners had not despaired of retrieving** it, **and another** person **came and consumed** the stolen item, if the owner **wants, he** may **collect** the value of the stolen item **from this one,** the robber, and if he **wants, he** may **collect from that one** who consumed it. The suggestion is **that** one **Sage,** Rav, **holds** in accordance with the opinion **of Rav Ḥisda,** and he therefore holds that the priest may claim the maw from either the buyer or the butcher; **and** one **Sage,** Rav Asi, **does not hold** in accordance with the opinion **of Rav Ḥisda,** and the priest may therefore claim the maw from the buyer alone.


###### Chullin 134a:6
[Chullin 134a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/134a:6)

לָא, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא אִית לְהוּ דְּרַב חִסְדָּא, וְהָכָא בְּמַתְּנוֹת כְּהוּנָּה נִגְזָלוֹת קָא מִיפַּלְגִי, דְּמָר סָבַר נִגְזָלוֹת, וּמַר סָבַר אֵין נִגְזָלוֹת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects this suggestion: **No; everyone holds** in accordance with the opinion **of Rav Ḥisda, and here they disagree with regard to** whether or not **gifts of the priesthood can be stolen. As** one **Sage,** Rav, **holds** that they **can be stolen,** and accordingly the robber remains responsible for them even if they are consumed by another. Consequently, if the butcher weighed the innards, the priest may claim the gifts from either the butcher or the buyer. **And** one **Sage,** Rav Asi, **holds** that gifts of the priesthood **cannot be stolen.** Since technically one cannot steal the gifts, the obligation to return them to the priest rests solely on the one in physical possession of them. Accordingly, the priest may claim the gifts from the buyer alone, as the gifts are in his custody.


###### Chullin 134a:7
[Chullin 134a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/134a:7)

אִיכָּא דְּמַתְנֵי לַהּ לְהָא שְׁמַעְתָּא בִּפְנֵי עַצְמָהּ: רַב אָמַר: מַתְּנוֹת כְּהוּנָּה נִגְזָלוֹת, וְרַב אַסִּי אָמַר: מַתְּנוֹת כְּהוּנָּה אֵין נִגְזָלוֹת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara notes that **some teach this *halakha*,** that there is a dispute between Rav and Rav Asi as to whether or not gifts of the priesthood can be stolen, **by itself,** i.e., as an independent dispute between them rather than in explanation of another dispute: **Rav says** that **gifts of the priesthood can be stolen, and Rav Asi says** that **gifts of the priesthood cannot be stolen.**


###### Chullin 134a:8
[Chullin 134a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/134a:8)

**מַתְנִי׳** גֵּר שֶׁנִּתְגַּיֵּיר וְהָיְתָה לוֹ פָּרָה, נִשְׁחֲטָה עַד שֶׁלֹּא נִתְגַּיֵּיר – פָּטוּר, מִשֶּׁנִּתְגַּיֵּיר – חַיָּיב, סָפֵק – פָּטוּר, שֶׁהַמּוֹצִיא מֵחֲבֵירוֹ עָלָיו הָרְאָיָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**MISHNA:** In the case of **a convert who converted and he had a cow,** if the cow **was slaughtered before** he **converted,** he is **exempt** from giving the gifts to the priest. If the animal was slaughtered **after he converted,** the convert is **obligated** to give the gifts. If there is **uncertainty** whether it was slaughtered before or after the conversion, the convert is **exempt, as the burden of proof rests upon the claimant.**


###### Chullin 134a:9
[Chullin 134a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/134a:9)

**גְּמָ׳** כִּי אֲתָא רַב דִּימִי אֲמַר: רָמֵי לֵיהּ רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן – תְּנַן: ״סָפֵק פָּטוּר״, אַלְמָא סְפֵיקָא לְקוּלָּא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**GEMARA:** The mishna teaches that if there is an uncertainty whether an individual is obligated to give gifts of the priesthood, he is exempt from giving them. In this regard, the Gemara relates that **when Rav Dimi came** from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, **he said** that **Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish raised a contradiction to Rabbi Yoḥanan: We learned** in the mishna that when there is **an uncertainty** one is **exempt** from giving the gifts. **Evidently,** in cases of **uncertainty** the *halakha* is **to** be **lenient.**


###### Chullin 134a:10
[Chullin 134a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/134a:10)

וּרְמִינְהוּ: חוֹרֵי הַנְּמָלִים שֶׁבְּתוֹךְ הַקָּמָה – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ שֶׁל בַּעַל הַבַּיִת, וְשֶׁלְּאַחַר הַקּוֹצְרִים – הָעֶלְיוֹנִים לַעֲנִיִּים, וְהַתַּחְתּוֹנִים שֶׁל בַּעַל הַבַּיִת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
But one can **raise a contradiction** from that which is taught in another mishna (*Pe’a* 4:11) with regard to gleanings left for the poor: In a case of grain found in **ant holes that are inside the standing** crop in an area of the field that was not harvested, **these are** the property **of the owner** of the field, as this grain does not have the status of gleanings. **And** in the case of grain found in ant holes **that are behind the harvesters** in an already harvested area, **the upper** wheat stalks, i.e., those stalks found at the mouth of the holes, belong **to the poor,** as they are assumed to be gleanings that fell from the bundles when that area was harvested, **and the lower** wheat inside the holes are the property **of the owner,** since it is possible that they were collected by the ants before the harvest and are not gleanings.


###### Chullin 134a:11
[Chullin 134a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/134a:11)

רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: הַכֹּל לַעֲנִיִּים, שֶׁסְּפֵק לֶקֶט – לֶקֶט.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Meir says: Everything** goes **to the poor, as** grain whose status as **gleanings** is **uncertain** is considered **gleanings.** According to Rabbi Meir, the *halakha* is stringent in the case of an uncertainty with regard to gifts left for the poor. This apparently contradicts the mishna’s statement that one is lenient in the case of an uncertainty with regard to gifts of the priesthood, as these gifts are similar in this regard to gifts left for the poor. Since any unattributed mishna is considered to be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, this is apparently a contradiction with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Meir.


###### Chullin 134a:12
[Chullin 134a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/134a:12)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אַל תַּקְנִיטֵנִי, שֶׁבִּלְשׁוֹן יָחִיד אֲנִי שׁוֹנֶה אוֹתָהּ, דְּתַנְיָא: רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן אַגְרָא אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי מֵאִיר: סְפֵק לֶקֶט – לֶקֶט, סְפֵק שִׁכְחָה – שִׁכְחָה, סְפֵק פֵּאָה – פֵּאָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rabbi Yoḥanan **said to** Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish: **Do not trouble me** with this contradiction, **as I teach** that *baraita* **in the singular,** i.e., it is not certain that this is the opinion of Rabbi Meir; rather, it is merely the claim of one Sage that this is Rabbi Meir’s opinion. **As it is taught** in a *baraita* that **Rabbi Yehuda ben Agra says in the name of Rabbi Meir:** Grain whose status as **gleanings** is **uncertain** is considered **gleanings;** grain whose status as **forgotten** sheaves is **uncertain** is considered **forgotten** sheaves; and grain whose status as ***pe’a*** is **uncertain** is considered ***pe’a*.** Therefore, one should not raise a contradiction to the mishna from the statement of a single Sage claiming to represent the opinion of Rabbi Meir.


###### Chullin 134a:13
[Chullin 134a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/134a:13)

אָמַר לוֹ אַל תִּשְׁנֶה אוֹתָהּ אֶלָּא בִּלְשׁוֹן בֶּן תַּדָּל, וְהָא טַעְמָא קָאָמַר, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ: מַאי דִּכְתִיב ״עָנִי וָרָשׁ הַצְדִּיקוּ״? מַאי ״הַצְדִּיקוּ״?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish **said to** Rabbi Yoḥanan: Even if **you teach that** *baraita* **only in a language** whereby a certain imbecile named **ben Tedal** states that this is the opinion of Rabbi Meir, a question remains, as **isn’t** there **a stated reason** for stringency in cases of uncertainties with regard to gifts left for the poor? **As Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: What** is the meaning of that **which is written: “Do justice to the afflicted and destitute”** (Psalms 82:3)? Specifically, **what is** the meaning of **“do justice”?**


###### Chullin 134a:14
[Chullin 134a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/134a:14)

אִילֵּימָא בְּדִינִים, וְהָא כְּתִיב ״וְדָל לֹא תֶהְדַּר בְּרִיבוֹ״? אֶלָּא, צַדֵּק מִשֶּׁלְּךָ וְתֵן לוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**If we say** that it means that one should do justice **in judgments,** i.e., a judge should sway judgments in favor of the afflicted and destitute, **but isn’t it written: “Neither shall you favor a poor man in his cause”** (Exodus 23:3)? **Rather,** the verse is teaching that in cases of uncertainty with regard to gifts left for the poor, **be righteous with that which is yours and give it to** the poor. Why, then, is the *halakha* stringent in the case of gifts left for the poor but lenient with regard to gifts to priests?


###### Chullin 134a:15
[Chullin 134a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/134a:15)

אָמַר רָבָא: הָכָא, פָּרָה בְּחֶזְקַת פְּטוּרָה קָיְימָא, קָמָה בְּחֶזְקַת חִיּוּבָא קָיְימָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava said** in response: **Here,** in the case of gifts of the priesthood, the *halakha* is lenient because the **cow** of a convert **maintains** the **presumptive status of exemption,** as the obligation of the gifts did not apply to the cow before the convert converted. By contrast, the *halakha* is stringent in the case of the gifts left for the poor, as the **standing** crop **maintains** the **presumptive status of obligation.**


###### Chullin 134a:16
[Chullin 134a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/134a:16)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: וַהֲרֵי עִיסָּה נַעֲשֵׂית עַד שֶׁלֹּא נִתְגַּיֵּיר – פָּטוּר מִן הַחַלָּה, מִשֶּׁנִּתְגַּיֵּיר – חַיָּיב, סָפֵק – חַיָּיב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Abaye said to** Rava: **But** with regard to the **dough** of a convert, the *halakha* is that if **it was prepared before he converted** he is **exempt from** separating ***ḥalla*** from this dough, and if it was prepared **after he converted,** he is **obligated** to separate *ḥalla* from it. And if there is an **uncertainty** as to whether the dough was prepared before or after his conversion, he is **obligated,** despite the fact that dough prepared by a gentile is exempt from *ḥalla*. Why isn’t the convert exempt from separating *ḥalla* just as he is exempt from giving gifts of the priesthood in the case of an uncertainty, as both the dough and the cow maintain a presumptive status of exemption?


###### Chullin 134a:17
[Chullin 134a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/134a:17)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: סְפֵק אִיסּוּרָא לְחוּמְרָא, סְפֵק מָמוֹנָא לְקוּלָּא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rava **said to** Abaye: There is a difference between *ḥalla* and gifts of the priesthood. Although the dough maintains the presumptive status of exemption, here there is also uncertainty with regard to a prohibition, as a non-priest who consumes *ḥalla* is liable to receive the punishment of death at the hand of Heaven. And whenever there is **an uncertainty** with regard to **a prohibition,** the *halakha* is **to** be **stringent.** Conversely, uncertainties with regard to gifts of the priesthood involve no prohibition and are strictly monetary, and whenever there is **an uncertainty** with regard to **monetary matters,** the *halakha* is **to** be **lenient.** Consequently, one relies on the presumptive status of exemption in the case of a cow, and the convert is exempt from giving the gifts to the priest.


###### Chullin 134a:18
[Chullin 134a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/134a:18)

דַּאֲמַר רַב חִסְדָּא, וְכֵן תָּנֵי רַבִּי חִיָּיא: שְׁמוֹנָה סְפֵקוֹת נֶאֶמְרוּ בַּגֵּר, אַרְבַּע לְחִיּוּב וְאַרְבַּע לִפְטוּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**As Rav Ḥisda said, and Rabbi Ḥiyya teaches likewise: Eight** instances of **uncertainties were stated with regard to the convert;** in **four** instances the *halakha* is **that** there is **an obligation, and** in the other **four** instances the *halakha* is **that** there is **an exemption.**


###### Chullin 134a:19
[Chullin 134a:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/134a:19)

קׇרְבַּן אִשְׁתּוֹ, וְחַלָּה, וּבְכוֹר בְּהֵמָה טְמֵאָה, וּבְכוֹר בְּהֵמָה טְהוֹרָה – לְחִיּוּב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
These are the four instances where the *halakha* is stringent: The first is an uncertainty with regard to the **offering of** one’s **wife** who gave birth, where it is uncertain whether she gave birth before her conversion and she is exempt from bringing an offering, or after her conversion and she is obligated. This case involves a prohibition, as a woman who does not bring her atonement offering is liable to receive *karet* for consuming sanctified items. **And** the second case is an uncertainty with regard to the obligation to separate ***ḥalla*** from his dough, which also involves a prohibition, as explained above. **And** the third case is an uncertainty with regard to a male **firstborn non-kosher animal,** i.e., a firstborn donkey, where it is uncertain if it was born before or after the owner’s conversion, which involves the prohibition against deriving benefit from it before its redemption. **And** the fourth case of an uncertainty is with regard to a male **firstborn of a kosher animal,** where it is uncertain if it was born before or after the owner’s conversion, where one can be liable to receive *karet* for slaughtering it outside the Temple courtyard. In these four cases, the *halakha* is **that** there is **an obligation.**