## Chullin Daf 39b

###### Chullin 39b:1
[Chullin 39b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/39b:1)

מְקוֹם שֶׁאֵין מַחְשָׁבָה פּוֹסֶלֶת בְּחוּלִּין אֶלָּא בִּשְׁתֵּי עֲבוֹדוֹת – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא הַכֹּל הוֹלֵךְ אֶלָּא אַחַר הַשּׁוֹחֵט.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
then **in a place where intent invalidates** the slaughter **in non-sacred** animals slaughtered with intent for idol worship **during** performance of **only two** sacrificial **rites,** slaughter and sprinkling the blood, **is it not right that everything should follow only** the intent of **the one who slaughters** the animal?


###### Chullin 39b:2
[Chullin 39b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/39b:2)

תַּנְיָא כְּוָותֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַבְּהֵמָה לִזְרוֹק דָּמָהּ לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וּלְהַקְטִיר חֶלְבָּהּ לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ זִבְחֵי מֵתִים. שְׁחָטָהּ וְאַחַר כָּךְ חִישֵּׁב עָלֶיהָ – זֶה הָיָה מַעֲשֶׂה בְּקֵיסָרִי, וְלֹא אָמְרוּ בָּהּ לֹא אִיסּוּר וְלֹא הֶיתֵּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**It is taught** in a *baraita* **in accordance with** the opinion **of Rabbi Yoḥanan:** With regard to **one who slaughters an animal** in order **to sprinkle its blood for idol worship** or **to burn its fat for idol worship,** the status of **these** animals **is** that of **offerings to the dead,** i.e., to idols, and the slaughter is not valid. **If one slaughtered** the animal **and thereafter intended in its** regard to sprinkle its blood or burn its fats for idol worship, **that was** the **incident in Caesarea, and** the Sages **did not say** anything **with regard to** the animal, **neither prohibition nor permission.**


###### Chullin 39b:3
[Chullin 39b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/39b:3)

אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: לֹא אָמְרוּ בָּהּ אִיסּוּר – מִשּׁוּם כְּבוֹדָן דְּרַבָּנַן. לֹא הֶיתֵּר – מִשּׁוּם כְּבוֹדוֹ דְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Ḥisda says** in explanation of the conduct of the Sages that **they did not say prohibition, due to the honor of the Rabbis** in the mishna, who hold that the unspecified intent of a gentile, and presumably likewise of a Jew who worships idols, is not presumed to be directed to idol worship, and therefore his slaughter is valid. **Nor** did the Sages say **permission, due to the honor of Rabbi Eliezer,** who holds that the unspecified intent of a gentile, and presumably likewise of a Jew who worships idols, is presumed to be directed to idol worship.


###### Chullin 39b:4
[Chullin 39b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/39b:4)

מִמַּאי? דִּלְמָא עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמְרִי רַבָּנַן הָתָם, אֶלָּא דְּלָא שְׁמַעְנֵאּ דְּחַשֵּׁיב, אֲבָל הָכָא דִּשְׁמַעְנֵאּ דְּחַשֵּׁיב – הוֹכִיחַ סוֹפוֹ עַל תְּחִלָּתוֹ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **From where** is that conclusion drawn? **Perhaps the Rabbis say** that the slaughter is permitted **only there** in the mishna, **because we did not hear** explicitly **that** the gentile **intends** the slaughter for idol worship. **But here** in the case in the *baraita*, **where we hear** thereafter **that he intends** to sprinkle the blood or burn the fats for idol worship, perhaps **his ultimate** statement **proves** the nature of **his original** intent while performing the slaughter.


###### Chullin 39b:5
[Chullin 39b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/39b:5)

אִי נָמֵי, עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הָתָם אֶלָּא גַּבֵּי נׇכְרִי, דִּסְתָם מַחְשֶׁבֶת נׇכְרִי לַעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, אֲבָל יִשְׂרָאֵל – הוֹכִיחַ סוֹפוֹ עַל תְּחִלָּתוֹ לָא אָמְרִינַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Alternatively,** perhaps when **Rabbi Eliezer states there** in the mishna that slaughter performed on behalf of a gentile is not valid, this applies **only with regard to** an animal that is owned by **a gentile, as the unspecified intent of a gentile is directed to idol worship. But** in the case in the *baraita* where the animal belongs to **a Jew, we do not say** that **his ultimate** statement **proves** the nature of **his original** intent.


###### Chullin 39b:6
[Chullin 39b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/39b:6)

אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב שֵׁיזְבִי: לֹא אָמְרוּ בָּהּ הֶיתֵּר מִשּׁוּם כְּבוֹדוֹ דְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, הֵי רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, Rav Sheizevi said** that the Sages **did not state permission with regard to** the animal in the *baraita* **due to the honor of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,** who holds that one’s ultimate actions prove the nature of his original intent. The Gemara asks: **Which** statement of **Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel** indicates that this is his opinion?


###### Chullin 39b:7
[Chullin 39b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/39b:7)

אִילֵּימָא רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל דְּגִיטִּין, דִּתְנַן: הַבָּרִיא שֶׁאָמַר ״כִּתְבוּ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתִּי״ – רָצָה לְשַׂחֵק בָּהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**If we say** that the reference is to the statement of **Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel with regard to bills of divorce,** this is difficult. **As we learned** in a mishna (*Gittin* 66a) that if a dying man said to the people present: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, those people should write and deliver the bill of divorce to his wife. Although the delivery was not included in his command, that is clearly his intent. But **a healthy** man **who says: Write a bill of divorce for my wife,** but did not say: Deliver it to her, presumably **sought to mock her** and not to designate his listeners as agents of delivery.


###### Chullin 39b:8
[Chullin 39b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/39b:8)

וּמַעֲשֶׂה בְּבָרִיא שֶׁאָמַר ״כִּתְבוּ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתִּי״, וְעָלָה לַגָּג וְנָפַל וָמֵת. אָמַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: אִם מֵעַצְמוֹ נָפַל, הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט, וְאִם הָרוּחַ דָּחַתּוּ, אֵינוֹ גֵּט.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The mishna continues: **And** there was **an incident involving a healthy** man **who said: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, and** then **ascended to the roof and fell, and died. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If he fell at his own** initiative, taking his own life, **it is** a valid **bill of divorce,** as it is clear that he anticipated his death, thereby rendering his halakhic status like that of a dying man. But **if the wind forced him** to fall and he died, **it is not** a valid **bill of divorce,** as there was no clear intent to give her the bill of divorce.


###### Chullin 39b:9
[Chullin 39b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/39b:9)

וְהָוֵינַן בַּהּ: מַעֲשֶׂה לִסְתּוֹר?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And we discussed** the mishna: Did the *tanna* cite **an incident to contradict** that which was stated previously in the mishna? The *tanna* states unequivocally that when a healthy man says: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, the bill of divorce is not valid. The *tanna* then cites an incident indicating that under certain circumstances, when a healthy man says: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, the bill of divorce is valid.


###### Chullin 39b:10
[Chullin 39b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/39b:10)

חַסּוֹרֵי מִיחַסְּרָא וְהָכִי קָתָנֵי: אִם הוֹכִיחַ סוֹפוֹ עַל תְּחִלָּתוֹ – הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט, וּמַעֲשֶׂה נָמֵי בְּבָרִיא שֶׁאָמַר ״כִּתְבוּ גֵּט לְאִשְׁתִּי״, וְעָלָה לַגָּג וְנָפַל וָמֵת. אָמַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: אִם מֵעַצְמוֹ נָפַל – הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט, וְאִם הָרוּחַ דָּחַתּוּ – אֵינוֹ גֵּט.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: The mishna **is incomplete and this** is what **it is teaching:** The healthy man who says: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, but did not say: Deliver it to her, presumably sought to mock her. But **if his ultimate** actions **prove** the nature of **his initial** intent, that he seeks to give the bill of divorce because he is about to die, **it is** a valid **bill of divorce. And** there was **an incident involving a healthy** man **who said: Write a bill of divorce for my wife, and** then **ascended to the roof and fell, and died. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: If he fell at his own** initiative, **it is** a valid **bill of divorce,** but **if the wind forced him** to fall, **it is not** a valid **bill of divorce.**


###### Chullin 39b:11
[Chullin 39b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/39b:11)

וְדִלְמָא שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּקָאָמַר ״כִּתְבוּ״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains why this is not a proof: **But perhaps** the case cited **there is different, as** the husband initially **says: Write** a bill of divorce for my wife, indicating that he originally intended to fall from the roof. By contrast, in the case of slaughter, there is no indication of his original intent.


###### Chullin 39b:12
[Chullin 39b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/39b:12)

אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבִינָא: מִשּׁוּם כְּבוֹדוֹ דְּרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל דְּהָכָא, דְּתַנְיָא: הַכּוֹתֵב נְכָסָיו לַאֲחֵרִים, וְהָיוּ בָּהֶן עֲבָדִים, וְאָמַר הַלָּה ״אִי אֶפְשִׁי בָּהֶן״, אִם הָיָה רַבּוֹ שֵׁנִי כֹּהֵן – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ אוֹכְלִין בִּתְרוּמָה. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: כֵּיוָן שֶׁאָמַר הַלָּה ״אִי אֶפְשִׁי בָּהֶן״ – כְּבָר זָכוּ בָּהֶן יוֹרְשִׁין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, Ravina said** that the Sages did not state permission in the incident in Caesarea with regard to the animal **due to the honor of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,** to avoid contradicting the opinion **that** is cited **here, as it is taught** in a *baraita*: In a case of a person on his deathbed **who wrote** a document transferring **his property to others, and there were slaves among** his property, **and that** intended recipient **says: I do not want** to assume ownership of the slaves, **if their second master,** the intended recipient, **was a priest, these** slaves **may partake of *teruma*,** and his protest is ignored. **Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Once that** intended recipient **says: I do not want** to assume ownership of the slaves, **heirs** of the original owner **already acquired them.**


###### Chullin 39b:13
[Chullin 39b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/39b:13)

וְהָוֵינַן בַּהּ: לְתַנָּא קַמָּא, אֲפִילּוּ עוֹמֵד וְצוֹוֵחַ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And we discussed** the *baraita*: **And** according **to the first *tanna*,** does the intended recipient acquire the slaves **even** if **he stands and shouts** in protest that he does not want to assume ownership of the slaves? That is not reasonable.


###### Chullin 39b:14
[Chullin 39b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/39b:14)

אֲמַר רַבָּה, וְאִיתֵּימָא רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: בְּצוֹוֵחַ מֵעִיקָּרָא – דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דְּלָא קָנָה, בְּשׁוֹתֵק וּבַסּוֹף צוֹוֵחַ – דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דִּקְנָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabba said, and some say** it was **Rabbi Yoḥanan** who said: **In** a case where **he shouts** in protest **at the outset,** while the owner is giving him the gift, **everyone agrees that he did not acquire** the slaves. In a case where **he was silent** at that moment **and ultimately shouted** his protest at a later opportunity, **everyone agrees that he acquired** the slaves.


###### Chullin 39b:15
[Chullin 39b:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/39b:15)

כִּי פְּלִיגִי – שֶׁזִּיכָּה לוֹ עַל יְדֵי אַחֵר, וְשָׁתַק וּלְבַסּוֹף צָוַוח; תַּנָּא קַמָּא סָבַר: מִדִּשְׁתֵיק – קְנָנְהוּ, וְהַאי דְּקָא צָוַוח – מִיהְדָּר קָא הָדַר בֵּיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**When they disagree** it is in a case **where** the owner **transferred ownership** of the slaves **to him through another** person, **and** at that point the recipient **was silent, and ultimately,** when he actually received the slaves, **he shouted** in protest. **The first *tanna* holds: Since he was** initially **silent, he acquired** the slaves, **and** the fact **that he is** ultimately **shouting** indicates that **he is retracting** his initial acceptance of the gift. That retraction is ineffective, as acquisitions cannot be nullified in that manner.


###### Chullin 39b:16
[Chullin 39b:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/39b:16)

וְרַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל סָבַר: הוֹכִיחַ סוֹפוֹ עַל תְּחִילָּתוֹ, וְהָא דְּלָא צְוַוח מֵעִיקָּרָא, סָבַר: כִּי לָא אָתֵי לִידִי אַמַּאי אֶצְוַוח.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds: His ultimate** actions **prove** the nature of **his original** intent. He never wanted the slaves and always intended to avoid assuming ownership of them. **And** the fact **that he did not shout initially** is because **he thought:** As the situation is **that they did not** yet **enter my possession, why would I shout?**


###### Chullin 39b:17
[Chullin 39b:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/39b:17)

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The Gemara resumes discussion of the dispute in the mishna where Rabbi Yosei says that when a Jew slaughters an animal on behalf of a gentile, even if it is known that the intent of the gentile is for idol worship, the slaughter is valid, as it is only the intent of the slaughterer that is relevant. **Rav Yehuda says** that **Shmuel says:** The ***halakha*** is **in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yosei.**


###### Chullin 39b:18
[Chullin 39b:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/39b:18)

הָנְהוּ טַיָּיעֵי דַּאֲתוֹ לְצִיקוֹנְיָא, יְהוּב דִּיכְרֵי לְטַבָּחֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל, אֲמַרוּ לְהוּ: דְּמָא וְתַרְבָּא לְדִידַן, מַשְׁכָּא וּבִישְׂרָא לְדִידְכוּ. שַׁלְחַהּ רַב טוֹבִי בַּר רַב מַתְנָה לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב יוֹסֵף: כִּי הַאי גַּוְונָא מַאי? שְׁלַח לֵיהּ: הָכִי אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara relates: There were **these Arabs who came to Tzikuneya,** and **they gave rams to Jewish slaughterers.** The Arabs **said to them: The blood and the fat are for us,** for use in our idol worship, and **the hide and the flesh are for you. Rav Tuvi bar Rav Mattana sent** a question to be asked **before Rav Yosef:** In **a case like this, what** is the *halakha*? Rav Yosef **sent to him: This** is what **Rav Yehuda said** that **Shmuel said:** The ***halakha*** is **in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yosei,** and it is the intent of the slaughterer and not the intent of the owner that determines the validity of the slaughter.


###### Chullin 39b:19
[Chullin 39b:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/39b:19)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אַוְיָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: לְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, יְהֵיב לֵיהּ זוּזָא לְטַבָּח יִשְׂרָאֵל, מַאי? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: חָזֵינַן, אִי אִינִישׁ אַלָּמָא הוּא דְּלָא מָצֵי מְדַחֵי לֵיהּ – אָסוּר, וְאִי לָא – אָמַר לֵיהּ: ״רֵישָׁיךָ וְהַר״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Avya, said to Rav Ashi:** According **to** the opinion of **Rabbi Eliezer** in the mishna, that if a Jew slaughters an animal on behalf of a gentile the slaughter is not valid, if the gentile **gave a dinar to a Jewish slaughterer** in order to purchase a small amount of the meat, **what** is the *halakha*? Does that small amount invalidate the entire slaughter? Rav Ashi **said to him: We examine** the situation. **If** this gentile **is a violent man, and** the Jew **is unable** to **repudiate his** offer and tell him to take his money, the entire animal is **forbidden,** because the slaughter was partially on behalf of the gentile. **And if** the gentile is **not** violent, the Jew can **say to him:** Go and arrange a collision between **your head and a mountain,** as I will not slaughter an animal on your behalf.


###### Chullin 39b:20
[Chullin 39b:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/39b:20)

**מַתְנִי׳** הַשּׁוֹחֵט לְשֵׁם הָרִים, לְשֵׁם גְּבָעוֹת, לְשֵׁם יַמִּים, לְשֵׁם נְהָרוֹת, לְשֵׁם מִדְבָּרוֹת – שְׁחִיטָתוֹ פְּסוּלָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**MISHNA:** In the case of **one who slaughters** an animal **for the sake of,** i.e., to worship, **mountains, for the sake of hills, for the sake of seas, for the sake of rivers,** or **for the sake of wildernesses, his slaughter is not valid.**