## Gittin Daf 85a

###### Gittin 85a:1
[Gittin 85a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/85a:1)

דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל כָּשֵׁר. וּמַתְנִיתִין, דְּקָתָנֵי ״כְּתָבוֹ״ וְאוֹקִימְנָא בְּ״חוּץ״; אֲבָל ״עַל מְנָת״ לָא פָּסֵיל – אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: לִפְנֵי הַתּוֹרֶף, וְרַבָּנַן; וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: לְאַחַר הַתּוֹרֶף, וְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**everyone agrees** that it **is valid. And the mishna, which teaches** that if **he wrote** his qualification in the bill of divorce it is invalid, **and we established** that it is referring only **to** a case of **an exception, but a condition does not render** the bill of divorce **invalid,** does not contradict this *baraita*. As **if you wish, say** that the mishna is referring to a case where the qualification is written **before the essential** part of the bill of divorce, **and** it is in accordance with the opinion of **the Rabbis. And if you wish, say** that it is referring to a case where the qualification is written **after the essential** part, **and everyone,** even Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, **agrees** with regard to its ruling.


###### Gittin 85a:2
[Gittin 85a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/85a:2)

וְרָבָא אָמַר: מַחְלוֹקֶת לְאַחַר הַתּוֹרֶף – דְּרַבִּי סָבַר: גָּזְרִינַן אַטּוּ לִפְנֵי הַתּוֹרֶף; וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: לָא גָּזְרִינַן אַטּוּ לִפְנֵי הַתּוֹרֶף. אֲבָל לִפְנֵי הַתּוֹרֶף – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל פָּסוּל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And Rava said:** The **dispute** between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis **is** with regard to a case where the condition is written **after the essential** part, **as Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi **holds** that **we issue a decree** rendering the bill of divorce invalid **due to** a case where the condition is written **before the essential** part, **and the Rabbis hold** that **we do not issue a decree due to** a case where it is written **before the essential** part. **But** if it is written **before the essential** part, **everyone agrees** that it **is invalid.**


###### Gittin 85a:3
[Gittin 85a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/85a:3)

וּמַתְנִיתִין, דְּקָתָנֵי ״כְּתָבוֹ״ וְאוֹקִימְנָא בְּ״חוּץ״; אֲבָל ״עַל מְנָת״ לָא פָּסֵיל – אַחַר הַתּוֹרֶף, וְרַבָּנַן הִיא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And** accordingly, **the mishna, which teaches** that if **he wrote** his qualification in the bill of divorce it is invalid, **and we established** that it is referring only **to** a case of **an exception, but a condition does not render** the bill of divorce **invalid,** does not contradict this *baraita*. It is referring to a case where he wrote the condition **after the essential** part, **and it is** in accordance with the opinion of **the Rabbis,** who hold that a condition written after the essential part does not render the bill of divorce invalid.


###### Gittin 85a:4
[Gittin 85a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/85a:4)

תָּנֵי אֲבוּהּ דְּרַבִּי אָבִין קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַבִּי זֵירָא: כָּתַב גֵּט עַל תְּנַאי – דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל פָּסוּל. דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל פָּסוּל?! וְהָא מִיפְלָג פְּלִיגִי!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**The father of Rabbi Avin taught** a *baraita* **before Rabbi Zeira:** If one **wrote a conditional bill of divorce, everyone agrees** that it **is invalid.** Rabbi Zeira asked him: **Everyone agrees** that it **is invalid? But don’t they disagree** about this?


###### Gittin 85a:5
[Gittin 85a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/85a:5)

אֶלָּא אֵימָא: לְדִבְרֵי הַכֹּל כָּשֵׁר, וְהֵיכִי דָּמֵי – לְאַחַר הַתּוֹרֶף.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rabbi Zeira therefore modified the *baraita* in accordance with his opinion: **Rather, say** that **everyone agrees** that it **is valid. And what are the circumstances** in which both sides agree that it is valid? It is referring to a case where the condition is written **after the essential** part of the bill of divorce.


###### Gittin 85a:6
[Gittin 85a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/85a:6)

וְלֵימָא: הֲרֵי זֶה פָּסוּל – וְרַבִּי! תַּנָּא ״דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל״ אַתְנְיֵיהּ; ״כָּשֵׁר״ בְּ״פָסוּל״ מִיחַלַּף לֵיהּ, ״הֲרֵי זֶה״ בְּ״דִבְרֵי הַכֹּל״ לָא מִיחַלַּף לֵיהּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara counters: **Let** Rabbi Zeira **say** an alternative modification of the *baraita*: **It is invalid,** omitting the words: Everyone agrees, **and** this *baraita* is in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi** Yehuda HaNasi. The Gemara answers: **The *tanna* taught him** that **everyone agrees,** which is a conspicuous statement. Although **he may** conceivably **confuse** the word **valid with invalid, he** certainly **does not confuse** the phrase: **It is, with** the phrase: **Everyone agrees.** Therefore, Rabbi Zeira modified the *baraita* the way he did.


###### Gittin 85a:7
[Gittin 85a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/85a:7)

**מַתְנִי׳** ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מוּתֶּרֶת לְכׇל אָדָם – אֶלָּא לְאַבָּא״; וּ״לְאָבִיךְ״; ״לְאָחִי״; וּ״לְאָחִיךְ״; לְעֶבֶד; וּלְנׇכְרִי; וּלְכׇל מִי שֶׁאֵין לָהּ עָלָיו קִדּוּשִׁין – כָּשֵׁר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**MISHNA:** If a man says to his wife while handing her a bill of divorce: **You are hereby permitted to** marry **any man, except to** marry **my father or to** marry **your father, to** marry **my brother or to** marry **your brother, to** marry **a slave or to** marry **a gentile, or to** marry **anyone** to whom **she cannot** legally become **betrothed,** the divorce **is valid.** Since these men cannot betroth her anyway, his qualification is meaningless.


###### Gittin 85a:8
[Gittin 85a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/85a:8)

״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מוּתֶּרֶת לְכׇל אָדָם״ – אֶלָּא אַלְמָנָה לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל; גְּרוּשָׁה וַחֲלוּצָה לְכֹהֵן הֶדְיוֹט; מַמְזֶרֶת וּנְתִינָה לְיִשְׂרָאֵל; בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל לְמַמְזֵר וּלְנָתִין; וְכׇל מִי שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהּ עָלָיו קִדּוּשִׁין, אֲפִילּוּ בַּעֲבֵירָה – פָּסוּל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
If he says to her: **You are hereby permitted to** marry **any man, except** for when doing so violates the following: The prohibition against **a widow** being married **to a High Priest;** the prohibition against **a divorcée or a *yevama* who performed *ḥalitza* [*ḥalutza*]** being married **to a common priest; a *mamzeret* or a Gibeonite woman** being married **to an Israelite** man; **an Israelite woman** being married **to a *mamzer* or to a Gibeonite** man; **or** marrying **anyone** to whom **she can** legally become **betrothed, even** if this betrothal would be **a transgression,** such as in the aforementioned cases; in all of these cases the divorce **is invalid.** His statement renders it a partial divorce, as the woman is still not permitted to marry any man who is eligible to betroth her.


###### Gittin 85a:9
[Gittin 85a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/85a:9)

**גְּמָ׳** כְּלָלָא דְּרֵישָׁא – לְאֵתוֹיֵי שְׁאָר חַיָּיבֵי כָרֵיתוֹת. כְּלָלָא דְּסֵיפָא – לְאֵתוֹיֵי שְׁאָר חַיָּיבֵי לָאוִין, כְּגוֹן עַמּוֹנִי וּמוֹאָבִי (נְתִינִי, מִצְרִי וַאֲדוֹמִי).

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**GEMARA:** The stating of **the generalization in the first clause** of the mishna: Anyone to whom she cannot legally become betrothed, serves **to include the rest of those liable** to receive ***karet*** for engaging in sexual intercourse with her, who are not listed explicitly in the mishna. The stating of **the generalization in the last clause** of the mishna: Anyone to whom she can legally become betrothed, serves **to include the rest of those liable by a prohibition** for engaging in sexual intercourse with her, **such as an Ammonite and a Moabite, a Gibeonite, an Egyptian, and an Edomite** (Deuteronomy 23:4, 8–9). Although they are all prohibited from engaging in sexual intercourse with her due to a prohibition or a positive mitzva, she can legally become betrothed to them.


###### Gittin 85a:10
[Gittin 85a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/85a:10)

בְּעָא מִינֵּיהּ רָבָא מֵרַב נַחְמָן: חוּץ מִקִּדּוּשֵׁי קָטָן, מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן הַשְׁתָּא מִיהָא לָאו בַּר הֲוָיָה הוּא, אוֹ דִלְמָא אָתֵי לִכְלַל הֲוָיָה?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman:** If the husband says that she is permitted to marry any man **except for a betrothal to** so-and-so, who is **a minor boy** at that time, **what is** the *halakha*? **Do we say** that **now,** since **he is in any event not eligible for betrothal,** as a minor boy cannot betroth a woman, the husband’s qualification does not prohibit his wife to anyone, and it is a complete act of severance? **Or perhaps,** since **he will reach** eligibility for **betrothal,** is the husband’s qualification considered as prohibiting her to someone to whom betrothal could apply?


###### Gittin 85a:11
[Gittin 85a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/85a:11)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ, תְּנֵיתוּהָ: קְטַנָּה מִתְגָּרֶשֶׁת בְּקִידּוּשֵׁי אָבִיהָ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rav Naḥman **said to him: You learned** the solution to this dilemma in a *baraita*: **A minor girl can get divorced** from her husband even if she was betrothed to him **through her father’s betrothal,** i.e., her father betrothed her to her husband (see Deuteronomy 22:16).


###### Gittin 85a:12
[Gittin 85a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/85a:12)

אַמַּאי? וְהָא בָּעֵינַן: ״וְיָצְאָה״–״וְהָיְתָה״? אֶלָּא אָתְיָא לִכְלַל הֲוָיָה; הָכָא נָמֵי – אָתְיָא לִכְלַל הֲוָיָה.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Why** can she? **But don’t we need** there to be a broad similarity between the *halakhot* of divorce and betrothal, as derived from the juxtaposition between the clause: **“And she departs,”** and the clause: **“And becomes”** (Deuteronomy 24:2), which serves as the basis for the comparison of the *halakhot* of divorce and betrothal? Accordingly, since she will not be eligible to receive her own betrothal until she reaches majority, she should not be able to receive her bill of divorce. **Rather,** evidently, since **she will** eventually **reach** the age of eligibility to receive her own **betrothal** she is considered essentially eligible for betrothal now as well. **Here also,** since the minor boy, whom the husband prohibited the wife from marrying, **will reach** the age of eligibility for **betrothal,** the divorce is invalid.


###### Gittin 85a:13
[Gittin 85a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/85a:13)

״חוּץ מִן הַנּוֹלָדִים״, מַהוּ? הַשְׁתָּא מִיהָא לָא אִיתְיְלִיד[וּ], אוֹ דִּלְמָא עֲתִידִי דְּמִתְיַילְדִי?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rava raised another dilemma: If the husband says that she is permitted to marry any man **except for those who will be born** in the future, **what is** the *halakha*? Should it be reasoned that **now,** since **in any event they are not yet born,** the qualification is void, as it pertains to people who do not exist? **Or perhaps** they are considered forbidden to her as **they will be born in the future.**


###### Gittin 85a:14
[Gittin 85a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/85a:14)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: תְּנֵיתוּהָ: ״לְעֶבֶד וּלְנׇכְרִי״, אִם אִיתָא – עֶבֶד וְנׇכְרִי נָמֵי עֲבִידִי דְּמִיגַּיְּירִי!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rav Naḥman **said to him: You learned** the solution to your dilemma in the mishna, which states that if the husband says that she is forbidden **to** marry **a slave or to** marry **a gentile** the divorce is valid; **if it is so** that future situations are taken into account, **a slave and a gentile are also likely to convert.** Therefore, the husband is prohibiting her from marrying a man whom she might be able to marry in the future, which should render the divorce invalid. Evidently, only the present situation is taken into consideration.


###### Gittin 85a:15
[Gittin 85a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/85a:15)

הָנָךְ – לָאו לְאִיגַּיּוֹרֵי קָיְימִי, הָנֵי – לְאִיתְיְלוֹדֵי קָיְימִי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects this solution: **Those** people **do not stand** before the court ready **to convert.** It is only a possibility that they will convert, as there is no reason to assume that they will do so. By contrast, **these** people who will be born **stand** ready **to be born.** Therefore, this solution cannot be inferred from the mishna.


###### Gittin 85a:16
[Gittin 85a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/85a:16)

חוּץ מִבַּעַל אֲחוֹתָהּ, מַהוּ? הַשְׁתָּא מִיהָא לָא חַזְיָא לֵיהּ, אוֹ דִלְמָא זִמְנִין דְּמֵתָה אֲחוֹתָהּ וְחַזְיָא לֵיהּ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rava raised another dilemma: If he permits her to marry any man **except for her sister’s husband, what is** the *halakha*? Should it be reasoned that **now,** since **in any event she is not yet fit for him,** as sexual intercourse between them is punishable by *karet*, the divorce is valid? **Or perhaps** should it be reasoned that **sometimes** a woman’s **sister dies and she is** thereby **fit to** marry her husband?


###### Gittin 85a:17
[Gittin 85a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/85a:17)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: תְּנֵיתוּהָ: ״לְעֶבֶד וּלְנׇכְרִי״, עֶבֶד וְנׇכְרִי נָמֵי עֲבִידִי דְּמִיגַּיְּירִי! גֵּירוּת לָא שְׁכִיחָא, מִיתָה שְׁכִיחָא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rav Naḥman **said to him: You learned** the solution to your dilemma in the mishna, which states that if the husband says that she is forbidden **to** marry **a slave or to** marry **a gentile** the divorce is valid. And **a slave and a gentile are also** potentially fit to marry her as they are **likely to convert.** Evidently, only the current situation is taken into account. The Gemara rejects this; whereas **conversion is uncommon, death is common.**


###### Gittin 85a:18
[Gittin 85a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/85a:18)

״חוּץ מִזְּנוּתִיךְ״, מַהוּ? בְּנִשּׂוּאִין – הָא לָא שַׁיַּיר, אוֹ דִלְמָא שַׁיַּיר – בְּבִיאָה?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rava raised another dilemma: If he says to her: You are hereby permitted to any man **except for your licentiousness,** meaning she may get married to any man but she may not engage in sexual intercourse outside of a second marriage, as she is still rendered a married woman in that regard, **what is** the *halakha* in this case? Is the divorce valid? Should it be reasoned that **with regard to marriage he did not leave** anything **out** of the divorce, as she is permitted to marry any man, **or perhaps he left out** part of the divorce **with regard to sexual intercourse?**


###### Gittin 85a:19
[Gittin 85a:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/85a:19)

אֲמַר לֵיהּ, תְּנֵיתוּהָ: ״לְאַבָּא וּלְאָבִיךָ״. וּבְמַאי? אִילֵימָא בְּנִשּׂוּאִין, אַבָּא וְאָבִיךְ בְּנֵי נִשּׂוּאִין נִינְהוּ?! אֶלָּא לָאו בִּזְנוּת – וּלְאַבָּא וּלְאָבִיךְ הוּא דְּלָא שַׁיַּיר, הָא לְאַחֵר – שַׁיַּיר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rav Naḥman **said to him: You learned** the solution in the mishna: If the husband says while handing her the bill of divorce: You are hereby forbidden **to my father or to your father,** the divorce is valid. **And with regard to what** action is this stated? **If we say** that it is **with regard to marriage, are my father and your father eligible for marriage?** Her betrothal to them would not take effect. **Rather, is it not with regard to** them engaging in **licentiousness** with her? **And** it may be inferred from the mishna that only if he renders her forbidden **to my father or to your father is it not** considered as if **he left out** part of the divorce, rendering the divorce valid; but if he renders her forbidden **to** engage in licentiousness with **another** man, it is considered as if **he left out** part of the divorce, and it will not take effect.


###### Gittin 85a:20
[Gittin 85a:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/85a:20)

דִּלְמָא בְּנִשּׂוּאִין, דַּעֲבַר וְאִינְּסִיב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara rejects this: **Perhaps** the mishna is referring **to marriage, where** the father **transgresses** the prohibition **and marries** her anyway. Therefore, the *halakha* with regard to licentiousness cannot be inferred from here.


###### Gittin 85a:21
[Gittin 85a:21](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/85a:21)

חוּץ מִשֶּׁלֹּא כְּדַרְכָּהּ, מַהוּ? בִּכְדַרְכָּהּ הָא לָא שַׁיַּיר, אוֹ דִלְמָא ״מִשְׁכְּבֵי אִשָּׁה״ כְּתִיב?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
Rava raised another dilemma: If he says to her that she is permitted to any man **except for** engaging in **intercourse in an atypical manner,** i.e., anal intercourse, **what is** the *halakha*? Should it be reasoned that **with regard to typical** sexual intercourse **he did not leave out** part of the divorce, rendering the divorce valid? **Or perhaps** from the fact that the expression: **“Cohabitations of a woman”** (Leviticus 20:13), **is written** in the plural, it is derived that typical and atypical sexual intercourse have the same status, and accordingly this is considered a partial divorce, and it will not take effect.


###### Gittin 85a:22
[Gittin 85a:22](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/85a:22)

״חוּץ מֵהֲפָרַת נְדָרַיִךְ״, מַהוּ? בְּנִשּׂוּאִין הָא לֹא שַׁיַּיר, אוֹ דִלְמָא ״אִישָׁהּ יְקִימֶנּוּ וְאִישָׁהּ יְפֵרֶנּוּ״ כְּתִיב?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara raises a similar dilemma: If he says to her that she is permitted to marry any man: **Except** for the *halakhot* of **the nullification of your vows,** i.e., no man who marries her can nullify her vows other than her ex-husband, who retains his power to do so, **what is** the *halakha*? Should it be reasoned that **with regard to** her ability to enter into **marriage, he did not leave out** anything from his act of severance? **Or perhaps** is it derived from that which **is written: “Her husband may sustain it, or her husband may nullify it”** (Numbers 30:14), that a husband’s power to nullify his wife’s vows is an intrinsic component of being married, and therefore this divorce is not a complete severance?


###### Gittin 85a:23
[Gittin 85a:23](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/85a:23)

״חוּץ מִתְּרוּמָתִיךְ״, מַהוּ? בְּנִשּׂוּאִין הָא לָא שַׁיַּיר, אוֹ דִלְמָא ״קִנְיַן כַּסְפּוֹ״ כְּתִיב?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara raises another dilemma: If he says to her: You are hereby permitted to marry any man **except for your** partaking of ***teruma*,** i.e., if she marries a priest she will not be able to partake of *teruma*, **what is** the *halakha*? Should it be reasoned that **with regard to** her ability to enter into **marriage, he did not leave out** anything from his act of severance? **Or perhaps** is it derived from that which **is written: “The purchase of his money,** he may eat of it” (Leviticus 22:11), indicating that a priest’s wife partakes of *teruma* because she is his acquisition, and that if she is prohibited from partaking of *teruma*, then his acquisition of her is not complete?


###### Gittin 85a:24
[Gittin 85a:24](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/85a:24)

״חוּץ מִיְּרוּשָּׁתִיךְ״, מַהוּ? בְּנִשּׂוּאִין הָא לָא שַׁיַּיר, אוֹ דִלְמָא ״לִשְׁאֵרוֹ״, ״וְיָרַשׁ אוֹתָהּ״, כְּתִיב?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara raises another dilemma: If he says to her: You are hereby permitted to marry any man **except for your inheritance,** i.e., her future husband will not be considered her husband with regard to the *halakhot* of inheritance, **what is** the *halakha*? Should it be reasoned that **with regard to** her ability to enter into **marriage, he did not leave out** anything from his act of severance? **Or perhaps** since it is derived that a husband inherits from his wife, who is considered his next of kin, from that which **is written: “To his kinsman** that is next to him of his family **and he shall possess it”** (Numbers 27:11), then if a husband does not become his wife’s beneficiary, is their marriage not complete?


###### Gittin 85a:25
[Gittin 85a:25](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/85a:25)

״חוּץ מִקִּידּוּשַׁיִךְ בִּשְׁטָר״, מַהוּ? מִי אָמְרִינַן: אֶפְשָׁר דִּמְקַדֵּשׁ לַהּ בְּכֶסֶף וּבְבִיאָה; אוֹ דִלְמָא ״וְיָצְאָה״–״וְהָיְתָה״, אִיתַּקּוּשׁ הֲווֹיוֹת לַהֲדָדֵי?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara raises another dilemma: If he says to her: You are hereby permitted to marry any man **except for your** ability to enter **betrothal by** receiving **a document,** i.e., if another man betroths her by giving her a document of betrothal, the betrothal will not take effect, **what is** the *halakha*? **Do we say** that since one **can** still **betroth her with money or with sexual intercourse,** the act of severance is complete? **Or perhaps** is it derived from the juxtaposition between the clause: **“And she departs”** and the clause: **“And becomes”** (Deuteronomy 24:2), that the different ways of **becoming** a wife **are compared to each other,** so that the inability to perform one of them renders the severance incomplete?


###### Gittin 85a:26
[Gittin 85a:26](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/85a:26)

תֵּיקוּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara comments: These dilemmas **shall** all **stand** unresolved.


###### Gittin 85a:27
[Gittin 85a:27](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Gittin/r/85a:27)

**מַתְנִי׳** גּוּפוֹ שֶׁל גֵּט: ״הֲרֵי אַתְּ מוּתֶּרֶת לְכׇל אָדָם״.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**MISHNA:** **The basic,** essential, element **of a bill of divorce is: You are hereby permitted to** marry **any man.**