## Gittin Daf 72a

###### Gittin 72a:1
[Gittin 72a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/72a:1)

רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הִיא, דְּאָמַר: מִילֵּי לָא מִימַּסְרָן לְשָׁלִיחַ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**It is** the opinion of **Rabbi Yosei, who says:** Verbal **directives cannot be delegated to an agent,** and there is no concern that the scribe signed the document without the husband instructing him to do so.


###### Gittin 72a:2
[Gittin 72a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/72a:2)

וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ מוֹדֶה רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּאוֹמֵר ״אִמְרוּ״, נָפֵיק מִינַּהּ חוּרְבָּא – דְּזִימְנִין דְּאָמַר לְהוּ לִשְׁנַיִם ״אִמְרוּ לְסוֹפֵר וְיִכְתּוֹב, וְלִפְלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי וְיַחְתֹּמוּ״; וּמִשּׁוּם כִּיסּוּפָא דְּסוֹפֵר – חָיְישִׁי וּמַחְתְּמִי לֵיהּ, וּבַעַל לָא אֲמַר הָכִי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if it enters your mind** to say that **Rabbi Yosei concedes in** the case of one who **says: Tell** another to write it, **a pitfall will result from it. As sometimes,** it happens **that one said to two** people: **Tell a scribe and he will write** the document **and** tell **so-and-so and so-and-so and they will sign** it. **And due to the shame of the scribe,** who asks: Don’t you consider me a sufficiently upright person to sign the document as a witness, the agents **are concerned** to avoid that disgrace **and** they will **have one of those witnesses and the scribe sign together with him, and the husband did not say** to do **so.** This bill of divorce is invalid because it was signed contrary to the husband’s instructions, and the agents will mistakenly think it is valid.


###### Gittin 72a:3
[Gittin 72a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/72a:3)

אֶלָּא מְחַוַּורְתָּא, רֵישָׁא רַבִּי מֵאִיר וְסֵיפָא רַבִּי יוֹסֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The reason that this is not a concern must be because Rabbi Yosei holds that even if the husband says to the agents: Tell the scribe to write, the bill of divorce is not valid. **Rather, it is clear** that **the first clause** of the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Meir and the latter clause** is in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Yosei.**


###### Gittin 72a:4
[Gittin 72a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/72a:4)

רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: כּוּלַּהּ רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הִיא, וְלָא מִיבַּעְיָא קָאָמַר: לָא מִבַּעְיָא הֵיכָא דְּלָא אֲמַר ״תְּנוּ״, אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ אֲמַר ״תְּנוּ״ – לָא. וְלָא מִיבַּעְיָא הֵיכָא דְּלָא אֲמַר לְבֵי תְלָתָא, אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ אֲמַר לְבֵי תְּלָתָא – לָא. וְלָא מִיבַּעְיָא הֵיכָא דְּלָא אֲמַר ״אִמְרוּ״, אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ אֲמַר ״אִמְרוּ״ – נָמֵי לָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Ashi said** an alternative explanation of the attribution of the mishna: The mishna in **its entirety is** in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Yosei,** who said that verbal directives cannot be delegated to an agent, **and it is speaking** utilizing the style of: **It is not necessary,** as follows: **It is not necessary** to state that the bill of divorce is not valid in a case **where he did not say** to the agents: **Give** the document to my wife; **rather, even** if **he said** to the agents: **Give** the bill of divorce to my wife, the document is **not** valid. **And it is not necessary** to state the *halakha* in a case **where** the husband **did not say** his instructions **to three** people; **rather, even** if **he said** his instructions **to three** people, **no,** the bill of divorce is not valid. **And it is not necessary** to state the *halakha* in a case **where** the husband **did not say** to the agents: **Say** my instructions to a scribe, **but even** if **he said: Say** my instructions to a scribe, the bill of divorce is **also not** valid.


###### Gittin 72a:5
[Gittin 72a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/72a:5)

תַּנְיָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרַב אָשֵׁי: כָּתַב סוֹפֵר לִשְׁמָהּ וְחָתְמוּ עֵדִים לִשְׁמָהּ, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁכְּתָבוּהוּ וַחֲתָמוּהוּ וּנְתָנוּהוּ לוֹ וּנְתָנוֹ לָהּ – הֲרֵי הַגֵּט בָּטֵל, עַד שֶׁיִּשְׁמְעוּ קוֹלוֹ שֶׁיֹּאמַר לַסּוֹפֵר ״כְּתוֹב״ וְלָעֵדִים ״חֲתוֹמוּ״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara notes: It **is taught** in a *baraita* (*Tosefta* 2:7–8) **in accordance with** the opinion **of Rav Ashi** that Rabbi Yosei invalidated the bill of divorce even if the husband said: Tell my instructions to a scribe, as it is taught: If **the scribe wrote** the bill of divorce **for her sake and the witnesses signed it for her sake** then **even though they wrote it, and they signed it, and they gave it to** the husband **and he gave it to** his wife, **the bill of divorce is void until they hear** the husband’s **voice when he says to the scribe: Write** the document for the sake of my wife, **and to the witnesses: Sign** the document for the sake of my wife.


###### Gittin 72a:6
[Gittin 72a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/72a:6)

״יִשְׁמְעוּ״ – לְאַפּוֹקֵי מִמַּאן דְּאָמַר, מוֹדֶה רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּאוֹמֵר: ״אִמְרוּ״. ״קוֹלוֹ״ – לְאַפּוֹקֵי מִדְּרַב כָּהֲנָא אֲמַר רַב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The inference from the *baraita* is that it uses the term: Until **they hear,** serves **to exclude** the opinion of **the one who said: Rabbi Yosei concedes in** a case where the husband **says: Say** my instructions to the scribe; because the scribe and the witnesses must hear the husband themselves. Furthermore, the *baraita* uses the term: **His voice, to exclude that which Rav Kahana** says that **Rav says,** that a husband may issue written instructions to the scribe and witnesses. According to the *baraita* the instructions must be verbal.


###### Gittin 72a:7
[Gittin 72a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/72a:7)

**מַתְנִי׳** ״זֶה גִּיטִּיךְ אִם מַתִּי״; ״זֶה גִּיטִּיךְ מֵחוֹלִי זֶה״; ״זֶה גִּיטִּיךְ לְאַחַר מִיתָה״ – לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם. ״מֵהַיּוֹם אִם מַתִּי״; ״מֵעַכְשָׁיו אִם מַתִּי״ – הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**MISHNA:** If one says to his wife: **This is your bill of divorce if I die,** or: **This is your bill of divorce** if I die **from this illness,** or: **This is your bill of divorce after** my **death,** then it is as if **he said nothing,** since a bill of divorce is valid only if it takes effect before the husband’s death. But if the husband said to his wife: This is your bill of divorce **from today if I die,** or: This is your bill of divorce **from now if I die,** then **this is** a valid **bill of divorce,** because once he dies, the bill of divorce retroactively applies from when he made this statement.


###### Gittin 72a:8
[Gittin 72a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/72a:8)

״מֵהַיּוֹם וּלְאַחַר מִיתָה״ – גֵּט וְאֵינוֹ גֵּט; וְאִם מֵת – חוֹלֶצֶת, וְלֹא מִתְיַיבֶּמֶת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
If the husband says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce **from today and after** my **death,** then it is uncertain whether his primary intention was for the bill of divorce to take effect that day, in which case it is a valid bill of divorce, or if his primary intention was that it should take effect after his death and is therefore not valid. The *halakha* is that there is uncertainty whether it is a valid **bill of divorce or not** a valid **bill of divorce. And if he dies** without children his wife must **perform *ḥalitza*,** since perhaps the bill of divorce is not valid and she is bound by the levirate bond and may not remarry without first performing *ḥalitza*. **But she may not enter into levirate marriage,** since perhaps the bill of divorce is valid, and it is prohibited for a divorcée to marry her brother-in-law.


###### Gittin 72a:9
[Gittin 72a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/72a:9)

״זֶה גִּיטִּיךְ מֵהַיּוֹם, אִם מַתִּי מֵחוֹלִי זֶה״, וְעָמַד וְהָלַךְ בַּשּׁוּק, וְחָלָה וָמֵת – אוֹמְדִין אוֹתוֹ, אִם מֵחֲמַת חוֹלִי הָרִאשׁוֹן מֵת – הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט, וְאִם לָאו – אֵינוֹ גֵּט.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
If he said: **This is your bill of divorce from today if I die from this illness,** and he recovered, **and he arose and walked in the market, but** then **became ill** again **and died,** the court **assesses him. If he died because of the first illness** then **this is** a valid **bill of divorce,** as his conditional statement was fulfilled, **but if not,** i.e., if he was cured from the first illness and died from another illness, then **it is not** a valid **bill of divorce.**


###### Gittin 72a:10
[Gittin 72a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/72a:10)

**גְּמָ׳** אַלְמָא ״אִם מַתִּי״ כִּ״לְאַחַר מִיתָה״ דָּמֵי, וַהֲדַר תָּנֵי: ״מֵהַיּוֹם אִם מַתִּי״; ״מֵעַכְשָׁיו אִם מַתִּי״ – אַלְמָא ״אִם מַתִּי״ לָאו כִּ״לְאַחַר מִיתָה״ דָּמֵי!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**GEMARA:** The mishna teaches: If one says to his wife: This is your bill of divorce if I die, then it is as if he said nothing. The Gemara deduces: **Apparently,** the formulation: **If I die,** is **considered** to be **like** the formulation: The bill of divorce will be valid only **after** my **death. And afterward** the mishna **teaches:** If he said: This is your bill of divorce **from today if I die,** or: This is your bill of divorce **from now if I die,** then this is a valid bill of divorce. **Apparently,** the formulation: **If I die,** is **not considered** to be **like** the formulation: The bill of divorce will be valid only **after** my **death.** As explained previously in the mishna, a bill of divorce which takes effect only after the husband’s death is not a valid bill of divorce. There is an apparent contradiction as to the meaning of the term: If I die.


###### Gittin 72a:11
[Gittin 72a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/72a:11)

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: ״אִם מַתִּי״ – שְׁתֵּי לְשׁוֹנוֹת מַשְׁמַע; מַשְׁמַע כְּמֵעַכְשָׁיו, וּמַשְׁמַע כִּלְאַחַר מִיתָה;

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Abaye said:** The expression: **If I die, indicates two** different **meanings.** It **indicates** the same meaning **as** one who says: **From now,** i.e., that the bill of divorce will take effect after death retroactively from now. **And** it **indicates** the same meaning **as** one who says: **After** my **death,** i.e., that the bill of divorce will take effect only after his death.


###### Gittin 72a:12
[Gittin 72a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/72a:12)

אָמַר לָהּ ״מֵהַיּוֹם״ – כְּמַאן דְּאָמַר לָהּ ״מֵעַכְשָׁיו״ דָּמֵי, לֹא אָמַר לָהּ ״מֵהַיּוֹם״ – כְּמַאן דְּאָמַר לָהּ ״לְאַחַר מִיתָה״ דָּמֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
If the husband **said to** his wife: **From today** if I die, it is **considered** to be **like one who says to her: From now,** conditional upon my death. But if **he did not say to her: From today,** it is **considered** to be **like one who says to her: After** my **death,** and the bill of divorce is void because it takes effect only after his death.


###### Gittin 72a:13
[Gittin 72a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/72a:13)

״זֶה גִּיטֵּךְ אִם מַתִּי״ – לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם: אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: וְחוֹלֶצֶת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The mishna teaches that if one says to his wife: **This is your bill of divorce if I die,** then it is as if **he said nothing. Rav Huna says: But** if her husband died without children this woman must **perform *ḥalitza*** and not enter into a levirate marriage because perhaps it is a valid bill of divorce.


###### Gittin 72a:14
[Gittin 72a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/72a:14)

וְהָא ״לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם״ קָתָנֵי! לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם – דַּאֲסִירָא לְעָלְמָא; וּלְיָבָם נָמֵי אֲסִירָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara raises a challenge: **But isn’t** the expression: It is as if **he said nothing, taught** in the mishna? The Gemara answers: The mishna means that it is as if **he said nothing** with regard to the fact that **she is** still **forbidden to everyone** after the death of her husband, and is bound by a levirate bond. **And she is also forbidden to the *yavam*** because perhaps the bill of divorce was valid, in which case she has no levirate bond.


###### Gittin 72a:15
[Gittin 72a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/72a:15)

וְהָא מִדְּסֵיפָא חוֹלֶצֶת, מִכְּלָל דְּרֵישָׁא יַבּוֹמֵי נָמֵי מִיַּבְּמָה! מַתְנִיתִין כְּרַבָּנַן;

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara raises a challenge: **But since the latter clause** of the mishna teaches that in those cases of uncertainty **she** must **perform *ḥalitza*, by inference** it appears **that** in the cases of **the first clause she may also enter into levirate marriage,** indicating that in those cases the bill of divorce is definitely not valid. The Gemara answers: This is not a challenge to Rav Huna’s opinion, as **the mishna is in accordance** with the opinion of **the Rabbis** that this kind of conditional bill of divorce is invalid and she may enter into levirate marriage.


###### Gittin 72a:16
[Gittin 72a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/72a:16)

וְרַב הוּנָא דְּאָמַר כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי, דְּאָמַר: זְמַנּוֹ שֶׁל שְׁטָר מוֹכִיחַ עָלָיו.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But Rav Huna** was not explaining the words of the mishna; the statement **that he said is in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yosei, who says** as a principle: **The date** written **in a document proves** when **it** takes effect. Therefore, since the bill of divorce bears that day’s date, it takes effect immediately, even though it is not stated explicitly.


###### Gittin 72a:17
[Gittin 72a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/72a:17)

אִי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי, חֲלִיצָה נָמֵי לָא תִּיבְעֵי! וְכִי תֵּימָא מְסַפְּקָא לֵיהּ לְרַב הוּנָא אִי הִלְכְתָא כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי אוֹ אֵין הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי; וּמִי מְסַפְּקָא לֵיהּ?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara challenges: **If** Rav Huna’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Yosei** then the woman **should also not require *ḥalitza*,** as in his opinion the bill of divorce is entirely valid and there is no levirate bond at all. **And if you would say** that **Rav Huna is uncertain if the *halakha*** is **in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yosei or** if **the *halakha*** is **not in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yosei,** and on account of this he was stringent in accordance with both opinions, i.e., the one which requires *ḥalitza* and the one which forbids levirate marriage, this also presents a difficulty. **But is** Rav Huna in fact **uncertain?**


###### Gittin 72a:18
[Gittin 72a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/72a:18)

וְהָא רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ חֲלַשׁ, עוּל לְגַבֵּיהּ רַב הוּנָא וְרַב נַחְמָן; אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב הוּנָא לְרַב נַחְמָן, בְּעִי מִינֵּיהּ מֵרַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי, אוֹ אֵין הֲלָכָה? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי לָא יָדַעְנָא, הֲלָכָה אֶיבְעֵי מִינֵּיהּ?! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אַתְּ בְּעִי מִינֵּיהּ הֲלָכָה, וְטַעְמֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי אֲנָא אָמֵינָא לָךְ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But when Rabba bar Avuh was ill Rav Huna and Rav Naḥman entered** to visit **him. Rav Huna said to Rav Naḥman: Ask of him, Rabba bar Avuh:** Is **the *halakha* in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yosei or** is **the *halakha* not** in accordance with his opinion? Rav Naḥman **said to** Rav Huna: **I do not know the reason** for the opinion held **by Rabbi Yosei,** and **you ask me** to ask Rabba bar Avuh the ***halakha*?** Rav Huna **said to** Rav Naḥman: **You ask him** the ***halakha*, and I will tell you the reason** for the opinion held **by Rabbi Yosei** afterward.


###### Gittin 72a:19
[Gittin 72a:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/72a:19)

בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ, הָכִי אֲמַר רַב: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי. לְבָתַר דִּנְפַק אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי – דְּקָסָבַר: זְמַנּוֹ שֶׁל שְׁטָר מוֹכִיחַ עָלָיו! אֶלָּא מְסַפְּקָא לֵיהּ

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rav Naḥman **asked of** Rabba bar Avuh what the *halakha* is. Rabba bar Avuh **said to him: So said Rav:** The ***halakha*** is **in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yosei. After he left** Rav Huna **said to** Rav Naḥman: **This is the reason** for the opinion **of Rabbi Yosei, as he holds: The date** written **in a document proves** when **it** takes effect. From this incident it is clear that Rav Huna holds that the *halakha* is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei, as Rav Huna certainly accepted the opinion that Rabba bar Avuh said in the name of Rav. **Rather,** it is necessary to say that Rav Huna **is uncertain**