## Gittin Daf 21a

###### Gittin 21a:1
[Gittin 21a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/21a:1)

זָקֵן שָׁאנֵי, דְּיָדַע לְאַקְנוֹיֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
a knowledgeable **old man is different, as he understands** the need **to transfer** the documents, and this may not be true in the case of a woman and the bill of divorce.


###### Gittin 21a:2
[Gittin 21a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/21a:2)

אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: מֵהָכָא – עָרֵב הַיּוֹצֵא לְאַחַר חִיתּוּם שְׁטָרוֹת, גּוֹבֶה מִנְּכָסִים בְּנֵי חוֹרִין!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, Rava said:** A proof may be brought **from here:** If there was **a guarantor** whose commitment **emerged after the** promissory **note was signed,** then the creditor may **collect** only **from** the guarantor’s **unsold property.** However, he does not have a lien on the guarantor’s property with which he could collect from property sold after he signed on as a guarantor. Rava’s proof is that it must be that ownership of the promissory note was transferred to the guarantor before he signed it, in order for his commitment to take effect. It may therefore be seen from this *baraita* that the participants understand the need to transfer ownership of the document.


###### Gittin 21a:3
[Gittin 21a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/21a:3)

אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: מַאי קוּשְׁיָא? דִּלְמָא גַּבְרָא שָׁאנֵי, דְּיָדַע לְאַקְנוֹיֵי! אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: מֵהָכָא – אִשָּׁה כּוֹתֶבֶת אֶת גִּיטָּהּ, וְהָאִישׁ כּוֹתֵב אֶת שׁוֹבָרוֹ, שֶׁאֵין קִיּוּם הַגֵּט אֶלָּא בְּחוֹתְמָיו.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Ashi said: What is the difficulty** raised by this *baraita*? **Perhaps a man is different,** in **that** he **understands** the need **to transfer** the document, and the question of the Gemara pertains to a woman, who may not be as well versed in the minutiae of monetary law. **Rather, Rav Ashi said:** There is a proof **from** what was taught **here** (22b): **A woman may write her bill of divorce** on her own or allow a scribe to write it on her behalf, and then give it to her husband, so that he will give it to her. Similarly, **a man may write his receipt** that he will receive from the woman after paying her marriage contract, **as the ratification of a bill of divorce is only through its signatories,** i.e., the witnesses who sign it, and the mere writing of the document or its receipt has no legal ramifications and may be done by anyone. In any case, it is clear from here that a woman understands the need to transfer the bill of divorce that will be given to her by her husband in the future.


###### Gittin 21a:4
[Gittin 21a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/21a:4)

אָמַר רָבָא: כָּתַב לָהּ גֵּט, וּנְתָנוֹ בְּיַד עַבְדּוֹ, וְכָתַב לָהּ שְׁטַר מַתָּנָה עָלָיו – קְנָאַתְהוּ, וּמִתְגָּרֶשֶׁת בּוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **Rava says:** If **he wrote her a bill of divorce and placed it in the hand of his slave, and he wrote her a deed of gift with regard to** the slave, then **she acquired** the slave due to the document, **and she is divorced** immediately **by the** bill of divorce that is in his hand. The slave is considered to be like her property, and it is as though the husband had placed the bill of divorce in her domain at the time that he transferred the slave to her, and she acquires the bill of divorce as though it were in her courtyard.


###### Gittin 21a:5
[Gittin 21a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/21a:5)

וְאַמַּאי? חָצֵר מְהַלֶּכֶת הִיא, וְחָצֵר מְהַלֶּכֶת לֹא קָנָה! וְכִי תֵּימָא בְּעוֹמֵד, וְהָאָמַר רָבָא: כׇּל שֶׁאִילּוּ מְהַלֵּךְ לֹא קָנָה, עוֹמֵד וְיוֹשֵׁב לֹא קָנָה! וְהִלְכְתָא – בְּכָפוּת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And why** does she acquire the bill of divorce? The slave **is** considered **a mobile courtyard, and a mobile courtyard does not acquire** property. One’s courtyard can acquire items for him only when the courtyard is fixed in its location. Since a slave is considered to be like land with regard to other areas of *halakha*, he should also be defined as a mobile courtyard, as he can move from place to place. **And if you would say** that Rava was referring **to a** slave who happens to be **standing,** who is not mobile, **but didn’t Rava say: Anything that does not acquire when moving** also **does not acquire** when it is **standing or sitting.** The fact that the slave could move gives him the status of a moving courtyard, regardless if he is currently moving or not. The Gemara answers: **And the *halakha*** taught by Rava could apply **in** a case where the slave was **bound** and unable to move, as in that case he is not even able to move, and is not considered to be a mobile courtyard.


###### Gittin 21a:6
[Gittin 21a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/21a:6)

וְאָמַר רָבָא: כָּתַב לָהּ גֵּט וּנְתָנוֹ בַּחֲצֵרוֹ, וְכָתַב לָהּ שְׁטַר מַתָּנָה עָלָיו – קְנָאַתְהוּ, וּמִתְגָּרֶשֶׁת בּוֹ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And Rava** also **says:** If **he wrote her a bill of divorce and placed it in his courtyard, and he wrote a deed of gift with regard to** the courtyard, then **she has acquired** the courtyard **and is divorced** immediately **by the** bill of divorce in the courtyard.


###### Gittin 21a:7
[Gittin 21a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/21a:7)

וּצְרִיכָא; דְּאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן עֶבֶד, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: דַּוְקָא עֶבֶד, אֲבָל חָצֵר – לִיגְזַר, מִשּׁוּם חֲצֵרָהּ הַבָּאָה לְאַחַר מִכָּאן;

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara comments: **And** it is **necessary** for Rava to teach his *halakha* both with regard to a slave and with regard to a courtyard. One could not have been learned from the other, **as had he taught us** only about **a slave, I would say** that the husband may transfer the bill of divorce to his wife **specifically** through **a slave, but** in the case of **a courtyard** the Sages may decide **to enact a decree** that this should not be a valid bill of divorce, **due to** the case of **her courtyard that comes afterward.** People may not differentiate between this case and a similar case, where the husband places the bill of divorce in the courtyard of a third party, and that courtyard is subsequently acquired by her. In that case, the couple is not divorced, as the bill of divorce was not given by the husband to the wife. Therefore, Rava has to teach that the Sages did not make this decree, and in this case, where the husband gave the courtyard together with the bill of divorce, it is valid.


###### Gittin 21a:8
[Gittin 21a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/21a:8)

וְאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן חָצֵר, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא דַּוְקָא חָצֵר, אֲבָל עֶבֶד – לִיגְזַר כָּפוּת אַטּוּ שֶׁאֵינוֹ כָּפוּת; קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And had** Rava **taught us** only about **a courtyard,** then **I would say** that a woman is divorced **specifically** if her husband placed the bill of divorce in **a courtyard, but** in the case of **a slave** the Sages may decide **to decree** with regard to **a bound** slave that the divorce will not take effect, **due to** the similarity to **an unbound** slave, where the divorce would not take effect, as explained above. Therefore, Rava **teaches us** that it is a valid bill of divorce in both cases.


###### Gittin 21a:9
[Gittin 21a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/21a:9)

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: מִכְּדֵי חָצֵר מֵהֵיכָא אִיתְרַבַּי? מִ״יָּדָהּ״;

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Abaye said** as a challenge to Rava: **Now, from where was a courtyard included?** What is the source for the *halakha* that a man can divorce a woman by placing a bill of divorce in her courtyard? This can be derived **from** the phrase: “And gives it in **her hand”** (Deuteronomy 24:1), and the Sages derived that this is not limited to her actual hand but also includes anything that is an extension of her hand, such as her courtyard.


###### Gittin 21a:10
[Gittin 21a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/21a:10)

מַה יָדָהּ דְּאִיתַהּ בֵּין מִדַּעְתַּהּ וּבֵין בְּעַל כּוּרְחַהּ, אַף חֲצֵרָהּ דְּאִיתַהּ בֵּין מִדַּעְתַּהּ וּבֵין בְּעַל כּוּרְחַהּ; וְהָא מַתָּנָה – מִדַּעְתַּהּ אִיתַהּ, בְּעַל כּוּרְחַהּ לֵיתַהּ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Consequently, the following reasoning should apply: **Just as** with regard to **her hand, that it** acquires property for her **whether with her consent or against her will, so too,** with regard to **her courtyard,** it should be **that it** acquires property for her **whether with her consent or against her will. And** with regard to **a gift, it is** so that she acquires it **with her consent,** but **it is not** so that she acquires it **against her will.** Therefore, a courtyard that a husband transfers to his wife as a gift along with a bill of divorce is not the same as a bill of divorce that he gives into her hand. As a courtyard is different from her hand in this sense, it should not be able to be used as a means of transferring a bill of divorce.


###### Gittin 21a:11
[Gittin 21a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/21a:11)

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב שִׁימִי בַּר אָשֵׁי: וְהָא שְׁלִיחוּת לְקַבָּלָה, דְּמִדַּעְתַּהּ אִיתַהּ בְּעַל כּוּרְחַהּ לֵיתַהּ, וְקָא הָוֵי שָׁלִיחַ לְִקַבָּלָה!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Shimi bar Ashi objects to** the reasoning of Abaye: **But** what of **agency for receipt** of the bill of divorce, where the woman appoints an agent to receive a bill of divorce on her behalf, concerning **which** the agent can act **with her consent,** but **not against her will.** No one other than the wife can appoint an agent to receive the bill of divorce, and despite this **he is an agent for receipt.** Yet a woman is able to appoint an agent for receipt. Evidently, the comparison of other methods of acquisition to acquisition by placing the bill of divorce in her hand is not absolute.


###### Gittin 21a:12
[Gittin 21a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/21a:12)

וְאַבָּיֵי – אַטּוּ שְׁלִיחוּת מִ״יָּדָהּ״ אִיתְרַבַּי?! מִ״וְּשִׁלַּח וְשִׁלְּחָהּ״ אִיתְרַבַּי!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And Abaye** would respond: **Is that to say** that the *halakha* of **agency is included from** the words **“her hand”?** It is not learned from there; rather, it **is included** based on the additional wording of the verse, as the verse does not state: **And he sent [*veshillaḥ*].** Rather, it states: **“And sends her out [*veshilleḥa*]”** (Deuteronomy 24:1). The expanded term teaches that a woman can also appoint an agent to receive a bill of divorce on her behalf. Since agency has a different source in the Torah, it is not impacted by the limitations of her hand. The *halakha* that a bill of divorce can be given to her by placing it in her courtyard is an extension of the *halakha* that it can be placed in her hand and does carry the limitations of her hand. Therefore, it must be able to work whether with her consent or against her will.


###### Gittin 21a:13
[Gittin 21a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/21a:13)

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: שְׁלִיחוּת לְקַבָּלָה נָמֵי אַשְׁכְּחַן בְּעַל כּוּרְחַהּ, שֶׁכֵּן אָב מְקַבֵּל גֵּט לְבִתּוֹ קְטַנָּה בְּעַל כּוֹרְחָהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if you wish, say** a different answer: **We also have found** that **agency for receipt** can be effective **against her will.** How so? **As** the *halakha* is that **a father can receive a bill of divorce for his minor daughter against her will.** The *halakhot* of agency are therefore consistent with the *halakhot* with regard to her hand, and Abaye’s objection stands.


###### Gittin 21a:14
[Gittin 21a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/21a:14)

עַל הֶעָלֶה שֶׁל זַיִת וְכוּ׳: בִּשְׁלָמָא יָד דְּעֶבֶד

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna taught that a bill of divorce may be written **on an olive leaf,** on the horn of a cow, or on the hand of a slave, provided that the husband then gives her the slave or the cow. The Gemara asks: **Granted,** with regard to **the hand of a slave,**