## Chullin Daf 39a

###### Chullin 39a:1
[Chullin 39a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/39a:1)

לָא יָלְפִינַן. וַאֲתָא רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר לְמֵימַר: יָלְפִינַן חוּץ מִפְּנִים, וַאֲתָא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי לְמֵימַר: אֲפִילּוּ בִּפְנִים נָמֵי ״זֶה מְחַשֵּׁב וְזֶה עוֹבֵד״ לָא אָמְרִינַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**we do not derive** in this manner. **And Rabbi Eliezer comes to say** that **we derive** the *halakhot* of non-sacred slaughter **outside** the Temple **from** the *halakhot* of slaughter of sacrificial animals **inside** the Temple, and therefore the intent of the gentile invalidates non-sacred slaughter. **And Rabbi Yosei comes to say** that **even inside** the Temple, in a case where **this** owner **has** improper **intent and that** other person is **performing** the slaughter, **we do not say** that the intent of the owner invalidates the slaughter.


###### Chullin 39a:2
[Chullin 39a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/39a:2)

אִתְּמַר: הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַבְּהֵמָה לִזְרוֹק דָּמָהּ לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, וּלְהַקְטִיר חֶלְבָּהּ לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה – רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: פְּסוּלָה, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ אָמַר: מוּתֶּרֶת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **It was stated** that there is an amoraic dispute with regard to **one who slaughtered an animal** in order **to sprinkle its blood for idol worship, or to burn its fat for idol worship. Rabbi Yoḥanan says:** The slaughter is **not valid,** and benefit from the animal is forbidden. **Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says:** The slaughter is valid and deriving benefit from the animal is **permitted.**


###### Chullin 39a:3
[Chullin 39a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/39a:3)

רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר פְּסוּלָה: מְחַשְּׁבִין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה, וְיָלְפִינַן חוּץ מִפְּנִים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara elaborates. **Rabbi Yoḥanan says:** The slaughter is **not valid** and benefit from the animal is forbidden. He holds that **one transfers intent from** one sacrificial **rite to** another sacrificial **rite.** If, while slaughtering a sacrificial animal, one intends to perform one of the other sacrificial rites in an improper manner the offering is invalidated. **And** Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that **we derive** the *halakhot* of non-sacred slaughter **outside** the Temple **from** the *halakhot* of slaughter of sacrificial animals **inside** the Temple. Since that intent invalidates the slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple, it invalidates the slaughter of non-sacred animals outside the Temple as well.


###### Chullin 39a:4
[Chullin 39a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/39a:4)

רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר מוּתֶּרֶת: אֵין מְחַשְּׁבִין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה, וְלָא גָּמְרִינַן חוּץ מִפְּנִים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Reish Lakish says:** The slaughter is valid, and deriving benefit from the animal is **permitted.** He holds that **one does not transfer intent from** one sacrificial **rite to** another sacrificial **rite.** Therefore, while slaughtering the animal, only intent to perform the slaughter improperly invalidates the offering, but intent to perform another sacrificial rite improperly does not invalidate the offering. **And** Reish Lakish holds that **we do not derive** the *halakhot* of non-sacred slaughter **outside** the Temple **from** the *halakhot* of slaughter of sacrificial animals **inside** the Temple.


###### Chullin 39a:5
[Chullin 39a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/39a:5)

וְאָזְדוּ לְטַעְמַיְיהוּ, דְּאִתְּמַר: שְׁחָטָהּ לִשְׁמָהּ לִזְרוֹק דָּמָהּ שֶׁלֹּא לִשְׁמָהּ – רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: פְּסוּלָה, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ אָמַר: כְּשֵׁרָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish **follow their** standard line of **reasoning, as it was stated:** If one **slaughtered** a sin offering **for its own sake,** but with intent **to sprinkle its blood not for its own sake** but for the sake of another type of offering, **Rabbi Yoḥanan says** that the offering is **unfit,** and **Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says** that the offering is **fit.**


###### Chullin 39a:6
[Chullin 39a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/39a:6)

רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר פְּסוּלָה: מְחַשְּׁבִין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה, וְגָמְרִינַן מִמַּחְשֶׁבֶת פִּיגּוּל. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ אָמַר כְּשֵׁרָה: אֵין מְחַשְּׁבִין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה, וְלָא גָּמְרִינַן מִמַּחְשֶׁבֶת פִּיגּוּל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara elaborates: **Rabbi Yoḥanan says** that the offering is **unfit.** He holds that **one transfers intent from** one sacrificial **rite to** another sacrificial **rite, and** the reason is that **we derive** the *halakha* of slaughter of a sin offering not for its sake **from** the *halakha* of **intent for *piggul*,** i.e., performance of one of the sacrificial rites with the intent to sprinkle the blood of the offering beyond its appointed time. And **Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says** that the offering is **fit** because he holds that **one does not transfer intent from** one sacrificial **rite to** another sacrificial **rite, and** the reason is that **we do not derive** the *halakha* of any other improper intent **from** the *halakha* of **intent for *piggul*.**


###### Chullin 39a:7
[Chullin 39a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/39a:7)

וּצְרִיכָא, דְּאִי אִיתְּמַר בְּהָא, בְּהָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ, מִשּׁוּם דְּחוּץ מִפְּנִים לָא יָלְפִינַן, אֲבָל פְּנִים מִפְּנִים – אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara notes: **And** it is **necessary** to state the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish in both cases. **As, if** it **were stated** only **with regard to that** case of one who slaughters an animal in order to sprinkle its blood for idol worship, perhaps one would conclude that it is specifically **in that** case that **Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish states** his opinion that the slaughter is valid, **due to** the fact **that we do not derive** the *halakhot* of non-sacred slaughter **outside** the Temple **from** the *halakhot* of slaughter of sacrificial animals **inside** the Temple. **But** in the case of one who slaughters an offering for the sake of another offering, where we would be deriving the *halakhot* of slaughter of sacrificial animals **inside** the Temple **from** the *halakhot* of another case of slaughter of sacrificial animals **inside** the Temple, **say** that Reish Lakish **concedes to Rabbi Yoḥanan** that the offering is unfit.


###### Chullin 39a:8
[Chullin 39a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/39a:8)

וְאִי אִתְּמַר בְּהָךְ, בְּהַהִיא קָאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, אֲבָל בְּהָא – אֵימָא מוֹדֵי לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ, צְרִיכָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if** their dispute **was stated with regard to this** case of one who slaughters an offering for the sake of another offering, perhaps one would conclude that it is specifically **in this** case that **Rabbi Yoḥanan said** that the offering is unfit, because he holds that one derives the *halakhot* of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple from the *halakhot* of another case of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple. **But in that** case of one who slaughters an animal in order to sprinkle its blood for idol worship, **say that** Rabbi Yoḥanan **concedes to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish** that the offering is fit due to the fact that the *halakhot* of non-sacred slaughter outside the Temple are not derived from the *halakhot* of slaughter of sacrificial animals inside the Temple. Therefore, it is **necessary** to state the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish in both cases.


###### Chullin 39a:9
[Chullin 39a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/39a:9)

מֵתִיב רַב שֵׁשֶׁת: אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: קַל וָחוֹמֶר הַדְּבָרִים, וּמָה בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁמַּחְשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁין – אֵין הַכֹּל הוֹלֵךְ אֶלָּא אַחַר הָעוֹבֵד, מְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין מַחְשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת בְּחוּלִּין – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא הַכֹּל הוֹלֵךְ אֶלָּא אַחַר הַשּׁוֹחֵט?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Sheshet raises an objection** to both Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish from the statement in the mishna with regard to one who slaughters for a gentile when the intent of the gentile is for idol worship. **Rabbi Yosei says:** The **matter** of the intent of the gentile is irrelevant in this case as can be derived by means of **an *a fortiori*** inference. **If in a place where intent** while slaughtering the animal **invalidates** the slaughter, i.e., **in sacrificial** animals, such as when slaughtering an offering with the intent to sacrifice it beyond its designated time, **everything follows only** the intent of the priest **performing the service** and not the intent of the owner, then **in a place where intent does not invalidate** the slaughter, i.e., **in non-sacred** animals, **is it not right that everything should follow only** the intent of **the one who slaughters** the animal?


###### Chullin 39a:10
[Chullin 39a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/39a:10)

מַאי ״אֵין מַחְשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת בְּחוּלִּין״? אִילֵּימָא דְּלָא פָּסְלָה כְּלָל, אֶלָּא זְבִיחָה דַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה דְּמִיתַּסְרָא, הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rav Sheshet elaborates: **What** is the meaning of: **Intent does not invalidate** the slaughter **in non-sacred** animals? **If we say** that it means **that** intent **does not invalidate** the slaughter of non-sacred animals **at all, but** then **how can you find** a case of **slaughter** with intent **for idol worship where** the animal **is forbidden?**


###### Chullin 39a:11
[Chullin 39a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/39a:11)

אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה, וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: וּמָה בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁמַּחְשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה – אֵין הַכֹּל הוֹלֵךְ אֶלָּא אַחַר הָעוֹבֵד, מְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין מַחְשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת בְּחוּלִּין מֵעֲבוֹדָה לַעֲבוֹדָה, אֶלָּא בְּאוֹתָהּ עֲבוֹדָה – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא הַכֹּל הוֹלֵךְ אֶלָּא אַחַר הַשּׁוֹחֵט?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** it is **obvious** that the meaning of that phrase in the statement of Rabbi Yosei is that one does not transfer intent **from** one sacrificial **rite to** another sacrificial **rite, and this** is what Rabbi Yosei **is saying: If in a place where intent invalidates,** i.e., **in sacrificial** animals, **from** one sacrificial **rite to** another sacrificial **rite, everything follows only** the intent of the one **performing** the slaughter, and the intent of the owners is irrelevant, in a **place where intent does not invalidate,** i.e., **in non-sacred** animals, **from** one **rite to** another **rite** but it does so **only within the same rite, is it not right that everything should follow only** the intent of **the one who slaughters** the animal?


###### Chullin 39a:12
[Chullin 39a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/39a:12)

פְּנִים קַשְׁיָא לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ, חוּץ קַשְׁיָא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
According to this understanding of the contention of Rabbi Yosei in the mishna, the case of the slaughter of a sacrificial animal **inside** the Temple is **difficult for Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish,** as contrary to his opinion, Rabbi Yosei says that in that case one transfers intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite. The case of slaughter of a non-sacred animal **outside** the Temple is **difficult for Rabbi Yoḥanan,** as contrary to his opinion, Rabbi Yosei says that in that case one does not transfer intent from one rite to another rite.


###### Chullin 39a:13
[Chullin 39a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/39a:13)

בִּשְׁלָמָא פְּנִים, לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא מִקַּמֵּי דְּשַׁמְעַהּ מֵרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, הָא לְבָתַר דְּשַׁמְעַהּ מֵרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן. אֶלָּא חוּץ, קַשְׁיָא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rav Sheshet continues: **Granted,** the case of **inside** the Temple is **not difficult for Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish,** because one can explain that he stated **this** statement that one does not transfer intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite before **he heard** the mishna **from Rabbi Yoḥanan,** his teacher, and he stated **that** one transfers intent from one sacrificial rite to another sacrificial rite **after he heard** the mishna **from Rabbi Yoḥanan.** His dispute with Rabbi Yoḥanan is limited to transfer of intent for idol worship from rite to rite. **But** the case of slaughter of a non-sacred animal **outside** the Temple **is difficult for Rabbi Yoḥanan.**


###### Chullin 39a:14
[Chullin 39a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/39a:14)

הוּא מוֹתֵיב לַהּ וְהוּא מְפָרֵק לַהּ, בְּאַרְבַּע עֲבוֹדוֹת, וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: וּמָה בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁמַּחְשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת בְּמוּקְדָּשִׁין בְּאַרְבַּע עֲבוֹדוֹת – אֵין הַכֹּל הוֹלֵךְ אֶלָּא אַחַר הָעוֹבֵד,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rav Sheshet **raises the objection, and he resolves it.** That which Rabbi Yosei said, that intent inside the Temple disqualifies the slaughter of a sacrificial animal but intent outside the Temple does not disqualify the slaughter of a non-sacred animal, is unrelated to transfer of intent from one rite to another. Rather, Rabbi Yosei is referring to a case where one performed any **of the four** sacrificial **rites** with improper intent, e.g., to eat the offering beyond its appointed time. **And this** is what Rabbi Yosei **is saying: If in a place where intent** while slaughtering the animal **invalidates** the slaughter **in sacrificial** animals, if that intent was **during** performance of any of the **four** sacrificial **rites,** i.e., slaughter, receiving the blood, conveying the blood to the altar, and sprinkling the blood on the altar, **everything follows only** the intent of the priest **performing the service** and not the intent of the owner,