## Gittin Daf 83b

###### Gittin 83b:1
[Gittin 83b:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83b:1)

הֲרֵי גְּרוּשָׁה אֶצְלוֹ – בִּזְנוּת! אֶלָּא בְּ״חוּץ״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**isn’t** the woman **a divorcée with regard to** engaging in **licentious** behavior **with him?** The husband stipulated that she not marry that man, but he did not prohibit her from engaging in licentious behavior with him. Therefore, she is considered a divorcée with regard to him as well. This removes the *a fortiori* inference, as with regard to all other men she is not considered married at all. **Rather,** the objection was clearly raised **with regard to** a case of **exception.**


###### Gittin 83b:2
[Gittin 83b:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83b:2)

וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא, אִי ״חוּץ״ סְבִירָא לֵיהּ – לוֹתֵיב ״חוּץ״, וְאִי ״עַל מְנָת״ סְבִירָא לֵיהּ – לוֹתֵיב ״עַל מְנָת״!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **If Rabbi Akiva holds** that Rabbi Eliezer is referring to a case of **an exception, he should raise an objection** with regard to **an exception, and if he holds** that Rabbi Eliezer is referring to a case of **a stipulation, he should raise an objection** with regard to a case of **a stipulation.** Why does he raise one objection with regard to an exception and then another with regard to a stipulation?


###### Gittin 83b:3
[Gittin 83b:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83b:3)

רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא שְׁמִיעַ לֵיהּ דְּאִיכָּא דְּאָמַר ״חוּץ״ וְאִיכָּא דְּאָמַר ״עַל מְנָת״; מַאן דְּאָמַר ״חוּץ״ – הַאי פִּירְכָא, וּמַאן דְּאָמַר ״עַל מְנָת״ – הַאי פִּירְכָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **Rabbi Akiva heard that there is** someone **who states** Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling with regard to **an exception, and there is** someone else **who states** it with regard to **a stipulation.** He therefore raised objections with regard to both exceptions and stipulations; according to **the one who says** that it is with regard to **an exception, this is the refutation, and** according to **the one who says** that it is with regard to **a stipulation, that is the refutation.**


###### Gittin 83b:4
[Gittin 83b:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83b:4)

וּמַאי פִּירְכָא? אִי נֵימָא אִיסּוּר כְּהוּנָּה שָׁאנֵי, הָא רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר נָמֵי מֵאִיסּוּר כְּהוּנָּה קָא מַיְיתֵי לֵיהּ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **What is the refutation** that Rava found for Rabbi Akiva’s second objection? **If we say** that it is that **the prohibition** against marrying into the **priesthood is different,** and therefore the *halakhot* of adultery and divorce cannot be inferred from it, **doesn’t Rabbi Eliezer also derive** his opinion **from the prohibition** against marrying into **the priesthood?** Rabbi Yoḥanan stated (82b) that Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling is derived from the verse that states with regard to priests: “Neither may they take a woman divorced from her husband” (Leviticus 21:7), indicating that even if a woman was divorced only from her husband and was not permitted to marry others, she is disqualified from marrying into the priesthood as a divorcée.


###### Gittin 83b:5
[Gittin 83b:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83b:5)

רָבָא – כְּרַבִּי יַנַּאי מִשּׁוּם זָקֵן אֶחָד קָא מַתְנֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **Rava taught** his statement **in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yannai,** who said **in the name of one elder** that Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion is derived not from the prohibition against marrying into the priesthood, but from the verse: “And she departs out of his house, and goes and becomes another man’s wife” (Deuteronomy 24:2), which indicates that even if he divorced her in a manner that permitted her to marry only one other man, the divorce takes effect. Therefore, Rava refutes Rabbi Akiva’s latter objection by claiming that the prohibition against marrying into the priesthood is different from other prohibitions and cannot be compared to them.


###### Gittin 83b:6
[Gittin 83b:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83b:6)

אָמַר לָהֶן רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: אֵין מְשִׁיבִין אֶת הָאֲרִי לְאַחַר מִיתָה. לְמֵימְרָא דְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ כְּווֹתֵיהּ סְבִירָא לֵיהּ?! וְהָא אִיהוּ נָמֵי מִיפְרָךְ קָפָרֵיךְ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
It is stated in the *baraita* that **Rabbi Yehoshua said to them: One does not refute** the opinion of **a lion after** his **death.** The Gemara asks: **Is this to say that Rabbi Yehoshua holds in accordance with** the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer? **But doesn’t he also raise a refutation** against Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion?


###### Gittin 83b:7
[Gittin 83b:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83b:7)

הָכִי קָאָמַר לְהוּ: לְדִידִי נָמֵי אִית לִי פִּירְכָא; מִיהוּ בֵּין לְדִידִי, בֵּין לְדִידְכוּ – אֵין מְשִׁיבִין אֶת הָאֲרִי לְאַחַר מִיתָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers that **this is what he was saying to them: I also have a refutation** against Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion, **but both my** objection **and yours** should not be raised, as **one does not refute** the opinion of **a lion after** his **death.**


###### Gittin 83b:8
[Gittin 83b:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83b:8)

וּמַאי פִּירְכָא דְּרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ? דְּתַנְיָא, אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: מַקִּישׁ קוֹדְמֵי הֲוָיָה שְׁנִיָּה, לְקוֹדְמֵי הֲוָיָה רִאשׁוֹנָה; מָה קוֹדְמֵי הֲוָיָה רִאשׁוֹנָה – דְּלָא אֲגִידָא בְּאִינִישׁ אַחֲרִינָא; אַף קוֹדְמֵי הֲוָיָה שְׁנִיָּה – דְּלָא אֲגִידָא בְּאִינִישׁ אַחֲרִינָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And what is Rabbi Yehoshua’s refutation?** It is **as it is taught** in a *baraita*: **Rabbi Yehoshua said** that the passage: “When a man takes a wife, and marries her, and it comes to pass, if she finds no favor in his eyes, because he has found some unseemly matter in her, and he writes her a scroll of severance, and gives it in her hand, and sends her out of his house; and she departs out of his house, and goes and becomes another man’s wife” (Deuteronomy 24:1–2), **juxtaposes** the woman’s status **before the second marriage to** her status **before the first marriage.** It should be derived from here that **just as before the first marriage she is not bound to another man, so too, before the second marriage she is not bound to another man.** Therefore, a woman cannot remarry if she is still bound to her ex-husband due to a qualification that prohibits her from marrying a certain man.


###### Gittin 83b:9
[Gittin 83b:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83b:9)

גּוּפָא – מוֹדֶה רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בִּמְגָרֵשׁ אִשְׁתּוֹ וְאָמַר לָהּ: ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מוּתֶּרֶת לְכׇל אָדָם חוּץ מִפְּלוֹנִי״, וְהָלְכָה וְנִישֵּׂאת לְאֶחָד מִן הַשּׁוּק, וְנִתְאַרְמְלָה אוֹ נִתְגָּרְשָׁה, שֶׁמּוּתֶּרֶת לָזֶה שֶׁנֶּאֶסְרָה עָלָיו.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The Gemara discusses **the** matter **itself** that was mentioned above in passing: **With regard to** a case where a man **divorces his wife and said to her: You are hereby permitted to** marry **any man except for so-and-so, and she went and married someone from the** general **public and was** subsequently **widowed or divorced** from him, **Rabbi Eliezer concedes that she is** now **permitted to** marry the man **whom she was** initially **prohibited** from marrying.


###### Gittin 83b:10
[Gittin 83b:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83b:10)

הֵשִׁיב רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בַּר אֶלְעָזָר תְּשׁוּבָה לְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: הֵיכָן מָצִינוּ שֶׁזֶּה אוֹסֵר וְזֶה מַתִּיר?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The *baraita* continues: **Rabbi Shimon bar Elazar raised a refutation to Rabbi Eliezer’s statement: Where do we find** a situation **where this** person **prohibits** something **and that** other person **permits** it? How can the first husband render the woman prohibited from marrying a certain man and her second husband render her permitted to do so after his death or their divorce?


###### Gittin 83b:11
[Gittin 83b:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83b:11)

וְלָא?! וַהֲרֵי יְבָמָה – דְּבַעַל אוֹסֵר, וְיָבָם מַתִּיר!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara questions this refutation: Is there **not** such a situation? **But isn’t** there the case of **a *yevama*,** a woman **whose husband** dies childless, and he **deems** her **forbidden** to other men while she waits for his brother, her *yavam*, to perform levirate marriage with her, **and** the ***yavam*,** after performing levirate marriage with her, **deems** her **permitted** in the event of divorce or his death?


###### Gittin 83b:12
[Gittin 83b:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83b:12)

הָתָם, יָבָם הוּא קָא אָסַר לַהּ, דְּאִי מִבַּעַל – הָא שַׁרְיָא וְקָיְימָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers: **There, it is the *yavam* who renders her forbidden, since if** not for the *yavam*, i.e., if her deceased husband did not have any brothers, **she would have already been released from** her bond to her **husband** and permitted to marry any man. It is only the existence of the *yavam* that prevents her from marrying other men. Therefore, it is he who renders her permitted.


###### Gittin 83b:13
[Gittin 83b:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83b:13)

הֲרֵי נְדָרִים, דְּנוֹדֵר אוֹסֵר וְחָכָם מַתִּיר! הָא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: אֵין חָכָם מַתִּיר כְּלוּם אֶלָּא בַּחֲרָטָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **Isn’t** there the matter of **vows, where** the **one who takes the vow prohibits** something **and a halakhic authority renders** it **permitted** by dissolving the vow? The Gemara answers: **Rabbi Yoḥanan says** that **a halakhic authority dissolves** a vow **only through regret** of the person who took the vow. Since it is necessary for this person to express regret for taking the vow, it is not actually the halakhic authority who causes the dissolution of the vow.


###### Gittin 83b:14
[Gittin 83b:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83b:14)

הֲרֵי הֲפָרַת הַבַּעַל, דְּאִשָּׁה נוֹדֶרֶת וּבַעַל מֵיפֵר! הָתָם כִּדְרַב פִּנְחָס מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא – דְּאָמַר רַב פִּנְחָס מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא: כׇּל הַנּוֹדֶרֶת – עַל דַּעַת בַּעְלָהּ הִיא נוֹדֶרֶת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **Isn’t** there **the nullification of** a wife’s vows by **the husband, where** the **wife vows,** creating a prohibition, **and** her **husband nullifies** the vow? The Gemara answers: **There** it can be explained **in accordance with** that which **Rav Pineḥas** reasoned **in the name of Rava, as Rav Pineḥas says in the name of Rava** that with regard to **any woman who takes a vow,** it is from the outset contingent **on her husband’s consent** that **she takes the vow.** Therefore, the husband can nullify it.


###### Gittin 83b:15
[Gittin 83b:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83b:15)

נַעֲנָה רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה וְאָמַר: ״כְּרִיתוּת״ – דָּבָר הַכּוֹרֵת בֵּינוֹ לְבֵינָהּ; הָא לָמַדְתָּ, שֶׁאֵין זֶה כְּרִיתוּת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The Gemara resumes discussion of the previous *baraita*. **Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya responded, saying:** What is the meaning of the expression: “Scroll of **severance [*keritut*],”** that is used in the Torah for a bill of divorce? It means **something that severs** the bond **between him and her** entirely. **You have therefore derived that this** divorce, after which the wife is still bound to her husband due to his qualification, **is not** an act of **severance.**


###### Gittin 83b:16
[Gittin 83b:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83b:16)

וְרַבָּנַן, הַאי ״כְּרִיתוּת״ מַאי עָבְדִי לֵיהּ? מִיבְּעֵי לְהוּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא: ״הֲרֵי זֶה גִּיטִּיךְ עַל מְנָת שֶׁלֹּא תִּשְׁתִּי יַיִן; עַל מְנָת שֶׁלֹּא תֵּלְכִי לְבֵית אָבִיךְ״; ״לְעוֹלָם״ – אֵין זֶה כְּרִיתוּת. ״שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם״ – הֲרֵי זֶה כְּרִיתוּת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And what do the** other **Rabbis,** who did not refute Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion in this manner, **do with this** term **“severance”?** How do they interpret it? The Gemara answers: **They need it for that which is taught** in a *baraita*: If a man says to his wife: **This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will not** ever **drink wine,** or: **On the condition that you will never go to your father’s house, that is not** an act of **severance,** as she remains restricted by him indefinitely. If he stipulates that she may not do so for **thirty days, that is** an act of **severance.** The Rabbis derive from the term severance that any indefinite condition prevents the divorce from taking effect.


###### Gittin 83b:17
[Gittin 83b:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83b:17)

וְאִידָּךְ – מִ״כָּרֵת–כְּרִיתוּת״ נָפְקָא. וְאִידַּךְ – ״כָּרֵת–כְּרִיתוּת״ לָא דָּרְשִׁי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **And** from where does **the other** Sage, Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, derive this principle? The Gemara answers: **It is derived from** the fact that the verse does not utilize the basic form of the word severance, i.e., ***karet*,** but rather its conjugate, ***keritut*.** This indicates an additional principle that is derived from the term. The Gemara asks: **And** what do **the other** Sages derive from the seemingly superfluous use of this word? The Gemara answers: **They do not interpret** the distinction between ***karet*** and ***keritut*.**


###### Gittin 83b:18
[Gittin 83b:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83b:18)

אָמַר רָבָא: ״הֲרֵי זֶה גִּיטִּיךְ, עַל מְנָת שֶׁלֹּא תִּשְׁתִּי יַיִן״; ״כׇּל יְמֵי חַיַּי״ – אֵין זֶה כְּרִיתוּת. ״כׇּל יְמֵי חַיֵּי פְּלוֹנִי״ – הֲרֵי זֶה כְּרִיתוּת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **Rava says** that if a man says to his wife: **This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will not drink wine** for **all the days of my life, that is not** an act of **severance,** as she remains bound to his condition for the rest of his life. If he stipulates that she may not drink wine for **all the days of the life of so-and-so, that is** an act of **severance.**


###### Gittin 83b:19
[Gittin 83b:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83b:19)

מַאי שְׁנָא חַיֵּי פְלוֹנִי – דְּדִלְמָא מָאֵית וּמְקַיְּימָא לֵיהּ לִתְנָאֵיהּ; חַיֵּי דִידֵיהּ נָמֵי – דִּלְמָא מָאֵית, וּמְקַיְּימָא לֵיהּ לִתְנָאֵיהּ!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **What is different** about the case where he mentioned **the life of so-and-so?** Is it **because perhaps** that person **will die and she will** thereby **fulfill the condition,** allowing her to remarry? With regard to **his own life** it is **also** true that **perhaps he will die and she will** thereby **fulfill the condition.** Why is the divorce invalid in that case?


###### Gittin 83b:20
[Gittin 83b:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83b:20)

אֶלָּא אֵימָא: ״כׇּל יְמֵי חַיֵּיכִי״ – אֵין זֶה כְּרִיתוּת, ״כׇּל יְמֵי חַיַּי״ אוֹ ״חַיֵּי פְלוֹנִי״ – הֲרֵי זֶה כְּרִיתוּת.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, say** that if the husband tells her: This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you will not drink wine for **all the days of your life, that is not** an act of **severance,** as the wife will never be released from this restriction. If he says: For **all the days of my life, or:** For all the days of **so-and-so’s life, that is** an act of **severance,** as the condition can potentially be fulfilled during her lifetime.


###### Gittin 83b:21
[Gittin 83b:21](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83b:21)

בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רָבָא מֵרַב נַחְמָן: ״הַיּוֹם אִי אַתְּ אִשְׁתִּי, וּלְמָחָר אַתְּ אִשְׁתִּי״, מַהוּ? תִּיבְּעֵי לְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר, תִּיבְּעֵי לְרַבָּנַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman:** If a man hands his wife a bill of divorce and says to her: **Today you are not my wife, and tomorrow you are my wife, what is** the *halakha*? The Gemara elaborates: **Let the dilemma be raised according to** the opinion of **Rabbi Eliezer** and **let the dilemma be raised according to** the opinion of **the Rabbis.**


###### Gittin 83b:22
[Gittin 83b:22](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83b:22)

תִּיבְּעֵי לְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר – עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר הָתָם, אֶלָּא דִּלְמַאן דְּקָא שָׁרֵי – קָא שָׁרֵי לְעוֹלָם; אֲבָל הָכָא – לָא. אוֹ דִלְמָא לָא שְׁנָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Let the dilemma be raised according to Rabbi Eliezer: Is Rabbi Eliezer saying** that **only there,** in the case of the mishna, the divorce is valid **because concerning the one whom** the husband **permits** the wife to marry, **he permits** her **to marry him forever, but here,** the divorce is **not** valid as it is limited in time? **Or perhaps it is no different** from the case in the mishna, and in both cases Rabbi Eliezer holds that the divorce takes effect?


###### Gittin 83b:23
[Gittin 83b:23](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83b:23)

תִּיבְּעֵי לְרַבָּנַן – עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמְרִי רַבָּנַן הָתָם, אֶלָּא דְּלָא פַּסְקַהּ מִינֵּיהּ לִגְמָרֵי; אֲבָל הָכָא, כֵּיוָן דְּפַסְקַהּ – פַּסְקַהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Let the dilemma be raised according to the Rabbis:** Perhaps **the Rabbis are saying only there** that the divorce is invalid **because** the husband **did not separate her from himself entirely,** as she is prohibited from marrying a certain man due to his qualification. **But here,** the divorce takes effect, as **once he separates her,** even for a limited period of time, **he has** consequently **separated her** entirely.


###### Gittin 83b:24
[Gittin 83b:24](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/83b:24)

בָּתַר דְּבַעְיָא, הֲדַר פַּשְׁטַהּ:

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**After** Rava **raised the dilemma he then resolved it** on his own: