## Eruvin Daf 46a

###### Eruvin 46a:1
[Eruvin 46a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/46a:1)

כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן דְּהָווּ לְהוּ נוֹלָד, דַּאֲסִירִי!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara raises a difficulty: If the water was previously not in its current state, **all the more so should it be** considered as something that **came into being [*nolad*]** on the Festival, and consequently it is **prohibited** to carry it. Something that came into being or assumed its present form on Shabbat or Festivals is considered set-aside [*muktze*] and may not be handled on Shabbat or Festivals.


###### Eruvin 46a:2
[Eruvin 46a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/46a:2)

אֶלָּא: מַיָּא בְּעָבִים מֵינָד נָיְידִי. הַשְׁתָּא דְּאָתֵית לְהָכִי, אוֹקְיָינוֹס נָמֵי לָא לִיקְשׁוֹ לָךְ, מַיָּא בְּאוֹקְיָינוֹס נָמֵי מֵינָד נָיְידִי, וְתַנְיָא: נְהָרוֹת הַמּוֹשְׁכִין וּמַעְיָינוֹת הַנּוֹבְעִין הֲרֵי הֵן כְּרַגְלֵי כׇּל אָדָם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** we should say: **The water in clouds** is **in** constant **motion** and therefore does not acquire residence there. The Gemara comments: **Now that you have arrived at this** answer, **the ocean should also not be difficult for you,** as the **water in the ocean is also in** constant **motion. And it was taught** in a *baraita*: **Flowing rivers and streaming springs are like the feet of all people,** as their waters do not acquire residence in any particular place. The same law also applies to clouds and seas.


###### Eruvin 46a:3
[Eruvin 46a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/46a:3)

אָמַר רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב בַּר אִידֵּי אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן נוּרִי. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי זֵירָא לְרַבִּי יַעֲקֹב בַּר אִידִי: בְּפֵירוּשׁ שְׁמִיעַ לָךְ אוֹ מִכְּלָלָא שְׁמִיעַ לָךְ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: בְּפֵירוּשׁ שְׁמִיעַ לִי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi said** that **Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: The *halakha* is in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri,** that one who was asleep at the beginning of Shabbat may travel two thousand cubits in every direction. **Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi:** Did **you hear** this *halakha* **explicitly** from Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, **or did you understand it by inference** from some other ruling that he issued? Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi **said to him: I heard** it **explicitly** from him.


###### Eruvin 46a:4
[Eruvin 46a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/46a:4)

מַאי כְּלָלָא? דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי: הֲלָכָה כְּדִבְרֵי הַמֵּיקֵל בְּעֵירוּב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: From **what** other teaching could this ruling **be inferred?** The Gemara explains: From that **which Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: The *halakha* is in accordance with the lenient** opinion **with regard to an *eiruv*.**


###### Eruvin 46a:5
[Eruvin 46a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/46a:5)

וְתַרְתֵּי לְמָה לִי?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **Why do I need both?** Why was it necessary for Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi to state both the general ruling that the *halakha* is in accordance with the lenient opinion with regard to an *eiruv*, and also the specific ruling that the *halakha* is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri on this issue?


###### Eruvin 46a:6
[Eruvin 46a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/46a:6)

אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: צְרִיכִי, דְּאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן נוּרִי, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא בֵּין לְקוּלָּא וּבֵין לְחוּמְרָא, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן הֲלָכָה כְּדִבְרֵי הַמֵּיקֵל בְּעֵירוּב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Zeira said:** Both rulings **were necessary, as had he informed us** only that **the *halakha* is in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri, I would have said** that the *halakha* is in accordance with him **whether this is a leniency,** i.e., that a sleeping person acquires residence and may walk two thousand cubits in every direction, **or** whether **it is a stringency,** i.e., that ownerless utensils acquire residence and can be carried only two thousand cubits from that place. **Consequently, he teaches us** that **the *halakha* is in accordance with the lenient** opinion **with regard to an *eiruv*,** so that we rule in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri only when it entails a leniency.


###### Eruvin 46a:7
[Eruvin 46a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/46a:7)

וְלֵימָא ״הֲלָכָה כְּדִבְרֵי הַמֵּיקֵל בְּעֵירוּב״. הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן בֶּן נוּרִי לְמָה לִי?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **Let him state** only that **the *halakha* is in accordance with the lenient** opinion **with regard to an *eiruv*. Why do I need** the statement that **the *halakha* is in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri?**


###### Eruvin 46a:8
[Eruvin 46a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/46a:8)

אִיצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי יָחִיד בִּמְקוֹם יָחִיד וְרַבִּים בִּמְקוֹם רַבִּים, אֲבָל יָחִיד בִּמְקוֹם רַבִּים — אֵימָא לָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: This ruling **was necessary** as well, for had he informed us only that the *halakha* is in accordance with the lenient opinion with regard to an *eiruv*, **it might have entered your mind to say** that **this statement applies only** to disputes in which **a single** authority disagrees **with** another **single** authority, **or several** authorities disagree with **several** other authorities. **But** when **a single** authority maintains a lenient opinion against **several** authorities who maintain a more stringent position, you might have **said** that we do **not** rule in his favor. Hence, it was necessary to state that the *halakha* is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri although he disputes the Rabbis.


###### Eruvin 46a:9
[Eruvin 46a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/46a:9)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא לְאַבָּיֵי: מִכְּדֵי עֵירוּבִין דְּרַבָּנַן, מָה לִי יָחִיד בִּמְקוֹם יָחִיד, וּמָה לִי יָחִיד בִּמְקוֹם רַבִּים!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava said to Abaye: Now, since** the laws of ***eiruvin* are rabbinic** in origin, **what** reason is there for **me** to differentiate between a disagreement of **a single** authority **with a single** authority and a disagreement of **a single** authority **with several** authorities?


###### Eruvin 46a:10
[Eruvin 46a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/46a:10)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְרָבָא: וּבִדְרַבָּנַן לָא שָׁנֵי לַן בֵּין יָחִיד בִּמְקוֹם יָחִיד לְיָחִיד בִּמְקוֹם רַבִּים!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Pappa said to Rava: Is there no difference with regard to rabbinic** laws **between** a disagreement of **a single** authority **with a single** authority, **and** a disagreement of **a single** authority with **several** authorities?


###### Eruvin 46a:11
[Eruvin 46a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/46a:11)

וְהָתְנַן, רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר: כׇּל אִשָּׁה שֶׁעָבְרוּ עָלֶיהָ שָׁלֹשׁ עוֹנוֹת — דַּיָּיהּ שְׁעָתָהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Didn’t we learn** in a mishna that **Rabbi Elazar says: Any woman who passed three** expected menstrual **cycles** without experiencing bleeding is presumed not to be menstruating. If afterward she sees blood, **it is enough** that she be regarded as ritually impure due to menstruation **from the time** that she examined herself and saw that she had a discharge, rather than retroactively for up to twenty-four hours. The Rabbis, however, maintain that this *halakha* applies only to an older woman or to a woman after childbirth, for whom it is natural to stop menstruating, but not to a normal young woman for whom three periods have passed without bleeding.


###### Eruvin 46a:12
[Eruvin 46a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/46a:12)

וְתַנְיָא: מַעֲשֶׂה וְעָשָׂה רַבִּי כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר. לְאַחַר שֶׁנִּזְכַּר, אָמַר: כְּדַי הוּא רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר לִסְמוֹךְ עָלָיו בִּשְׁעַת הַדְּחָק.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And it was taught** in a *baraita*: **It once happened that Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi **ruled** that the *halakha* **is in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Elazar. After he remembered** that Rabbi Elazar’s colleagues disagree with him on this matter and that he had apparently ruled incorrectly, **he** nonetheless **said: Rabbi Elazar is worthy to rely upon in exigent circumstances.**


###### Eruvin 46a:13
[Eruvin 46a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/46a:13)

מַאי ״לְאַחַר שֶׁנִּזְכַּר״? אִילֵּימָא: לְאַחַר שֶׁנִּזְכַּר דְּאֵין הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אֶלָּא כְּרַבָּנַן — בִּשְׁעַת הַדְּחָק הֵיכִי עָבֵיד כְּווֹתֵיהּ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara comments: **What is** the meaning of: **After he remembered? If you say** that it means **after he remembered** that **the *halakha* is not in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Elazar but** rather **in accordance with** the opinion of **the Rabbis,** then **how could he rule in accordance with him** even **in exigent circumstances,** given that the *halakha* had been decided against him?


###### Eruvin 46a:14
[Eruvin 46a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/46a:14)

אֶלָּא: דְּלָא אִיתְּמַר הִלְכְתָא לָא כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר וְלָא כְּרַבָּנַן. ״לְאַחַר שֶׁנִּזְכַּר״ דְּלָאו יָחִיד פְּלִיג עֲלֵיהּ אֶלָּא רַבִּים פְּלִיגִי עֲלֵיהּ, אָמַר: כְּדַי הוּא רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר לִסְמוֹךְ עָלָיו בִּשְׁעַת הַדְּחָק.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** it must be that the ***halakha*** had **not been stated** on this matter, **neither in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Elazar, nor in accordance with** the opinion of **the Rabbis. And after he remembered that it was not a single** authority who **disagreed with** Rabbi Elazar, **but** rather **several** authorities who **disagreed with him, he** nonetheless **said: Rabbi Elazar is worthy to rely upon in exigent circumstances.** This demonstrates that even with a dispute that involves a rabbinic decree, such as whether a woman is declared ritually impure retroactively, there is room to distinguish between a disagreement of a single authority and a single authority, and a disagreement of a single authority and several authorities.


###### Eruvin 46a:15
[Eruvin 46a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/46a:15)

אָמַר רַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא לְרָבָא, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק לְרָבָא: וּבִדְרַבָּנַן לָא שָׁנֵי בֵּין יָחִיד בִּמְקוֹם יָחִיד, בֵּין יָחִיד בִּמְקוֹם רַבִּים?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Mesharshiya said to Rava, and some say** it was **Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak** who said **to Rava: Is there no difference with regard to rabbinic** laws **between** a disagreement of **a single** authority **with a single** authority, **and** a disagreement of **a single** authority **with several** authorities?


###### Eruvin 46a:16
[Eruvin 46a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/46a:16)

וְהָתַנְיָא: שְׁמוּעָה קְרוֹבָה נוֹהֶגֶת שִׁבְעָה וּשְׁלֹשִׁים, רְחוֹקָה אֵינָהּ נוֹהֶגֶת אֶלָּא יוֹם אֶחָד.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Wasn’t it was taught** in a *baraita*: If a person receives **a proximate report** that one of his close relatives has died, **he practices** all the customs of the intense **seven** day mourning period as well as the customs of the **thirty** day mourning period. But if he receives **a distant** report, **he practices** only **one day** of mourning.


###### Eruvin 46a:17
[Eruvin 46a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/46a:17)

וְאֵי זוֹ הִיא קְרוֹבָה וְאֵיזוֹ הִיא רְחוֹקָה? בְּתוֹךְ שְׁלֹשִׁים — קְרוֹבָה, לְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים — רְחוֹקָה, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: אַחַת שְׁמוּעָה קְרוֹבָה וְאַחַת שְׁמוּעָה רְחוֹקָה נוֹהֶגֶת שִׁבְעָה וּשְׁלֹשִׁים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**What is** considered a **proximate** report, **and what is** considered a **distant** report? If the report arrives **within thirty** days of the close relative’s passing, it is regarded as **proximate,** and if it arrives **after thirty** days it is considered **distant;** this is **the statement of Rabbi Akiva. But the Rabbis say: Both** in the case of **a proximate report and** in the case of **a distant report,** the grieving relative **practices** the **seven-**day mourning period **and** the **thirty-**day mourning period.


###### Eruvin 46a:18
[Eruvin 46a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/46a:18)

וְאָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁאַתָּה מוֹצֵא יָחִיד מֵיקֵל וְרַבִּים מֵחֲמִירִין, הֲלָכָה כְּדִבְרֵי הַמַּחְמִירִין הַמְרוּבִּים, חוּץ מִזּוֹ, שֶׁאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא מֵיקֵל וַחֲכָמִים מֵחֲמִירִין — הֲלָכָה כְּדִבְרֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And Rabba bar bar Ḥana said** that **Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Wherever you find** that **a single** authority **is lenient** with regard to a certain *halakha* **and several** other authorities **are stringent, the *halakha* is in accordance with the words of the stringent** authorities, who constitute **the majority, except for here, where despite** the fact that the opinion of **Rabbi Akiva is lenient and the** opinion of the **Rabbis is** more **stringent, the *halakha* is in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Akiva.**


###### Eruvin 46a:19
[Eruvin 46a:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/46a:19)

וְסָבַר לַהּ כִּשְׁמוּאֵל, דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הֲלָכָה כְּדִבְרֵי הַמֵּיקֵל בְּאֵבֶל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** Rabbi Yoḥanan **holds like Shmuel, as Shmuel said: The *halakha* is in accordance with the lenient** opinion **with** regard to **mourning** practices, i.e., wherever there is a dispute with regard to mourning customs, the *halakha* is in accordance with the lenient opinion.


###### Eruvin 46a:20
[Eruvin 46a:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/46a:20)

בַּאֲבֵילוּת הוּא דְּאַקִּילוּ בַּהּ רַבָּנַן, אֲבָל בְּעָלְמָא — אֲפִילּוּ בִּדְרַבָּנַן שָׁנֵי בֵּין יָחִיד בִּמְקוֹם יָחִיד בֵּין יָחִיד בִּמְקוֹם רַבִּים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
From here the Gemara infers: **It is** only **with regard to mourning** practices **that the Sages were lenient, but in general,** with regard to other areas of *halakha*, **even in the case of rabbinic** laws **there is a difference** between a disagreement of **a single** authority **with a single** authority and a disagreement of **a single** authority **with several** authorities. This being the case, Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi did well to rule explicitly that the *halakha* is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri, even though he is a single authority who ruled leniently in dispute with the Rabbis.