## Gittin Daf 84a

###### Gittin 84a:1
[Gittin 84a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/84a:1)

מִסְתַּבְּרָא, בֵּין לְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֵּין לְרַבָּנַן, כֵּיוָן דְּפַסְקַהּ – פַּסְקַהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**It stands to reason, both according to Rabbi Eliezer and according to the Rabbis,** that **once he separates her, he has separated her** entirely. By rendering her entirely permitted for one day he dissolves the bond between them and the divorce takes effect.


###### Gittin 84a:2
[Gittin 84a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/84a:2)

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״הֲרֵי זֶה גִּיטִּיךְ עַל מְנָת שֶׁתִּנָּשְׂאִי לִפְלוֹנִי״ – הֲרֵי זוֹ לֹא תִּנָּשֵׂא, וְאִם נִשֵּׂאת – לֹא תֵּצֵא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **The Sages taught** (*Tosefta* 6:7) that if a man says to his wife: **This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you marry so-and-so, she may not marry** that man, **but if she marries** him the marriage is valid and **she** need **not leave** her husband.


###### Gittin 84a:3
[Gittin 84a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/84a:3)

מַאי קָאָמַר? אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן, הָכִי קָאָמַר: הֲרֵי זוֹ לֹא תִּנָּשֵׂא לוֹ, שֶׁמָּא יֹאמְרוּ נְשֵׁיהֶן נוֹתְנִין בְּמַתָּנָה. וְאִם נִשֵּׂאת לְאַחֵר – לֹא תֵּצֵא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **What is** the *baraita* **saying?** She is forbidden from marrying whom? **Rav Naḥman said** that **this is what** the *baraita* **is saying: She may not marry him,** i.e., she may not marry the man mentioned by her husband in the condition, **lest** people **say** that these people **are giving their wives** to each other **as a gift. But if she marries another** man **she** need **not leave** him.


###### Gittin 84a:4
[Gittin 84a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/84a:4)

וּמִשּׁוּם גְּזֵרָה – לָא מַפְּקִינַן מִינֵּיהּ, וְשָׁרֵינַן אֵשֶׁת אִישׁ לְעָלְמָא?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **Do we not remove her from him,** thereby **allowing a married woman to** marry **anyone, due to** a rabbinic **decree,** lest people say that the husband is giving her as a gift? As long as the condition that she would marry a specific man is not fulfilled, she is a married woman by Torah law.


###### Gittin 84a:5
[Gittin 84a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/84a:5)

אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן, הָכִי קָאָמַר: הֲרֵי זוֹ לֹא תִּנָּשֵׂא לוֹ, שֶׁמָּא יֹאמְרוּ נְשֵׁיהֶם נוֹתְנִין בְּמַתָּנָה. וְאִם נִשֵּׂאת לוֹ – לֹא תֵּצֵא, דְּמִשּׁוּם גְּזֵרָה לָא מַפְּקִינַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, Rav Naḥman said** that **this is what** the *baraita* **is saying: She may not marry him,** i.e., the man who was specified in the condition, **lest** people **say** that **they are giving their wives** to each other **as a gift. But if she marries him she** need **not leave** him, **as we do not remove** a woman from her husband **due to a decree.**


###### Gittin 84a:6
[Gittin 84a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/84a:6)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא: לוֹ – הוּא דְּלֹא תִּנָּשֵׂא, הָא לְאַחֵר – תִּנָּשֵׂא?! וְהָא בָּעֲיָא קַיּוֹמֵיהּ לִתְנָאָה!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rava said to** Rav Naḥman: It may be inferred from your statement that **it is** specifically **to him that she may not get married, but she may marry another** man *ab initio*. **But isn’t** she **required** to **fulfill the condition** by marrying the specified man before marrying someone else?


###### Gittin 84a:7
[Gittin 84a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/84a:7)

וְכִי תֵּימָא: אֶפְשָׁר דְּמִינַּסְבָא הַיּוֹם וּמִיגָּרְשָׁה לִמְחַר – וּמְקַיְּימָא לִתְנָאָה; וּלְהָךְ דִּפְלִיגַתְּ עֲלֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוּדָה קָמְדַמֵּית לֵיהּ – דְּאִתְּמַר: ״קֻוֽנָּם עֵינַי בְּשֵׁינָה הַיּוֹם, אִם אִישַׁן לְמָחָר״, אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: אַל יִישַׁן הַיּוֹם, שֶׁמָּא יִישַׁן לְמָחָר;

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if you would say** that **it is possible for her to get married today** to someone else **and get divorced** from him **tomorrow and** then **fulfill** her **condition** by marrying the specified man, **and you** can **compare it to that** *halakha* **over which you disagree with Rav Yehuda. As it was stated** with regard to one who says: **Sleeping is** forbidden to me **as if** it were **an offering [*konam*] for my eyes today if I will sleep tomorrow, Rav Yehuda says** that **he may not sleep today lest he sleep tomorrow,** causing the vow to have been violated today, retroactively.


###### Gittin 84a:8
[Gittin 84a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/84a:8)

וְרַב נַחְמָן אָמַר: יִישַׁן הַיּוֹם, וְאֵין חוֹשְׁשִׁין שֶׁמָּא יִישַׁן לְמָחָר;

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And Rav Naḥman says: He may sleep today,** as there is currently no prohibition, **and we are not concerned that perhaps he will sleep tomorrow,** as he will be careful not to sleep. This dispute pertains to the general issue of a prohibition that will take effect retroactively if a condition is not fulfilled. Rav Yehuda holds that the prohibition must be observed until the condition is fulfilled, whereas Rav Naḥman maintains that it is not necessary to observe the prohibition, as he assumes that the condition will be fulfilled. Here too, perhaps Rav Naḥman allows the woman to marry another man because she can fulfill the condition after she is divorced from him.


###### Gittin 84a:9
[Gittin 84a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/84a:9)

הָכִי הַשְׁתָּא?! הָתָם בְּדִידֵיהּ קָיְימָא, דְּאִי בָּעֵי – מְבָרֵיז נַפְשֵׁיהּ בְּסִילְוָאתָא, וְלָא נָאֵים; הָכָא – בְּדִידַהּ קָיְימָא לְאִיגָּרוֹשֵׁי?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**How can** these cases **be compared? There,** in the case of the vow, the fulfillment of the condition **is in his** capability, **as, if he wants** to prevent himself from falling asleep **he can prick himself with thorns [*silevata*] and he will not fall asleep. Here, is it in** the woman’s power **to get divorced?** Perhaps her husband will not agree to divorce her and the condition will not be fulfilled.


###### Gittin 84a:10
[Gittin 84a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/84a:10)

אֶלָּא אָמַר רָבָא: הֲרֵי זוֹ לֹא תִּנָּשֵׂא לֹא לוֹ, וְלֹא לְאַחֵר. לוֹ לֹא תִּנָּשֵׂא – שֶׁמָּא יֹאמְרוּ: נְשׁוֹתֵיהֶם נוֹתְנִין בְּמַתָּנָה; לְאַחֵר לֹא תִּנָּשֵׂא – דְּבָעֲיָא קַיּוֹמֵיהּ לִתְנָאָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather, Rava said** that the *baraita* should be interpreted in the following manner: **This** woman **may marry neither** the man who was specified in the condition **nor another** man. **She may not marry him lest** people **say** that these men **are giving their wives** to each other **as a gift,** and **she may not marry another** man **because she is required to fulfill** the **condition.**


###### Gittin 84a:11
[Gittin 84a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/84a:11)

וְאִם נִשֵּׂאת לוֹ לֹא תֵּצֵא – דְּמִשּׁוּם גְּזֵרָה לָא מַפְּקִינַן; לְאַחֵר תֵּצֵא – דְּבָעֲיָא לְקַיּוֹמֵיהּ לִתְנָאָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if she marries** the specified man **she** need **not leave** him, **as we do not remove** a woman from her husband **due to a decree.** But if she gets married **to another** man **she must leave** him, **as she is required to fulfill** the **condition** before marrying another man.


###### Gittin 84a:12
[Gittin 84a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/84a:12)

תַּנְיָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרָבָא: הֲרֵי זוֹ לֹא תִּנָּשֵׂא לֹא לוֹ וְלֹא לְאַחֵר, וְאִם נִשֵּׂאת לוֹ – לֹא תֵּצֵא, לְאַחֵר – תֵּצֵא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**It is taught** in a *baraita* **in accordance with** the opinion of **Rava: This** woman **may marry neither him nor another** man, **but if she marries him she** need **not leave** him. But if she gets married **to another** man **she must leave** him.


###### Gittin 84a:13
[Gittin 84a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/84a:13)

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״הֲרֵי זֶה גִּיטִּךְ עַל מְנָת שֶׁתַּעֲלִי לָרָקִיעַ״; ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁתֵּרְדִי לַתְּהוֹם״; ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁתִּבְלְעִי קָנֶה שֶׁל אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת״; ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁתָּבִיאִי לִי קָנֶה בֶּן מֵאָה אַמָּה״; ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁתַּעַבְרִי אֶת הַיָּם הַגָּדוֹל בְּרַגְלַיִךְ״ – אֵינוֹ גֵּט.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **The Sages taught** (*Tosefta* 7:8) that if a man says to his wife: **This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you ascend to the sky,** or **on the condition that you descend to the depths** of the sea, or **on the condition that you swallow a four-cubit reed,** or **on the condition that you bring me a hundred-cubit reed,** or **on the condition that you cross the Great Sea,** i.e., the Mediterranean Sea, **by foot,** or on any other condition that it is impossible to fulfill, **it is not a** valid **bill of divorce.**


###### Gittin 84a:14
[Gittin 84a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/84a:14)

רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן תֵּימָא אוֹמֵר: כָּזֶה – גֵּט. כְּלָל אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן תֵּימָא: כׇּל תְּנַאי שֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר לוֹ לְקַיְּימוֹ בְּסוֹפוֹ, וְהִתְנָה עָלָיו מִתְּחִילָּתוֹ – אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא כְּמַפְלִיגָהּ בִּדְבָרִים, וְכָשֵׁר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima says:** A bill of divorce **like this** is a valid **bill of divorce,** as the condition is void. **Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima said** the following **principle:** With regard to **any condition that cannot be fulfilled in the end, yet** even so the husband **stipulated it initially, he is only hyperbolizing.** It is assumed that he did not really intend to attach a condition to the divorce, but rather, to cause her distress, **and** therefore the divorce **is valid** without her fulfilling the condition.


###### Gittin 84a:15
[Gittin 84a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/84a:15)

אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַב: הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן תֵּימָא. אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: מַתְנִיתִין נָמֵי דַּיְקָא, דְּקָתָנֵי: כׇּל שֶׁאֶפְשָׁר לוֹ לְקַיְּימוֹ בְּסוֹפוֹ, וְהִתְנָה עָלָיו בִּתְחִילָּתוֹ – תְּנָאוֹ קַיָּים; הָא אִי אֶפְשָׁר – תְּנָאוֹ בָּטֵל; שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Naḥman says** that **Rav says: The *halakha* is in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says:** The language of **the mishna is also precisely** formulated in support of this opinion, **as it teaches:** With regard to **any** condition **that can be fulfilled in the end and** the husband **stipulated** it **initially, his condition stands** (*Bava Metzia* 94a). **Consequently,** if **his condition cannot** be fulfilled **it is void.** The Gemara concludes: **Learn from it** that the *halakha* is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima.


###### Gittin 84a:16
[Gittin 84a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/84a:16)

אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: ״הֲרֵי זֶה גִּיטִּיךְ עַל מְנָת שֶׁתֹּאכְלִי בְּשַׂר חֲזִיר״, מַהוּ? אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: הִיא הִיא. רָבָא אָמַר: אֶפְשָׁר דְּאָכְלָה וְלָקְיָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**A dilemma was raised before** the Sages: If a husband said to his wife: **This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you eat pig meat, what is** the *halakha*? **Abaye said: It is the same.** This is also a condition that cannot be fulfilled, as it is forbidden by Torah law. Therefore, the condition is void. **Rava said: It is possible for her to eat** it **and be flogged** for it. Consequently, the condition can be fulfilled, although it is forbidden for her to do so.


###### Gittin 84a:17
[Gittin 84a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/84a:17)

לְאַבָּיֵי, ״כְּלָל״ – לְאֵתוֹיֵי בְּשַׂר חֲזִיר. לְרָבָא, ״כָּזֶה״ – לְמַעוֹטֵי בְּשַׂר חֲזִיר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara elaborates: **According to Abaye,** the **principle** stated by Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima serves **to include** a condition to eat **pig meat.** When a *tanna* states a general principle, it expands the *halakha* beyond the specific case mentioned previously. In this case, the stating of the principle serves to apply the *halakha* to a condition subject to a Torah prohibition, in addition to a physical impossibility. **According to Rava,** when Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima stated: A bill of divorce **like this** is a valid bill of divorce, the limiting term of: Like this, serves to emphasize that only when there is a condition that cannot be physically fulfilled is the bill of divorce valid, and serves **to exclude** a condition to eat **pig meat,** which cannot be fulfilled due to a Torah prohibition. Therefore, if she does not fulfill this condition the divorce is invalid.


###### Gittin 84a:18
[Gittin 84a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/84a:18)

מֵיתִיבִי: ״הֲרֵי זֶה גִּיטִּךְ עַל מְנָת שֶׁתִּבָּעֲלִי לִפְלוֹנִי״, נִתְקַיֵּים הַתְּנַאי – הֲרֵי זֶה גֵּט, וְאִם לָאו – אֵינוֹ גֵּט. ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁלֹּא תִּבָּעֲלִי לְאַבָּא, וּלְאָבִיךְ״ – אֵין חוֹשְׁשִׁין שֶׁמָּא נִבְעֲלָה לָהֶן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara **raises an objection** to Rava’s opinion from a *baraita*: If a man says to his wife: **This is your bill of divorce on the condition that you engage in sexual intercourse with so-and-so,** and **the condition is fulfilled, this is** a valid **bill of divorce. And if** the condition is **not** fulfilled then **it is not** a valid **bill of divorce.** If he says to her: **On the condition that you do not engage in sexual intercourse with my father or your father,** she is permitted to remarry, as **we are not concerned that perhaps she engaged in sexual intercourse with them.**


###### Gittin 84a:19
[Gittin 84a:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/84a:19)

וְאִילּוּ ״עַל מְנָת שֶׁתִּבָּעֲלִי לְאַבָּא וּלְאָבִיךְ״ – לָא קָתָנֵי; לְאַבָּיֵי נִיחָא, לְרָבָא קַשְׁיָא!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**But** the *baraita* **does not teach** that the condition is binding when the husband says: **On the condition that you engage in sexual intercourse with my father or your father,** which is forbidden by Torah law. **According to Abaye** it **works out well,** as in his opinion a condition that violates Torah law is void. **According to Rava** it is **difficult.**


###### Gittin 84a:20
[Gittin 84a:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/84a:20)

אָמַר לָךְ רָבָא: בִּשְׁלָמָא בְּשַׂר חֲזִיר – אֶפְשָׁר דְּאָכְלָה וְלָקְיָא; פְּלוֹנִי נָמֵי – אֶפְשָׁר דִּמְשַׁחֲדָא לֵיהּ בְּמָמוֹנָא; אֶלָּא אַבָּא וְאָבִיךְ – בְּדִידַהּ קָיְימָא?! נְהִי דְּאִיהִי עָבְדָא אִיסּוּרָא, אַבָּא וְאָבִיךְ מִי עָבְדִי אִיסּוּרָא?!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara answers that **Rava** could have **said to you: Granted,** with regard to **pig meat it is possible for her to eat** it **and be flogged.** Similarly, if the condition is that she engage in sexual intercourse with **so-and-so, it is also possible for her to bribe him with money** to engage in sexual intercourse with her. **But** with regard to the case of my **father or your father, is it in her** power to engage in sexual intercourse with them? **Though she can** potentially **perform a forbidden act** in order to fulfill her desire to get married, **would** my **father or your father perform a forbidden act?** They certainly would not cooperate. Therefore, this is a condition that cannot be fulfilled, and it is considered hyperbole.


###### Gittin 84a:21
[Gittin 84a:21](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/84a:21)

לְרָבָא, ״כְּלָל״ – לְאֵתוֹיֵי אַבָּא וְאָבִיךְ; ״כָּזֶה״ – לְמַעוֹטֵי בְּשַׂר חֲזִיר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Based on this analysis, **according to Rava,** Rabbi Yehuda ben Teima stated his **principle** in order **to include** the condition of **my father and your father,** as this condition is also considered impossible to fulfill. And the expression: A bill of divorce **like this** is a valid bill of divorce, serves **to exclude** the condition of eating **pig meat,** in which case the divorce is not valid unless she fulfills the condition.