## Gittin Daf 83a

###### Gittin 83a:1
[Gittin 83a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83a:1)

מַאי דַּאֲסַר שְׁרָא; ״לִרְאוּבֵן״, מַהוּ? לִרְאוּבֵן – וְהוּא הַדִּין לְשִׁמְעוֹן, וְהַאי דְּקָאָמַר לִרְאוּבֵן – מִשּׁוּם דִּפְתַח בֵּיהּ; אוֹ דִלְמָא – לִרְאוּבֵן דַּוְקָא?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
that **what he** initially **forbade he** then **permitted,** enabling her to marry anyone she wishes, **what is** the *halakha* if he said the second time that she is permitted **to** marry **Reuven?** Did he mean that she is permitted **to** marry **Reuven and the same is true** with regard **to Shimon,** i.e., she is permitted to marry him as well? Is the fact **that he mentioned** only that she is permitted **to** marry **Reuven because he opened** his prior qualification **by** mentioning **him** before he mentioned Shimon, but he intended to permit her to marry Shimon as well? **Or** did he, **perhaps, specifically** intend to permit her **to** marry **Reuven?**


###### Gittin 83a:2
[Gittin 83a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83a:2)

וְאִם תִּמְצָא לוֹמַר ״לִרְאוּבֵן״ דַּוְקָא; ״לְשִׁמְעוֹן״, מַהוּ? לְשִׁמְעוֹן – וְהוּא הַדִּין לִרְאוּבֵן, וְהַאי דְּקָאָמַר ״שִׁמְעוֹן״ – מִשּׁוּם דִּסְלֵיק מִינֵּיהּ; אוֹ דִלְמָא – לְשִׁמְעוֹן דַּוְקָא?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if you say** that he intended to permit her **to** marry **specifically Reuven** and not Shimon, **what is** the *halakha* if he said that she is permitted **to** marry **Shimon?** Did he mean that she is permitted **to** marry **Shimon and the same is true** with regard **to Reuven, and** the fact **that he mentioned** only **Shimon is because he ended** his initial previous statement **by** mentioning **him? Or perhaps** he was **specifically** referring only **to Shimon?**


###### Gittin 83a:3
[Gittin 83a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83a:3)

בָּעֵי רַב אָשֵׁי: ״אַף לְשִׁמְעוֹן״, מַהוּ? ״אַף״ – אַרְאוּבֵן קָאֵי; אוֹ דִלְמָא, ״אַף״ – אַעָלְמָא קָאֵי? תֵּיקוּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Ashi raises** another **dilemma** with regard to the same case: If he said to her the second time: You are **also** permitted **to** marry **Shimon, what is** the *halakha*? Is the word **also referring to Reuven,** i.e., she is permitted to marry Shimon in addition to Reuven, **or perhaps** it is **also referring to everyone,** i.e., she is permitted to marry Shimon in addition to all men, but not Reuven? The dilemma **shall stand** unresolved.


###### Gittin 83a:4
[Gittin 83a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83a:4)

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: לְאַחַר פְּטִירָתוֹ שֶׁל רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, נִכְנְסוּ אַרְבָּעָה זְקֵנִים לְהָשִׁיב עַל דְּבָרָיו, אֵלּוּ הֵן: רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי, וְרַבִּי טַרְפוֹן, וְרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה, וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **The Sages taught** (*Tosefta* 9:1): **After the death of Rabbi Eliezer, four Sages entered** the discussion **to refute his statement. They were: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, Rabbi Tarfon, Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, and Rabbi Akiva.**


###### Gittin 83a:5
[Gittin 83a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83a:5)

נַעֲנָה רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן וְאָמַר: הֲרֵי שֶׁהָלְכָה זוֹ, וְנִישֵּׂאת לְאָחִיו שֶׁל זֶה שֶׁנֶּאֶסְרָה עָלָיו, וּמֵת בְּלֹא בָּנִים – לֹא נִמְצָא זֶה עוֹקֵר דָּבָר מִן הַתּוֹרָה? הָא לָמַדְתָּ, שֶׁאֵין זֶה כְּרִיתוּת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Tarfon responded** to Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion, **saying:** If after the husband stipulated that the wife not marry a certain man **she went and married the brother of the one to whom she was prohibited** from marrying, **and** this husband **died without children,** she cannot perform levirate marriage with her husband’s brother, because he is forbidden to her due to the stipulation of her first husband. **Is** the first husband **not found** to be **uprooting a matter of Torah law** through his stipulation? **You have therefore derived that this is not** an act of **severance.** The divorce is not valid, as the Torah would not sanction a manner of divorce that can cause a mitzva to be nullified.


###### Gittin 83a:6
[Gittin 83a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83a:6)

נַעֲנָה רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי וְאָמַר: הֵיכָן מָצִינוּ אָסוּר לָזֶה וּמוּתָּר לָזֶה? הָאָסוּר – אָסוּר לַכֹּל, וְהַמּוּתָּר – מוּתָּר לַכֹּל! הָא לָמַדְתָּ, שֶׁאֵין זֶה כְּרִיתוּת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Yosei** also **responded** to Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion, **saying: Where do we find** an example of something that is **forbidden to this** person **and permitted to that** other person? **What is forbidden is forbidden to everyone, and what is permitted is permitted to everyone.** This contradicts Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion that a divorcée can be prohibited from marrying a certain man and permitted to marry all other men. **You have therefore derived that this is not** an act of **severance.**


###### Gittin 83a:7
[Gittin 83a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83a:7)

נַעֲנָה רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה וְאָמַר: ״כְּרִיתוּת״ – דָּבָר הַכּוֹרֵת בֵּינוֹ לְבֵינָהּ. הָא לָמַדְתָּ, שֶׁאֵין זֶה כְּרִיתוּת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya responded, saying:** What is the meaning of the expression: “Scroll of **severance,”** which is used in the Torah for a bill of divorce? It means **something that severs** the bond **between him and her** entirely. This woman, by contrast, is still bound to her husband after their divorce, as his stipulation prevents her from marrying a certain man. **You have therefore derived that this is not** an act of **severance.**


###### Gittin 83a:8
[Gittin 83a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83a:8)

נַעֲנָה רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא וְאָמַר: הֲרֵי שֶׁהָלְכָה זוֹ וְנִשֵּׂאת לְאֶחָד מִן הַשּׁוּק וְהָיוּ לָהּ בָּנִים, וְנִתְאַרְמְלָה אוֹ נִתְגָּרְשָׁה, וְעָבְרָה וְנִישֵּׂאת לָזֶה שֶׁנֶּאֶסְרָה עָלָיו – לֹא נִמְצָא גֵּט בָּטֵל, וּבָנֶיהָ מַמְזֵרִים? הָא לָמַדְתָּ, שֶׁאֵין זֶה כְּרִיתוּת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Akiva responded, saying:** If after the husband stipulated that the wife not marry a certain man **she went and married a man from the** general **public, and she had children** with him, **and she was** subsequently **widowed or divorced** from the second husband, **and she** then **arose and married the one to whom she was forbidden** by her first husband’s condition, **isn’t the bill of divorce** thereby **found** to be **nullified? And** would this not render **her children** from her second marriage as **born from an adulterous relationship [*mamzerim*],** as she is retroactively considered her first husband’s wife? **You have therefore derived that this is not** an act of **severance,** as the Torah would not enable a divorce that could lead to such a situation.


###### Gittin 83a:9
[Gittin 83a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83a:9)

דָּבָר אַחֵר: הֲרֵי שֶׁהָיָה זֶה שֶׁנֶּאֶסְרָה עָלָיו כֹּהֵן, וּמֵת הַמְגָרֵשׁ – לֹא נִמְצֵאת אַלְמָנָה אֶצְלוֹ, וּגְרוּשָׁה אֵצֶל כׇּל אָדָם?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rabbi Akiva continued to offer **an alternative** refutation of Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion: If **the one to whom she was forbidden was a priest, and** her ex-husband **who divorced** her **died, is she not** thereby **found** to be **a widow with regard to him,** as she was considered a married woman with regard to this priest even after her divorce, **and a divorcée with regard to any** other **man?** Nevertheless, she is forbidden to him too, just as she is forbidden to any other priest.


###### Gittin 83a:10
[Gittin 83a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83a:10)

וְקַל וָחוֹמֶר: מָה גְּרוּשָׁה – שֶׁהִיא קַלָּה, אֲסוּרָה בִּשְׁבִיל צַד גֵּירוּשִׁין שֶׁבָּהּ; אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ – שֶׁהִיא חֲמוּרָה. לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?! הָא לָמַדְתָּ, שֶׁאֵין זֶה כְּרִיתוּת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** it is therefore **an *a fortiori*** inference that **just as** the prohibition for **a divorcée** to marry a priest (see Leviticus 21:14) **is** a relatively **minor** prohibition, yet **she is forbidden** to this priest **due to the element of divorce that applies to her,** even though with regard to him she is not a divorcée but a widow, **all the more so** is it **not** clear that the prohibition against sexual intercourse with **a married woman, which is a major** prohibition, should apply to every man during the lifetime of the ex-husband, due to the fact that she is considered a married woman with regard to this one man? **You have therefore derived that this is not** an act of **severance,** as this divorce does not permit her to marry any man.


###### Gittin 83a:11
[Gittin 83a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83a:11)

אָמַר לָהֶן רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: אֵין מְשִׁיבִין אֶת הָאֲרִי לְאַחַר מִיתָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Yehoshua said to them:** Even though your objections are valid, **one does not refute** the opinion of **a lion after** his **death.** After a Sage has passed away one cannot reject his opinion based on a difficulty with it, as he possibly would have provided an answer had it been presented to him while he was still alive.


###### Gittin 83a:12
[Gittin 83a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83a:12)

אָמַר רָבָא: כּוּלְּהוּ אִית לְהוּ פִּירְכָא, לְבַר מִדְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה – דְּלֵית לֵיהּ פִּירְכָא. תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי, אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: רוֹאֶה אֲנִי אֶת דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה מִדִּבְרֵי כּוּלָּן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava said: All of** the previously mentioned responses **have refutations** that can be raised against them **except for** the response **of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, which does not have a refutation.** The Gemara notes that **this is also taught** in a *baraita*, as **Rabbi Yosei said: I see the statement of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya** as preferable **to the statements of all** the other Sages.


###### Gittin 83a:13
[Gittin 83a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83a:13)

אָמַר מָר, נַעֲנָה רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן וְאָמַר: הֲרֵי שֶׁהָלְכָה זוֹ וְנִשֵּׂאת לְאָחִיו שֶׁל זֶה שֶׁנֶּאֶסְרָה עָלָיו, וּמֵת בְּלֹא בָּנִים – לֹא נִמְצָא זֶה עוֹקֵר דָּבָר מִן הַתּוֹרָה? עוֹקֵר?! אִיהוּ עָקַר?! אֶלָּא ״מַתְנֶה לַעֲקוֹר דָּבָר מִן הַתּוֹרָה״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara commences discussion of the *baraita*: **The Master said** that **Rabbi Tarfon responded, saying:** If **she went and married the brother of the one to whom she was prohibited** from marrying, **and he died without children, is** the first husband **not** thereby **found** to be **uprooting a matter of Torah law?** The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the question: Is the first husband not **uprooting** a matter of Torah law? Is it **he** who **is uprooting** the mitzva? **Rather,** Rabbi Tarfon means that the husband **is stipulating to uproot a matter of Torah law.**


###### Gittin 83a:14
[Gittin 83a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83a:14)

מַתְנֶה?! מִי קָאָמַר לַהּ: לָא סַגִּי לַהּ דְּלָא מִינַּסְבָא לֵיהּ לַאֲחוּהּ דְּהָהוּא גַּבְרָא?! אֶלָּא ״גּוֹרֵם לַעֲקוֹר דָּבָר מִן הַתּוֹרָה״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara questions this assertion as well: Is the husband **stipulating** to uproot a mitzva? **Did he say to her** that **it is not sufficient if she does not marry the brother of that man,** who he rendered forbidden to her? Since he did not stipulate this, he did not uproot the mitzva; it is the woman who uprooted the mitzva by marrying specifically that man’s brother. **Rather,** Rabbi Tarfon means that the husband **is causing a matter of Torah law to be uprooted.**


###### Gittin 83a:15
[Gittin 83a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83a:15)

גּוֹרֵם?! אֶלָּא מֵעַתָּה, בַּת אָחִיו לֹא יִשָּׂא – שֶׁמָּא יָמוּת בְּלֹא בָּנִים, וְנִמְצָא גּוֹרֵם לַעֲקוֹר דָּבָר מִן הַתּוֹרָה! הַיְינוּ פִּירְכָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: He **is causing** of matter of Torah law to be uprooted? **But if that is so,** one **should not marry his brother’s daughter lest he die without children, and he will** thereby **be found** to be **causing a matter of Torah law to be uprooted** in that his brother will not be able to perform levirate marriage with his own daughter, and the Sages laud one who marries his brother’s daughter. The Gemara responds: **This is the refutation** against Rabbi Tarfon’s response that Rava was referring to.


###### Gittin 83a:16
[Gittin 83a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83a:16)

וּבְמַאי? אִילֵימָא בְּ״חוּץ״, מִשְׁרָא שָׁרֵי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And with regard to what** case did Rabbi Tarfon refute Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion? **If we say** that it was **with regard to** a case in which the husband said that his wife is permitted to marry any man **except** for so-and-so, the refutation is irrelevant, as **Rabbi Eliezer permits** the woman to marry this man after she married another man.


###### Gittin 83a:17
[Gittin 83a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83a:17)

דְּתַנְיָא: מוֹדֶה רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בִּמְגָרֵשׁ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ, וְאָמַר לָהּ: ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מוּתֶּרֶת לְכׇל אָדָם, חוּץ מִפְּלוֹנִי״, וְהָלְכָה וְנִיסֵּת לְאֶחָד מִן הַשּׁוּק, וְנִתְאַרְמְלָה אוֹ נִתְגָּרְשָׁה, שֶׁמּוּתֶּרֶת לָזֶה שֶׁנֶּאֶסְרָה עָלָיו!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**As it is taught** in a *baraita* (*Tosefta* 9:1): **With regard to** a case where a man **divorces his wife and said to her** while handing her the bill of divorce: **You are hereby permitted to** marry **any man except for so-and-so, and she went and married someone from the** general **public and was** subsequently **widowed or divorced** from him, **Rabbi Eliezer concedes that she is** now **permitted to** marry the man **whom she was** initially **prohibited** from marrying by the qualification of her first husband.


###### Gittin 83a:18
[Gittin 83a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83a:18)

אֶלָּא בְּ״עַל מְנָת״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** Rabbi Tarfon’s refutation was clearly stated **with regard to** a case where the woman was divorced **on the condition** that she would not marry so-and-so. A condition still applies after the woman remarries and its violation nullifies the divorce retroactively.


###### Gittin 83a:19
[Gittin 83a:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83a:19)

נַעֲנָה רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגְּלִילִי וְאָמַר: הֵיכָן מָצִינוּ אָסוּר לָזֶה וּמוּתָּר לָזֶה? הָאָסוּר – אָסוּר לַכֹּל, וְהַמּוּתָּר – מוּתָּר לַכֹּל. וְלָא?! וַהֲרֵי תְּרוּמָה וְקָדָשִׁים, שֶׁאֲסוּרָה לָזֶה, וּמוּתֶּרֶת לָזֶה! בְּאִיסּוּר אִשָּׁה קָא אָמְרִינַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The *baraita* states that **Rabbi Yosei HaGelili responded, saying: Where do we find** an example of something that is **forbidden to this** person **and permitted to that** other person? **What is forbidden is forbidden to everyone and what is permitted is permitted to everyone.** The Gemara asks: **Is** there **not** such an example? **Aren’t *teruma*,** the portion of the produce designated for the priest, **and sacrificial** meat **forbidden to this** group, i.e., non-priests (see Leviticus 22:10), **and permitted to that** group, i.e., priests? The Gemara answers: **We are referring to a forbidden woman.**


###### Gittin 83a:20
[Gittin 83a:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83a:20)

וַהֲרֵי עֲרָיוֹת! בְּאִישׁוּת קָאָמְרִינַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **Aren’t those** women **with whom relations are prohibited** due to familial ties forbidden to some men, i.e., their relatives, and permitted to others? The Gemara answers: **We are referring to** a woman who is forbidden due to **marriage.**


###### Gittin 83a:21
[Gittin 83a:21](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83a:21)

הֲרֵי אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ! הַיְינוּ פִּירְכָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **Isn’t a married woman** forbidden to all men but permitted to her husband? The Gemara responds: **This is the refutation** against Rabbi Yosei HaGelili’s response that Rava was referring to.


###### Gittin 83a:22
[Gittin 83a:22](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83a:22)

וּבְמַאי? אִילֵּימָא בְּ״עַל מְנָת״ – הֲרֵי הוּתְּרָה אֶצְלוֹ בִּזְנוּת! אֶלָּא בְּ״חוּץ״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara clarifies: **And with regard to what** case did Rabbi Yosei HaGelili raise this objection? **If we say** that it was **with regard to** a case in which the divorce was granted **on the condition** that she not marry a certain man, she is not entirely forbidden to him, as **she is permitted** to engage **in licentiousness with him;** the condition was with regard to marriage, not licentiousness. **Rather,** he clearly raised the objection **with regard to** a case where the husband told his wife that she is permitted to marry any man **except** for so-and-so, rendering her entirely forbidden to that man.


###### Gittin 83a:23
[Gittin 83a:23](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83a:23)

נַעֲנָה רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא וְאָמַר: הֲרֵי שֶׁהָלְכָה זוֹ וְנִישֵּׂאת לְאֶחָד מִן הַשּׁוּק וְהָיוּ לָהּ בָּנִים, וְנִתְאַרְמְלָה אוֹ נִתְגָּרְשָׁה, וְעָמְדָה וְנִשֵּׂאת לָזֶה שֶׁנֶּאֶסְרָה עָלָיו, לֹא נִמְצָא גֵּט בָּטֵל וּבָנֶיהָ מַמְזֵרִין?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The *baraita* states that **Rabbi Akiva responded, saying:** If **she went and married a man from the** general **public, and she had children** with him, **and she was** subsequently **widowed or divorced** from this second husband, **and she** then **arose and married the one to whom she was forbidden, isn’t the bill of divorce** thereby **nullified? And** would this not render **her children *mamzerim*?**


###### Gittin 83a:24
[Gittin 83a:24](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83a:24)

אִי הָכִי – בְּכוּלְּהוּ תְּנָאֵי דְּעָלְמָא נָמֵי לָא תִּנְּסִיב, דִּלְמָא לָא מְקַיְּימָא לֵיהּ לִתְנָאֵיהּ וְנִמְצָא גֵּט בָּטֵל וּבָנֶיהָ מַמְזֵרִין! הַיְינוּ פִּירְכָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **If that is so,** and there is a concern that she will eventually violate the condition, **in** a case of **any typical condition** that the husband attaches to the divorce **she should not remarry either, lest she not fulfill his condition and the bill of divorce** be **found** to be **nullified and her children** be rendered ***mamzerim*.** The Gemara responds: **This is the refutation** against Rabbi Akiva’s response that Rava was referring to.


###### Gittin 83a:25
[Gittin 83a:25](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83a:25)

וּבְמַאי? אִילֵימָא בְּ״חוּץ״, מִשְׁרָא שָׁרֵי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And with regard to what** case did Rabbi Akiva raise this objection? **If we say** that it was **with regard to** a case in which the husband said that his wife is permitted to marry any man **except** for so-and-so, the objection is irrelevant, as **Rabbi Eliezer permits** the woman to marry so-and-so after she marries another man.


###### Gittin 83a:26
[Gittin 83a:26](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83a:26)

דְּתַנְיָא: מוֹדֶה הָיָה רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בִּמְגָרֵשׁ אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ, וְאָמַר לָהּ: ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מוּתֶּרֶת לְכׇל אָדָם, חוּץ מִפְּלוֹנִי״, וְהָלְכָה וְנִשֵּׂאת לְאֶחָד מִן הַשּׁוּק וְנִתְאַרְמְלָה אוֹ נִתְגָּרְשָׁה, שֶׁמּוּתֶּרֶת לָזֶה שֶׁנֶּאֶסְרָה עָלָיו! אֶלָּא בְּ״עַל מְנָת״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**As it is taught** in a *baraita*: **With regard to** a case where a man **divorces his wife and said to her: You are hereby permitted to** marry **any man except for so-and-so, and she went and married someone from the** general **public, and was** subsequently **widowed or divorced** from him, **Rabbi Eliezer concedes that she is** now **permitted to** marry the man **whom she was** initially **prohibited** from marrying. **Rather,** Rabbi Akiva’s objection was clearly **with regard to** a case of **a condition** that she would not marry so-and-so.


###### Gittin 83a:27
[Gittin 83a:27](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83a:27)

דָּבָר אַחֵר: הֲרֵי שֶׁהָיָה זֶה שֶׁנֶּאֶסְרָה עָלָיו כֹּהֵן, וּמֵת הַמְגָרֵשׁ, לֹא נִמְצֵאת אַלְמָנָה אֶצְלוֹ, וּגְרוּשָׁה אֵצֶל כׇּל אָדָם? וְקַל וָחוֹמֶר: וּמָה גְּרוּשָׁה שֶׁהִיא קַלָּה – אֲסוּרָה מִשּׁוּם צַד גֵּירוּשִׁין שֶׁבָּהּ, אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ חֲמוּרָה – לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The *baraita* states that Rabbi Akiva added **an alternative** response: If **the one to whom she was forbidden was a priest, and** her ex-husband **who divorced** her **died, is she not found** to be **a widow with regard to him and a divorcée with regard to any** other **man? And** it is therefore **an *a fortiori*** inference that **just as** the prohibition against **a divorcée** marrying a priest **is minor,** and yet **she is forbidden** to this priest **due to the element of divorce that applies to her, all the more so** is it **not** clear that the prohibition against relations with **a married woman, which is major,** should apply to every man during the lifetime of the ex-husband, due to the fact that she is considered a married woman with regard to this one man? Therefore, the divorce does not take effect.


###### Gittin 83a:28
[Gittin 83a:28](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83a:28)

וּבְמַאי? אִילֵּימָא בְּ״עַל מְנָת״,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And with regard to what** case was this objection raised? **If we say** that it was **with regard to** a case of **a condition,**