## Horayot Daf 3a

###### Horayot 3a:1
[Horayot 3a:1](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/3a:1)

״זֹאת תּוֹרַת הָעוֹלָה הִיא״ – הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ שְׁלֹשָׁה מִיעוּטִין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**“This is the law of the burnt-offering, it is** that which goes up on its pyre on the altar” (Leviticus 6:2); **these are three exclusionary** terms: “This,” “the burnt-offering,” and “it is,” which serve to exclude three offerings concerning which the *halakha* is that even if they are placed on the altar they are subsequently removed: A burnt-offering slaughtered at night, a burnt-offering whose blood was spilled before it was sprinkled, and a burnt-offering whose blood was taken outside the courtyard. Apparently, it is Rabbi Yehuda who interprets multiple exclusionary terms.


###### Horayot 3a:2
[Horayot 3a:2](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/3a:2)

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: עֲדַיִין אֲנִי אוֹמֵר לָא מָצֵית מוֹקְמַתְּ לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, דְּקָתָנֵי: רוֹב קָהָל שֶׁחָטְאוּ – בֵּית דִּין מְבִיאִין עַל יְדֵיהֶן פַּר, וְאִי רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הָאָמַר: צִבּוּר הוּא דְּמַיְיתֵי, בֵּית דִּין – לָא. דִּתְנַן, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: שִׁבְעָה שְׁבָטִים שֶׁחָטְאוּ – מְבִיאִין שִׁבְעָה פָּרִים.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if you wish, say** that proof for the attribution of the *baraitot* may be cited from the second *baraita*, which begins with the phrase: **Still I say. You cannot interpret** that *baraita* **in accordance with** the opinion of **Rabbi Yehuda, as** the *baraita* **teaches:** One might have thought that each member of **a majority of the congregation that sinned** based on the ruling of a court is exempt from liability to bring an offering for his unwitting transgression, as the **court brings a bull** for an unwitting communal sin **on the basis of their** transgression. **And if** this *baraita* is in accordance with the opinion of **Rabbi Yehuda, didn’t he say: It is the congregation that brings** the bull as an offering, and **not the court? As we learned** in a mishna (5a) that **Rabbi Yehuda says: Seven tribes that sinned bring seven bulls.** The tribes bring the offerings, not the court.


###### Horayot 3a:3
[Horayot 3a:3](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/3a:3)

וְרַב נַחְמָן אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: זוֹ דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר, אֲבָל חֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: יָחִיד שֶׁעָשָׂה בְּהוֹרָאַת בֵּית דִּין – חַיָּיב. מַאי רַבִּי מֵאִיר וּמַאי רַבָּנַן? דְּתַנְיָא: הוֹרוּ וְעָשׂוּ – רַבִּי מֵאִיר פּוֹטֵר, וַחֲכָמִים מְחַיְּיבִין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ Up to this point, the Gemara explained the mishna in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda and contrary to the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with him. **And Rav Naḥman** says that **Shmuel says:** The mishna **is the statement of Rabbi Meir, but the Rabbis say: An individual who performed** a transgression **on** the basis of **the ruling of** the **court** is **liable.** The Gemara asks: **What** is the opinion of **Rabbi Meir and what** is the opinion of **the Rabbis** to which Shmuel referred? It is **as it is taught** in a *baraita*: If the court **issued a ruling and** the judges **performed** a transgression on the basis of that ruling, **Rabbi Meir deems** them **exempt and the Rabbis deem** them **liable.**


###### Horayot 3a:4
[Horayot 3a:4](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/3a:4)

מַאן עָשׂוּ? אִילֵּימָא בֵּית דִּין, מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבָּנַן דִּמְחַיְּיבִי? וְהָתַנְיָא: יָכוֹל הוֹרוּ בֵּית דִּין וְעָשׂוּ בֵּית דִּין, יָכוֹל יְהוּ חַיָּיבִין? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״הַקָּהָל וְעָשׂוּ״, מַעֲשֶׂה תָּלוּי בַּקָּהָל וְהוֹרָאָה תְּלוּיָה בְּבֵית דִּין!

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara asks: **Who performed** the transgression? **If we say** that it is the members of the **court** who performed the transgression, **what is the reasoning of the Rabbis, who deem** him **liable? But isn’t it taught** in a *baraita*: One **might** have thought that if the **court issued a ruling and** the members of the **court performed** the transgression, one **might** have thought **they** would **be liable** to bring a bull for an unwitting communal sin. **The verse states** with regard to that bull: “And the matter is hidden from the eyes of **the congregation and they performed”** (Leviticus 4:13), from which it is derived that the **action is dependent on the congregation and** the **ruling is dependent on** the **court.**


###### Horayot 3a:5
[Horayot 3a:5](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/3a:5)

אֶלָּא הוֹרוּ בֵּית דִּין וְעָשׂוּ רוֹב קָהָל. מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר דְּפוֹטֵר? אֶלָּא לָאו: הוֹרוּ בֵּית דִּין וְעָשׂוּ מִיעוּט קָהָל, וּבְהָא קָמִיפַּלְגִי, מָר סָבַר: יָחִיד שֶׁעָשָׂה בְּהוֹרָאַת בֵּית דִּין – פָּטוּר, וּמַר סָבַר: יָחִיד שֶׁעָשָׂה בְּהוֹרָאַת בֵּית דִּין – חַיָּיב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rather,** the case in the *baraita* is where the **court issued a ruling and the majority of the congregation performed** a transgression on the basis of that ruling. If so, **what is the reasoning of Rabbi Meir, who deems** them **exempt? Rather, is it not** referring to a case where the **court issued a ruling and a minority of the congregation performed** a transgression on the basis of that ruling, **and** it is **with regard to this** matter that the *tanna’im* **disagree:** One **Sage,** Rabbi Meir, **holds: An individual who performed** a transgression **on** the basis of **the ruling of** the **court** is **exempt; and** one **Sage,** the Rabbis, **holds: An individual who performed** a transgression **on** the basis of **a ruling of** the **court** is **liable.** The mishna, which states that an individual who performs a transgression on the basis of a ruling of the court is exempt, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.


###### Horayot 3a:6
[Horayot 3a:6](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/3a:6)

אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא יָחִיד שֶׁעָשָׂה בְּהוֹרָאַת בֵּית דִּין – פָּטוּר, אֶלָּא בֵּית דִּין מַשְׁלִים לְרוֹב צִבּוּר קָמִיפַּלְגִי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**Rav Pappa said:** There is no proof that the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis relates to the mishna, as their dispute can be understood differently. Perhaps **everyone agrees** that **an individual who performed** a transgression **on** the basis of **the ruling of** the **court** is **exempt. Rather,** the *tanna’im* **disagree** with regard to whether the members of the **court** combine with the members of the congregation to **complete a majority of** the **congregation.** The members of the congregation who sinned constitute less than a majority. When the judges of the court who sinned are added to that minority, the total of people who sinned constitute a majority.


###### Horayot 3a:7
[Horayot 3a:7](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/3a:7)

מָר סָבַר: בֵּית דִּין מַשְׁלִים לְרוֹב צִבּוּר, וּמַר סָבַר: אֵין בֵּית דִּין מַשְׁלִים לְרוֹב צִבּוּר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
He explains: One **Sage,** the Rabbis, **holds:** The members of **the court** combine with the members of the congregation to **complete a majority of** the **congregation. And** one **Sage,** Rabbi Meir, **holds:** The members of the **court do not** combine with the members of the congregation to **complete a majority of** the **congregation;** therefore, those who sinned on the basis of the ruling of the court constitute less than a majority and the court is exempt from liability to bring an offering. The mishna is not only in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, as in the case of the mishna, but even the Rabbis agree.


###### Horayot 3a:8
[Horayot 3a:8](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/3a:8)

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: הוֹרוּ בֵּית דִּין וְעָשׂוּ רוּבּוֹ שֶׁל קָהָל, וּמַאן חֲכָמִים – רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא, דְּאָמַר: צִבּוּר מַיְיתֵי וּבֵית דִּין מַיְיתִי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if you wish, say** instead that the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis is in a case where the **court issued a ruling and a majority of the congregation performed** a transgression on the basis of that ruling, and everyone agrees that the court is liable to bring a bull as an offering for an unwitting communal sin. Rabbi Meir deems the members of the congregation exempt from bringing an offering. **And who are the Rabbis** who deem them liable to bring an offering? **It is Rabbi Shimon, who said:** The **congregation brings** an offering **and** the **court brings** an offering.


###### Horayot 3a:9
[Horayot 3a:9](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/3a:9)

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: שֵׁבֶט שֶׁעָשָׂה בְּהוֹרָאַת בֵּית דִּינוֹ, וּמַאן חֲכָמִים? רַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא, דְּתַנְיָא: שֵׁבֶט שֶׁעָשָׂה בְּהוֹרָאַת בֵּית דִּינוֹ, אוֹתוֹ הַשֵּׁבֶט חַיָּיב.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if you wish, say** instead that the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis is in the case of **a tribe that performed** a transgression **on** the basis of **the ruling of its** tribal **court.** Rabbi Meir holds that there is no liability to bring a bull as an offering for an unwitting communal sin for a ruling issued by a tribal court; therefore, he deems the court exempt from bringing an offering. **And who are the Rabbis** who deem the tribal court liable to bring an offering? **It is Rabbi Yehuda, as it is taught** in a *baraita*: In the case of **a tribe that performed** a transgression **on** the basis of **a ruling of its** tribal **court, that tribe** is **liable.**


###### Horayot 3a:10
[Horayot 3a:10](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/3a:10)

וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: כְּגוֹן שֶׁחָטְאוּ שִׁשָּׁה, וְהֵן רוּבּוֹ שֶׁל קָהָל, אוֹ שִׁבְעָה אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינָן רוּבּוֹ שֶׁל קָהָל, וּמַתְנִיתִין מַנִּי? רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר הִיא.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if you wish, say** instead that the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis is in a case **where six** of the twelve tribes **sinned and,** although they do not constitute a majority of the number of the tribes, in terms of population **they** constitute **a majority of** the **congregation. Or seven** tribes sinned, and **even though** in terms of population **they are not a majority of** the **congregation,** they constitute a majority of the tribes. **And whose** opinion is expressed in **the *baraita*** as the opinion of the Rabbis? **It is** the opinion of **Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.**


###### Horayot 3a:11
[Horayot 3a:11](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/3a:11)

דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן אֶלְעָזָר אוֹמֵר מִשְּׁמוֹ: חָטְאוּ שִׁשָּׁה וְהֵן רוּבּוֹ שֶׁל קָהָל, אוֹ שִׁבְעָה אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינָן רוּבּוֹ שֶׁל קָהָל – חַיָּיבִין.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
This is **as it is taught** in a *baraita*: **Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says in the name of** Rabbi Meir: If **six** tribes **sinned and** in terms of population **they are a majority of** the **congregation, or** if **seven** tribes sinned **even though** in terms of population **they are not a majority of** the **congregation, they are liable.** All these alternative understandings of the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis lead to the conclusion that there is no proof for the statement of Rav Naḥman in the name of Shmuel that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir.


###### Horayot 3a:12
[Horayot 3a:12](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/3a:12)

אָמַר רַב אַסִּי: וּבְהוֹרָאָה, הַלֵּךְ אַחַר רוֹב יוֹשְׁבֵי אֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וַיַּעַשׂ שְׁלֹמֹה בָעֵת הַהִיא אֶת הֶחָג וְכׇל יִשְׂרָאֵל עִמּוֹ קָהָל גָּדוֹל מִלְּבוֹא חֲמָת עַד נַחַל מִצְרַיִם לִפְנֵי ה׳ אֱלֹהֵינוּ שִׁבְעַת יָמִים וְשִׁבְעַת יָמִים אַרְבָּעָה עָשָׂר יוֹם״. מִכְּדֵי כְּתִיב: ״וְכׇל יִשְׂרָאֵל עִמּוֹ״, ״קָהָל גָּדוֹל מִלְּבוֹא חֲמָת עַד נַחַל מִצְרַיִם״ לְמָה לִי? שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: הָנֵי הוּא דְּאִיקְּרִי קָהָל, אֲבָל הָנָךְ לָא אִיקְּרִי קָהָל.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **Rav Asi says: And with regard to** the definition of the majority that establishes liability for performance of a transgression on the basis of the **ruling** of a court, **follow the majority of the residents of Eretz Yisrael, as it is stated: “And Solomon held the feast at that time, and all Israel with him, a great congregation, from the entrance of Hamath until the Brook of Egypt, before the Lord our God, seven days and seven days, fourteen days”** (I Kings 8:65). The Gemara clarifies the words of this verse: **Since it is written: “And all Israel with him,” why do I** need to add: **“A great congregation, from the entrance of Hamath until the Brook of Egypt”? Conclude from it:** It is **these** residents of Eretz Yisrael **who are characterized** as **a congregation; but those** who reside outside Eretz Yisrael **are not characterized** as **a congregation.**


###### Horayot 3a:13
[Horayot 3a:13](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/3a:13)

פְּשִׁיטָא: מְרוּבִּין וְנִתְמַעֲטוּ – הַיְינוּ פְּלוּגְתָּא דְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן וְרַבָּנַן.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ The Gemara continues defining the majority that establishes liability. It is **obvious** that the case of when those who performed a transgression on the basis of the ruling of the court were **numerous,** i.e., they constituted a majority, **and** their percentage **diminished,** e.g., if some sinners died and they now constitute a minority of the congregation; **that is the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis,** who disagree in a mishna (10b) with regard to an anointed High Priest or a king who performed an unwitting transgression before assuming his position. The Rabbis hold: Since they were laymen when they sinned, they are liable to bring the offering of a layman. Rabbi Shimon holds: If they became aware of their transgression while still laymen, they bring the offering of a layman. If they became aware of their transgression after they assumed their positions, they are exempt. Accordingly, in the case of a majority whose number diminished, the Rabbis hold that since it was a majority that sinned, they bring an offering. Rabbi Shimon holds that it depends on their status when they became aware they had unwittingly sinned.


###### Horayot 3a:14
[Horayot 3a:14](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/3a:14)

מוּעָטִין וְנִתְרַבּוּ, מַאי? מִי פְּלִיגִי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן וְרַבָּנַן? רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן דְּאָזֵיל בָּתַר יְדִיעָה מְחַיַּיב, וְרַבָּנַן דְּאָזְלִי בָּתַר חַטָּאת – פָּטְרִי [אוֹ לָא], מַאי?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
If those who performed a transgression on the basis of the ruling of the court were **few,** i.e., they constituted a minority, **and** their percentage **increased,** e.g., if some non-sinners died and the sinners now constitute a majority of the congregation, **what** is the *halakha*? **Do Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis disagree** with regard to this matter as well? That would mean that **Rabbi Shimon, who follows** the status at the time of **awareness, deems** the court **liable, and the Rabbis, who follow** the status at the time of the **transgression, deem** the court **exempt. Or** do they **not** disagree? **What** is the conclusion?


###### Horayot 3a:15
[Horayot 3a:15](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/3a:15)

וְתִיסְבְּרָא? אֵימוֹר דְּשָׁמְעַתְּ לֵיהּ לְרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן דְּאָזֵיל אַף בָּתַר יְדִיעָה [הֵיכִי דְּהָוֵי יְדִיעָה וַחֲטָאָה בְּחִיּוּב], יְדִיעָה דְּלָא חֲטָאָה מִי שָׁמְעַתְּ לֵיהּ?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And can you understand** that this case is contingent on the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis? **Say that you heard that Rabbi Shimon follows** the status at the time of **awareness as well,** i.e., in a case **where** both the **awareness and** the **transgression** were **in** a period of **liability,** either liability as a layman or liability as a king or as an anointed High Priest, the sinner is liable to bring an offering. But in a case where the **awareness** was during a period of liability, but the **transgression** was **not, did you hear** Rabbi Shimon say the court is liable?


###### Horayot 3a:16
[Horayot 3a:16](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/3a:16)

דְּאִם כֵּן, לַיְיתֵי כִּי הַשְׁתָּא! אֶלָּא, רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן חֲטָאָה וִידִיעָה בָּעֵי.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara clarifies: **As, if** it is **so** that Rabbi Shimon holds that the period of awareness is the sole determining factor, **let** the High Priest and the king **bring** an offering **according to** their **present** status. If they became aware of the transgression after assuming their positions, let them bring the offering appropriate for a High Priest or a king. Why, then, does Rabbi Shimon say that in that case they are exempt? **Rather,** apparently **Rabbi Shimon requires** that both the **transgression and** the **awareness** take place in a period of liability. There is no resolution for the dilemma that was raised.


###### Horayot 3a:17
[Horayot 3a:17](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/3a:17)

אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: הוֹרוּ בֵּית דִּין חֵלֶב מוּתָּר, וְעָשׂוּ מִיעוּט הַקָּהָל, וְחָזְרוּ בֵּית דִּין בָּהֶן, וְהוֹרוּ, וְעָשׂוּ מִיעוּט אַחֵר, מַהוּ? כֵּיוָן דִּשְׁתֵּי יְדִיעוֹת נִינְהוּ לָא מִצְטָרֵף, אוֹ דִּלְמָא: כֵּיוָן דְּאִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי חֵלֶב הוּא, מִצְטָרֵף?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **A dilemma was raised before** the Sages: If the **court issued a ruling** that forbidden **fat** is **permitted, and a minority of the congregation performed** the transgression of eating forbidden fat on the basis of that ruling, **and the court reversed their** decision and then reversed their decision again **and issued a ruling** that forbidden fat is permitted, **and a different minority** of the congregation **performed** the transgression, **what is** the *halakha*? The Gemara elaborates: Is it that **since there are two** disparate experiences of **awareness,** the first minority **does not combine** with the second minority, even though the two minorities together would constitute a majority? **Or perhaps, since** both **this** transgression **and that** transgression are the same, eating forbidden **fat,** the first minority **combines** with the second minority, and the two minorities together constitute a majority.


###### Horayot 3a:18
[Horayot 3a:18](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/3a:18)

וְאִם תִּמְצָא לוֹמַר: כֵּיוָן דְּאִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי חֵלֶב הוּא מִצְטָרֵף, מִיעוּט בְּחֵלֶב שֶׁעַל גַּבֵּי הַקֵּבָה, וּמִיעוּט בְּחֵלֶב שֶׁעַל גַּבֵּי דַּקִּין, מַהוּ? הָכָא וַדַּאי כֵּיוָן דְּבִתְרֵי קְרָאֵי קָאָתֵי – לָא מִצְטָרֵף, אוֹ דִּלְמָא כֵּיוָן דְּאִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי חֵלֶב הוּא – מִצְטָרֵף?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if you say** in that case: **Since** both **this** transgression **and that** transgression are the same, eating forbidden **fat,** the first minority **combines** with the second minority, then there is another dilemma: In a case where **a minority** performed a transgression on the basis of the first ruling of the court and ate forbidden **fat that is upon the maw, and a minority** performed a transgression on the basis of the second ruling of the court and ate forbidden **fat that is upon the small intestine, what is** the *halakha*? The Gemara elaborates: **Here, certainly, since** these transgressions **come from two** different **verses,** the first minority **does not combine** with the second minority; **or perhaps, since** both **this** transgression **and that** transgression are the same, eating forbidden **fat,** the first minority **combines** with the second minority, and the two minorities together constitute a majority.


###### Horayot 3a:19
[Horayot 3a:19](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/3a:19)

וְאִם תִּמְצֵי לוֹמַר: שֵׁם חֵלֶב הוּא וּמִצְטָרֵף, מִיעוּט בְּחֵלֶב וּמִיעוּט בְּדָם, מַהוּ? הָכָא וַדַּאי (כֵּיוָן) דִּתְרֵי אִיסּוּרֵי נִינְהוּ, [וְכֵיוָן דְּאֵין אִיסּוּרָן שָׁוֶה] – לָא מִצְטָרֵף, אוֹ דִלְמָא כֵּיוָן (דְּאִיסּוּרָן שָׁוֶה) – דְּקׇרְבָּנָן שָׁוֶה, מִצְטָרֵף?

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if you say** in that case: **It is the name of** forbidden **fat** that they both have in common, **and** the first minority **combines** with the second minority, then there is another dilemma: In a case where **a minority** performed a transgression on the basis of the first ruling of the court and ate forbidden **fat, and a minority** performed a transgression on the basis of the second ruling of the court and ate forbidden **blood, what is** the *halakha*? The Gemara elaborates: **Here, certainly, they are two** distinct **prohibitions, and since** the nature of **their prohibition is not identical,** the first minority **does not combine** with the second minority. **Or perhaps, since their offerings are identical,** as one is liable to bring a sin-offering for unwitting violation of either of these prohibitions, the first minority **combines** with the second minority.


###### Horayot 3a:20
[Horayot 3a:20](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/3a:20)

וְאִם תִּמְצֵי לוֹמַר: כֵּיוָן (דְּאִיסּוּרָן שָׁוֶה) דְּקׇרְבָּנָן שָׁוֶה מִצְטָרֵף, מִיעוּט בְּחֵלֶב וּמִיעוּט בַּעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, מַהוּ? הָכָא וַדַּאי אֵין אִיסּוּרָן שָׁוֶה וְאֵין קׇרְבָּנָן שָׁוֶה, אוֹ דִּלְמָא כֵּיוָן דְּאִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי כָּרֵת הוּא, מִצְטָרֵף? תֵּיקוּ.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
**And if you say** in that case: **Since their offerings are identical,** the first minority **combines** with the second minority, then there is another dilemma: In a case where **a minority** performed a transgression on the basis of the first ruling of the court and ate forbidden **fat, and a minority** performed a transgression on the basis of the second ruling of the court and engaged **in idol worship, what is** the *halakha*? **Here, certainly, neither are their prohibitions identical nor are their offerings identical,** because an individual who unwittingly engages in idol worship may bring only a female goat for atonement. Therefore, the first minority does not combine with the second minority. **Or perhaps, since** for both **this** transgression **and that** transgression one **is** liable to receive **excision from the World-to-Come [*karet*]** if he performs it intentionally, the first minority **combines** with the second minority. The Gemara concludes: The dilemma **shall stand** unresolved.


###### Horayot 3a:21
[Horayot 3a:21](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/3a:21)

אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: הוֹרוּ בֵּית דִּין שֶׁחֵלֶב מוּתָּר, וְעָשׂוּ מִיעוּט הַקָּהָל, וּמֵת אוֹתוֹ בֵּית דִּין וְעָמַד בֵּית דִּין אַחֵר, וְחָזְרוּ וְהוֹרוּ, וְעָשׂוּ מִיעוּט אַחֵר.

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
§ **A dilemma was raised before** the Sages: If the **court issued a ruling that** forbidden **fat** is **permitted, and a minority of the congregation performed** the transgression of eating forbidden fat on the basis of that ruling, **and** the members of **that court died and another court stood** in their place, **and again issued** the same **ruling** that forbidden fat is permitted, **and a different minority performed** the transgression of eating forbidden fat on the basis of that ruling, what is the *halakha*?


###### Horayot 3a:22
[Horayot 3a:22](https://torahapp.org/share/book/Horayot/r/3a:22)

אַלִּיבָּא דְּמַאן דְּאָמַר בֵּית דִּין מַיְיתֵי – לָא תִּיבְּעֵי לָךְ, דְּהָא לֵיתַנְהוּ, אֶלָּא כִּי תִּיבְּעֵי לָךְ – אַלִּיבָּא דְּמַאן דְּאָמַר צִבּוּר מַיְיתֵי, מַאי צִבּוּר? הָא קָאֵי,

**William Davidson Edition - English:**
The Gemara elaborates: **According to** the opinion **of the one who said** that only the **court brings** the offering, **do not raise the dilemma, as those** judges who issued the original ruling on the basis of which the minority performed a transgression **are no** longer alive. **Rather, when should you raise the dilemma?** Raise it **according to** the opinion **of the one who said** that the **congregation brings** the offering. **What** is the *halakha*? The Gemara elaborates: The **congregation exists,** as together the two minorities constitute a majority of the congregation who performed the transgression.