## Chullin Daf 68a

###### Chullin 68a:1
[Chullin 68a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/68a:1)

מַתְנִי׳ **בְּהֵמָה הַמְקַשָּׁה** לֵילֵד, וְהוֹצִיא הָעוּבָּר אֶת יָדוֹ וְהֶחְזִירוֹ – מוּתָּר בַּאֲכִילָה. הוֹצִיא אֶת רֹאשׁוֹ, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהֶחְזִירוֹ – הֲרֵי זֶה כְּיָלוּד.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**MISHNA:** When a pregnant kosher animal is slaughtered, the slaughter also renders the consumption of its fetus permitted. Even if **an animal was encountering difficulty giving birth and** meanwhile **the fetus extended its foreleg** outside the mother animal’s womb **and** then **brought it back** inside, and then the mother animal was slaughtered, the **consumption** of the fetus is **permitted** by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. But if the fetus **extended its head** outside the womb, **even if it** then **brought it back** inside, the halakhic status of **that** fetus is **like** that of **a newborn,** and the slaughter of the mother animal does not permit the consumption of the fetus. Rather, it requires its own slaughter.


###### Chullin 68a:2
[Chullin 68a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/68a:2)

חוֹתֵךְ מֵעוּבָּר שֶׁבְּמֵעֶיהָ – מוּתָּר בַּאֲכִילָה, מִן הַטְּחוֹל וּמִן הַכְּלָיוֹת – אָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה. זֶה הַכְּלָל: דָּבָר שֶׁגּוּפָהּ – אָסוּר, וְשֶׁאֵינָהּ גּוּפָהּ – מוּתָּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
If, prior to slaughtering an animal, one **severs** pieces **from a fetus that is in** the **womb** and leaves those pieces in the womb, their **consumption** is **permitted** by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. By contrast, if one severs pieces **of the spleen or of the kidneys** of an animal and then slaughters it, then even if those pieces are left inside the animal their **consumption** is **prohibited,** because an organ severed from a living being is not permitted by the subsequent slaughter of the animal. **This is the principle: An item that is** part of an animal’s **body** that was severed prior to its slaughter is **prohibited** even after slaughter, **and** an item **that is not** part of **its body,** i.e., its fetus, is **permitted** by virtue of its slaughter.


###### Chullin 68a:3
[Chullin 68a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/68a:3)

**גְּמָ׳** אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: וְאֵבֶר עַצְמוֹ אָסוּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**GEMARA:** The Gemara qualifies the first ruling of the mishna: **Rav Yehuda says** that **Rav says: But** as for **the limb itself,** i.e., the foreleg, its consumption is **prohibited,** even though the fetus brought it back inside prior to the slaughter.


###### Chullin 68a:4
[Chullin 68a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/68a:4)

מַאי טַעְמָא? דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״וּבָשָׂר בַּשָּׂדֶה טְרֵפָה לֹא תֹאכֵלוּ״, כֵּיוָן שֶׁיָּצָא בָּשָׂר חוּץ לִמְחִיצָתוֹ – נֶאֱסָר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**What is the reason** for this? It is **as the verse states: “And flesh, in the field, a *tereifa*, you shall not eat”** (Exodus 22:30). A *tereifa* is an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months; its consumption is prohibited even if it is ritually slaughtered. The Gemara interprets the verse as teaching a principle: **Once flesh** whose permitted status is dependent on being within a certain area, e.g., sacrificial meat within the Temple courtyard, **has gone outside of its boundary,** i.e., the area in which it is permitted, which the verse describes as being “in the field,” **it becomes** permanently **prohibited,** like a *tereifa*. Likewise, the permitted status of a fetus is dependent on its being within the womb when the mother animal is slaughtered. Accordingly, if any part of the fetus leaves the womb before the slaughter, it is rendered permanently prohibited.


###### Chullin 68a:5
[Chullin 68a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/68a:5)

תְּנַן: בְּהֵמָה הַמְקַשָּׁה לֵילֵד, וְהוֹצִיא הָעוּבָּר אֶת יָדוֹ וְהֶחְזִירוֹ – מוּתָּר בַּאֲכִילָה. מַאי לָאו אַאֵבֶר? לָא, אַעוּבָּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara raises a difficulty: **We learned** in the mishna: If **an animal was encountering difficulty giving birth and** as a result **the fetus extended its foreleg** outside the mother animal’s body **but** then **brought it back,** and then the animal was slaughtered, the **consumption** of the fetus is **permitted** by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. The Gemara assumes: **What,** is the mishna **not referring to** the entire fetus, including **the limb,** i.e., the foreleg, when it states that its consumption is permitted by the slaughter? This would contradict Rav’s ruling. The Gemara answers: **No,** the mishna is **referring to** the rest of the **fetus,** apart from the foreleg.


###### Chullin 68a:6
[Chullin 68a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/68a:6)

אִי אַעוּבָּר, מַאי אִירְיָא הֶחְזִירוֹ? אֲפִילּוּ לֹא הֶחְזִירוֹ נָמֵי! הוּא הַדִּין אַף עַל גַּב דְּלֹא הֶחְזִירוֹ. וְאַיְּידֵי דְּקָא בָּעֵי מִיתְנֵא סֵיפָא: הוֹצִיא אֶת רֹאשׁוֹ אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהֶחְזִירוֹ – הֲרֵי זֶה כְּיָלוּד, תְּנָא נָמֵי רֵישָׁא הֶחְזִירוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **If** the mishna is **referring to** the rest of the **fetus, why** state **specifically** that the fetus **brought back** its foreleg? **Even** if it did **not bring it back** the rest of the fetus would still be permitted. The Gemara answers: **The same is true,** that the rest of the fetus is permitted, **even if** it **did not bring back** its foreleg. **But since** the *tanna* of the mishna **wants to teach** in **the latter clause:** If the fetus **extended its head, even though it brought it back,** the halakhic status of **that** fetus is **like** that of **a newborn** and is permitted only through its own slaughter, therefore **he also taught** in **the first clause** that the fetus **brought back** its foreleg, for stylistic reasons, despite the fact that the ruling is not limited to that case.


###### Chullin 68a:7
[Chullin 68a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/68a:7)

וְסֵיפָא, מַאי קָמַשְׁמַע לַן? דְּכֵיוָן דְּיָצָא רֹאשׁוֹ הָוְיָא לַהּ לֵידָה? תְּנֵינָא: אֵיזֶהוּ בְּכוֹר לְנַחֲלָה וְאֵינוֹ בְּכוֹר לְכֹהֲנִים – הַבָּא אַחַר נְפָלִים, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁיָּצָא רֹאשׁוֹ חַי, אוֹ בֶּן תִּשְׁעָה שֶׁיָּצָא רֹאשׁוֹ מֵת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And** concerning this **latter clause** itself, **what does it teach us?** Does it teach **that once** the fetus **extended its head, that is** considered **a birth?** But **we** have already **learned** this in a mishna (*Bekhorot* 46a): **Who is** considered **a firstborn with regard to inheritance but is not** considered **a firstborn with regard to** the requirement to be redeemed by giving five shekels to **the priests?** It is a son **who came after** the **miscarriage** of an underdeveloped fetus. The mishna adds that the category of stillbirth includes the case of a child who did not reach full term, **even if its head emerged alive, or** a fully developed, **nine-**month**-old** fetus **whose head emerged dead.**


###### Chullin 68a:8
[Chullin 68a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/68a:8)

טַעְמָא דְּרֹאשׁוֹ מֵת, הָא רֹאשׁוֹ חַי – הַבָּא אַחֲרָיו בְּכוֹר לְנַחֲלָה נָמֵי לָא הָוֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara infers from the final clause of the mishna: **The reason** a son born following the miscarriage is considered a firstborn with regard to inheritance is **that** the **head** of the miscarriage emerged only after it was already **dead. But** if **its head** had initially emerged **alive,** even if it then died before being fully delivered, the son **born after him would not be** considered **a firstborn even with regard to inheritance.** Apparently, this is because the emergence of the head alive is considered a birth, and therefore any subsequent child cannot be considered the firstborn. Evidently, it is unnecessary for the mishna here to teach this definition of a birth.


###### Chullin 68a:9
[Chullin 68a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/68a:9)

וְכִי תֵּימָא, אַשְׁמְעִינַן בְּאָדָם, וְקָא מַשְׁמַע לַן בִּבְהֵמָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if you would say** that the mishna there **teaches us** the definition of birth **with regard to a person, and** the mishna here **teaches us** that the same definition applies **to an animal,** another problem remains, as the Gemara will presently explain.


###### Chullin 68a:10
[Chullin 68a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/68a:10)

דְּאָדָם מִבְּהֵמָה לָא יָלֵיף, דְּאֵין פְּרוֹזְדוֹר לִבְהֵמָה, וּבְהֵמָה מֵאָדָם לָא יָלְפָא, דַּחֲשִׁיב פַּרְצוּף פָּנִים דִּידֵיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Before explaining the problem with this suggestion, the Gemara explains why it is necessary to teach the definition with regard to both people and animals: **Because** the definition of birth with regard to **a person cannot be derived from** that **of an animal, as an animal does not have a concealed opening [*prozdor*]** to the womb, unlike women, whose thighs conceal the opening to their womb. Consequently, even if the definition were stated with regard to an animal, one might limit it to animals, as that stage is immediately visible; whereas in women it is not. **And** conversely, the definition of birth with regard to **an animal cannot be derived from** that of **a person, as the form of** a person’s **face is significant** because people are created in the image of God, and their faces bear the mark of their intelligence, which is not true of animals. Consequently, perhaps the emergence of the head alone is considered a birth only with regard to a person.


###### Chullin 68a:11
[Chullin 68a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/68a:11)

הָא נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא: שִׁלְיָא שֶׁיָּצְתָה מִקְצָתָהּ – אֲסוּרָה בַּאֲכִילָה, כְּסִימָן וָלָד בָּאִשָּׁה כָּךְ סִימָן וָלָד בַּבְּהֵמָה!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara proceeds to explain why the above suggestion is not a solution: With regard to **this** *halakha* **also,** that the emergence of the head of an animal is considered a birth, **we** have already **learned** it in a mishna (77a): If **part of a placenta emerged** from the womb of an animal before it was slaughtered, its **consumption** is **prohibited** even after the mother animal is slaughtered. The reason for this is just **as** the placenta is **an indication of** the presence of **a fetus in a woman, so too,** it is **an indication of** the presence of **a fetus in an animal.** Consequently, it is possible that the part of the placenta that emerged contained the head of the fetus, and accordingly it would be considered to have been born. The slaughter of the mother animal would therefore not permit it for consumption. Evidently, it is unnecessary for the mishna here to teach the definition of a birth even with regard to an animal.


###### Chullin 68a:12
[Chullin 68a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/68a:12)

אִי אָמְרַתְּ בִּשְׁלָמָא הֶחְזִירוֹ דְּרֵישָׁא דַּוְקָא, תְּנָא סֵיפָא אַטּוּ רֵישָׁא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara has established that the latter clause does not teach any novelty. Accordingly, it returns to challenging Rav’s ruling: **Granted,** the mishna is understood **if you say** that the statement that the fetus **brought** its foreleg **back** inside the mother animal, which is mentioned **in the first clause** of the mishna, is written **specifically** in order to teach the novelty that the foreleg is permitted if it was brought back before the slaughter, in contrast to Rav’s ruling. If so, then one can claim the mishna **taught** it in **the latter clause due to the first clause,** so that they would be parallel stylistically, and no novelty is necessary in the latter clause.


###### Chullin 68a:13
[Chullin 68a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/68a:13)

אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ: לָא דְּרֵישָׁא דַּוְקָא, וְלָא דְּסֵיפָא דַּוְקָא, לְמָה לֵיהּ לְמִתְנְיַיהּ כְּלָל?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But if you say the first clause** is **not** written **specifically** and does not teach a novelty, but rather the mishna is referring to the permitted status of the rest of the fetus, which is permitted even if it does not bring back its foreleg, **and** you also say **the latter clause is not** written **specifically** to teach a novelty, since the definition of birth is already taught in a mishna elsewhere, then **why does it** need **to teach** the *halakha* that the foreleg or head were brought back **at all?** Perforce, the first clause must be referring to the permitted status of the foreleg and limiting it specifically to the case where it was brought back inside. This contradicts Rav’s ruling.


###### Chullin 68a:14
[Chullin 68a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/68a:14)

לָא, לְעוֹלָם אַעוּבָּר, וְכִדְאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: לֹא נִצְרְכָה אֶלָּא לִמְקוֹם חֲתָךְ. הָכָא נָמֵי, לֹא נִצְרְכָה אֶלָּא לִמְקוֹם חֲתָךְ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara responds: **No; actually,** the mishna is **referring to** the permitted status of the rest of the **fetus, but** nevertheless, the statement that the fetus brought back its foreleg does teach a novelty. This is **similar to that which Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said,** in explanation of a ruling in a *baraita* cited below, that it is **necessary only with regard to the location of a cut** limb on the fetus’s body. If the foreleg were to be severed at precisely the point that lay on the boundary between the inside and the outside of the womb, then the location of the cut on the fetus’s body would also be prohibited. **Here too,** one can explain that the ruling is **necessary only with regard to the location of the cut,** and it teaches that if the fetus did not bring back its foreleg, then not only is the foreleg prohibited but the location of the cut is also prohibited.


###### Chullin 68a:15
[Chullin 68a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/68a:15)

תָּא שְׁמַע: בְּהֵמָה הַמְקַשָּׁה לֵילֵד, הוֹצִיא עוּבָּר אֶת יָדוֹ וְהֶחְזִירָהּ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׁחַט אֶת אִמּוֹ – מוּתָּר בַּאֲכִילָה. שָׁחַט אֶת אִמּוֹ וְאַחַר כָּךְ הֶחְזִירָהּ – אָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests: **Come** and **hear** a challenge to Rav’s ruling from a *baraita*: If **an animal was encountering difficulty giving birth,** and as a result **the fetus extended its foreleg** outside the mother animal’s body **and then brought it back** inside **and** then **afterward one slaughtered its mother,** its **consumption** is **permitted** by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. But if **one** first **slaughtered its mother, and** only **afterward** did the fetus **return its** foreleg back inside, its **consumption** is **prohibited.**


###### Chullin 68a:16
[Chullin 68a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/68a:16)

הוֹצִיא אֶת יָדוֹ וַחֲתָכוֹ, וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׁחַט אֶת אִמּוֹ – שֶׁבַּחוּץ טָמֵא וְאָסוּר, וְשֶׁבִּפְנִים טָהוֹר וּמוּתָּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
If the fetus **extended its foreleg** outside **and** one **cut it** off, **and** then **afterward one slaughtered its mother,** then the part of the foreleg **that was outside** and was cut off is **ritually impure and** its consumption is **prohibited,** as it has the status of a limb cut from a living animal, which is forbidden. **And** the rest of the fetus **that was inside** is **ritually pure and** its consumption is **permitted** by virtue the slaughter of the mother animal.


###### Chullin 68a:17
[Chullin 68a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/68a:17)

שָׁחַט אֶת אִמּוֹ וְאַחַר כָּךְ חֲתָכוֹ –

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
If **one slaughtered its mother and** only **afterward cut off** the foreleg that had been extended outside,