## Gittin Daf 42a

###### Gittin 42a:1
[Gittin 42a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/42a:1)

בְּעֶבֶד שֶׁל שְׁנֵי שׁוּתָּפִין, וְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The mishna is referring **to a slave belonging to two partners, and** in that case **everyone agrees** that each one of them can emancipate his portion of the slave. Consequently, there could be a half-slave half-freeman even according to Rav Yosef’s understanding of the opinion of the Rabbis.


###### Gittin 42a:2
[Gittin 42a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/42a:2)

אָמַר רַבָּה: מַחֲלוֹקֶת – בְּשֶׁשִּׁיחְרֵר חֶצְיוֹ וְהִנִּיחַ חֶצְיוֹ; אֲבָל שִׁיחְרֵר חֶצְיוֹ, וּמָכַר חֶצְיוֹ אוֹ נָתַן בְּמַתָּנָה חֶצְיוֹ, כֵּיוָן דְּקָנָפֵיק מִינֵּיהּ כּוּלֵּיהּ – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל קָנָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The Gemara discusses another dispute with regard to one who emancipates half of his slave. **Rabba said:** The **dispute** between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis concerning whether the slave can be half-emancipated applies only **when** the master **freed half of him and left** the other **half of him** unaffected. **However,** if he **freed half of him and sold** the other **half of him, or gave** the other **half of him as a gift** to someone else, then, **since** the slave **left him entirely,** as the original master no longer owns any portion of the slave, **everyone agrees** that the slave has **acquired** half of his freedom.


###### Gittin 42a:3
[Gittin 42a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/42a:3)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: וּבְכוּלּוֹ – לָא פְּלִיגִי?! וְהָתָנֵי חֲדָא: הַכּוֹתֵב נְכָסָיו לִשְׁנֵי עֲבָדָיו – קָנוּ וּמְשַׁחְרְרִין זֶה אֶת זֶה. וְתַנְיָא אִידַּךְ, הָאוֹמֵר: ״כׇּל נְכָסַי נְתוּנִין לִפְלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי עֲבָדַיי״ – אַף עַצְמָם לֹא קָנוּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Abaye said to him: And do they not disagree with regard to** a case where **he** is released **entirely? But** it **is taught** in **one** *baraita*: In the case of **one who writes his property to his two slaves,** i.e., gives it to them via a document, **they acquired** the property **and they free each other,** because each one has ownership over half of the other slave. **And it was taught** in **another** *baraita* that in the case of **one who says: All of my property is given to so-and-so and so-and-so my slaves, they did not acquire even themselves,** and all the more so they did not acquire the property. Seemingly, the two *baraitot* contradict each other.


###### Gittin 42a:4
[Gittin 42a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/42a:4)

מַאי, לָאו הָא רַבִּי, וְהָא רַבָּנַן?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Abaye continues his question: **What, is it not** that the way to reconcile the *baraitot* is to say that **this,** the first *baraita*, is in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi, that emancipation can take effect with regard to half a slave? **And that,** the second *baraita*, is in accordance with the opinion of **the Rabbis,** who maintain that even when the master retains no hold on the slave, a slave cannot be partially released?


###### Gittin 42a:5
[Gittin 42a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/42a:5)

לָא, אִידִי וְאִידִי רַבָּנַן; הָא דְּאָמַר כּוּלּוֹ, הָא דְּאָמַר חֲצִי חֲצִי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara offers a different reconciliation: **No,** both **this and that** *baraita* are in accordance with the opinion of **the Rabbis. This** first *baraita* is discussing a case **where one said** that he is giving **all of** his property to each one of the slaves. Since he gave everything to both of them, they each acquire the property, including each other, emancipate each other, and divide the property between them. **That** second *baraita* is discussing a case **where one said** that he is giving **half** of his property to one slave and **half** of it to the other, so neither is fully emancipated.


###### Gittin 42a:6
[Gittin 42a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/42a:6)

וְהָא מִדְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: וְאִם אָמַר חֲצִי חֲצִי – לֹא קָנוּ, מִכְּלָל דְּרֵישָׁא דְּאָמַר כּוּלּוֹ! פָּרוֹשֵׁי קָא מְפָרֵשׁ – אַף עַצְמָן לֹא קָנוּ, כֵּיצַד? כְּגוֹן דְּאָמַר חֲצִי חֲצִי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara challenges this explanation: **But from** the fact **that the latter clause** of the second *baraita* **teaches: But if he said** that he is giving **half** of his property to one slave and **half** of it to the other, **they did not acquire** the property, **it may be inferred that the first clause** is discussing a case **where he said** that he is giving **all of** his property to each one of them, and yet they do not acquire the property. The Gemara answers: There are not two separate cases in the *baraita*. Rather, the second clause **is explaining** the first clause of the *baraita*, as follows: **They did not acquire even themselves. How so? For example,** this is the *halakha* in a case **where** the master **said** that he is giving **half** of his property to one slave and **half** of it to the other.


###### Gittin 42a:7
[Gittin 42a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/42a:7)

הָכִי נָמֵי מִסְתַּבְּרָא, דְּאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ רֵישָׁא דְּאָמַר כּוּלּוֹ – הַשְׁתָּא אָמַר כּוּלּוֹ לֹא קָנוּ, אָמַר חֲצִי חֲצִי מִיבַּעְיָא?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara comments: **So too, it is reasonable** to say this, **for if it enters your mind** to say that **the first clause** of the *baraita* is discussing a case **where he said** that he gives **all of** his property to his slaves, and yet they do not acquire it, then the latter clause is unnecessary. **Now** that the mishna taught that if **one said** that he gives **all of** the property to his two slaves, then each slave **did not acquire** himself, **is** it **necessary** to state in the second clause that this is true when one gives **half** of his property to one slave and **half** of it to the other?


###### Gittin 42a:8
[Gittin 42a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/42a:8)

אִי מִשּׁוּם הָא לָא אִירְיָא – תְּנָא סֵיפָא לְגַלּוֹיֵי רֵישָׁא, שֶׁלֹּא תֹּאמַר: רֵישָׁא דְּאָמַר חֲצִי חֲצִי, אֲבָל אָמַר כּוּלּוֹ קָנוּ; תְּנָא סֵיפָא דְּאָמַר חֲצִי חֲצִי, מִכְּלָל דְּרֵישָׁא דְּאָמַר כּוּלּוֹ – וַאֲפִילּוּ הָכִי לֹא קָנוּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **If it is due to that** reason, **there is no** conclusive **argument.** One could say that the *tanna* **taught the latter clause to shed light on the first clause, so that you do not say: The first clause** is discussing only a case **where one said** that he gives **half** of his property to one slave and **half** to the other, **but** if **one said** that he gives **all of it** to both of them, then **they did acquire** the property. Therefore, the *tanna* **taught the latter clause,** where it explicitly discusses a case **where he said** that he gives **half** to one and **half** to the other, and **by inference** it is clear **that the first clause** must be discussing a case **where he said** that he gives **all of it** to both of them, **and even so they did not acquire** the property.


###### Gittin 42a:9
[Gittin 42a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/42a:9)

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא, לָא קַשְׁיָא: כָּאן בִּשְׁטָר אֶחָד, כָּאן בִּשְׁנֵי שְׁטָרוֹת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if you wish, say** instead that it is **not difficult.** It is possible to reconcile the two *baraitot* differently: **Here,** in the second *baraita*, where they did not acquire the property, this is a case where the master wrote everything **in one document.** The reason the slaves do not acquire themselves is that it is not possible to emancipate two slaves with one document. **There,** in the first *baraita*, which rules that they did acquire the property, the case is one where the master wrote the transfer of property **in two documents.**


###### Gittin 42a:10
[Gittin 42a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/42a:10)

בִּשְׁטָר אֶחָד, מַאי אִירְיָא חֲצִי חֲצִי? אֲפִילּוּ אָמַר כּוּלּוֹ נָמֵי לֹא קָנוּ! הָכִי נָמֵי קָאָמַר: אַף עַצְמָן לֹא קָנוּ, בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים – בִּשְׁטָר אֶחָד, אֲבָל בִּשְׁנֵי שְׁטָרוֹת – קָנוּ; וְאִם אָמַר חֲצִי חֲצִי – אַף בִּשְׁנֵי שְׁטָרוֹת נָמֵי לָא קָנוּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: If the second *baraita* is referring to a case where he wrote everything **in one document, why specifically** mention that the slaves do not acquire themselves when he gave **half** to one and **half** to the other? **Even if he said all of it as well, they did not acquire** the property, as was taught explicitly in the beginning of the *baraita*. The Gemara answers: **That is also what** the *tanna* **is saying: They did not acquire even themselves. In what** case is **this statement said?** In a case where the master wrote everything **in one document. But** if he wrote it **in two documents, they acquired** the property. **And if** the master **said** that he gives **half** to one and **half** to the other, then **even** if he wrote it **in two documents they also did not acquire** the property.


###### Gittin 42a:11
[Gittin 42a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/42a:11)

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: לָא קַשְׁיָא – כָּאן בְּבַת אַחַת, כָּאן בְּזֶה אַחַר זֶה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if you wish, say** instead that it is **not difficult,** and it is possible to reconcile the two *baraitot* differently: **Here,** the first *baraita*, where they did acquire the property, is referring to a case where he gave them the documents **simultaneously. There,** the second *baraita*, where they did not acquire, the property is referring to a case where he gave them the documents **sequentially.**


###### Gittin 42a:12
[Gittin 42a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/42a:12)

בִּשְׁלָמָא בָּתְרָא לָא קָנֵי, דְּהָא קָנֵי לֵיהּ קַמָּא; אֶלָּא קַמָּא, לִיקְנֵי נַפְשֵׁיהּ וְלִקְנְיֵיהּ לְחַבְרֵיהּ! אֶלָּא מְחַוַּורְתָּא כִּדְשַׁנִּינַן מֵעִיקָּרָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara questions this explanation: **Granted,** if the master gave the documents sequentially, **the last** slave **did not acquire, for the first** slave **had already acquired him,** as the second slave was among the possessions transferred via the first document. **However, the first** slave **should acquire himself and should** also **acquire the other** slave, as he was given all of the property in one document. Due to this objection, the Gemara concludes: **Rather, it is clear as we initially answered,** and in any case it is referring to when he gave both documents simultaneously.


###### Gittin 42a:13
[Gittin 42a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/42a:13)

רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּקָא קָרֵי לְהוּ ״עֲבָדַיי״. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַפְרָם לְרַב אָשֵׁי: וְדִלְמָא ״עֲבָדַיי״ – שֶׁהָיוּ כְּבָר!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Ashi said:** The contradiction between the *baraitot* can be resolved by noting that **it is different there,** in the second *baraita*, **because** the master **calls them: My slaves.** By writing: All of my property is given to so-and-so and so-and-so my slaves, he indicates that he does not intend to free them. **Rafram said to Rav Ashi: But perhaps** when he says: **My slaves,** he is referring to those **who were** his slaves **in the past.**


###### Gittin 42a:14
[Gittin 42a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/42a:14)

מִי לָא תְּנַן: הַכּוֹתֵב כׇּל נְכָסָיו לְעַבְדּוֹ – יָצָא לְחֵירוּת; שִׁיֵּיר קַרְקַע כָּל שֶׁהוּא – לֹא יָצָא לְחֵירוּת. רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: לְעוֹלָם הוּא בֶּן חוֹרִין, עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר: ״כׇּל נְכָסַי נְתוּנִין לִפְלוֹנִי עַבְדִּי, חוּץ מֵאֶחָד מֵרִבּוֹא שֶׁבָּהֶן״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rafram attempts to prove that the expression my slaves can be used in this manner. **Didn’t we learn** in a mishna (*Pe’a* 3:8): In the case of **one who writes all of his property to his slave,** i.e., gives it to him via a document, the slave **has been emancipated.** But if **he reserved** for himself even **any amount of land,** then **he has not been emancipated. Rabbi Shimon says: Actually,** the slave **is a freeman until** the master **says** the following: **All of my property is given to so-and-so my slave except for one ten-thousandth of it,** as in that case it is possible that the master meant to include the slave in the portion that he is not giving.


###### Gittin 42a:15
[Gittin 42a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/42a:15)

טַעְמָא דְּאָמַר [״חוּץ מֵאֶחָד מֵרִבּוֹא שֶׁבָּהֶן״], הָא לָא אָמַר הָכִי – קָנֵי; אַמַּאי? וְהָא ״עֶבֶד״ קָא קָרֵי לֵיהּ! אֶלָּא ״עַבְדִּי״ שֶׁהָיָה כְּבָר, הָכָא נָמֵי ״עֲבָדַיי״ שֶׁהָיוּ כְּבָר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rafram continues his proof: **The reason** the slave is not emancipated is specifically **because** the master **said: Except for one ten-thousandth of it. But** if **he did not say this,** then the slave **acquires** the property. Rafram asks: According to your reasoning, **why** does he acquire the property? **Didn’t he call him a slave? Rather,** it must be that when he called him: **My slave,** he meant **that** he **was** his slave **in the past. Here also,** when he said: **My slaves,** he meant: Those **who were** my slaves **in the past.** Therefore, Rav Ashi’s attempt to resolve the contradiction between the *baraitot* cannot be accepted.


###### Gittin 42a:16
[Gittin 42a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/42a:16)

נְגָחוֹ שׁוֹר; יוֹם שֶׁל רַבּוֹ – לְרַבּוֹ, יוֹם שֶׁל עַצְמוֹ – לְעַצְמוֹ. אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה – יוֹם שֶׁל רַבּוֹ יִשָּׂא שִׁפְחָה, יוֹם שֶׁל עַצְמוֹ יִשָּׂא בַּת חוֹרִין! אִיסּוּרָא לָא קָאָמְרִינַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ If a half-slave half-freeman, who works for himself and his master on alternating days, **was gored by an ox** and damaged, then, if he was gored on **the day of his master,** the reimbursement for the damage caused is paid **to his master.** If it was **on his** own **day,** it is paid **to** the slave **himself.** The Gemara asks: **However, if that is so,** if he is viewed as entering and leaving a state of slavery each day, then **on the day of his master he should** be able to **marry a maidservant** and on **his** own **day he should** be able to **marry a free woman.** However, the mishna states that he cannot marry anyone. The Gemara answers: **We are not saying** that he is viewed as entering and leaving a state of slavery each day with regard to **prohibitions.**


###### Gittin 42a:17
[Gittin 42a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/42a:17)

תָּא שְׁמַע: הֵמִית מִי שֶׁחֶצְיוֹ עֶבֶד וְחֶצְיוֹ בֶּן חוֹרִין – נוֹתֵן חֲצִי קְנָס לְרַבּוֹ,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Come** and **hear** a proof with regard to this issue: When a Canaanite slave is killed by an ox, in addition to the ox being put to death, the owner of the ox pays a fixed penalty of thirty shekels to the slave’s owner. If a freeman is killed by an ox, in addition to the ox being put to death, the freeman’s value is paid to his heirs. If an ox **killed a half-slave half-freeman,** then the owner of the ox **gives half** of **a penalty,** i.e., fifteen shekels, **to his master**