## Eruvin Daf 7a

###### Eruvin 7a:1
[Eruvin 7a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/7a:1)

וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ הִיא דְּלָא מַשְׁגַּח בְּבַת קוֹל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**and** the latter statement **is** in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Yehoshua, who does not pay attention to a Divine Voice** that attempts to intervene in matters of *halakha*, for according to him, the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel has not yet been decided.


###### Eruvin 7a:2
[Eruvin 7a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/7a:2)

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא, הָכִי קָאָמַר: כׇּל הֵיכָא דְּמַשְׁכַּחַתְּ תְּרֵי תַּנָּאֵי וּתְרֵי אָמוֹרָאֵי דִּפְלִיגִי אַהֲדָדֵי כְּעֵין מַחֲלוֹקֶת בֵּית שַׁמַּאי וּבֵית הִלֵּל — לָא לֶיעְבַּד כִּי קוּלֵּיהּ דְּמָר וְכִי קוּלֵּיהּ דְּמָר, וְלָא כְּחוּמְרֵיהּ דְּמָר וְכִי חוּמְרֵיהּ דְּמָר. אֶלָּא, אוֹ כִּי קוּלֵּיהּ דְּמָר וּכְחוּמְרֵיהּ עָבֵיד, אוֹ כְּקוּלֵּיהּ דְּמָר וּכְחוּמְרֵיהּ עָבֵיד.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara suggests yet another resolution: **And if you wish, say** instead that **this is** what the *baraita* **is saying: Wherever you find two *tanna’im* or two *amora’im* who disagree with each other in the manner of the disputes between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, one should not act either in accordance with the leniency of the** one **Master and in accordance with the leniency of** the other **Master,** nor should one act **in accordance with the stringency of** the one **Master and in accordance with the stringency of** the other **Master. Rather, one should act either in accordance with** both **the leniencies and the stringencies of** the one **Master, or in accordance with** both **the leniencies and the stringencies** of the other **Master.**


###### Eruvin 7a:3
[Eruvin 7a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/7a:3)

מִכׇּל מָקוֹם קַשְׁיָא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
All of this is suggested to explain the wording of the *baraita*. **In any case, it is difficult** to explain the law with regard to the alleyway in Neharde’a, concerning which they simultaneously adopted the stringencies of both Rav and Shmuel.


###### Eruvin 7a:4
[Eruvin 7a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/7a:4)

אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: כּוּלֵּיהּ כְּרַב עַבְדוּהּ. דְּאָמַר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב: הֲלָכָה וְאֵין מוֹרִין כֵּן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said:** In fact, **they acted entirely in accordance with** the opinion of **Rav,** and the reason that they required doors and did not rely on the opening in the form of a doorway alone is due to that **which Rav Huna said** that **Rav said:** This is the ***halakha*; however, a** public **ruling is not issued to that effect** *ab initio*. Although Rav maintains that an opening in the form of a doorway is sufficient in an open alleyway, a public ruling is not issued to that effect; rather, the ruling is stringent, in accordance with Ḥananya’s position, and requires doors.


###### Eruvin 7a:5
[Eruvin 7a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/7a:5)

וּלְרַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה אָמַר רַב, דְּאָמַר: הֲלָכָה וּמוֹרִין כֵּן, מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And according to** the statement of **Rav Adda bar Ahava** that **Rav said, as** Rav Adda bar Ahava **said** that Rav said with regard to the same issue: This is the ***halakha* and a** public **ruling is issued to that effect, what can be said?** Why did the residents of Neharde’a adopt the stringencies of the two authorities?


###### Eruvin 7a:6
[Eruvin 7a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/7a:6)

אָמַר רַב שֵׁיזְבִי: כִּי לָא עָבְדִינַן כְּחוּמְרֵי דְּבֵי תְרֵי — הֵיכָא דְּסָתְרִי אַהֲדָדֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Sheizvi said:** The principle of dictating **when we do not act in accordance with the stringencies of two** authorities applies only in a case **where** the two stringencies **contradict one another.** In these types of cases, following both stringencies would result in an internal contradiction.


###### Eruvin 7a:7
[Eruvin 7a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/7a:7)

כְּגוֹן שִׁדְרָה וְגוּלְגּוֹלֶת. דִּתְנַן: הַשִּׁדְרָה וְהַגּוּלְגּוֹלֶת שֶׁחָסְרוּ — וְכַמָּה חֶסְרוֹן? בַּשִּׁדְרָה, בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: שְׁתֵּי חוּלְיוֹת, וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: חוּלְיָא אַחַת. וּבַגּוּלְגּוֹלֶת, בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: כִּמְלֹא מַקְדֵּחַ, וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: כְּדֵי שֶׁיִּנָּטֵל מִן הַחַי וְיָמוּת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara illustrates this principle with **an example** from the laws governing **the spine and skull. As we learned** in a mishna: **The spine and the skull** of a corpse that are **incomplete** do not impart ritual impurity via a tent as a corpse would; rather, they impart impurity only through contact or if they are carried as individual bones. This basic law was unanimously accepted, but the details were the subject of dispute: **How much** is considered **a deficiency in the spine** for this purpose? **Beit Shammai say:** If it is missing **two vertebrae, and Beit Hillel say:** Even if it is missing only **one vertebra. And** similarly, they argued over the deficiency **in the skull: Beit Shammai say:** It must be missing piece the **size of a drill hole, and Beit Hillel say:** It must be missing an amount that, **when removed from a living** person, would cause him **to die,** which is a larger amount.


###### Eruvin 7a:8
[Eruvin 7a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/7a:8)

וְאָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: וְכֵן לְעִנְיַן טְרֵיפָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And Rav Yehuda said** that **Shmuel said:** Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel argued **likewise with respect to a *tereifa*,** a kosher animal suffering from a wound or illness that will cause it to die within twelve months, and which is prohibited to be eaten even after the required ritual slaughter. Beit Shammai say that an animal is regarded as a *tereifa* if it is missing two vertebrae, while Beit Hillel hold that it is a *tereifa* if it lacks even one. In such a situation, a person must not be stringent with regard to the *halakhot* of *tereifa* in accordance with the view of Beit Hillel, and at the same time be stringent with regard to the *halakhot* of ritual impurity of a corpse in accordance with the view of Beit Shammai, for the two disputes relate to the same issue, and one must not act in accordance with two contradictory opinions.


###### Eruvin 7a:9
[Eruvin 7a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/7a:9)

אֲבָל הֵיכָא דְּלָא סָתְרִי אַהֲדָדֵי עָבְדִינַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rav Sheizvi continues: **However, in a case where** the two stringencies **do not contradict one another, we may** indeed **act** in accordance with the stringencies of two authorities. Therefore, the stringencies adopted in the case of the alleyway in Neharde’a were legitimate, for the two stringencies related to two separate issues: Rav’s stringency was that an L-shaped alleyway is regarded like an open alleyway, and Shmuel’s stringency was that an open alleyway requires a door.


###### Eruvin 7a:10
[Eruvin 7a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/7a:10)

וְהֵיכָא דְּסָתְרִי אַהֲדָדֵי לָא עָבְדִינַן?! מֵתִיב רַב מְשַׁרְשְׁיָא: מַעֲשֶׂה בְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא שֶׁלִּיקֵּט אֶתְרוֹג בְּאֶחָד בִּשְׁבָט, וְנָהַג בּוֹ שְׁנֵי עִישּׂוּרִין: אֶחָד כְּדִבְרֵי בֵּית שַׁמַּאי, וְאֶחָד כְּדִבְרֵי בֵּית הִלֵּל?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara challenges Rav Sheizvi’s assertion: Is it true that **we do not act** in accordance with the stringencies of two authorities in a case **where** the two stringencies **contradict one another? Rav Mesharshiya raised an objection** from a *baraita*: There was **an incident involving Rabbi Akiva, who gathered** the fruit of **a citron** tree **on the first of** the month of **Shevat and applied** the laws of **two tithes to it.** After *teruma* and the first tithe have been separated, an additional tithe is separated from what is left. During the first, second, fourth, and fifth years of the Sabbatical cycle, second tithe is set aside to be taken to Jerusalem and eaten there by its owner, while during the third and sixth years, poor man’s tithe is set aside to be distributed to the needy. When tithing the fruit picked on the first of Shevat, Rabbi Akiva set aside both additional tithes, second tithe and poor man’s tithe: He set aside **one in accordance with the statement of Beit Shammai,** who say that the new year for trees begins on the first of Shevat, and as that day belongs to the new year, a tithe must be set aside in accordance with the law of that year; and he set aside **one in accordance with the statement of Beit Hillel,** that the new year for trees is the fifteenth of Shevat, and any fruit picked prior to that date must be tithed in accordance with the law of the previous year. Apparently, Rabbi Akiva adopted for himself two contradictory stringencies.


###### Eruvin 7a:11
[Eruvin 7a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/7a:11)

רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא גְּמָרֵיהּ אִיסְתַּפֵּיק לֵיהּ, וְלָא יְדַע אִי בֵּית הִלֵּל בְּחַד בִּשְׁבָט אֲמוּר, אִי בַּחֲמֵיסַר בִּשְׁבָט אֲמוּר, וַעֲבַד הָכָא לְחוּמְרָא וְהָכָא לְחוּמְרָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **Rabbi Akiva** did not act in this way in order to be stringent in accordance with both opinions, but because **he was in doubt with regard to his tradition and did not know whether Beit Hillel said** the New Year for trees falls **on the first of Shevat or on the fifteenth of Shevat, and** therefore **he acted stringently here and stringently there.**


###### Eruvin 7a:12
[Eruvin 7a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/7a:12)

יָתֵיב רַב יוֹסֵף קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב הוּנָא, וְיָתֵיב וְקָאָמַר, אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: מַחֲלוֹקֶת בִּסְרַטְיָא מִכָּאן וּסְרַטְיָא מִכָּאן, וּפְלַטְיָא מִכָּאן וּפְלַטְיָא מִכָּאן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara resumes its discussion of alleyways that are open on two opposite sides. **Rav Yosef sat before Rav Huna, and he sat and said: Rav Yehuda said** that **Rav said: The dispute** between the anonymous first *tanna* of the *baraita* and Ḥananya refers **to** a case where there is **a main street [*seratya*] from here,** on one side of the alleyway, **and a main street from here,** on the other side. **Alternatively,** it refers to a case where there is **a plaza [*pelatya*] from here,** on one side of the alleyway, **and a plaza from here,** on the other side.


###### Eruvin 7a:13
[Eruvin 7a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/7a:13)

אֲבָל סְרַטְיָא מִכָּאן וּבִקְעָה מִכָּאן, אוֹ בִּקְעָה מִכָּאן וּבִקְעָה מִכָּאן — עוֹשֶׂה צוּרַת הַפֶּתַח מִכָּאן וְלֶחִי וְקוֹרָה מִכָּאן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But** if there is **a main street from here,** on one side, **and a valley from here,** on the other side, a valley being a *karmelit*, which is neither a public domain nor a private domain, in which carrying is prohibited on Shabbat by rabbinic decree, **or** if there is **a valley from here,** on one side, **and a valley from here,** on the other side, **one constructs** an opening in the **form of a doorway from here,** on one side of the alleyway, **and** places **a side post or a** cross **beam from here,** on the other side. One is thereby permitted to carry in the alleyway even according to the opinion of Ḥananya.


###### Eruvin 7a:14
[Eruvin 7a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/7a:14)

הַשְׁתָּא סְרַטְיָא מִכָּאן וּבִקְעָה מִכָּאן, עוֹשֶׂה לוֹ צוּרַת הַפֶּתַח מִכָּאן וְלֶחִי וְקוֹרָה מִכָּאן — בִּקְעָה מִכָּאן וּבִקְעָה מִכָּאן מִיבַּעְיָא?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara raises a question about this ruling: **Now,** if you say that where there is **a main street from here,** on one side of the alleyway, **and a valley from here,** on the other side, it is sufficient to **construct** an opening in **the form of a doorway from here,** on one side, **and a side post or a** cross **beam from here,** on the other side, **was it necessary** to state that these are sufficient if there is **a valley from here,** on one side of the alleyway, **and a valley from her**e, on the other side?


###### Eruvin 7a:15
[Eruvin 7a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/7a:15)

הָכִי קָאָמַר: סְרַטְיָא מִכָּאן וּבִקְעָה מִכָּאן — נַעֲשֶׂה כְּבִקְעָה מִכָּאן וּבִקְעָה מִכָּאן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **This is** what **he** intended **to say:** If there is **a main street from here,** on one side, **and a valley from here,** on the other side, **it is considered as if there were a valley from here,** on one side, **and a valley from here,** on the other side.


###### Eruvin 7a:16
[Eruvin 7a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/7a:16)

וּמְסַיֵּים בַּהּ מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוּדָה: אִם הָיָה מָבוֹי כָּלֶה לִרְחָבָה, אֵין צָרִיךְ כְּלוּם.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara continues: **And** when Rav Yosef reported this ruling, **he concluded** with a statement **in the name** of **Rav Yehuda** himself, without attributing it to one of Rav Yehuda’s teachers: **If the alleyway terminated in a backyard,** i.e., a closed-off area behind a group of houses, then even if there is a breach in the wall between the yard and the public domain beyond it, **nothing is needed** on this side of the alleyway, as it is considered closed.


###### Eruvin 7a:17
[Eruvin 7a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/7a:17)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי לְרַב יוֹסֵף: הָא דְּרַב יְהוּדָה דִּשְׁמוּאֵל הִיא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Abaye said to Rav Yosef: This** ruling **of Rav Yehuda is** a ruling **of** his teacher **Shmuel,** and not of his other teacher, Rav.