## Chullin Daf 38b

###### Chullin 38b:1
[Chullin 38b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/38b:1)

אוֹ כֶשֶׂב״ – פְּרָט לְכִלְאַיִם, ״אוֹ עֵז״ – פְּרָט לְנִדְמֶה, ״כִּי יִוָּלֵד״ – פְּרָט לְיוֹצֵא דּוֹפֶן, ״שִׁבְעַת יָמִים״ – פְּרָט לִמְחוּסַּר זְמַן, ״תַּחַת אִמּוֹ״ – פְּרָט לַיָּתוֹם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**or a sheep”** is **to the exclusion of** an animal born to parents of **diverse kinds,** which may not be brought as an offering. The phrase **“or a goat”** is **to the exclusion of** an animal **that resembles** another species of animal. **“When it is born”;** this is **to the exclusion of** an animal **born by caesarean section.** “It shall be **seven days”;** this is **to the exclusion of** an animal **whose time has not yet** arrived. **“Under its mother”;** this is **to the exclusion of** an animal that is **an orphan.**


###### Chullin 38b:2
[Chullin 38b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/38b:2)

הַאי יָתוֹם הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא דִּילִידְתֵּיהּ אִמֵּיהּ וַהֲדַר מִתָה, לְעוֹלָם תֵּיחֵי וְתֵיזִיל? אֶלָּא דְּמִתָה וַהֲדַר יְלִידְתֵּיהּ, מִ״כִּי יִוָּלֵד״ נָפְקָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rava elaborates: **What are the circumstances** of **this orphan? If we say that its mother gave birth to it and then died,** this is unreasonable. Will the mother **continue living forever? Rather,** perhaps the reference is to a case **where** the mother **died and then gave birth to it.** The Gemara rejects that possibility, as the fact that this animal is disqualified from sacrifice **is derived from** the phrase: **“When it is born,”** since after the mother’s death the newborn animal can emerge from the womb only by means of caesarean section.


###### Chullin 38b:3
[Chullin 38b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/38b:3)

אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא, זֶה פֵּירַשׁ לְמִיתָה וְזֶה פֵּירַשׁ לְחַיִּים. אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא בָּעֵינַן חִיּוּתָא בְּסוֹף לֵידָה – הַיְינוּ דְּאִיצְטְרִיךְ קְרָא לְמַעוֹטֵי, אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ לָא בָּעֵינַן חִיּוּתָא בְּסוֹף לֵידָה, לְמָה לֵיהּ? מִ״כִּי יִוָּלֵד״ נָפְקָא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** it is **obvious** that the reference is to a case where the mother died at the conclusion of the birth, at which point **this** mother **withdrew for death and that** newborn **withdrew for life. Granted, if you say** that **we require life at the conclusion of** the **birth, that is why a verse was necessary to exclude** the orphan. **But if you say** that **we do not require life at the conclusion of the birth,** and the verse is excluding only an animal that was born after its mother’s death, **why is** this verse necessary to exclude it? It can **be derived from** the phrase: **“When it is born.”** It may be derived from here that in any situation where the animal must be alive, it must remain alive until the end of the process. That is the case with regard to the slaughter of an animal in danger of imminent death as well. The slaughter is valid only if there is an indication of life at the end of the act of slaughter.


###### Chullin 38b:4
[Chullin 38b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/38b:4)

אָמַר רָבָא: הִלְכְתָא כִּי הָא מַתְנִיתָא – בְּהֵמָה דַּקָּה שֶׁפָּשְׁטָה יָדָהּ וְלֹא הֶחְזִירָה, פְּסוּלָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna teaches: The slaughter of a small animal in danger of imminent death that during the slaughter extended its foreleg that was bent and did not restore it to the bent position is not valid, as extending the foreleg is only part of the natural course of removal of the animal’s soul from its body and not a convulsion indicating life. **Rava says** that **the *halakha* is in accordance with** the opinion expressed in **this *baraita*:** The slaughter of **a small animal that extended its foreleg** that was bent **and did not restore it** to the bent position **is not valid.**


###### Chullin 38b:5
[Chullin 38b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/38b:5)

בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? בַּיָּד, אֲבָל בָּרֶגֶל, בֵּין פָּשְׁטָה וְלֹא כָּפְפָה, בֵּין כָּפְפָה וְלֹא פָּשְׁטָה – כְּשֵׁרָה. בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים? בְּדַקָּה, אֲבָל בְּגַסָּה, בֵּין בַּיָּד בֵּין בָּרֶגֶל, בֵּין פָּשְׁטָה וְלֹא כָּפְפָה, בֵּין כָּפְפָה וְלֹא פָּשְׁטָה – כְּשֵׁרָה. וְעוֹף, אֲפִילּוּ לֹא רִפְרֵף אֶלָּא גַּפּוֹ, וְלֹא כִּשְׁכֵּשׁ אֶלָּא זְנָבוֹ – הֲרֵי זֶה פִּירְכּוּס.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The *baraita* continues: **In what** case **is this statement said?** It is **with regard to the foreleg. But with regard to the hind leg, whether** the animal **extended it and did not restore** it to the bent position **or** the animal **bent it but did not extend it,** the slaughter **is valid. In what** case **is this statement,** about extending the foreleg, **said?** It is **with regard to a small** animal. **But with regard to a large** animal, **whether** the convulsion involves its **foreleg or its hind leg,** and **whether** the animal **extended it and did not restore** it to the bent position **or** the animal **bent it but did not extend it,** the slaughter **is valid. And** with regard to **a bird, even** if it **fluttered [*rifref*] only its wing or wagged only its tail, that is a convulsion** and an indication of life.


###### Chullin 38b:6
[Chullin 38b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/38b:6)

מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן? כּוּלְּהוּ תְּנַנְהִי! בְּהֵמָה דַּקָּה שֶׁפָּשְׁטָה יָדָהּ וְלֹא הֶחְזִירָה – פְּסוּלָה, שֶׁאֵינָהּ אֶלָּא הוֹצָאַת נֶפֶשׁ. יָד – אִין, רֶגֶל – לָא; דַּקָּה – אִין, גַּסָּה – לָא. עוֹף אִיצְטְרִיכָא לֵיהּ, דְּלָא תְּנַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **What is** Rava **teaching us** in ruling in accordance with the *baraita*? He is teaching us **all of** those *halakhot* **we learned** in the mishna: The slaughter of **a small animal that** when being slaughtered **extended its foreleg** that was bent **and did not restore** it to the bent position **is not valid, as** extending the foreleg **is only** part of the natural course of **removal** of the animal’s **soul** from its body and not a convulsion indicating life. It may be inferred from the mishna that with regard to movement of **a foreleg** alone, **yes,** it is not an indication of life, but movement of **a hind leg, no,** it is an indication of life. With regard to **a small** animal, **yes,** this is the *halakha*; with regard to **a large** animal, **no,** this is not the *halakha*, and extending a hind leg does indicate life. The Gemara answers: It **was necessary for** Rava to teach the *halakha* in the *baraita* with regard to **a bird, as we did not learn** it in the mishna.


###### Chullin 38b:7
[Chullin 38b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/38b:7)

**מַתְנִי׳** הַשּׁוֹחֵט לְנׇכְרִי – שְׁחִיטָתוֹ כְּשֵׁרָה, וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר פּוֹסֵל. אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: אֲפִילּוּ שְׁחָטָהּ לֶאֱכוֹל לְנׇכְרִי מֵחֲצַר כָּבֵד שֶׁלָּהּ – פְּסוּלָה, שֶׁסְּתָם מַחְשֶׁבֶת נׇכְרִי לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**MISHNA:** In the case of a Jew **who slaughters** the animal of a gentile **for a gentile, his slaughter is valid, and Rabbi Eliezer deems it not valid. Rabbi Eliezer says: Even if** the Jew **slaughtered** the animal with the intent **to feed the gentile from its diaphragm [*meḥatzar kaved*],** its slaughter is **not valid, as the unspecified intent of a gentile is** to slaughter the animal **for idol worship,** and it is prohibited to derive benefit from it.


###### Chullin 38b:8
[Chullin 38b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/38b:8)

אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: קַל וָחוֹמֶר הַדְּבָרִים, וּמָה בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁהַמַּחְשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁין – אֵין הַכֹּל הוֹלֵךְ אֶלָּא אַחַר הָעוֹבֵד, מְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין מַחְשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת בְּחוּלִּין – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא הַכֹּל הוֹלֵךְ אֶלָּא אַחַר הַשּׁוֹחֵט?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Yosei says:** The **matter** of the intent of the gentile is irrelevant in this case, as can be derived by means of **an *a fortiori*** inference. **If in a place where intent** while slaughtering the animal **invalidates** the slaughter, i.e., **in sacrificial** animals, such as when slaughtering an offering with the intent to sacrifice it beyond its designated time, **everything follows only** the intent of the priest **performing the service** and not the intent of the owner, then **in a place where intent does not invalidate** the slaughter, i.e., **in non-sacred** animals, **is it not right that everything should follow only** the intent of **the one who slaughters** the animal?


###### Chullin 38b:9
[Chullin 38b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/38b:9)

**גְּמָ׳** הָנֵי תַּנָּאֵי אִית לְהוּ דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי, דְּתַנְיָא: אָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי: שָׁמַעְתִּי שֶׁהַבְּעָלִים מְפַגְּלִין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**GEMARA:** In explanation of the dispute between the first *tanna* and Rabbi Eliezer, the Gemara explains: **These *tanna’im* hold** in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei, as it is taught** in a *baraita* that **Rabbi Eliezer, son of Rabbi Yosei, says: I heard that the owners,** and not only the priest, **render** an offering ***piggul*** by means of improper intent. The same is true with regard to non-sacred slaughter, where the owners’ intent for idol worship invalidates the slaughter, even if the slaughterer has no intent for idol worship.


###### Chullin 38b:10
[Chullin 38b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/38b:10)

מִיהוּ תַּנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: אִי שַׁמְעִינֵיהּ דְּחַשֵּׁיב – אִין, אִי לָא – לָא, סְתָם מַחְשֶׁבֶת נׇכְרִי לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה לָא אָמְרִינַן. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר סָבַר: אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא שַׁמְעִינֵיהּ דְּחַשֵּׁיב, סְתָם מַחְשֶׁבֶת נׇכְרִי לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה אָמְרִינַן. וַאֲתָא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי לְמֵימַר: אַף עַל גַּב דְּשַׁמְעִינֵיהּ דְּחַשֵּׁיב, זֶה מְחַשֵּׁב וְזֶה עוֹבֵד לָא אָמְרִינַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But the first *tanna* holds** that **if we heard** the gentile say **that he intends** the animal for idol worship, **yes,** his intent invalidates the slaughter, and **if** the gentile did **not** voice his intent before us, his intent does **not** invalidate the slaughter, as **we do not say** that the **unspecified intent of a gentile is for idol worship. Rabbi Eliezer holds: Although we did not hear** the gentile say **that he intends** the animal for idol worship, the slaughter is not valid, as **we say** the **unspecified intent of a gentile is for idol worship. And Rabbi Yosei comes to say** that **even though we heard** the gentile say **that he intends** the animal for idol worship, in a case where **this** owner **has intent** for idol worship **and that** other person is **performing** the slaughter, **we do not say** that the intent of the owner invalidates the slaughter.


###### Chullin 38b:11
[Chullin 38b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/38b:11)

אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: בִּדְשַׁמְעִינֵיהּ דְּחַשֵּׁיב פְּלִיגִי, תַּנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: כִּי אָמְרִינַן ״זֶה מְחַשֵּׁב וְזֶה עוֹבֵד״ – הָנֵי מִילֵּי בִּפְנִים, אֲבָל בְּחוּץ לֹא, חוּץ מִפְּנִים

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**There are** those **who say** an alternative explanation of the mishna. It is **with regard to** a case **where we heard** the gentile say **that he intends** the animal for idol worship that the *tanna’im* **disagree. The first *tanna* holds** that **when we say** in a case where **this** owner **has** improper **intent and that** other person is **performing** the slaughter that the intent of the owner invalidates the slaughter, **this statement** applies only **inside** the Temple, in the slaughter of offerings. **But** with regard to non-sacred slaughter **outside** the Temple, the intent of the owner does **not** invalidate the slaughter, as with regard to deriving the *halakhot* of non-sacred slaughter **outside** the Temple **from** the *halakhot* of slaughter of sacrificial animals **inside** the Temple,