## Chullin Daf 69a

###### Chullin 69a:1
[Chullin 69a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/69a:1)

זֶה הַכְּלָל: דָּבָר שֶׁגּוּפָהּ – אָסוּר, וְשֶׁאֵינָהּ גּוּפָהּ – מוּתָּר. שֶׁאֵין גּוּפָהּ לְאֵתוֹיֵי מַאי? לָאו לְאֵתוֹיֵי כְּהַאי גַּוְנָא?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**This is the principle: An item that is** part of an animal’s **body** that was severed prior to the slaughter is **prohibited** to be consumed even after slaughter, **and** an item **that is not** part of **its body,** i.e., its fetus, is **permitted** by virtue of its slaughter. The Gemara asks: Just prior to stating the principle, the mishna states the *halakha* that even if parts of a fetus are cut from it the slaughter of the mother permits it. If so, when the mishna presents the principle and states that an item **that is not** part of **its body** is permitted, **what is added?** Is it **not to include a case like this,** where the majority of the fetus has already left the womb, and nevertheless the principle clarifies that the rest of the fetus that remains inside the womb is permitted?


###### Chullin 69a:2
[Chullin 69a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/69a:2)

לָא, לְאֵתוֹיֵי קָלוּט בִּמְעֵי פָּרָה, וְאַלִּיבָּא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, דְּאַף עַל גַּב דְּאָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: קָלוּט בֶּן פָּרָה אָסוּר – הָנֵי מִילֵּי הֵיכָא דְּיָצָא לַאֲוִיר הָעוֹלָם, אֲבָל בִּמְעֵי אִמּוֹ – שְׁרֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects this suggestion: **No, it comes to include** a fetus with **non-cloven hooves** found **inside the womb of a cow** that was slaughtered. Although the fetus does not bear the hallmarks of a kosher animal, which has split hooves and chews its cud, it is nevertheless permitted to be consumed by virtue of the slaughter of its mother. **And** a specific clause in the mishna permitting this is necessary **according to** the opinion **of Rabbi Shimon, as Rabbi Shimon says:** A calf with **non-cloven hooves born from a** kosher **cow** is **forbidden,** as the calf does not bear the hallmarks of a kosher animal. The mishna teaches that **this matter** applies only **where** the fetus **emerged into the airspace of the world,** i.e., it was born before the mother animal was slaughtered. **But** if it is still **inside its mother’s womb** when the mother is slaughtered, it is permitted to be consumed.


###### Chullin 69a:3
[Chullin 69a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/69a:3)

בָּעֵי רַב חֲנַנְיָא: הוֹצִיא עוּבָּר אֶת יָדוֹ בָּעֲזָרָה, מַהוּ? מִגּוֹ דְּהָוֵי מְחִיצָה לְגַבֵּי קָדָשִׁים – הָוֵי נָמֵי לְגַבֵּי דְּהַאי, אוֹ דִלְמָא לְגַבֵּי דְּהַאי לָאו מְחִיצָה הִיא, דִּמְחִיצַת עוּבָּר – אִמּוֹ הִיא?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The Gemara taught that the reason to deem a limb of a fetus that was extended outside the womb forbidden for consumption is because it went outside of its boundary. Based on this, **Rav Ḥananya raises a dilemma:** If the **fetus** of a sacrificial animal of the most sacred order **extended its foreleg** outside the womb while **in the** Temple **courtyard** and then brought it back, **what is** the *halakha*? Will the slaughter of the mother permit that limb? Do we say that **since** the courtyard **is** regarded as the **boundary for** such **sacrificial** animals, as they are permitted only when in the courtyard, therefore **it is also** regarded as the boundary **for this** fetus, and even if it extended its limb outside of the womb, it is irrelevant since it ultimately remained within its boundary? **Or perhaps, for this** fetus, the courtyard **is not** considered its **boundary, as the boundary of a fetus is its mother,** and so the limb would become prohibited.


###### Chullin 69a:4
[Chullin 69a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/69a:4)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: וְתִבְּעֵי לָךְ קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים בִּירוּשָׁלַיִם? קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים בִּירוּשָׁלַיִם מַאי טַעְמָא לָא קָא מִיבַּעְיָא לָךְ? דִּמְחִיצַת עוּבָּר אִמּוֹ הִוא, הָכָא נָמֵי מְחִיצַת עוּבָּר אִמּוֹ הִוא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Abaye said to** Rav Ḥananya: **But** why don’t **you raise** the same **dilemma** with regard to the fetuses of **offerings of lesser sanctity,** which are permitted only **within Jerusalem?** Abaye continues: It would appear that concerning **offerings of lesser sanctity within Jerusalem, what is the reason** that **you did not raise** this **dilemma?** It is because it is clear to you **that the boundary of a fetus is its mother.** But **here too,** concerning a fetus of an offering of the most sacred order, one must say that **the boundary of a fetus is its mother,** and not the Temple courtyard.


###### Chullin 69a:5
[Chullin 69a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/69a:5)

בָּעֵי אִילְפָא: הוֹצִיא עוּבָּר אֶת יָדוֹ בֵּין סִימָן לְסִימָן, מַהוּ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The *baraita* cited on 68b discusses the case of a fetus that extended a limb outside the womb. It cites the opinion of the Rabbis that although the slaughter of the mother does not permit the consumption of the limb, it does prevent it from being defined as a carcass with the associated ritual impurity. Based on this, **Ilfa raises a dilemma: If** the **fetus extended its foreleg** outside the womb **between** the severing of its mother’s windpipe, which is **one of the organs that must be severed in ritual slaughter [*siman*],** and the severing of the other ***siman*,** the gullet, **what is** the *halakha*?


###### Chullin 69a:6
[Chullin 69a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/69a:6)

מִי מִצְטָרֵף סִימָן רִאשׁוֹן לְסִימָן שֵׁנִי לְטַהוֹרֵיהּ מִידֵי נְבֵלָה, אוֹ לָא? אָמַר רָבָא: קַל וָחוֹמֶר, אִם הוֹעִיל לוֹ סִימָן רִאשׁוֹן לְסִימָן שֵׁנִי לְהַתִּירוֹ בַּאֲכִילָה, לֹא יוֹעִיל לוֹ לְטַהוֹרֵיהּ מִידֵי נְבֵלָה?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Does** the cutting of the **first *siman* combine with** that of **the second *siman* to render** that limb **pure from** the impurity of **a carcass or not?** The cutting of the first *siman* could potentially permit the consumption of the limb, as the limb was still inside the womb, whereas the cutting of the second *siman* could not permit consumption, as the limb had already been extended outside the womb. Since they have different effects, can they combine to render the limb pure? **Rava said:** It is **an *a fortiori*** inference: **If** the cutting of the **first *siman* was effective to** the extent that it can combine with the cutting of the **second *siman* to permit** the rest of the fetus **for consumption, will it not be effective** with regard to the limb **to render it pure from** the impurity of **a carcass?**


###### Chullin 69a:7
[Chullin 69a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/69a:7)

בָּעֵי רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: מַהוּ לָחוֹשׁ לְזַרְעוֹ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Yirmeya raises a dilemma:** If a fetus extended a limb outside the womb, thereby rendering the limb forbidden, and then, after the mother animal was slaughtered, the fetus emerged alive, **what is** the *halakha* **concerning** whether there is a need **to be concerned with regard to** any **offspring of** that fetus, i.e., that the prohibition pertaining to its limb will pass on to its offspring?


###### Chullin 69a:8
[Chullin 69a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/69a:8)

הֵיכִי דָמֵי? אִילֵּימָא דַּאֲזַל אַבְּהֵמָה מְעַלַּיְיתָא, מַאי אִירְיָא הַאי דְּאִית בֵּיהּ אִיסּוּר יוֹצֵא?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara clarifies: **What are the circumstances** of this case? **If we say** the dilemma applies to the offspring in a case **where** the fetus matured and **mated with a full-fledged,** normal **animal,** which would be fully permitted if slaughtered, then **why** raise this dilemma **specifically** with regard to **this** fetus, **which has a prohibition** attached to it caused **by leaving** its boundary?


###### Chullin 69a:9
[Chullin 69a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/69a:9)

אֲפִילּוּ בֶּן פְּקוּעָה דְּעָלְמָא נָמֵי, דְּאָמַר רַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא: לְדִבְרֵי הָאוֹמֵר חוֹשְׁשִׁין לְזֶרַע הָאָב, בֶּן פְּקוּעָה הַבָּא עַל בְּהֵמָה מְעַלַּיְיתָא – הַוָּלָד אֵין לוֹ תַּקָּנָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Even** in the case of **a regular fetus that emerged alive from its mother’s womb after the mother was slaughtered [*ben pekua*],** which is permitted without the need for any slaughter, the dilemma could **also** be raised, **as Rav Mesharshiyya says: According to the statement of the one who says** that when defining the status of an animal **one** needs **to be concerned with its paternity** and not only its maternity, if **a *ben pekua* mated with a full-fledged animal, the offspring has no rectification.** The offspring of two *ben pekua* animals is permitted without ritual slaughter. But if the father is a *ben pekua* but not the mother, then it is simultaneously defined as requiring slaughter, based on the mother, and being excluded from the possibility of being permitted through slaughter, based on the father. Therefore, no act of slaughter can permit it.


###### Chullin 69a:10
[Chullin 69a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/69a:10)

לָא צְרִיכָא, דַּאֲזַל אַבֶּן פְּקוּעָה דִּכְוָותֵיהּ. מַאי? אֵבֶר מוֹלִיד אֵבֶר, וְחָתֵיךְ לֵיהּ וּשְׁרֵי, אוֹ דִלְמָא מִבַּלְבַּל זַרְעֵיהּ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **No,** the dilemma does not concern that case. Rather, it is **necessary** in a case in **which** the fetus later **mated with a *ben pekua* like it** and had offspring. Since neither of the parents require slaughter, the offspring does not require it either. In such a case, **what** is the *halakha*? To what extent does the prohibition pertaining to the limb of the father pass to the offspring? Do we say that each **limb** of the father **produces** the corresponding **limb** in the offspring, **and** so only the parallel limb in the offspring is prohibited, **and** therefore **one** could **sever** that limb **and** the rest of the offspring will be **permitted? Or perhaps** the father’s **seed is intermingled** through the entire offspring, and so the entire offspring is prohibited.


###### Chullin 69a:11
[Chullin 69a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/69a:11)

הֲדַר אָמַר: פְּשִׁיטָא דְּמִבַּלְבַּל זַרְעֵיהּ, דְּאִם כֵּן, סוֹמֵא יִוָּלֵד סוֹמֵא, וְקִיטֵּעַ יִוָּלֵד קִיטֵּעַ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
After raising this dilemma, Rabbi Yirmeya **then said:** It is **obvious that the seed of** the father **is intermingled** through the entire offspring, **as if** it were **so** that each limb produces the corresponding limb, every **blind** father would **bear blind** offspring, **and an amputee** father would **bear** offspring that is **an amputee.**


###### Chullin 69a:12
[Chullin 69a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/69a:12)

אֶלָּא פְּשִׁיטָא דְּמִבַּלְבַּל זַרְעֵיהּ, וְהָכִי קָמִיבַּעְיָא לַן: בְּהֵמָה בְּעָלְמָא, לָאו מִכֹּחַ חֵלֶב וָדָם קָאָתְיָא, וְשָׁרְיָא? הָכָא נָמֵי לָא שְׁנָא. אוֹ דִלְמָא: תְּרֵי אִיסּוּרֵי אָמְרִינַן, תְּלָתָא לָא אָמְרִינַן?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** it is **obvious that the seed of** the father **is intermingled, and this is** the **dilemma we are raising:** Even with regard to **a regular animal,** is it **not produced from the influence of** the forbidden **fat and blood** of its father and mother, **and** yet it **is permitted** to be consumed? **Here too,** it **is no different,** and although the forbidden limb of the father was an influence in the offspring’s formation, the offspring should nevertheless be permitted. **Or perhaps we say** that the Torah permitted these **two prohibitions,** the consumption of forbidden fat and the consumption of blood, but **we do not say** that it permitted **three** prohibitions, i.e., also the prohibition of a limb that left its boundary.


###### Chullin 69a:13
[Chullin 69a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/69a:13)

וּלְמַאן? אִי לְרַבִּי מֵאִיר – אִיסּוּר חֵלֶב וָדָם אִיכָּא, אִיסּוּר יוֹצֵא לֵיכָּא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And according to whom** is it possible to speak of three prohibitions in order to raise this dilemma? **If** it is **in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Meir** that is difficult, because he holds that a fetus that has completed its gestational term is regarded as being independent of its mother and is no longer permitted by virtue of its mother’s slaughter. Consequently, **there is a prohibition of** forbidden **fat and blood,** just like any other animal, **but there is no prohibition of** a limb that **leaves** its boundary, as its permitted status is no longer dependent on being within its mother’s womb.


###### Chullin 69a:14
[Chullin 69a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/69a:14)

אִי לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה – אִיסּוּר יוֹצֵא אִיכָּא, אִיסּוּר חֵלֶב וָדָם לֵיכָּא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
And **if** you say it is **in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yehuda** that is also difficult, because he holds that since ultimately the offspring was inside its mother’s womb when the mother was slaughtered, the fetus is permitted in its entirety by virtue of that slaughter. Consequently, **there is a prohibition of** a limb that **leaves** its boundary, **but there is no prohibition of** forbidden **fat and blood.**


###### Chullin 69a:15
[Chullin 69a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/69a:15)

דִּתְנַן: גִּיד הַנָּשֶׁה נוֹהֵג בַּשְּׁלִיל, וְחֶלְבּוֹ אָסוּר, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אֵין נוֹהֵג בַּשְּׁלִיל, וְחֶלְבּוֹ מוּתָּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara cites the source of the opinions of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda: **As we learned** in a *baraita*: The prohibition of the **sciatic nerve applies to the fetus** that had already completed its gestational term when its mother was slaughtered, **and** likewise **its fat is forbidden;** this is **the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says** that the prohibition of the **sciatic nerve does not apply to the fetus, and its fat is permitted.** Evidently, according to all opinions, both the prohibitions of forbidden fat and blood and the prohibition of a limb that leaves its boundary cannot apply to the same animal.


###### Chullin 69a:16
[Chullin 69a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/69a:16)

אֶלָּא, כֹּל מִכֹּחַ לָא אָמְרִינַן דִּשְׁרֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** it must be that **we do not say** that **any** item that is produced **from the influence of** a forbidden entity is itself forbidden, **as** in fact **it is permitted.** Therefore, it would certainly be permitted to consume the offspring of a fetus whose limb had been forbidden, and the dilemma does not concern such an animal.


###### Chullin 69a:17
[Chullin 69a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/69a:17)

וְהָכִי קָמִיבַּעְיָא לַן: מַהוּ לִגְמוֹעַ אֶת חֶלְבּוֹ? חֵלֶב דְּעָלְמָא לָא כְּאֵבֶר מִן הַחַי דָּמֵי, וּשְׁרֵי, הַאי נָמֵי לָא שְׁנָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And this is** the **dilemma** that **we are raising: What is** the *halakha* **with regard to drinking** the **milk** of a fetus whose limb is forbidden? **Isn’t regular milk** of a normal animal **comparable to a limb from a living** animal, given that it is taken from a live animal, **and** yet it **is permitted?** If so, **this** milk **too** should be **no different,** and although the milk comes from an animal whose limb is forbidden as a limb from a living animal, as it was not permitted through the slaughter of its mother, nevertheless, the milk should be permitted.


###### Chullin 69a:18
[Chullin 69a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/69a:18)

אוֹ דִלְמָא הָתָם, אִית לֵיהּ תַּקַּנְתָּא לְאִיסּוּרֵיהּ בִּשְׁחִיטָה, הָכָא לֵית לֵיהּ תַּקַּנְתָּא לְאִיסּוּרֵיהּ בִּשְׁחִיטָה? תֵּיקוּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Or perhaps there,** with regard to regular milk, the Torah waives the prohibition of a limb from a living animal, **as there is a rectification for its prohibition through slaughter.** But **here,** with regard to a fetus whose limb is forbidden as a limb from a living animal, **there is no rectification for its prohibition through slaughter.** The Gemara accepts that this was the dilemma, but concludes that no resolution for it was found, and so the dilemma **shall stand** unresolved.


###### Chullin 69a:19
[Chullin 69a:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/69a:19)

חוֹתֵךְ מֵעוּבָּר וְכוּ׳. מְנָלַן? דִּכְתִיב: ״וְכׇל בְּהֵמָה מַפְרֶסֶת פַּרְסָה וְגוֹ׳״, ״בְּהֵמָה … בַּבְּהֵמָה״ – לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַוָּלָד.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna states: If, prior to slaughtering an animal, one **severed** pieces **from a fetus** that is in its womb, leaving those pieces in the womb, their consumption is permitted by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal. The Gemara asks: **From where do we** derive this *halakha*? It is derived from a verse, **as it is written: “And every animal that has a split hoof** and is cloven into two hooves, chews the cud, of the animals, it you may eat” (Deuteronomy 14:6). The term “of the animals [*babehema*]” is translated literally as: In the animal, and is referring to the term “every animal” mentioned at the beginning of the verse. Accordingly, the verse may be read as saying: Every **animal in the animal** you may eat, and is referring to a fetus inside its mother. It therefore serves **to include the offspring,** i.e., the fetus, as being permitted by its mother’s slaughter, even if parts of the fetus had been severed.


###### Chullin 69a:20
[Chullin 69a:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/69a:20)

אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, יָמִירוּ בּוֹ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara objects: **If that is so,** that the phrase: Every animal of the animals, is referring to a fetus, then one should be able to **substitute** a non-sacred animal **for** the sanctified fetus of a pregnant offering, i.e., the non-sacred animal should become consecrated through the attempt to do so. This is because the verse referring to substitution also uses that phrase: “And if he shall substitute an animal for an animal [*behema bivhema*], it and its substitute shall be consecrated” (Leviticus 27:10). There too, the phrase “an animal for an animal” translates literally as: An animal in an animal.


###### Chullin 69a:21
[Chullin 69a:21](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/69a:21)

אַלְּמָה תְּנַן: אֵין מְמִירִין לֹא אֵבָרִין בְּעוּבָּרִין, וְלֹא עוּבָּרִין בְּאֵבָרִין, וְלֹא אֵבָרִין וְעוּבָּרִין בִּשְׁלֵמִין, וְלֹא שְׁלֵמִין בָּהֶן!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Why,** then, **did we learn** in a mishna (*Temura* 10a): **One cannot substitute limbs** of a non-sacred animal **for fetuses** of pregnant offerings, i.e., those limbs will not thereby be consecrated; **and** one **cannot** substitute **fetuses** of non-sacred animals **for limbs** of an offering, **and** one **cannot** substitute **limbs and fetuses** of non-sacred animals **for whole** offerings, **and** one **cannot** substitute **whole,** non-sacred animals **for them,** i.e., limbs and fetuses of offerings?


###### Chullin 69a:22
[Chullin 69a:22](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/69a:22)

אֶלָּא, אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְכׇל בְּהֵמָה״, לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הַוָּלָד.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** the *halakha* that a fetus and its severed pieces are permitted to be consumed by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal is derived from that which **the verse states: “And every animal.”** The term “and every” serves **to include the offspring,** i.e., the fetus, as being permitted, even if parts of it had been severed.


###### Chullin 69a:23
[Chullin 69a:23](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/69a:23)

אִי הָכִי, אֲפִילּוּ חוֹתֵךְ מִן הַטְּחוֹל וּמִן הַכְּלָיוֹת נָמֵי, אַלְּמָה תְּנַן: חוֹתֵךְ מִן הָעוּבָּר שֶׁבְּמֵעֶיהָ – מוּתָּר בַּאֲכִילָה, מִן הַטְּחוֹל וּמִן הַכְּלָיוֹת – אָסוּר בַּאֲכִילָה? אָמַר קְרָא: ״אוֹתָהּ״ – שְׁלֵמָה וְלֹא חֲסֵרָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara objects: **If so,** then **even** if **one severs** pieces **of the spleen or of the kidneys** of an animal, those pieces should be permitted **as well. Why,** then, **did we learn** in the mishna: If one **severed** pieces **from a fetus that was in** its **womb,** leaving those pieces in the womb, their **consumption** is **permitted** by virtue of the slaughter of the mother animal, but if one severed pieces **of the spleen or of the kidneys** of an animal and then slaughtered it their **consumption** is **prohibited?** The Gemara explains: That **verse states:** “Of the animal, **it** you may eat,” which indicates that slaughter permits consumption of only the **whole** animal, **but not** of the parts of the animal that it is **lacking,** i.e., the parts that were severed.


###### Chullin 69a:24
[Chullin 69a:24](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Chullin/r/69a:24)

אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַבְּהֵמָה וּמָצָא בָּהּ דְּמוּת יוֹנָה תִּשְׁתְּרֵי? אַלְּמָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַשּׁוֹחֵט אֶת הַבְּהֵמָה וּמָצָא בָּהּ דְּמוּת יוֹנָה (אסור) [אֲסוּרָה] בַּאֲכִילָה?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara objects: **If that is so,** that the *halakha* is derived from the term “and every animal,” then even in the case of **one who slaughters an animal and finds a dove-shaped** fetus **in it, it should be permitted. Why,** then, **does Rabbi Yoḥanan say: One who slaughters an animal and finds a dove-shaped** fetus **in it,** that fetus is **prohibited for consumption?**