## Eruvin Daf 46b

###### Eruvin 46b:1
[Eruvin 46b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/46b:1)

וְרַב פָּפָּא אָמַר, אִיצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הָנֵי מִילֵּי בְּעֵירוּבֵי חֲצֵירוֹת, אֲבָל בְּעֵירוּבֵי תְחוּמִין — אֵימָא לָא צְרִיכָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Pappa said** a different explanation for the fact that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi made both statements: **It was necessary** for Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi to inform us that the *halakha* is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri, because had he said only that the *halakha* follows the lenient opinion with regard to an *eiruv*, **it could have entered your mind to say** that **this statement applies only with regard to** the laws governing the ***eiruv* of courtyards,** which are entirely rabbinic in origin. **But with regard to** the more stringent laws governing the ***eiruv* of** Shabbat **limits,** you would have **said** that we should **not** rule leniently, and therefore **it was necessary** to make both statements.


###### Eruvin 46b:2
[Eruvin 46b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/46b:2)

וּמְנָא תֵּימְרָא דְּשָׁנֵי לַן בֵּין עֵירוּבֵי חֲצֵירוֹת לְעֵירוּבֵי תְּחוּמִין — דִּתְנַן, אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים — בְּעֵירוּבֵי תְחוּמִין, אֲבָל בְּעֵירוּבֵי חֲצֵירוֹת מְעָרְבִין בֵּין לְדַעַת וּבֵין שֶׁלֹּא לְדַעַת, שֶׁזָּכִין לְאָדָם שֶׁלֹּא בְּפָנָיו, וְאֵין חָבִין לְאָדָם אֶלָּא בְּפָנָיו.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And from where do you say that we distinguish between an *eiruv* of courtyards and an *eiruv* of** Shabbat **limits? As we learned** in a mishna that **Rabbi Yehuda said: In what** case **is this statement said,** that an *eiruv* may be established for another person only with his knowledge? It was said **with regard to an *eiruv* of** Shabbat **limits, but with regard to an *eiruv* of courtyards, an *eiruv* may be established** for another person whether **with his knowledge or without his knowledge, as one may act in a person’s interest in his absence; however, one may not act to a person’s disadvantage in his absence.** One may act unilaterally on someone else’s behalf when the action is to that other person’s benefit; however, when it is to the other person’s detriment, or when there are both advantages and disadvantages to him, one may act on the other person’s behalf only if one has been explicitly appointed as an agent. Since an *eiruv* of courtyards is always to a person’s benefit, it can be established even without his knowledge. However, with regard to an *eiruv* of Shabbat limits, while it enables one to walk in one direction, it disallows him from walking in the opposite direction. Therefore, it can be established only with his knowledge.


###### Eruvin 46b:3
[Eruvin 46b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/46b:3)

רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: אִיצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא, הָנֵי מִילֵּי בְּשִׁיּוּרֵי עֵירוּב, אֲבָל בִּתְחִילַּת עֵירוּב — אֵימָא לָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Ashi said** that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi’s need to issue two rulings can be explained in another manner: **It is necessary** for Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi to inform us that the *halakha* is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri, as if he had said only that the *halakha* is in accordance with the lenient opinion with regard to an *eiruv*, **it could have entered your mind to say** that **this statement applies only with regard to the remnants of an *eiruv*,** i.e., an *eiruv* that had been properly established, where the concern is that it might subsequently have become invalid. **But with regard to an initial *eiruv*,** i.e., an *eiruv* that is just being established and has not yet taken effect, you might have **said** that we should **not** rule leniently, and therefore it was necessary to issue both rulings.


###### Eruvin 46b:4
[Eruvin 46b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/46b:4)

וּמְנָא תֵּימְרָא דְּשָׁנֵי לַן בֵּין שִׁיּוּרֵי עֵירוּב לִתְחִילַּת עֵירוּב — דִּתְנַן, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים — בִּתְחִילַּת עֵירוּב, אֲבָל בְּשִׁיּוּרֵי עֵירוּב — אֲפִילּוּ כָּל שֶׁהוּא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And from where do you say that we distinguish between the remnants of an *eiruv* and an initial *eiruv*? As we learned** in a mishna: **Rabbi Yosei said: In what** case **is this statement said,** that the Sages stipulated that a fixed quantity of food is necessary for establishing an *eiruv*? It is said **with regard to an initial *eiruv*,** i.e., when setting up an *eiruv* for the first time; **however, with regard to the remnants of an *eiruv*,** i.e., on a subsequent Shabbat when the measure may have become diminished, **even a minimal amount** suffices.


###### Eruvin 46b:5
[Eruvin 46b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/46b:5)

וְלֹא אָמְרוּ לְעָרֵב חֲצֵירוֹת, אֶלָּא כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא לְשַׁכֵּחַ תּוֹרַת עֵירוּב מִן הַתִּינוֹקוֹת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And they said to establish an *eiruv* for courtyards only** after all the inhabitants of the city merge their alleyways and become like the inhabitants of a single courtyard, **so that the law of *eiruv* should not be forgotten by the children,** who may not be aware of the arrangement that has been made with regard to the alleyways.


###### Eruvin 46b:6
[Eruvin 46b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/46b:6)

רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב וְרַבִּי זְרִיקָא אָמְרוּ: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא מֵחֲבֵירוֹ, וּכְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי מֵחֲבֵרָיו, וּכְרַבִּי מֵחֲבֵירוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Since the Gemara discussed the principles cited with regard to halakhic decision-making, it cites additional principles. **Rabbi Ya’akov and Rabbi Zerika said:** The ***halakha* is in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Akiva** in disputes **with** any individual **Sage, and** the *halakha* **is in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yosei** even in disputes **with** other **Sages, and the *halakha* is in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi in disputes **with** any individual **Sage.**


###### Eruvin 46b:7
[Eruvin 46b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/46b:7)

לְמַאי הִלְכְתָא? רַבִּי אַסִּי אָמַר: הֲלָכָה. וְרַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר: מַטִּין. וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי חֲנִינָא אָמַר: נִרְאִין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: With regard **to what *halakha*** do these principles apply, meaning, to what degree are they binding? **Rabbi Asi said:** This is considered binding ***halakha*. And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said: One is inclined** toward such a ruling in cases where an individual asks, but does not issue it as a public ruling in all cases. **And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: It appears** that one should rule this way, but it is not an established *halakha* that is considered binding with regard to issuing rulings.


###### Eruvin 46b:8
[Eruvin 46b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/46b:8)

כַּלָּשׁוֹן הַזֶּה אָמַר רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב בַּר אִידֵּי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: רַבִּי מֵאִיר וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה — הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי — הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי. וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר רַבִּי מֵאִיר וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי — הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי. הַשְׁתָּא בִּמְקוֹם רַבִּי יְהוּדָה לֵיתָא, בִּמְקוֹם רַבִּי יוֹסֵי מִיבַּעְיָא?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi said** that **Rabbi Yoḥanan said:** In the case of a dispute between **Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda,** the ***halakha* is in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yehuda;** in the case of a dispute between **Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei,** the ***halakha* is in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yosei; and, needless to say,** in the case of a dispute between **Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei,** the ***halakha* is in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yosei.** As **now,** if **in disputes with Rabbi Yehuda,** the opinion of Rabbi Meir **is not** accepted as law, **need it** be stated that **in disputes with Rabbi Yosei,** Rabbi Meir’s opinion is rejected? Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion is not accepted in disputes with Rabbi Yosei.


###### Eruvin 46b:9
[Eruvin 46b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/46b:9)

אָמַר רַב אַסִּי: אַף אֲנִי לוֹמֵד: רַבִּי יוֹסֵי וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן — הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: רַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן — הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה. הַשְׁתָּא בִּמְקוֹם רַבִּי יְהוּדָה לֵיתָא, בִּמְקוֹם רַבִּי יוֹסֵי מִיבַּעְיָא?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Asi said: I also learn** based on the same principle that in a dispute between **Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon,** the ***halakha* is in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yosei. As Rabbi Abba said** that **Rabbi Yoḥanan said:** In cases of dispute between **Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon,** the ***halakha* is in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yehuda. Now,** if **where** it is opposed by **Rabbi Yehuda** the opinion of Rabbi Shimon **is not** accepted as law, **where** it is opposed by the opinion of **Rabbi Yosei,** with whom the *halakha* is in accordance against Rabbi Yehuda, **is it necessary** to say that the *halakha* is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei?


###### Eruvin 46b:10
[Eruvin 46b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/46b:10)

אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: רַבִּי מֵאִיר וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, מַאי? תֵּיקוּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara **raises a dilemma:** In a dispute between **Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon, what** is the *halakha*? No sources were found to resolve this dilemma, and it **stands** unresolved.


###### Eruvin 46b:11
[Eruvin 46b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/46b:11)

אָמַר רַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא: לֵיתַנְהוּ לְהָנֵי כְּלָלֵי. מְנָא לֵיהּ לְרַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא הָא?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Mesharshiya said: These principles** of halakhic decision-making **are not** to be relied upon. The Gemara asks: **From where does Rav Mesharshiya** derive **this** statement?


###### Eruvin 46b:12
[Eruvin 46b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/46b:12)

אִילֵּימָא מֵהָא דִּתְנַן: רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר לְמָה הַדָּבָר דּוֹמֶה — לְשָׁלֹשׁ חֲצֵירוֹת הַפְּתוּחוֹת זוֹ לָזוֹ וּפְתוּחוֹת לִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים. עֵירְבוּ שְׁתַּיִם הַחִיצוֹנוֹת עִם הָאֶמְצָעִית — הִיא מוּתֶּרֶת עִמָּהֶן וְהֵן מוּתָּרוֹת עִמָּהּ, וּשְׁתַּיִם הַחִיצוֹנוֹת אֲסוּרוֹת זוֹ עִם זוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**If you say** that he derived it **from that which we learned** in the mishna that **Rabbi Shimon said: To what is this comparable?** It is like **three courtyards that open into one another, and** also **open into a public domain.** If **the two outer** courtyards **established an *eiruv* with the middle one,** the residents of the middle one **are permitted to** carry to the two outer ones, **and they are permitted to** carry to **it, but the** residents of the **two outer** courtyards **are prohibited to** carry from **one** to the **other,** as they did not establish an *eiruv* with one another.


###### Eruvin 46b:13
[Eruvin 46b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/46b:13)

וְאָמַר רַב חָמָא בַּר גּוּרְיָא אָמַר רַב: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן. וּמַאן פְּלִיג עֲלֵיהּ — רַבִּי יְהוּדָה. וְהָא אָמְרַתְּ: רַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן — הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה. אֶלָּא לָאו שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: לֵיתַנְהוּ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And Rav Ḥama bar Gurya said** that **Rav said:** The ***halakha* is in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Shimon; and who disagrees with** Rabbi Shimon on this matter? It is **Rabbi Yehuda. Didn’t you say:** In disputes between **Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon,** the ***halakha* is in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yehuda? Rather, can we not conclude from** this mishna that these principles should **not** be relied upon?


###### Eruvin 46b:14
[Eruvin 46b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/46b:14)

וּמַאי קוּשְׁיָא, דִּילְמָא הֵיכָא דְּאִיתְּמַר — אִיתְּמַר, הֵיכָא דְּלָא אִיתְּמַר — לָא אִיתְּמַר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects this argument: **What is the difficulty** posed by this ruling? **Perhaps where it is stated** explicitly to the contrary, **it is stated,** but **where it is not stated** explicitly to the contrary, **it is not stated,** and these principles apply.


###### Eruvin 46b:15
[Eruvin 46b:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/46b:15)

אֶלָּא, מֵהָא דִּתְנַן: עִיר שֶׁל יָחִיד וְנַעֲשֵׂית שֶׁל רַבִּים — מְעָרְבִין אֶת כּוּלָּהּ. שֶׁל רַבִּים וְנַעֲשֵׂית שֶׁל יָחִיד — אֵין מְעָרְבִין אֶת כּוּלָּהּ אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן עוֹשֶׂה חוּצָה לָהּ, כָּעִיר חֲדָשָׁה שֶׁבִּיהוּדָה שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהּ חֲמִשִּׁים דָּיוֹרִין — דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** the proof is **from that which we learned** elsewhere in a mishna: **If a city that belongs to a** single **individual** subsequently **becomes** one that **belongs to many** people, **one may establish an *eiruv*** of courtyards **for all of it.** But if the city **belongs to many** people, **and it** falls into the possession **of a** single **individual, one may not establish an *eiruv* for all of it, unless he excludes** from the *eiruv* an area the size **of the town of Ḥadasha in Judea, which contains fifty residents;** this is **the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.**


###### Eruvin 46b:16
[Eruvin 46b:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/46b:16)

רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר:

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Shimon says:**