## Eruvin Daf 70b

###### Eruvin 70b:1
[Eruvin 70b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/70b:1)

הֵיכָא דְּאִי בָּעֵי לְעָרוֹבֵי מֵאֶתְמוֹל מָצֵי מְעָרֵב — בַּטּוֹלֵי נָמֵי מָצֵי מְבַטֵּל, אֲבָל הַאי כֵּיוָן דְּאִי בָּעֵי לְעָרוֹבֵי מֵאֶתְמוֹל — לָא מָצֵי מְעָרֵב, לָא מָצֵי מְבַטֵּל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains the two sides of the question: On the one hand, perhaps only in a case **where, if** the person **wanted to establish an *eiruv* on the previous day he could have established an *eiruv*, he can also** renounce his rights on Shabbat. **But this** heir, **since, if he wanted to establish an *eiruv* the previous day he could not have established an *eiruv*,** as he was not then a resident of the courtyard, therefore, today **he cannot renounce** his rights either.


###### Eruvin 70b:2
[Eruvin 70b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/70b:2)

אוֹ דִּלְמָא: יוֹרֵשׁ כַּרְעֵיהּ דַּאֲבוּהּ הוּא?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Or perhaps an heir is** like **his father’s foot,** i.e., he is considered an extension of his father and substitutes for him in all regards, which means that just as his father could have renounced his rights, so can he.


###### Eruvin 70b:3
[Eruvin 70b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/70b:3)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אֲנִי אוֹמֵר מְבַטֵּל, וְהָנֵי דְּבֵי שְׁמוּאֵל תָּנוּ אֵין מְבַטֵּל. אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: זֶה הַכְּלָל, כׇּל שֶׁמּוּתָּר לְמִקְצָת שַׁבָּת — הוּתַּר לְכׇל הַשַּׁבָּת, וְכׇל שֶׁנֶּאְסַר לְמִקְצָת שַׁבָּת — נֶאְסַר לְכׇל הַשַּׁבָּת חוּץ מִמְּבַטֵּל רְשׁוּת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rav Naḥman **said to him: I** myself **say** that an heir **can** indeed **renounce** rights in a courtyard, **while those** scholars of **the school of Shmuel taught: He cannot renounce** rights in a courtyard. Rava **raised an objection to** Rav Naḥman from the following *baraita*: **This is the principle: Anything that is permitted for part of Shabbat is permitted for all of Shabbat, and anything that is prohibited for part of Shabbat is prohibited for all of Shabbat, apart from one who renounces his rights** in a courtyard, for renunciation can provide an allowance halfway through Shabbat.


###### Eruvin 70b:4
[Eruvin 70b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/70b:4)

כׇּל שֶׁהוּתַּר לְמִקְּצָת שַׁבָּת, מוּתָּר לְכׇל הַשַּׁבָּת — כְּגוֹן עֵירַב דֶּרֶךְ הַפֶּתַח, וְנִסְתַּם הַפֶּתַח. עֵירַב דֶּרֶךְ חַלּוֹן, וְנִסְתַּם חַלּוֹן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara now explains each element of the *baraita*: **Anything that is permitted for part of Shabbat is permitted for all of Shabbat. For example,** if **an *eiruv* was established** between two adjacent courtyards that are connected **via an opening** between them, **and** that **opening was closed up** on Shabbat, the *eiruv* is valid. Alternately, if **an *eiruv* was established** between the two courtyards that are connected **via a window** opening from one to the other, **and** that **window was closed up** on Shabbat, the *eiruv* is valid. As carrying from one courtyard to another was permitted at the beginning of Shabbat, it is permitted throughout Shabbat.


###### Eruvin 70b:5
[Eruvin 70b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/70b:5)

זֶה הַכְּלָל — לְאֵתוֹיֵי מָבוֹי שֶׁנִּיטְּלוּ קוֹרוֹתָיו אוֹ לְחָיָיו.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara comments: The words **this is the principle** come **to include** the case of **an alleyway whose** cross **beams or side posts were removed** on Shabbat, teaching that one may nonetheless use the alleyway, as it had been permitted at the outset of Shabbat.


###### Eruvin 70b:6
[Eruvin 70b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/70b:6)

כׇּל שֶׁנֶּאְסַר לְמִקְצָת שַׁבָּת, נֶאְסַר לְכׇל הַשַּׁבָּת כּוּלָּהּ — כְּגוֹן שְׁנֵי בָתִּים בִּשְׁנֵי צִידֵּי רְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, וְהִקִּיפוּם גּוֹיִם מְחִיצָה בְּשַׁבָּת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara continues its explanation of the *baraita*: **Anything that is prohibited for part of Shabbat is prohibited for all of Shabbat. For example,** if there were **two houses on two sides of a public domain, which gentiles enclosed with a wall on Shabbat,** the enclosed area remains prohibited. Even though a partition of this kind is considered a proper one with regard to Shabbat domains, it is prohibited to carry objects from either house into the enclosed area, even if the owner of the first house renounces his rights in the area in favor of the owner of the second house, as they could not have established an *eiruv* between them before Shabbat.


###### Eruvin 70b:7
[Eruvin 70b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/70b:7)

זֶה הַכְּלָל לְאֵתוֹיֵי מַאי? לְאֵתוֹיֵי מֵת גּוֹי בְּשַׁבָּת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **What** do the words **this is the principle** come **to include** in this part of the *baraita*? The Gemara answers: It comes **to include** the case of **a gentile** resident of the courtyard who **died on Shabbat** without having rented out his domain to a Jew for the purpose of an *eiruv*. In this case, the Jewish neighbors are prohibited from carrying in the courtyard. Because it was prohibited to establish an *eiruv* the previous day, carrying in the courtyard continues to be prohibited on Shabbat, even though the gentile is now deceased.


###### Eruvin 70b:8
[Eruvin 70b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/70b:8)

וְקָתָנֵי: חוּץ מִמְּבַטֵּל רְשׁוּת. אִיהוּ — אִין, יוֹרֵשׁ — לָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** the *baraita* **teaches: Apart from one who renounces his rights** in a courtyard, which teaches that a person may renounce his rights in a courtyard even on Shabbat, despite the fact that the courtyard was prohibited prior to his renunciation. The Gemara infers: **He** himself, i.e., the original owner, **yes,** he may renounce his rights even on Shabbat, but with regard to his **heir, no,** he may not renounce his rights on Shabbat, which contradicts Rav Naḥman’s opinion.


###### Eruvin 70b:9
[Eruvin 70b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/70b:9)

אֵימָא: חוּץ מִתּוֹרַת בִּיטּוּל רְשׁוּת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rav Naḥman replied: **Say** that the *baraita* must be understood as follows: **Apart from** anyone who falls **into the** halakhic **category of one who renounces his rights** in a domain. In other words, the *baraita* is not referring to a particular person who renounces his rights, but rather to the category of renunciation in general, which includes an heir.


###### Eruvin 70b:10
[Eruvin 70b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/70b:10)

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ: אֶחָד מִבְּנֵי חָצֵר שֶׁמֵּת, וְהִנִּיחַ רְשׁוּתוֹ לְאֶחָד מִן הַשּׁוּק, מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם — אוֹסֵר, מִשֶּׁחָשֵׁיכָה — אֵינוֹ אוֹסֵר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rava **raised a** further **objection to** the opinion of Rav Naḥman from a different *baraita*: If **a resident of a courtyard died and left his domain,** the use of his house, **to one from the marketplace,** i.e., a non-resident of the courtyard, the following distinction applies: If he died **while it was still day,** i.e., before Shabbat, the one from the marketplace renders carrying **prohibited,** for it is assumed that he received his portion before the onset of Shabbat and should have joined in an *eiruv* with the others. Since he failed to establish an *eiruv* with the other residents of the courtyard, he renders carrying prohibited in the entire courtyard. If, however, he died **after nightfall, he does not** render carrying **prohibited,** for so long as it was permitted to carry for part of Shabbat it remains permitted for the entirety of Shabbat.


###### Eruvin 70b:11
[Eruvin 70b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/70b:11)

וְאֶחָד מִן הַשּׁוּק שֶׁמֵּת וְהִנִּיחַ רְשׁוּתוֹ לְאֶחָד מִבְּנֵי חָצֵר, מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם — אֵינוֹ אוֹסֵר, מִשֶּׁחָשֵׁיכָה — אוֹסֵר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** alternatively, if **one from the marketplace** who owned a residence in the courtyard but did not dwell there **died and left his domain to a resident of the courtyard** who does live there and usually joins in an *eiruv* with his neighbors, the following distinction applies: If the person from the marketplace died **while it was still day,** i.e., before Shabbat, the courtyard resident **does not** render carrying **prohibited,** as when he establishes his *eiruv* it includes his new residence as well. If, however, the person from the marketplace died **after nightfall** without having established an *eiruv*, the deceased renders carrying **prohibited.** As this residence was prohibited at the beginning of Shabbat, it can no longer be permitted on that Shabbat.


###### Eruvin 70b:12
[Eruvin 70b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/70b:12)

אַמַּאי אוֹסֵר? נִיבַטֵּיל! מַאי ״אוֹסֵר״ נָמֵי דְּקָתָנֵי — עַד שֶׁיְּבַטֵּל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rava’s question is based on the first case discussed in the *baraita*: According to Rav Naḥman, **why does** the heir render carrying **prohibited** in this case? **Let him renounce** his rights in the courtyard to the other residents, as Rav Naḥman maintains that an heir may renounce rights. Rav Naḥman replied: **What is** the meaning of the word **prohibits that** the *baraita* **teaches** here? It means he renders carrying prohibited **until he renounces** his rights, i.e., although there is no way of rectifying the situation by means of an *eiruv*, it can be corrected by way of renunciation.


###### Eruvin 70b:13
[Eruvin 70b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/70b:13)

תָּא שְׁמַע: יִשְׂרָאֵל וְגֵר שְׁרוּיִין בִּמְגוּרָה אַחַת, וּמֵת גֵּר מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Come** and **hear** a different proof challenging Rav Naḥman’s opinion, from the following *baraita*: If **a Jew and a convert were living in a single residency** comprised of several rooms, **and the convert died** childless **while it was still day,** such a convert has no heirs, and therefore the first to take possession of his property acquires it.