## Gittin Daf 75a

###### Gittin 75a:1
[Gittin 75a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/75a:1)

מִכְּלָל דִּבְעָלְמָא, נְתִינָה בְּעַל כֻּרְחֵיהּ לָא הָוְיָא נְתִינָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
This proves **by inference that generally, giving against** the recipient’s **will is not** considered valid **giving,** as if it were, then Hillel would not have needed to institute this ordinance.


###### Gittin 75a:2
[Gittin 75a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/75a:2)

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב פָּפָּא, וְאִיתֵּימָא רַב שִׁימִי בַּר אָשֵׁי: וְדִלְמָא כִּי אִצְטְרִיךְ לֵיהּ לְתַקּוֹנֵי – שֶׁלֹּא בְּפָנָיו, אֲבָל בְּפָנָיו – בֵּין מִדַּעְתּוֹ בֵּין בְּעַל כׇּרְחוֹ הָוְיָא נְתִינָה!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Pappa objects to this, and some say** it was **Rav Shimi bar Ashi** who raises this objection: **And perhaps when it was necessary** for Hillel **to institute** an ordinance allowing the seller to repay the money against the will of the purchaser it was specifically in a case **where** he gives the money **not in** the **presence** of the purchaser. **But** when he repays him **in his presence, whether** the recipient was **willing** or **whether** it was **against his will, it is** considered valid **giving.** Accordingly, one cannot apply Hillel’s ordinance to the case of conditional bills of divorce.


###### Gittin 75a:3
[Gittin 75a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/75a:3)

וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי, אָמַר רָבָא: מִתַּקָּנָתוֹ שֶׁל הִלֵּל – ״הֲרֵי זֶה גִּיטֵּךְ עַל מְנָת שֶׁתִּתְּנִי לִי מָאתַיִם זוּז״, וּנְתָנָהּ לוֹ – בֵּין מִדַּעְתּוֹ וּבֵין בְּעַל כׇּרְחוֹ הָוְיָא נְתִינָה; וְכִי אִיצְטְרִיךְ לֵיהּ לְהִלֵּל לְתַקּוֹנֵי – שֶׁלֹּא בְּפָנָיו, אֲבָל בְּפָנָיו – בֵּין מִדַּעְתּוֹ בֵּין בְּעַל כׇּרְחוֹ הָוְיָא נְתִינָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And there are** those **who say** a different version of this discussion. **Rava says: From the ordinance of Hillel** it can be inferred that if one says to his wife: **This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will give me two hundred dinars, and she gave** it **to him, whether** it was **with his consent or whether** it was **against his will, it is** valid **giving. And** the case **where it was necessary for Hillel to institute** his ordinance was **when** the giving of the money **was not in his presence. But** if the repayment was **in his presence, whether** it was **with his consent** or **whether** it was **against his will, it is** considered valid **giving.**


###### Gittin 75a:4
[Gittin 75a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/75a:4)

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב פָּפָּא, וְאִיתֵּימָא רַב שִׁימִי בַּר אָשֵׁי: וְדִלְמָא אֲפִילּוּ בְּפָנָיו נָמֵי – מִדַּעְתּוֹ אִין, עַל כׇּרְחוֹ לָא; וְהִלֵּל – מַאי דְּאִיצְטְרִיךְ לֵיהּ תַּקֵּין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Pappa objects to this, and some say** it was **Rav Shimi bar Ashi** who raises this objection: **And perhaps even** in a case where she gives him the money **in his presence,** if she gives it **with his consent, yes,** it is valid. If she gives it **against his will, no,** it is not considered to be valid giving. **And Hillel** specifically **instituted what was necessary,** because in the case of a house in a walled city the purchaser would hide, and therefore that ordinance was necessary there.


###### Gittin 75a:5
[Gittin 75a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/75a:5)

אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר בַּר חָנָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁשָּׁנָה רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל בְּמִשְׁנָתֵינוּ – הֲלָכָה כְּמוֹתוֹ; חוּץ מֵעָרֵב, וְצַיְדָן,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **Rabba bar bar Ḥana says** that **Rabbi Yoḥanan says:** In **every place where Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel taught** a *halakha* **in our** body of **Mishna, the *halakha*** is **in accordance with** his opinion, even though it is cited as an individual opinion, **except** for three cases. With regard to the *halakha* of **a guarantor** (*Bava Batra* 173b), if the creditor stipulated that he can collect his debt from either the debtor or the guarantor, according to the Rabbis he can collect from the guarantor’s property even if the debtor has available property. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that the creditor can collect the debt only from the debtor. **And** likewise the *halakha* is not like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel with regard to the case mentioned here concerning the incident that occurred in **Tzaidan.**


###### Gittin 75a:6
[Gittin 75a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/75a:6)

וּרְאָיָה אַחֲרוֹנָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** similarly, the *halakha* is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel concerning the dispute with regard to **evidence** in the **final** disagreement (*Sanhedrin* 31a), where the Rabbis hold that if one claims that he has no evidence or witnesses, but subsequently brings evidence to court, the judges do not accept it. According to the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel they can accept it.


###### Gittin 75a:7
[Gittin 75a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/75a:7)

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״הֲרֵי זֶה גִּיטִּיךְ, וְהַנְּיָיר שֶׁלִּי״ – אֵינָהּ מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת. ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁתַּחְזִירִי לִי אֶת הַנְּיָיר״ – מְגוֹרֶשֶׁת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **The Sages taught** in a *baraita*: If the husband said to his wife: **Behold this is your bill of divorce,** but **the paper** on which it is written **is** still **mine,** then **she is not divorced,** as he must give her the actual bill of divorce in order for the divorce to take effect. Since the paper still belongs to him, it is as if he had given her only the writing. But if he said to her: Behold this is your bill of divorce **on the condition that you return the paper to me,** then **she is divorced.** The bill of divorce belongs entirely to her, and the returning of the paper is only a stipulation that must be fulfilled later.


###### Gittin 75a:8
[Gittin 75a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/75a:8)

מַאי שְׁנָא רֵישָׁא וּמַאי שְׁנָא סֵיפָא? אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: הָא מַנִּי – רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל הִיא, דְּאָמַר: תִּתֵּן לוֹ אֶת דָּמֶיהָ; הָכָא נָמֵי – אֶפְשָׁר דִּמְפַיְּיסָה לֵיהּ בִּדְמֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **What is different** in **the first clause** of the *baraita* **and what is different** in **the latter clause?** In neither case does she have ownership of the bill of divorce. **Rav Ḥisda said:** In accordance with **whose** opinion **is this** *baraita*? **It is** in accordance with the opinion of **Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who says** with regard to his coat that **she** can **give him its value** and does not need to give the item itself in order to fulfill the condition. **Here also,** since **it is possible for her to appease him with money** and she may give him the value of the paper, therefore it is considered as though she received the paper.


###### Gittin 75a:9
[Gittin 75a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/75a:9)

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ אַבָּיֵי: אֵימוֹר דְּאָמַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל – הֵיכָא דְּלֵיתֵיהּ בְּעֵינֵיהּ, הֵיכָא דְּאִיתֵיהּ בְּעֵינֵיהּ מִי אָמַר?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Abaye objects to this** answer: **Say that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says** that it is acceptable to give the value instead of the item itself **when** the item **is not extant,** because it is lost. But in a case **where it is extant,** such as the paper in this case, **did** Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel actually **say** that giving the value of the item is sufficient?


###### Gittin 75a:10
[Gittin 75a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/75a:10)

אֶלָּא אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הָא מַנִּי – רַבִּי מֵאִיר הִיא, דְּאָמַר: בָּעֵינַן תְּנַאי כָּפוּל; וְהָכָא – הָא לָא כַּפְלֵיהּ לִתְנָאֵיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, Abaye said:** In accordance with **whose** opinion **is this** *baraita*? **It is** in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Meir, who says: We require** any stipulated condition to be structured as **a compound condition** describing both outcomes, meaning that the condition must mention what will happen both if the condition is fulfilled and if it is not fulfilled. **And here he did not compound his condition.** The husband said only: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you return the paper to me. He did not specify that it will not be a valid bill of divorce if she does not return it.


###### Gittin 75a:11
[Gittin 75a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/75a:11)

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רָבָא: טַעְמָא דְּלָא כַּפְלֵיהּ לִתְנָאֵיהּ, הָא כַּפְלֵיהּ לִתְנָאֵיהּ – לָא הָוֵי גִּיטָּא; מִכְּדֵי כֹּל תְּנָאֵי מֵהֵיכָא גָּמְרִינַן לְהוּ? מִתְּנַאי בְּנֵי גָּד וּבְנֵי רְאוּבֵן;

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava objects to this** explanation: According to Abaye **the reason** the bill of divorce is valid is **that** the husband **did not compound his condition, but if** the husband did **compound his condition** then it **would not be** a valid **bill of divorce. Now, from where do we learn** the *halakhot* of **all conditions?** They are derived **from the condition of the children of Gad and the children of Reuben.** Moses stipulated with them that if they fight the battles with the Jewish people in Eretz Yisrael, they will inherit the land of Gilead in the Transjordan, as they requested; but if they do not fight the battles with the Jewish people in Eretz Yisrael, they will not inherit that land (see Numbers, chapter 32).


###### Gittin 75a:12
[Gittin 75a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/75a:12)

מָה הָתָם – תְּנַאי קוֹדֵם לְמַעֲשֶׂה, אַף כֹּל תְּנַאי קוֹדֵם לְמַעֲשֶׂה; לְאַפּוֹקֵי הָכָא – דְּמַעֲשֶׂה קוֹדֵם לִתְנַאי!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Just as there,** in the conditions that Moses made, the language of the **condition precedes the** consequent **action,** for he first stated the condition and afterward he described the result if they fulfill the condition: “And you shall give them the land of Gilead as an inheritance” (Numbers 32:29), **so too, any condition** is valid only when it is stated **before the** resultant **action.** And this serves **to exclude** the case mentioned **here, where the** resultant **action** of the giving of the bill of divorce **precedes the condition.** Consequently, according to Rabbi Meir this bill of divorce would not be valid, even if the husband had compounded the condition.


###### Gittin 75a:13
[Gittin 75a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/75a:13)

אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: מִשּׁוּם דְּמַעֲשֶׂה קוֹדֵם לִתְנַאי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, Rava said:** The condition does not apply and the woman is divorced **because** the **action** of giving the bill of divorce **precedes** the **condition.**


###### Gittin 75a:14
[Gittin 75a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/75a:14)

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה: טַעְמָא דְּמַעֲשֶׂה קוֹדֵם לִתְנַאי, הָא תְּנַאי קוֹדֵם לְמַעֲשֶׂה – לָא הָוֵי גִּיטָּא; מִכְּדֵי כֹּל תְּנָאֵי מֵהֵיכָא גָּמְרִינַן לְהוּ – מִתְּנַאי בְּנֵי גָּד וּבְנֵי רְאוּבֵן, מָה הָתָם – תְּנַאי בְּדָבָר אֶחָד וּמַעֲשֶׂה בְּדָבָר אַחֵר, אַף כֹּל; לְאַפּוֹקֵי הָכָא –

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Adda bar Ahava objects to this** explanation: **The reason** that the bill of divorce is valid is **that the action precedes the condition,** and the condition does not take effect. **But** if **the condition** were to **precede the action** then it would **not be** a valid **bill of divorce. Now, from where do we learn all** the *halakhot* of **conditions?** They are derived **from the condition of the children of Gad and the children of Reuben. Just as there** it is **a condition with regard to one matter,** i.e., that they should fight along with the rest of the Jewish people, **and** a resultant **action with regard to another matter,** i.e., that they would receive the land of Gilead, **so too, every** other condition must follow this pattern. This serves **to exclude** the case mentioned **here,**