## Chullin Daf 2b

###### Chullin 2b:1
[Chullin 2b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/2b:1)

אֲבָל אָמַר ״הֲרֵי עָלַי״ – לֹא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But** in the case of one who vows and **says: It** is incumbent **upon me** to bring an offering, even Rabbi Yehuda concedes that **no,** it is best not to vow at all. Likewise, it is preferable not to vow to donate a certain monetary value to the Temple treasury. Apparently, then, the statements in that mishna: Everyone takes vows of valuation, and: Everyone vows to donate the assessment of a person to the Temple treasury, do not indicate that it is permitted to do so *ab initio*.


###### Chullin 2b:2
[Chullin 2b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/2b:2)

וְכֹל ״הַכֹּל״ לָאו לְכַתְּחִלָּה הוּא? אֶלָּא ״הַכֹּל חַיָּיבִים בְּסוּכָּה״, ״הַכֹּל חַיָּיבִין בְּצִיצִית״, הָכִי נָמֵי דְּלָאו לְכַתְּחִלָּה?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rav Ashi responded: **And** is that to say that **every** use of the term: **Everyone,** is an indication that the action in question **is not** permitted ***ab initio*? Rather,** is the term: Everyone, in the *baraita* that states: **Everyone is obligated in** the mitzva of ***sukka*,** and in the *baraita* that states: **Everyone is obligated in** the mitzva of **ritual fringes, also** an indication **that** they are **not** permitted ***ab initio*?**


###### Chullin 2b:3
[Chullin 2b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/2b:3)

חַיָּיבִין – לָא קָאָמֵינָא. אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, ״הַכֹּל סוֹמְכִין, אֶחָד הָאֲנָשִׁים וְאֶחָד הַנָּשִׁים״ – הָכִי נָמֵי דְּלָאו לְכַתְּחִלָּה? וְהָא כְּתִיב: ״וְסָמַךְ יָדוֹ … וְנִרְצָה״!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rav Aḥa answered: **I am not speaking** about cases where it is stated: Everyone is **obligated,** as it goes without saying that fulfilling any obligation is permitted *ab initio*. Rav Ashi asked: **If that is so,** that which was stated: **Everyone** who brings an offering **places hands** on the animal, **both men and women** (see *Menaḥot* 93a), is that **also** an expression indicating **that** it is **not** permitted ***ab initio*? But isn’t it written: “And he shall place his hand** upon the head of the burnt offering, **and it shall be accepted** for him to effect atonement for him” (Leviticus 1:4)?


###### Chullin 2b:4
[Chullin 2b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/2b:4)

אִין, אִיכָּא ״הַכֹּל״ לְכַתְּחִלָּה, וְאִיכָּא ״הַכֹּל״ דִּיעֲבַד. אֶלָּא ״הַכֹּל״ דְּהָכָא, מִמַּאי דִּלְכַתְּחִלָּה הוּא דְּתִקְשֵׁי לָךְ? דִּלְמָא דִּיעֲבַד הוּא, וְלָא תִּקְשֵׁי לָךְ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rav Aḥa answered: **Indeed, there are** instances where the word: **Everyone,** indicates ***ab initio*, and there are** instances where the word: **Everyone,** indicates **after the fact. Rather,** concerning the term: **Everyone, that** appears **here** in the mishna, **from where** can it be determined **that it is** an expression indicating that it is permitted ***ab initio*,** creating an apparent contradiction in the mishna **that will be difficult for you? Perhaps** it is an expression indicating that everyone’s slaughter is valid **after the fact, and** there will **not** be a contradiction in the mishna that **will be difficult for you.**


###### Chullin 2b:5
[Chullin 2b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/2b:5)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֲנָא ״שְׁחִיטָתָן כְּשֵׁרָה״ קַשְׁיָא לִי, מִדְּקָתָנֵי שְׁחִיטָתָן כְּשֵׁרָה דִּיעֲבַד, מִכְּלָל דְּ״הַכֹּל״ לְכַתְּחִלָּה הוּא, דְּאִי דִּיעֲבַד – תַּרְתֵּי דִּיעֲבַד לְמָה לִי?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rav Ashi **said to** Rav Aḥa: **I** find the phrase: **And their slaughter is valid,** to be **difficult for me. From** the fact **that** the *tanna* **teaches: And their slaughter is valid,** which is an expression indicating that it is valid **after the fact,** conclude **by inference that** the initial phrase in the mishna: **Everyone** slaughters, **is** an expression indicating that it is permitted ***ab initio*. As, if** it indicated that it is valid **after the fact, why do I** need **two** phrases teaching that it is valid **after the fact?**


###### Chullin 2b:6
[Chullin 2b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/2b:6)

אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר עוּלָּא: הָכִי קָתָנֵי – הַכֹּל שׁוֹחֲטִין, וַאֲפִילּוּ טָמֵא בְּחוּלִּין. טָמֵא בְּחוּלִּין מַאי לְמֵימְרָא? בְּחוּלִּין שֶׁנַּעֲשׂוּ עַל טׇהֳרַת הַקֹּדֶשׁ, וְקָסָבַר: חוּלִּין שֶׁנַּעֲשׂוּ עַל טׇהֳרַת הַקֹּדֶשׁ כְּקֹדֶשׁ דָּמוּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabba bar Ulla said,** in resolution of the conflict in the mishna, that **this** is what the mishna **is teaching: Everyone slaughters, and even a ritually impure** person may slaughter **a non-sacred** animal *ab initio*. The Gemara interjects: **What** is the purpose **of stating** that **a ritually impure** person may slaughter **a non-sacred** animal *ab initio*? There is no prohibition against rendering non-sacred meat impure. The Gemara answers that the reference is **to non-sacred** animals **that were** being **prepared according to** the strictures of **sacrificial** food, **and** the *tanna* **holds** that the halakhic status of **non-sacred** foods **that were prepared according to** the strictures of **sacrificial** food is **like** that of **sacrificial** food insofar as it is prohibited to render such food impure.


###### Chullin 2b:7
[Chullin 2b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/2b:7)

כֵּיצַד הוּא עוֹשֶׂה? מֵבִיא סַכִּין אֲרוּכָּה וְשׁוֹחֵט בָּהּ, כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יִגַּע בַּבָּשָׂר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **How does** an impure person **act** in order to ensure that he will not render the flesh of the slaughtered animal impure? The Gemara answers: **He brings a long knife and slaughters** the animal **with it, so that he will not come into contact with the flesh** of the slaughtered animal.


###### Chullin 2b:8
[Chullin 2b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/2b:8)

וּבְמוּקְדָּשִׁים לֹא יִשְׁחוֹט, שֶׁמָּא יִגַּע בַּבָּשָׂר, וְאִם שָׁחַט וְאוֹמֵר ״בָּרִי לִי שֶׁלֹּא נָגַעְתִּי״ – שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rabba bar Ulla continues his interpretation of the mishna: **And** the reason the mishna also indicates that he may not slaughter *ab initio* is that **with regard to sacrificial** animals, **he may not slaughter** them *ab initio* even with a long knife, **lest he come into contact with the flesh. But if he slaughtered** the sacrificial animal **and says:** It is **clear to me that I did not come into contact** with the flesh, **his slaughter is valid** after the fact.


###### Chullin 2b:9
[Chullin 2b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/2b:9)

חוּץ מֵחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן, דַּאֲפִילּוּ בְּחוּלִּין גְּרֵידֵי, דִּיעֲבַד נָמֵי לָא, שֶׁמָּא יִשְׁהוּ, שֶׁמָּא יִדְרְסוּ, וְשֶׁמָּא יַחֲלִידוּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
And it teaches: This is the *halakha* with regard to all people **except for a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, who, even** if they slaughtered **only non-sacred** animals, their slaughter is **not** valid **even after the fact.** The reason the Sages deemed such slaughter not valid is **lest** people in these categories **interrupt** the slaughter, **lest they press** the knife in the course of slaughter, **and lest they conceal** the knife beneath the windpipe or the gullet in the course of an inverted slaughter.


###### Chullin 2b:10
[Chullin 2b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/2b:10)

וְכוּלָּן שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ, אַהֵיָיא? אִילֵּימָא אַחֵרֵשׁ שׁוֹטֶה וְקָטָן – עֲלַהּ קָאֵי, ״וְאִם שָׁחֲטוּ״ מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ! אֶלָּא אַטָּמֵא בְּחוּלִּין – הָא אָמְרַתְּ: לְכַתְּחִלָּה נָמֵי שָׁחֵיט!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: If so, with regard to the clause that follows in the mishna: **And any of them who slaughtered** an animal and others see and supervise them, their slaughter is valid, **to which** case in the mishna is it referring? **If we say** that the reference is to the case **of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor,** why was it formulated: And any of them who slaughtered? Since **it stands adjacent** to that *halakha*, the *tanna* **should have** formulated the phrase: **And if they slaughtered. Rather,** perhaps the reference is to the case **of a ritually impure** person who slaughtered **a non-sacred** animal. The Gemara rejects that possibility as well. **But didn’t you say** in that case: **He slaughters** the animal **even *ab initio*?**


###### Chullin 2b:11
[Chullin 2b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/2b:11)

וְאֶלָּא, אַטָּמֵא בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁים – בְּ״בָרִי לִי״ סַגִּי! דְּלֵיתֵיהּ קַמַּן דִּנְשַׁיְּילֵיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And rather,** perhaps the reference is to the case **of a ritually impure** person who slaughtered **a sacrificial** animal. The Gemara rejects that possibility, as **in** that case, if the ritually impure person says: It is **clear to me** that I did not come into contact with the flesh, it is **sufficient,** and there is no need for supervision. The Gemara answers: Supervision is necessary in the case of a ritually impure person who slaughtered a sacrificial animal, to account for a case **where** the ritually impure person **is not before us** so **that we** can **ask him** whether he came into contact with the flesh.


###### Chullin 2b:12
[Chullin 2b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/2b:12)

הַאי טָמֵא בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁים, מֵהָכָא נָפְקָא? מֵהָתָם נָפְקָא: כׇּל הַפְּסוּלִין שֶׁשָּׁחֲטוּ – שְׁחִיטָתָן כְּשֵׁרָה, שֶׁהַשְּׁחִיטָה כְּשֵׁרָה בְּזָרִים, בְּנָשִׁים, וּבַעֲבָדִים, וּבִטְמֵאִים, וַאֲפִילּוּ בְּקׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים, וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יִהְיוּ טְמֵאִין נוֹגְעִין בַּבָּשָׂר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: Is **this** *halakha* of **a ritually impure** person who slaughtered **a sacrificial** animal **learned from** an analysis of the mishna **here?** It is **learned** explicitly **from** the mishna **there** (*Zevaḥim* 31b): With regard to **all** those **who are unfit** for Temple service **who slaughtered** an offering, **their slaughter is valid, as the slaughter** of an offering **is valid** *ab initio* when performed even **by non-priests, by women, by** Canaanite **slaves, and by ritually impure** individuals. **And** this is the *halakha* **even with** regard to **offerings of the most sacred order, provided that the ritually impure will not touch the flesh** of the slaughtered animal, thereby rendering it impure.


###### Chullin 2b:13
[Chullin 2b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/2b:13)

הָכָא עִיקָּר. הָתָם, אַיְּידֵי דִּתְנָא שְׁאָר פְּסוּלִין – תְּנָא נָמֵי טָמֵא בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁים. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: הָתָם עִיקָּר, דִּבְקָדָשִׁים קָאֵי. הָכָא, אַיְּידֵי דִּתְנָא טָמֵא בְּחוּלִּין – תָּנֵי נָמֵי טָמֵא בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: The mishna **here** is the **primary** source. **There, since** the *tanna* **taught the rest of** those **disqualified** for Temple service, **he taught** the case of **a ritually impure** person who slaughtered **a sacrificial** animal **as well. And if you wish, say** instead that the mishna **there** is the **primary** source, as it **is standing** in tractate *Zevaḥim*, **which** deals **with sacrificial** animals. **Here, since** the *tanna* **taught** the case of **a ritually impure** person who slaughtered **a non-sacred** animal, **he also teaches** the case of **a ritually impure** person who slaughtered **a sacrificial** animal.


###### Chullin 2b:14
[Chullin 2b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/2b:14)

הַאי טָמֵא, דְּאִיטַּמָּא בְּמַאי? אִילֵּימָא דְּאִיטַּמִּי בְּמֵת, ״בַּחֲלַל חֶרֶב״ אָמַר רַחֲמָנָא,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **This ritually impure** person mentioned in the mishna is one **who became impure with what** form of impurity? **If we say that he became impure with** impurity imparted by **a corpse,** this is difficult, as **the Merciful One states:** “And whosoever in the open field touches **one slain with a sword”** (Numbers 19:16).