## Eruvin Daf 82a

###### Eruvin 82a:1
[Eruvin 82a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/82a:1)

גַּבְרָא אַגַּבְרָא קָא רָמֵית?! מָר סָבַר פְּלִיגִי, וּמָר סָבַר לָא פְּלִיגִי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Are you raising a contradiction between** the opinion of **one person and** that of **another?** In other words, a difficulty cannot be raised from the statement of one *amora* against those of another. **One Sage,** Shmuel, **maintains** that Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages **disagree, and one** other **Sage,** Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, **maintains** that they **do not disagree.**


###### Eruvin 82a:2
[Eruvin 82a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/82a:2)

גּוּפָא, אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁאָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה ״אֵימָתַי״ וּ״בַמֶּה״ בְּמִשְׁנָתֵינוּ — אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא לְפָרֵשׁ דִּבְרֵי חֲכָמִים. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: ״אֵימָתַי״ לְפָרֵשׁ, וּ״בַמֶּה״ לַחֲלוֹק.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara analyzes the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi cited in the course of the previous discussion. With regard to **the matter itself: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said** that **any place where Rabbi Yehuda says when, or in what** case **are these, in the Mishna, he** intends **only to explain the** earlier **statement of the Rabbis,** not to disagree with them. **And Rabbi Yoḥanan said:** The term **when** indicates that Rabbi Yehuda comes **to explain,** but the phrase **in what** case is this, indicates that he intends **to disagree.**


###### Eruvin 82a:3
[Eruvin 82a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/82a:3)

וְ״אֵימָתַי״ לְפָרֵשׁ הוּא? וְהָא תְּנַן: וְאֵלּוּ הֵן הַפְּסוּלִים: הַמְשַׂחֵק בְּקוּבְיָא, וּמַלְוֶה בְּרִיבִּית, וּמַפְרִיחֵי יוֹנִים, וְסוֹחֲרֵי שְׁבִיעִית.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara raises a difficulty: **Is** the word **when** invariably a sign that Rabbi Yehuda merely seeks **to explain? Didn’t we learn** in a mishna: **The following** people **are disqualified** by the Sages from giving testimony, as they are people who commit transgressions for profit: **One who plays with dice [*kubiyya*]** for money, **and one who lends** money **at interest, and those who fly pigeons,** i.e., people who arrange competitions between pigeons while placing wagers on which bird will fly faster. The reason for their disqualification is that those who play games of chance do not fully relinquish ownership of their gambling money, as they expect to win their bet. Consequently, one who accepts money in such circumstances has effectively taken something that the giver has not wholeheartedly handed over, and he is therefore like a robber, at least by rabbinic decree. The list of those disqualified from giving testimony includes **merchants** who trade in the produce **of the Sabbatical Year,** which may be eaten but may not be sold as an object of commerce.


###### Eruvin 82a:4
[Eruvin 82a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/82a:4)

אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: אֵימָתַי — בִּזְמַן שֶׁאֵין לוֹ אוּמָּנוּת אֶלָּא הִיא, אֲבָל יֵשׁ לוֹ אוּמָּנוּת שֶׁלֹּא הִיא — הֲרֵי זֶה כָּשֵׁר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Yehuda said: When** is this so? **When he has no occupation other than this** one, **but if he has a** worthy **occupation other than this,** although he also earns money by these means, **this** person **is qualified** to give testimony. Rabbi Yehuda maintains that one who earns money by means of games of chance is not a criminal or a robber. Rather, the reason why these people are disqualified from giving testimony is because they are not occupied in the constructive development of the world. As they earn their money without effort, they do not care about the monetary losses of others. Consequently, if they have any other occupation, they are valid witnesses.


###### Eruvin 82a:5
[Eruvin 82a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/82a:5)

וְתָנֵי עֲלַהּ בְּבָרַיְיתָא, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: בֵּין שֶׁאֵין לוֹ אוּמָּנוּת אֶלָּא הִיא, וּבֵין שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ אוּמָּנוּת שֶׁלֹּא הִיא — הֲרֵי זֶה פָּסוּל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara resumes its difficulty: According to the above principle with regard to statements introduced with the term when, Rabbi Yehuda’s statement should be understood merely as an explanation of the previous opinion. However, **a *baraita* was taught about** the mishna: **And the Rabbis say: Whether he has no occupation other than this** one, **or whether he has a** fitting **occupation other than this, this** person **is disqualified** from giving testimony. Apparently, Rabbi Yehuda is disagreeing rather than explaining, even though he introduced his statement with the term when.


###### Eruvin 82a:6
[Eruvin 82a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/82a:6)

הָהִיא דְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן הִיא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **That** opinion in the *baraita*, with regard to those disqualified from providing testimony, is not the opinion of the Rabbis of the mishna. Rather, **it is** that **of Rabbi Yehuda,** who maintained that **Rabbi Tarfon said** this opinion. The Rabbis of the mishna, however, agree with Rabbi Yehuda in this regard, and his statement serves to explain their position.


###### Eruvin 82a:7
[Eruvin 82a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/82a:7)

דְּתַנְיָא, אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן: לְעוֹלָם אֵין אֶחָד מֵהֶן נָזִיר, לְפִי שֶׁאֵין נְזִירוּת אֶלָּא לְהַפְלָאָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**As it was taught** in a *baraita* with regard to naziriteship: **Rabbi Yehuda said in the name of Rabbi Tarfon:** In a case where two people accepted a bet, with each undertaking to become a nazirite if he lost the wager, and a doubt arose as to who won, **neither one** of them **can possibly be a nazirite, as there is no** acceptance of **naziriteship without** clear and definitive **pronunciation.** A vow of naziriteship is only binding if it was expressly pronounced, i.e., if it was clear from the outset that the person intended to become a nazirite.


###### Eruvin 82a:8
[Eruvin 82a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/82a:8)

אַלְמָא כֵּיוָן דִּמְסַפְּקָא לֵיהּ אִי נָזִיר אִי לָא נָזִיר הוּא — לָא מְשַׁעְבֵּיד נַפְשֵׁיהּ. הָכָא נָמֵי: כֵּיוָן דְּלָא יָדַע אִי קָנֵי אִי לָא קָנֵי — לָא גָּמַר וּמַקְנֵה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Consequently,** it can be inferred that **since he is in doubt** as to **whether he is a nazirite or he is not a nazirite, he does not submit himself** to and accept his vow of naziriteship. **Here, too,** Rabbi Yehuda disqualifies those who play games of chance from delivering testimony due to the fact that they are robbers. **Since** the player **does not know whether he will** win and **acquire** the money **or whether he will** lose and **not acquire** it, **he does not fully transfer ownership** of the money with which he plays to others, which means that the one who gains from these games receives money that was not wholeheartedly given to him. He is therefore likened to a robber, at least on the rabbinic level, which disqualifies him from giving testimony.


###### Eruvin 82a:9
[Eruvin 82a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/82a:9)

**הַדְרָן עֲלָךְ חַלּוֹן**


###### Eruvin 82a:10
[Eruvin 82a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/82a:10)

**מַתְנִי׳** כֵּיצַד מִשְׁתַּתְּפִין בִּתְחוּמִין? מַנִּיחַ אֶת הֶחָבִית, וְאוֹמֵר: הֲרֵי זֶה לְכׇל בְּנֵי עִירִי, לְכׇל מִי שֶׁיֵּלֵךְ לְבֵית הָאֵבֶל אוֹ לְבֵית הַמִּשְׁתֶּה. וְכׇל שֶׁקִּיבֵּל עָלָיו מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם — מוּתָּר, מִשֶּׁתֶּחְשַׁךְ — אָסוּר. שֶׁאֵין מְעָרְבִין מִשֶּׁתֶּחְשַׁךְ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**MISHNA:** **How does one participate in** the joining of Shabbat **boundaries?** One who wishes to establish a joining of Shabbat boundaries for himself and others **places a barrel** of food in the location he designates as their place of residence, **and says: This is for all the residents of my town, for anyone who** wishes to **go** on Shabbat **to a house of mourning or to a house of** a wedding **feast** situated beyond the Shabbat limit. **Anyone who accepted upon himself while it was still day,** i.e., before the onset of Shabbat, that he will rely on the *eiruv*, **is permitted** to rely upon it; but if one did so only **after nightfall,** he is **prohibited** to rely upon it, as the principle is that **one may not establish an *eiruv* after nightfall.**


###### Eruvin 82a:11
[Eruvin 82a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/82a:11)

**גְּמָ׳** אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: אֵין מְעָרְבִין אֶלָּא לִדְבַר מִצְוָה. מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן? תְּנֵינָא: לְכׇל מִי שֶׁיֵּלֵךְ לְבֵית הָאֵבֶל אוֹ לְבֵית הַמִּשְׁתֶּה!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**GEMARA:** **Rav Yosef said: One may establish a joining** of Shabbat boundaries **only for the purpose of a mitzva,** i.e., to enable the fulfillment of a religious obligation, but not for an optional activity. The Gemara asks: **What** novel element **is he teaching us** by this? **We** explicitly **learned** this idea in the mishna from the phrase: **For anyone who** wishes to **go** on Shabbat **to a house of mourning or to a house of a** wedding **feast.** This mishna indicates that an *eiruv* may be established only for the purpose of a mitzva, e.g., in order to comfort mourners or to celebrate a wedding, but not for any other reason.


###### Eruvin 82a:12
[Eruvin 82a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/82a:12)

מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: אוֹרְחָא דְמִלְּתָא קָתָנֵי, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: This teaching is necessary, **lest you say** that the mishna merely **teaches the usual case.** Generally, a group of people would establish an *eiruv* in order to walk beyond the Shabbat limit only for a special purpose, such as a wedding, but one might be permitted to establish an *eiruv* even for an optional activity as well. Rav Yosef therefore **teaches us** that an *eiruv* may indeed be established only for the purpose of a mitzva.


###### Eruvin 82a:13
[Eruvin 82a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/82a:13)

וְכֹל שֶׁקִּיבֵּל עָלָיו מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם. שָׁמְעַתְּ מִינַּהּ אֵין בְּרֵירָה, דְּאִי יֵשׁ בְּרֵירָה — תִּיגַּלֵּי מִילְּתָא לְמַפְרֵעַ דְּמִבְּעוֹד יוֹם הֲוָה נִיחָא לֵיהּ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
We learned in the mishna: **Anyone who accepted upon himself while it was still day** that he will rely upon the *eiruv* is permitted to rely upon it on Shabbat. The Gemara comments: Apparently, **learn from here** that **there is no** halakhic principle of retroactive **clarification.** That is to say, there is no halakhic assumption that an uncertain state of affairs can be retroactively clarified. A later statement or action cannot retroactively clarify one’s earlier intentions as though he had explicitly stated those intentions at the outset. For **if there is** a halakhic principle of retroactive **clarification,** the *eiruv* should be effective even if one relied upon it only after nightfall, as **it is retroactively revealed that he wanted** the *eiruv* **while it was still day.**


###### Eruvin 82a:14
[Eruvin 82a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/82a:14)

אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: ״הוֹדִיעוּהוּ״ וְ״לֹא הוֹדִיעוּהוּ״ קָתָנֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Ashi said** that the mishna **teaches:** While it was still day. This phrase does not require one to make the decision to rely on the *eiruv* before Shabbat. Rather, the criterion for using the *eiruv* on Shabbat is whether **they informed him or they did not inform him** of the existence of the *eiruv* prior to Shabbat. In other words, if one knew about the *eiruv* while it was still day, he may rely on it, even if he decided to use it only after the onset of Shabbat, as the halakhic principle of retroactive clarification is accepted. However, if one was unaware of the existence of the *eiruv* when it came into effect at the onset of Shabbat, the matter cannot be retroactively clarified.


###### Eruvin 82a:15
[Eruvin 82a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/82a:15)

אָמַר רַב אַסִּי: קָטָן בֶּן שֵׁשׁ יוֹצֵא בְּעֵירוּב אִמּוֹ. מֵיתִיבִי: קָטָן שֶׁצָּרִיךְ לְאִמּוֹ — יוֹצֵא בְּעֵירוּב אִמּוֹ, וְשֶׁאֵין צָרִיךְ לְאִמּוֹ — אֵין יוֹצֵא בְּעֵירוּב אִמּוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Asi said: A six-year-old child may go out by** means of **his mother’s *eiruv*.** As he is subordinate to her, he is included in her *eiruv* and does not require his own *eiruv*. **The Gemara raises an objection** from a *baraita*: **A child who needs his mother may go out by** means of **his mother’s *eiruv*, but one who does not need his mother may not go out by** means of **his mother’s *eiruv*.**


###### Eruvin 82a:16
[Eruvin 82a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/82a:16)

וּתְנַן נָמֵי גַּבֵּי סוּכָּה כִּי הַאי גַוְונָא: קָטָן שֶׁאֵין צָרִיךְ לְאִמּוֹ — חַיָּיב בְּסוּכָּה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And we also learned a similar** *halakha* in a mishna **with regard to a *sukka*: A child who does not need his mother is obligated in** the mitzva of ***sukka*** by rabbinical law, so that he will be trained in the observance of mitzvot.


###### Eruvin 82a:17
[Eruvin 82a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/82a:17)

וְהָוֵינַן בַּהּ: וְאֵיזֶהוּ קָטָן שֶׁאֵין צָרִיךְ לְאִמּוֹ? אָמְרִי דְּבֵי רַבִּי יַנַּאי: כׇּל שֶׁנִּפְנֶה וְאֵין אִמּוֹ מְקַנַּחְתּוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And we discussed** this mishna and raised a question: **But who is** the **child who does not need his mother? The** Sages of the **school of Rabbi Yannai said:** This is referring to **any** child **who defecates and his mother does not wipe him.** A child who can clean himself is considered sufficiently mature for the purposes of the *halakha* of *sukka*.


###### Eruvin 82a:18
[Eruvin 82a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/82a:18)

רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ אָמַר: כׇּל שֶׁנֵּיעוֹר וְאֵינוֹ קוֹרֵא ״אִימָּא״. ״אִימָּא״ סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ? גְּדוֹלִים, נָמֵי קָרוּ. אֶלָּא אֵימָא: כָּל שֶׁנֵּיעוֹר מִשְּׁנָתוֹ וְאֵינוֹ קוֹרֵא ״אִימָּא, אִימָּא״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Any** child **who wakens** from sleep **and does not call: Mother,** is obligated in the mitzva of *sukka*. The Gemara expresses surprise at this statement: **Can it enter your mind** that every child who cries: **Mother** is considered to be one who needs his mother? Much **older** children **also call** out to their mothers for assistance when they awaken. **Rather, say** that the *halakha* includes **any** child **who wakens from sleep and does not** persistently **call: Mother, Mother.** A minor who arises only when his mother comes is classified as one who needs his mother.


###### Eruvin 82a:19
[Eruvin 82a:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Eruvin/r/82a:19)

וְכַמָּה? כְּבַר אַרְבַּע, כְּבַר חָמֵשׁ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara continues. The Sages who discussed the mishna asked: **And** at **what** age is a child no longer considered to be in need of his mother? Such a child is **one about four** years **old** or **about five** years **old,** as some children become independent of their mothers earlier than others. This poses a difficulty to the opinion of Rav Asi, who maintains that even a six-year-old child is considered to be in need of his mother, and may go out by means of his mother’s *eiruv*.