## Em LaMikra, Leviticus

###### Em LaMikra, Leviticus 20:2:1
[Em LaMikra, Leviticus 20:2:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Em%20LaMikra/s/Leviticus/r/20:2:1)

**מזרעו למלך.** חז"ל אמרו מזרעו ולא כל זרעו — וכבר אמרו בזה שמחקי המלך להקריב בן אחד בלבד ועל כן אינו חייב משום ע"ז אלא בעושה כמעשיהם, אך לא הביאו ע"ז ראיה, ואני מצאתי שבהודו משפט לכהנים להקריב ביום אחד מימי אידם, איש **אחר** וסוס אחד ושור אחד Creuzer Relig.de I' antiq.Tome.I.664.

**Vayiqra in Context. An English summary by Sina Kahen and Ben Rothstein; Da'at Press, 2024:**
*And to the Israelites you shall say: ‘Every man of the Israelites and of the sojourners who sojourns in Israel who gives of his seed to Molekh is doomed to die. The people of the land shall stone him.*
Rabbi Benamozegh explores the specificities of the idolatrous practice to offer a child to Molekh, a Canaanite deity associated with child sacrifice.


###### Em LaMikra, Leviticus 20:2:2
[Em LaMikra, Leviticus 20:2:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Em%20LaMikra/s/Leviticus/r/20:2:2)

[השמטה: **מזרעו למולך.** רבותינו אמרו מזרעו ולא כל זרעו עיין במקומו, ואין ספק כי רבותינו היה לאל ידם להשיג בטיב ע"ז זו מה שלא נוכל אנחנו להשיג, כי בזמנם עדיין כפרחת עלתה ניצה ונתברר בראיות כי עד שנת. 424 לחשבונם עדין היו זבחי אדם לע"ז במלכות רומי.]

**Vayiqra in Context. An English summary by Sina Kahen and Ben Rothstein; Da'at Press, 2024:**
He references Ḥazal’s careful distinction when commenting on the verse, that the directive applies to those *“**of his** seed and not **all his** seed”* (*Sanhedrin* 64b). This *derasha* indicates that if one passed all one’s children through the fire, that person would be exempt from the punishment of idolatry. This is due to the practise of sacrificing only one child to Molekh, hence the prohibition on idolatry applies to offering only **of** his seed, and not **all** his seed. However, Rabbi Benamozegh notes that Ḥazal did not bring a proof for this assertion. Therefore, he draws a parallel with a custom documented in India, as described by 18th century German archaeologist, Georg Creuzer. According to Creuzer, during certain festivals, priests would sacrifice one man, one horse, and one ox. Rabbi Benamozegh uses this example to suggest that these acts might be similar to what is being condemned in our verse, where only one son is sacrificed.
Additionally, Rabbi Benamozegh notes that Ḥazal had a deeper insight into the nature of this idolatry, as it was more prevalent during their times. The evidence suggests that human sacrifices for idolatry were still performed in the Roman Empire as late as the year 424. This context would allow for Ḥazal’s more profound understanding of the verse and the nature of the specific condemnation of idolatrous practices it entails.


###### Em LaMikra, Leviticus 20:3:1
[Em LaMikra, Leviticus 20:3:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Em%20LaMikra/s/Leviticus/r/20:3:1)

**ואני אתן את פני באיש ההוא והכרתי אותו וגו'.** והלא כבר אמר מות יומת עם הארץ ירגמוהו באבן-בא ללמד מהו ענין הכרת שהנפש נכרתת אחר מיתה ושתים זו שמעת, האחת שהנפש מטבעה להיות קיימת לולי הכרת, והשנית, שהכרת הוא עונש רוחניי, שהרי מזומן לאחר מיתה — ואם תאמר מקרב עמו איך יתכן לאחר מיתה הרי הוא אומר בכל מקום במיתת הצדיקים יאסף אל **עמיו**, ונאספת אל עמך גם אתה, ואתה תבוא אל אבותיך בשלום וגו' ואינו ר"ל שיקבר אצלם שהרי א"א נקבר בחברון רחוק מאבותיו, וכן בישמעאל נאמר ויגוע וימת ויאסף אל עמיו, ולהפך ברשעים יאמר **שיכרתו מקרב עמם**, הכוונה שלא תהיה להם מנוחה ושלות השקט בכלל שאר המתים.

**Vayiqra in Context. An English summary by Sina Kahen and Ben Rothstein; Da'at Press, 2024:**
*And as for Me, I shall set My face against the man and cut him off from the midst of his people, for he has given of his seed to Molekh so as to defile my sanctuary and to profane My sacred name.*
Rabbi Benamozegh begins his analysis of this verse by questioning the apparent redundancy of this punishment, as it was already stated in the previous verse that such a person *“shall be put to death; the people of the land shall pelt the person with stones.”*
Rabbi Benamozegh clarifies that this verse is explicating the concept of *“cutting off”* or “*karet”* (כרת) – a punishment that extends beyond physical death.
He emphasises two key insights: firstly, that the soul is inherently eternal and only ceases to be so if it is *“cut off”*. This concept underscores the gravity of “*karet*”, as it is not merely a physical demise but an obliteration of the eternal soul. Secondly, he reiterates that “*karet*” is indeed a spiritual consequence, inflicted post-mortem.
Rabbi Benamozegh then addresses the phrase *“from the midst of his people”* in our verse, in the context of death. He draws a contrast between the righteous and the wicked in their death. For the righteous such as Abraham, Ya’aqob, Yiṣḥaq, and others, we see phrases such as *“he shall be gathered unto his people”* (ויאסף אל עמיו)*,* and *“you shall go to your fathers in peace”*, implying a peaceful transition and reunion with ancestors after physical death. This, Rabbi Benamozegh argues, is not a reference to physical burial, as illustrated by Abraham who was buried in Hebron, far from his forefathers.
In stark contrast to being *“gathered unto”* their people, the wicked are described as being *“cut off”* from the midst of their people. Rabbi Benamozegh interprets this as a lack of peace or tranquillity in the afterlife. Unlike the righteous, who find rest and unity with their ancestors, the wicked are subjected to a form of eternal unrest and isolation, separated from their people even in death.


###### Em LaMikra, Leviticus 20:3:2
[Em LaMikra, Leviticus 20:3:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Em%20LaMikra/s/Leviticus/r/20:3:2)

**למען טמא את מקדשי.** מקדשי האמור כאן אין הכוונה על בית המקדש בלבד רק דרך כלל על ארץ ישראל, והעם הנבחר וגם השכינה השוכנת בתוכם, והעד ולמען חלל את שם קדשי, והמשתדל נלחץ לפרשו באופן רחוק כדי לברוח מפשוטו המעיד על אמתות אמונות הקבלה ופירש כי הזובח את בניו למולך מורה במעשיו כי עבודת ה' בבי"המק גרועה מזה כי אין קרבים שם אלא ב"ח בלבד, ומה יעשה מאזהרות כיוצא בזאת שבאו בענינים אחרים כמו ולא תטמאו את מקדשי — ומה נעמו דברי רש"י שפירש כאן **מקדשי זו כנסת ישראל וגו'** והגם שכוונתו ז"ל על כללות ישראל, מי שלו חיך לטעום יבין כי רוח הקבלה רוחפת על כל דבריו בזה עיין עליו.

**Vayiqra in Context. An English summary by Sina Kahen and Ben Rothstein; Da'at Press, 2024:**
Rabbi Benamozegh then turns his attention to another phrase in the verse, *“to defile My sanctuary”.* He posits that the sanctuary in this context is not limited to the physical Temple, but rather encompasses a broader conceptualisation. This includes the land of Israel, the Jewish people as the chosen people, and the Divine presence that resides among them. Rabbi Benamozegh appreciates a similar interpretation by Rashi. He acknowledges that while Rashi’s interpretation is focused on the collective of Israel, a deeper, more mystical understanding can be gleaned from it, which aligns with the principles of Kabbalah. Rabbi Benamozegh suggests that a discerning reader, with an appreciation for the mystical, would recognise the Kabbalistic undertones in Rashi’s words.
This interpretation serves to underscore the profound sacredness of the Jewish people and their land, elevating them to the status of a sanctuary in the eyes of God. He criticises Shadal’s interpretation, that this does indeed refer to defiling the Temple, as one who sacrifices their child to Molekh is indicating that they view the Temple service – which uses only animals, not humans – as inferior. Rabbi Benamozegh views this interpretation as ‘forced’ in order to deny the Kabbalah.


###### Em LaMikra, Leviticus 20:12:1
[Em LaMikra, Leviticus 20:12:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Em%20LaMikra/s/Leviticus/r/20:12:1)

**דמיהם בם.** בהגהות מימוניות סוף הלכות אבל משם רבינו אפרים כתבו מי שמצאוהו הרוג יקברוהו כמו שמצאוהו בלא תכריכין ולא יחלצו בו אפילו מנעליו, ומהרי"ל כתב שכן עושים ליולדת, ונראה שאין שרש לזה הפסוק לא בגמרא ולא במדרשים, אלא שמצאתי גלוי יקר שיירונימוס שתרגם התורה לנוצרים ומהידוע שמלמדו היה אחד מחכמי א"י, ואולי איזה אמורא נטה מדרך הפשט בתרגמו דמיהם בם ותרגם **בלא דחיצה**, ומפשט דבריו נראה שייחס לתורה הדעת הזה עצמו שמצינו אצל האחרונים דהיינו שההרוג קוברים אותו כמו שמוצאים אותו בלא רחיצה, והוא מהטעם עצמו שכתבו ביולדת שמא רביעית דם שהנפש יוצאה בו נבלע בבגדיו, וביותר יתאמת אצלי שכן הבין יירונימוס להיות שהוא לא יודה כי דמיהם בם ענינו כמ"ש חז"ל אלא כפשוטו שההרוג מתבוסס בדמו — וסוף דבר מצאנו סמך קדמון לדעת אחרוני הפוסקים וקרוב לודאי שמפי איזה אמורא למד יירונימוס הפירוש הזה ולא הוציאו מחדרי לבו להיותו יוצא חוץ מנתיב הפשט, ואלו לא הגיע לו מבחוץ לא היה עולה על דעתו כלל, וגם זו מהראיות שגם אחר חתימת התלמוד נשארו איזה קבלות בלתי כתיבה ונשתרשו באומה מבלי שידע החוקר מקום מוצאם, או לפחות, שהאחרונים נתכוונו לדעת קדמונינו ונתנבאו בסגנון אחד.

**Vayiqra in Context. An English summary by Sina Kahen and Ben Rothstein; Da'at Press, 2024:**
*If a man lies with his daughter-in-law, both of them shall be put to death; they have committed incest, and their blood is upon them.*
Rabbi Benamozegh focuses on the meaning of the phrase *“their blood is upon them”* (דמיהם בם).
He begins by referencing *Haggahot Maimuniyot*, the 13th century Ashkenazi gloss to Rambam’s *Mishneh Torah.* In the glosses on the laws of mourning, it is stated there that one who finds a murdered person should bury them as they are found (i.e. while their *“blood”* is still *“upon them”*), without shrouds or even removing their shoes. The Maharil, a 14th century Ashkenazi scholar, states that this practice is paralleled concerning the burial of women who die in childbirth.
Rabbi Benamozegh points out that there does not seem to be a source for this in the Torah, nor in the Talmud or *midrash.* However, he brings in the early Christian theologian and historian, Jerome of Stridon, who translated the Torah for Christians, and who Rabbi Benamozegh suggests was known to have been taught by *“one of the Sages of Israel, perhaps one of the Amor’aim [who] deviated from the peshat.”* Jerome appears to have deviated from the simple meaning of the verse in his translation by opining that after being put to death, the incestuous pair should be buried without washing, a practice that later authorities also mentioned. This interpretation seems to align with the practice concerning women in childbirth, where it is feared that perhaps the *rebi’it* of blood through which the soul departs has already been absorbed into her clothes, and so the clothes must be buried with her. This concern was rooted in an ancient idea that a significant portion of a person’s life force or soul is associated with their blood.
Rabbi Benamozegh then proposes that Jerome might not have recognised the interpretation given by Ḥazal, rather understanding the verse in its simplest form – that the slain lie in their blood. Through this discussion, Rabbi Benamozegh acknowledges the possibility of an ancient source for the opinion of later decisors, suggesting that Jerome likely learned this interpretation from an *Amora* and did not conceive it independently. This hypothesis is based on the understanding that such an interpretation, deviating from the plain meaning, would not have occurred to Jerome without external influence.
Ultimately, Rabbi Benamozegh argues that Jerome’s interpretation provides evidence that oral traditions continued to evolve and become rooted in our nation even after the sealing of the Talmud. These traditions, having taken root in popular practise, may have been unknown in origin to those who then inquired about them, attempting to find a source. Alternatively, perhaps the later authorities aligned their opinions with those of earlier Sages even unknowingly, thus continuing a unified tradition of interpretation stemming from the same source.


###### Em LaMikra, Leviticus 20:14:1
[Em LaMikra, Leviticus 20:14:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Em%20LaMikra/s/Leviticus/r/20:14:1)

**באש וגו' ואתהן.** פירש במשתדל משם תלמידו שעל שתיהן בא העונש אם הראשונה שוהה עמו ונבעלת לו אחר שלקח השניה, ולחנם עזב דברי רז"ל כי מה חטאה הראשונה אם בעלה לקח גם את בתה, והלא בהתר נשאת לו ולמה תתחייב לצאת ממנו, ועוד שכיצד תענש בדבר שאין בידה לעשותו וכי יכולה היא להתגרש מבעלה בעל כרחו — ואם תאמר שלא תבעל לו, למה תפסיד זכותה והיא נשאת ברשות — ועוד כיצד יתברר הענין בדבר שבינו לבינה עד שיפסקו הדין גם על הראשונה-ועוד שמשעה שלקח השניה כבר נתחייבו הוא והיא עונש מיתה ועל אותה שעה הוא אומר אותו ואתהן, וא"כ למה תתחייב גם הראשונה ולא היה בה כדי שהות — וא"ת שהתורה דברה כששהתה א"כ העקר חסר ולא היה לה לשתוק מתנאי זה העקרי, באופן שפירוש זה בטל מכמה טעמים.

**Vayiqra in Context. An English summary by Sina Kahen and Ben Rothstein; Da'at Press, 2024:**
*And a man who takes a woman and her mother, it is depravity. In fire shall he and they be burned, so that there be no depravity in your midst.*
Rabbi Benamozegh challenges Shadal’s interpretation of this verse. According to this verse, in a case where a man has relations with a woman and then her mother, both women are put to death. Shadal explains that the first woman is put to death only if she knows that this man has had relations with her mother, and continues to remain with him and engage in relations.
Rabbi Benamozegh fails to understand what prompted Shadal to depart from the interpretation provided by the Sages (*Yebamot* 94b). Granted, he wished to explain what the sin of the first woman was, but the Sages limited this verse in multiple ways, for example by stating that the man and only the second woman are put to death.
Rabbi Benamozegh raises multiple questions attacking Shadal’s position. He wonders why the wife should be punished for her husband’s actions, especially considering she was lawfully married to him first. Why should she leave the marriage when she was married correctly? Further, why should she be punished for something that is not within her control, namely divorcing her husband? And if she were to abstain from intimacy with him, causing him to divorce her but without having to pay her *ketuba*, why should she forfeit her rights to her *ketuba* simply because he sinned?
The commentary also delves into the timing of the punishment. Rabbi Benamozegh points out that according to Shadal’s interpretation of the text, the husband and both women are subject to the death penalty immediately upon their wrongful union. If this is the case, why is the first wife also liable to punishment, when she has not had any time to ‘remain’ with him? If you were to respond to that by claiming that the execution is indeed to take place only after some time has elapsed and the first woman has remained with him, then that fundamental piece of information is lacking from the Torah’s description! Rabbi Benamozegh therefore rejects Shadal’s understanding in favour of Ḥazal’s commuting of the punishment.


###### Em LaMikra, Leviticus 20:16:1
[Em LaMikra, Leviticus 20:16:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Em%20LaMikra/s/Leviticus/r/20:16:1)

**ואת הבהמה מות יומתו דמיהם בם.** באומרו דמיהם בם כולל גם הבהמה וכן הוא אומר ואך את דמכם וגו' מיד כל חיה אדרשנו והגם שאין הבהמה בעלת בחירה, יודע נסתרות מבחין שראויה היא ליענש ועד מתי לא נפקח עינינו ונראה שרעיונות כאלה בדברי התורה יתנו עידיהן על אמונת הגלגול ע"פי פשטן הגמור, ולמה יעשו עצמם בעלי הפשט דרשנים להוציאם ממשמעותם כמו שעשה עצמו המשתדל וכתב שלתקוע בלבות בני אדם כי כל פועל רע יקבל ענשו, נכתבו מליצות כאלה על הבהמה--- כאלו העם החכם והנבון הוא גרוע מתנוק קטן שלא יאמין כי יסופר לו כי הבהמה מצד עצמה היא ראויה לשכר ועונש, וכאלו תורת אמת תבדה שקרים מלבה ללמד דעת את העם ואין בכח האמת לבוא עד תכליתו אם לא ישים כזב מחסהו ויסתייע מדברי הבל ורוח — ולכל הפחות למדנו מזה שאין פירוש **דמיהם בם** בכל מקום כמו דמו בראשו דוקא, אבל תהיה ג"כ הכוונה להורות אופן המיתה איך תהיה וכמו שלמדו חז"ל, ועיין מ"ש למעלה **דמיהם בם.**

**Vayiqra in Context. An English summary by Sina Kahen and Ben Rothstein; Da'at Press, 2024:**
*And a woman who approaches any beast to couple with it, you shall kill the woman and the beast. They are doomed to die. Their bloodguilt is on them.*
Rabbi Benamozegh explores this injunction which, on its surface, simply discusses the punishment for bestiality. This verse, however, is delved into deeply to extract broader theological and ethical implications.
Rabbi Benamozegh notes the inclusion of the animal in the punishment (דמיהם בם) which, at first glance, might seem perplexing given that animals, lacking free will and moral discernment, cannot be held accountable for their actions in the same way humans can. This observation leads him to question the rationale behind such a decree and to explore the deeper meanings and implications behind these words.
He argues that this passage suggests a belief in the transmigration of souls *(‘gilgul neshamot’),* a concept found within the Kabbalistic tradition. According to this belief, souls are reincarnated through various forms of existence, including human and animal forms, as part of their spiritual journey and purification process. Rabbi Benamozegh implies that if animals could be subject to Divine punishment, it might hint at the presence of a soul or spiritual essence capable of moral judgement and, subsequently, deserving of punishment or reward.
He criticises those who interpret the text superficially and interpret the Torah's commandments purely on ethical or moral grounds. He suggests that such approaches underestimate the intelligence and spiritual capacity of the people. He argues that the Torah does not need to resort to falsehoods or fabrications to convey its truths and that to suggest otherwise is to undermine the Torah's integrity and the depth of its teachings.
Finally, Rabbi Benamozegh addresses the nuances of capital punishment, indicating that the phrase דמיהם בם is not consistently used throughout the Torah to imply that guilt lies exclusively with the individual (or animal) in question. Rather, it can also instruct on the manner of execution, as understood by the Sages.