## Gittin Daf 75b

###### Gittin 75b:1
[Gittin 75b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/75b:1)

דִּתְנַאי וּמַעֲשֶׂה בְּדָבָר אֶחָד! אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב אַדָּא בַּר אַהֲבָה: מִשּׁוּם דִּתְנַאי וּמַעֲשֶׂה בְּדָבָר אֶחָד.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**where the condition and the action are about the same matter,** the giving of the bill of divorce. Accordingly, the condition would not be valid even if one were to disregard the concern of the action preceding the condition. **Rather, Rav Adda bar Ahava said** that this condition is void **because the condition and the action are about the same matter,** and therefore the bill of divorce is valid even without fulfillment of the condition.


###### Gittin 75b:2
[Gittin 75b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/75b:2)

רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: הָא מַנִּי – רַבִּי הִיא, דְּאָמַר רַב הוּנָא אָמַר רַב: כׇּל הָאוֹמֵר ״עַל מְנָת״ כְּאוֹמֵר ״מֵעַכְשָׁיו״ דָּמֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Ashi said:** In accordance with **whose** opinion **is this** *baraita*? **It is** in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi, **as Rav Huna says** that **Rav says: Anyone who states** a condition employing the language: **On the condition,** is **like** one who **states:** The agreement will take effect retroactively **from now,** even though the condition is fulfilled only later on. Consequently, the bill of divorce is effective immediately, even if the woman will later be required to return the document itself to him.


###### Gittin 75b:3
[Gittin 75b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/75b:3)

אַתְקֵין שְׁמוּאֵל בְּגִיטָּא דִּשְׁכִיב מְרַע: ״אִם לֹא מַתִּי לֹא יְהֵא גֵּט, וְאִם מַתִּי יְהֵא גֵּט״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ With regard to conditions in a bill of divorce, **Shmuel instituted** that **in a bill of divorce of a person on his deathbed** the following expression should be written: **If I do not die this will not be** a valid **bill of divorce, and if I die it will be** a valid **bill of divorce.**


###### Gittin 75b:4
[Gittin 75b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/75b:4)

וְלֵימָא: ״אִם מַתִּי יְהֵא גֵּט, וְאִם לֹא מַתִּי לֹא יְהֵא גֵּט״! לָא מַקְדֵּים אִינִישׁ פּוּרְעָנוּתָא לְנַפְשֵׁיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks about the wording used here: **But let us say** this statement in a more intuitive order: **If I die it will be** a valid **bill of divorce, and if I do not die this will not be** a valid **bill of divorce.** The Gemara explains: **A person does not hasten a calamity upon himself.** Consequently, he does not wish to mention his death first.


###### Gittin 75b:5
[Gittin 75b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/75b:5)

וְלֵימָא: ״לֹא יְהֵא גֵּט אִם לֹא מַתִּי״! בָּעֵינַן תְּנַאי קוֹדֵם לְמַעֲשֶׂה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: Why did Shmuel use this phrasing? **But let us** say the condition using the following formulation: **It will not be** a valid **bill of divorce if I do not die,** and it will be a valid bill of divorce if I do die. The Gemara asks: When stipulating a condition, **we require the condition** to come **before the action,** but in this formulation the resultant action, that the bill of divorce is not valid, precedes the condition, if I do not die.


###### Gittin 75b:6
[Gittin 75b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/75b:6)

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רָבָא: מִכְּדֵי כֹּל תְּנָאֵי מֵהֵיכָא גָּמְרִינַן – מִתְּנַאי בְּנֵי גָּד וּבְנֵי רְאוּבֵן; מָה הָתָם – הֵן קוֹדֵם לְלָאו, אַף כֹּל [תְּנָאֵי, הֵן קוֹדֵם לְלָאו].

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava objects to this** explanation: **Now, from where do we learn** the principles of **all conditions?** They are derived **from the condition of the children of Gad and the children of Reuben. Just as there, the affirmative precedes the negative,** meaning that the positive portion that speaks about what will occur if the condition is fulfilled appears before the negative portions that describe what will exist if the condition is not fulfilled, **so too, all** conditions must be formulated in this manner. This serves **to exclude** the case **here,** instituted by Shmuel, **where the negative precedes the affirmative.**


###### Gittin 75b:7
[Gittin 75b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/75b:7)

אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: ״אִם לֹא מַתִּי לֹא יְהֵא גֵּט, אִם מַתִּי יְהֵא גֵּט, אִם לֹא מַתִּי לֹא יְהֵא גֵּט״ –

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, Rava said** that the condition in the bill of divorce of a dying man should be worded in the following manner: **If I do not die this will not be a bill of divorce. If I die this will be a bill of divorce,** and **if I do not die this will not be a bill of divorce.**


###### Gittin 75b:8
[Gittin 75b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/75b:8)

״אִם לֹא מַתִּי לֹא יְהֵא גֵּט״ – לָא מַקְדֵּים אִינִישׁ פּוּרְעָנוּתָא לְנַפְשֵׁיהּ; ״אִם מַתִּי יְהֵא גֵּט, אִם לֹא מַתִּי לֹא יְהֵא גֵּט״ – בָּעֵינַן הֵן קוֹדֵם לְלָאו.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains the necessity for such a formulation: The husband first says: **If I do not die this will not be a bill of divorce,** because **a person does not hasten a calamity upon himself.** Therefore, he first mentions the possibility that he will not die. Then he states the compound condition in the following order: **If I die this will be a bill of divorce,** and **if I do not die this will not be a bill of divorce.** This is because **we require** that **the affirmative precedes the negative.**


###### Gittin 75b:9
[Gittin 75b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/75b:9)

**מַתְנִי׳** ״הֲרֵי זֶה גִּיטִּיךְ עַל מְנָת שֶׁתְּשַׁמְּשִׁי אֶת אַבָּא״; ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁתָּנִיקִי אֶת בְּנִי״ – כַּמָּה הִיא מְנִיקָתוֹ? שְׁתֵּי שָׁנִים. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: שְׁמֹנָה עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ. מֵת הַבֵּן אוֹ שֶׁמֵּת הָאָב – הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**MISHNA:** If a husband says to his wife: **This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will serve** my **father,** or: **On the condition that you will nurse,** i.e., breastfeed, **my son,** without specifying a time period, **how long** is **she** required **to nurse him** in order to fulfill the condition? She is required to nurse the baby for **two years** from his birth, which is the length of time generally designated for nursing. **Rabbi Yehuda says:** The time for nursing is only **eighteen months.** If **the** baby **son died or the** husband’s **father died, this is** a valid **bill of divorce,** even though the condition was not fulfilled.


###### Gittin 75b:10
[Gittin 75b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/75b:10)

״הֲרֵי זֶה גִּיטִּיךְ עַל מְנָת שֶׁתְּשַׁמְּשִׁי אֶת אַבָּא שְׁתֵּי שָׁנִים״; ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁתָּנִיקִי אֶת בְּנִי שְׁתֵּי שָׁנִים״ – מֵת הַבֵּן, אוֹ שֶׁאָמַר הָאָב: ״אִי אֶפְשִׁי שֶׁתְּשַׁמְּשֵׁנִי״ שֶׁלֹּא בְּהַקְפָּדָה – אֵינוֹ גֵּט.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
But if the husband said to his wife: **This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will serve** my **father** for **two years,** or: **On the condition that you will nurse my son** for **two years,** and **the son died** before she nursed him for two years, **or the father said: I do not want you to serve me,** then even if the father **did not** say this **in anger** and she did everything she was expected to do, it **is not** a valid **bill of divorce** because the condition was not fulfilled.


###### Gittin 75b:11
[Gittin 75b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/75b:11)

רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: כָּזֶה – גֵּט. כְּלָל אָמַר רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל: כׇּל עַכָּבָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ הֵימֶנָּה – הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:** In a case **like this** it is a valid **bill of divorce. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel stated a principle:** If there is **any hindrance** to the fulfillment of the condition **that does not** result **from her,** then **it is** a valid **bill of divorce.**


###### Gittin 75b:12
[Gittin 75b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/75b:12)

**גְּמָ׳** וּמִי בָּעֵינַן כּוּלֵּי הַאי?! וּרְמִינְהִי: שִׁמְּשַׁתּוּ יוֹם אֶחָד; הֱנִיקַתּוּ יוֹם אֶחָד – הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**GEMARA:** **But do we require** that she serve the father or nurse the son for **all of this** time that was stipulated? **And** the Gemara **raises a contradiction** based on what was taught in a *baraita* (*Tosefta*, *Nidda* 2:2): If **she served** the father for **one day** or **she nursed** the son for **one day it is** a valid **bill of divorce.**


###### Gittin 75b:13
[Gittin 75b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/75b:13)

אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא, לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא רַבָּנַן, וְהָא רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל –

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Ḥisda said** that this is **not difficult: This** *baraita* is in accordance with the opinion of **the Rabbis, and this** mishna is in accordance with the opinion of **Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,** who disagreed in the previous mishna (74a) with regard to a coat that was lost. According to the opinion of the Rabbis there, if there is no possibility that the wife can fulfill the condition by returning the coat, as it was lost, the bill of divorce is not valid. According to the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel there, she can give the husband the coat’s value and the bill of divorce is valid.


###### Gittin 75b:14
[Gittin 75b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/75b:14)

מַתְנִיתִין רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל, וּבָרַיְיתָא רַבָּנַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara explains: **The mishna** is in accordance with the opinion of **Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,** who claims that the wife can give the husband the equivalent of the stipulated item to render the bill of divorce valid, as the primary factor is his receiving the benefit he intended when stating his condition. Therefore, she must nurse the child for the standard length of time, as that is the benefit he intended when stating his condition, or else the bill of divorce is not valid. **And the *baraita*** is in accordance with the opinion of **the Rabbis,** who hold that the wife must fulfill the literal terms of the condition. If she nurses the baby for even one day, or serves the father for a single day, the literal terms of the condition have been fulfilled.


###### Gittin 75b:15
[Gittin 75b:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/75b:15)

הָא מִדְּסֵיפָא רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל הָוֵי, מִכְּלָל דְּרֵישָׁא לָאו רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל! אֶלָּא בָּרַיְיתָא – רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל הִיא, דְּמֵיקֵל בִּתְנָאֵי; מַתְנִיתִין – רַבָּנַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara challenges: Is this explanation possible? **But from** the fact that **the latter clause** of the mishna **is** attributed to **Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,** it can be derived **by inference that the first clause** is **not** in accordance with the opinion of **Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. Rather,** the ***baraita* is** in accordance with the opinion of **Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who is lenient with regard to a condition,** and interprets it so that it can be fulfilled. **The mishna** is in accordance with the opinion of **the Rabbis,** who interpret the condition in an expanded manner.


###### Gittin 75b:16
[Gittin 75b:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/75b:16)

רָבָא אָמַר, לָא קַשְׁיָא: כָּאן בִּסְתָם, כָּאן בִּמְפָרֵשׁ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava** offered an alternative explanation and **said** that the apparent contradiction **is not difficult: Here,** in the mishna, where the husband spoke **without specification** and did not set a time, the Sages assigned what they understand to be the standard time for the stipulated action. **There,** in the *baraita*, it is referring to where the husband said **explicitly** that she should perform the action for only one day.


###### Gittin 75b:17
[Gittin 75b:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/75b:17)

רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: כׇּל סְתָם נָמֵי כִּמְפָרֵשׁ ״יוֹם אֶחָד״ דָּמֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Ashi** offered a different alternative explanation and **said: Any unspecified** statement is **also considered** to be **as though** he **explicitly** said **one day.** Since the husband did not mention a specific amount of time in which to perform the action, one day should be sufficient.


###### Gittin 75b:18
[Gittin 75b:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/75b:18)

תְּנַן: כַּמָּה הִיא מְנִיקָתוֹ? שְׁתֵּי שָׁנִים. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: שְׁמֹנָה עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ. בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרָבָא – נִיחָא; אֶלָּא לְרַב אָשֵׁי, לְמָה לִי שְׁתֵּי שָׁנִים? לְמָה לִי שְׁמֹנָה עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ? בְּיוֹם אֶחָד סַגִּי!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara challenges Rav Ashi’s explanation: **We learned** in the mishna: **How long** is **she** required **to nurse him** in order to fulfill the condition? She is required to nurse the baby for **two years** from his birth. **Rabbi Yehuda says:** The time for nursing is only **eighteen months. Granted, according to** the opinion of **Rava,** it **works out well** that if the husband does not specify the length of time, the wife must nurse the baby for the generally accepted time. **But according to** the opinion of **Rav Ashi, why do I** need her to nurse the baby for **two years** or **why do I** need her to nurse him for **eighteen months? One day** should **suffice** to fulfill the husband’s condition.


###### Gittin 75b:19
[Gittin 75b:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/75b:19)

הָכִי קָאָמַר: יוֹם אֶחָד – מִשְׁתֵּי שָׁנִים; לְאַפּוֹקֵי לְאַחַר שְׁתֵּי שָׁנִים – דְּלָא. יוֹם אֶחָד – מִשְּׁמֹנָה עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ; לְאַפּוֹקֵי לְאַחַר שְׁמֹנָה עָשָׂר חֹדֶשׁ – דְּלָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **This is what** the mishna **is saying** according to the opinion of Rav Ashi: How long is the wife required to nurse the baby? **One day from** within the **two years** of the baby’s birth, **to exclude** the case where the one day that she nursed him occurred **after** he was **two years** old, in which case the husband’s condition would **not** be fulfilled, for that is the accepted length of time for a mother to nurse a baby. Or according to Rabbi Yehuda **one day from** within the **eighteen months** of the baby’s birth, **to exclude** the case where the one day that she nursed him occurred after he was she nursed him occurred **after** he was **eighteen months** old, in which case the bill of divorce would not be valid.


###### Gittin 75b:20
[Gittin 75b:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/75b:20)

מֵיתִיבִי: ״הֲרֵי זֶה גִּיטִּיךְ עַל מְנָת שֶׁתְּשַׁמְּשִׁי אֶת אַבָּא שְׁתֵּי שָׁנִים״; ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁתָּנִיקִי אֶת בְּנִי שְׁתֵּי שָׁנִים״ – מֵת הַבֵּן, אוֹ שֶׁאָמַר הָאָב ״אִי אֶפְשִׁי שֶׁתְּשַׁמְּשֵׁנִי״ שֶׁלֹּא בְּהַקְפָּדָה – אֵינוֹ גֵּט.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara **raises an objection** to the opinion of Rav Ashi from the latter clause of the mishna: If a husband said to his wife: **This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will serve** my **father** for **two years,** or: This is your bill of divorce **on the condition that you will nurse my son** for **two years,** and **the son died or the father said: I do not want you to serve me,** then even though the father **did not** say this **in anger,** it **is not** a valid **bill of divorce.**